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ABSTRACT 
The re-acceptance of South Africa into the international community has cleared the path 
for the closer integration of South Africa with its neighbours in a broader southern 
African regional union. In particular, the countries of the Southern African Development 
Community {SADC}' which South Africa joined in August 1994, have committed 
themselves to the formation of a free trade area (FT A) over an eight-year period. 
The most likely impediment to this process is the perception of a highly unequal 
distribution of the economic gains and losses of such an arrangement. This reflects the 
particular context of SADC: one of a comparatively undeveloped region, dominated by 
a relatively large, more industrially advanced country, which is itself small by 
international standards. The essential question with which this study is concerned, 
therefore, is whether, despite the existing inequalities in the region, a FTA among SADC 
members could be mutually beneficial to South Africa and its partners. 
The thesis applies orthodox and new trade theory to the analysis of economic 
integration among unequal partners. Using the theoretical analysis, and with reference 
to empirical studies of such experience elsewhere in the world, it attempts to provide 
an assessment of the existing body of literature on the possible effects of a SADC FT A. 
In the light of this discussion, and from its own preliminary empirical analysis of the 
possible pattern of inter-sectoral versus intra-sectoral specialisation which may result 
on union, the study suggests ways in which a fuller evaluation of the welfare 
implications of a southern African FTA may be achieved. 
The thesis argues that the orthodox theory based on perfect competition provides an 
insufficient framework for the analysis of the likely effects of a SADC FT A. It finds 
that, firstly, in an alternative analytical framework which retains the assumption of 
perfect competition, there may be other criteria for judging the success of a regional 
union that are neglected by orthodoxy, particularly in the case of developing countries. 
Secondly, the new trade theory based on imperfect competition and product 
differentiation provides useful insights into the possible effects of a regional union 
among countries at unequal levels of development. The formal extension of this body 
of literature to the theory of economic integration is clearly called for. 
iv 
It is found, however, that neither orthodox customs union theory, nor its suggested 
alternatives and extensions, enable one to conclude, a priori, that the formation of a 
FTA in the southern African region could not be beneficial to both South Africa and its 
smaller partners. Further, the present empirical studies on SADC do not take account 
of the full range of factors necessary for a complete welfare assessment of the possible 
effects. 
Since the outcome of integration depends on the empirical circumstances of the 
particular case, and since the information necessary for a comprehensive welfare 
evaluation is not currently available, the study concludes that the countries of the region 
have committed themselves to a FT A without any definite knowledge of its likely 
effects. 
v 
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INTRODUCTION 
In August 1996, the countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
signed a trade protocol which provides for the phased reduction and eventual elimination 
of import duties and other charges over an eight-year period (Business Day, 26 August 
1996).' The proposed formation of a SADC free trade area (FTA)2 will have important 
implications both for the current re-negotiation of the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU)3 Agreement and for South Africa's trade negotiations with the European Union. 
The essential question, however, is whether such an arrangement would be 
economically beneficial for the participating countries, either individually or collectively. 
The subject of regional economic integration in southern Africa has a long history, 
dating back to the origins of the SACU in the late nineteenth century. However, with 
the political transition in South Africa, the question of the country's future economic 
interaction with other states and regional economic groupings in southern Africa has 
become a subject of intensive debate in academic and policy circles. There has been 
a proliferation of research in the field of regional integration and co-operation, both 
within the region and across the continent as a whole. 
This renewed concern with regionalism also reflects the emergence of major trading 
blocs elsewhere in the world. The United States, until recently a staunch supporter of 
multilateralism, has joined Canada and Mexico in the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA), and will seek to conclude free trade agreements with other groups of Latin 
American states under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. European integration 
has widened and deepened, and there are moves towards a FT A among the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). With respect to North-North and North-South 
integration, it has been argued that, for smaller countries, the new regionalism is an 
3 
The current members of SADC are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles were admitted in September 1997, 
by which time this study was substantially complete. 
In a FT A, tariffs and quotas are removed among member countries, but each maintains its own 
restrictions against the rest of the world. 
SACU includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. A customs. union is a FTA 
with a common external tariff against the rest of the world. 
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instrument for ensuring future market access as fears grow of a new wave of 
protectionism in the global economy (de Melo and Panagariya, 1993: 20). New South-
South agreements have also emerged, notably the Southern Cone Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) in Latin America. 
These developments have raised concerns that poorer countries outside the major blocs, 
in Africa in particular, will be marginalised unless they, too, move towards meaningful 
integration. The idea of a continental common market for Africa is an old one, which 
was given new impetus by the Organisation of African Unity's 1980 Lagos Plan of 
Action, envisaging the establishment of four regional common markets that would 
merge by the end of the century (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1993: 31).4 
Despite this international climate, current opinion on the economic desirability and 
feasibility of a SADC FT A varies considerably. Implicit in the southern African literature 
is the critical question of the prospects for mutually beneficial trade integration among 
a group of developing countries differing greatly in per capita income, economic size and 
stage of development. However, it seems that no definitive analysis has been 
undertaken of the potential effects of a FTA on the countries of the region. Further, it 
is unclear in many of the southern African studies how their diverse views and 
conclusions were derived, whether they are consistent with the theory, and hence 
whether they have been properly established. 
This study will attempt to address some of the key questions relating to economic 
integration among unequal partners, with reference to the theoretical literature and 
empirical studies of such experiences elsewhere in the world, and hence in effect to 
assess the current state of the debate on trade integration in the SADC region. 
Plan of the thesis 
The first two chapters of the study provide the necessary background for a 
consideration of the prospects for a mutually beneficial free trade arrangement among 
4 The 1991 Abuja Treaty adjusted the time frame to 2020, with the establishment of full economic and 
monetary union by 2025. 
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the members of SADC. Chapter 1 outlines the essential features of existing southern 
African regional organisations and bilateral agreements, as well as the WTO's provisions 
on regional arrangements. The implications of the WTO rules, and processes such as 
South Africa's trade negotiations with the European Union, for a SADC FTA are also 
considered. Chapter 2 describes some of the main features of the economies of the 
SADC region, with international comparisons. Differences in per capita income, size, 
growth performance and economic structure are examined, in relation to those within 
other regional arrangements, such as NAFT A and MERCOSUR, which involve countries 
of differing size and levels of development. Since the impact of a southern African FTA 
is likely to depend largely on its effects on manufacturing production and trade within 
the region, the comparative manufacturing structures of the SADC countries are 
considered in some detail, as are the volume, direction and structure of southern African 
trade flows. 
Chapter 3 surveys a number of recent studies on the viability of trade integration in the 
SADC region. An attempt is made to synthesise the main features of the views and 
conclusions reached in these studies, with a view to a more detailed analysis of the 
arguments on which they are, implicitly or explicitly, based. 
The following two chapters attempt to address the key issues relevant to the analysis 
of trade integration among unequal partners, drawing on the general theoretical 
literature and empirical case studies of experience elsewhere in the world, to permit an 
assessment of some of the arguments and conclusions reached in the southern African 
literature. Chapter 4 examines the theoretical analysis of trade integration in a perfectly 
competitive framework. The discussion considers the orthodox conditions for a 
beneficial customs union or free trade area, in terms of the conventional trade creation-
trade diversion analysis, and their implications for the prospects of a mutually beneficial 
SADC FT A. The chapter then explores some non-traditional perspectives on the 
conditions for successful integration, and their implications for the conventional 
assessment of the merits of regional integration based solely on the balance between 
trade creation and trade diversion. The analysis specifically considers whether, in an 
alternative analytical framework, there may be other criteria for judging the success of 
regional unions than the conventional ones, particularly in the case of developing 
countries. 
4 
Chapter 5 extends the theoretical framework of the previous chapter in three important 
ways. Firstly, by relaxing the assumption of perfect competition, it considers the 
implications of trade integration in the presence of increasing returns to scale, focusing 
on the inter-industry resource reallocation effects of integration in a regional union 
among unequal partners. Secondly, it abandons the assumption of homogeneous 
products, allowing for product differentiation and a consideration of the possible intra-
industry resource reallocation effects of integration. In each case, the analysis draws 
on empirical studies of experience in regional unions elsewhere, among countries of 
differing size and levels of development, and attempts to draw inferences for SADC. 
Finally, the discussion moves away from static analysis, to consider the possible 
dynamic effects of integration, with a focus on the possible polarisation effects of 
integration among unequal partners. 
In the light of the preceding analysis, the two subsequent chapters of the study consider 
the Evans (1996, 1997a) Regional Trade Model for Southern Africa (RTMSA), probably 
the most analytically ambitious attempt to address, empirically, the question of the 
economic desirability of a southern African FTA. The Evans studies appear to provide 
the only detailed sectoral estimates available to date of the effects of the formation of 
a SADC FTA on the individual members of SADC. Given the intense debate about the 
sectoral and distributional implications of a southern African regional union incorporating 
South Africa, and the interest of policy-makers in the region in the further development 
of the model, the focus on the RTMSA seems warranted. 
Chapter 6 outlines the structure and mechanics of the RTMSA in an attempt to 
demonstrate clearly how relative price changes resulting from the removal of intra-SADC 
tariffs, in a given sector, work through the model to affect the key economic variables 
under analysis. In particular, the analysis in this chapter seeks to clarify, through 
algebraic manipulation of the model's equations, the manner in which the model's 
structure and assumptions affect the direction and magnitude of the predicted changes 
in intra-SADC imports and exports, imports from the rest of the world, import-
competing supply and employment. While technical, this discussion provides essential 
background for a critical assessment, in Chapter 7, of the model's assumptions, and the 
inferences drawn from the results of the simulations undertaken to date. 
5 
The discussion in Chapter 7 draws on the theoretical analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, as 
well as similar empirical studies conducted for other regional groupings, in an attempt 
to provide an assessment of the RTMSA. An examination is made of the simulation 
results obtained to date and the conclusions drawn from these results on the desirability 
of a SADC FTA. The analysis then considers, specifically, whether the model's 
elasticity assumptions tend to bias the simulation results in any systematic way, 
particularly with respect to the likely trade creation-trade diversion consequences of the 
FTA. Finally, a preliminary analysis is made of the directions in which the RTMSA could 
usefully be extended to provide the basis for a fuller assessment of the desirability and 
feasibility of a SADC FTA, in the light of the discussion in previous chapters. 
The concluding chapter attempts to synthesise the key issues relevant to the analysis 
of regional trade integration among countries of unequal size and levels of development, 
and their implications for the formation of a SADC FT A. It considers, in the light of this, 
the current state of the debate in the southern African literature, and suggests ways in 
which a more complete assessment of the possible welfare effects of the FT A may be 
pursued. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
1 .1 Introduction 
The purpose of the present chapter is to provide a picture of existing arrangements for 
regional co-operation in southern Africa, and the implications of processes such as the 
re-negotiation of the Southern African Customs Union Agreement and South Africa's 
trade negotiations with the European Union (EU) for the formation of a SADC free trade 
area (FTA), as well as the multilateral obligations of SADC members to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Such a picture provides important background for any attempt to 
assess the desirability and feasibility of a SADC FT A. 
Section 1.2 introduces the existing regional organisations in southern Africa, and 
attempts to highlight their major problems and achievements to date. Sections 1.3 and 
1.4 outline the essential features of some of the more prominent bilateral trade 
agreements in the subcontinent, both involving South Africa and between other SADC 
countries. Section 1.5 considers the WTO provisions on regional arrangements, their 
relation to existing southern African organisations, and their implications for the 
proposed SADC FTA, while Section 1.6 examines the importance of South Africa's 
trade negotiations with the EU. Section 1.7 concludes. 
1.2 Existing regional groupings in southern Africa 
South Africa's apartheid policies placed the country at political odds with its majority-
ruled neighbours. Until recently, economic co-operation arrangements in the region 
reflected this divide. Of the four existing economic groupings in southern Africa, two 
date from the colonial period and have always included South Africa, while the other 
two, formed in the early 1980s, excluded South Africa (one being specifically formed 
to counter the country's hegemony in the region). 
7 
In order of establishment, these groupings are: the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU), the Common Monetary Area (CMA)' the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) (formerly the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference, SADCC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) (formerly the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African 
States, PTA). 
1.2.1 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
The only formal integration arrangement' in southern Africa is the SACU between 
South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (collectively known as the 
BLNS countries). The origins of the SACU date back to the 1 889 Customs Union 
Convention between the Cape of Good Hope and the Orange Free State Republic. By 
1906, all the current SACU members, except Namibia, were part of a customs union, 
together with Southern and North-Western Rhodesia. 2 The present SACU Agreement 
was negotiated in 1969, and is a successor to the 1910 agreement between the newly-
formed Union of South Africa and the three High Commission Territories (as Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) were then known). South Africa treated the former South 
West Africa as part of the customs union when it began to administer the territory in 
1915. Namibia's membership was formalised only after its independence in 1990 
(Maasdorp, 1990a: 11-16; Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1993: 33). 
Since economic integration arrangements among developing countries have seldom been 
successful, it is interesting to note that the SACU has been in existence in one form or 
another for nearly a century. 
The 1910 agreement between South Africa and BLS provided for: 
There are various degrees of formal integration, the main ones being (in order of increasing level of 
commitment) free trade areas, customs unions, common markets and economic unions. 
A Customs Union Convention in 1903 established a union covering the Cape, Natal, Orange River 
Colony, Transvaal, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Basutoland (Lesotho) and Bechuanaland 
(Botswana). Swaziland was admitted in 1904 and North-Western Rhodesia at the end of 1905 
(Maasdorp, 1990a: 14-15). The 1903 Convention was therefore also the origin of the current trade 
agreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe (see Section 1.3.1 below). 
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j) the free interchange of manufactured goods and the maintenance of a common 
external tariff (CET) against the rest of the world (ROW); 
ii) conformity of the BLS countries to South Africa's tariff laws; and 
iii) payment by South Africa to BLS of a share of the total pool of customs and 
excise revenue in proportion to their level of trade between 1 906 and 1 908. 
South Africa received 98.7 per cent of the revenue, while BLS together earned 
only 1.3 per cent. 
The agreement was re-negotiated in 1 969 at the instigation of the (newly-independent) 
smaller countries, whose main concerns were the continued application of a customs 
and excise revenue-sharing formula based on their trade levels sixty years previously, 
the polarisation effect (the tendency for industry to be attracted to the most developed 
sector of the union), the price-raising effect of South African-determined tariffs, and loss 
of fiscal discretion due to the lack of control over customs and excise policies which 
were unilaterally determined by South Africa. 
The 1969 agreement allowed for, inter alia: 
i) a revised method of calculating the division of revenue; 
ii) the establishment of a Customs Union Commission for consultation among 
member states; and 
iii) measures enabling BLS to protect the development of certain industries. 
The new revenue-sharing formula (Appendix 1) was intended to compensate BLS for 
participating in a customs union with a more economically developed country. It 
included a "compensation factor" or multiplier of 0.42, which meant that the smaller 
countries would receive 42 per cent more from the common revenue pool than they 
individually paid into it. However, the new formula also included BLS imports from 
South Africa, raising the smaller countries' revenue above that which would be received 
on imports from outside the SACU area alone. This was evidently an attempt to 
reproduce the revenue the smaller countries would earn outside the customs union if 
they were imposing tariffs in such a way that prices were equal to those within the 
SACU. Effectively, then, BLS would receive the revenue due to them, plus 
compensation for trade diversion (that is, for the price-raising effect of the CET). The 
9 
new formula therefore provided compensation for price-ralsmg effects before the 
application of the compensation factor of 0.42 (Walters, 1989: 44).3 The inclusion of 
the compensation factor itself was then intended to compensate BLS for the polarisation 
effects of the SACU Agreement and for loss of fiscal discretion. 
The revenue-sharing formula was amended in 1976, with the introduction of a 
stabilisation factor to ensure a more consistent basic average rate of duty for BLS. 
Fluctuations in this rate had made it difficult for the smaller countries to predict available 
revenue for government expenditure. The amended formula ensured that the rate of 
duty could not decline below 17 per cent nor exceed 23 per cent. The range was based 
on a target rate of 20 per cent, which was considered to be "the norm" for similar 
countries. 
In 1981-82, further amendments to the SACU Agreement were sought by BLS. The 
two areas of concern were the range of the stabilisation factor and the lag in payments 
from the common revenue pool. The first proposal was that the range of the 
stabilisation factor be adjusted to 19-25 per cent, given the persistent tendency for the 
stabilised average rate of duty to fall below the target rate of 20 percent. Secondly, the 
fact that revenue payments to BLS for a particular fiscal year were spread over a three-
year period meant that they were always owed money by the pool. During the lag 
period, South Africa had free use of the funds, which has been described as an interest-
free loan from BLS, the real value of which is additionally eroded by inflation (Mayer and 
Zarenda, 1994: 21; Maasdorp, 1982: 100). Walters (1989: 43) argues that the 
fundamental issue is the forecasting technique used, which is believed to underestimate 
the cash flow systematically. Several alternative forecasting methods were considered 
at the 1981 discussions, but the formula agreed upon by the Customs Union 
Commission was rejected by the South African Cabinet in 1982. 
The South African position appeared to be that no further amendments could be made 
According to Walters (1989: 44-45), an important question is whether the basic average rate of duty 
(i.e. customs, excise and sales duty revenue as a proportion of the duty-inclusive value of dutiable 
imports and domestically-consumed dutiable domestic production) derived from the formula 
reproduced the "iso-price" tariff or not. An unresolved issue at the 1969 negotiations was whether 
the basic average rate of duty would fully compensate for trade diversion. (The question was 
subsequently raised of whether BLS should be compensated at a" for trade diversion, since they 
benefit from the protection afforded by the CET (McCarthy, 1985, cited in Walters, 1989: 45). 
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unless the Agreement as a whole was re-negotiated. This was viewed as an attempt 
to pressurise the smaller countries into accepting homeland membership of the SACU. 
South Africa saw the SACU as a vehicle for channelling funds to the homelands, but the 
BLS countries' refusal to recognise their "independence" prevented their direct inclusion 
in the Agreement, since any change in SACU membership had to be unanimously 
approved. South Africa consequently entered into separate bilateral agreements with 
the former homelands, and paid them revenue out of its own share (Maasdorp and 
Whiteside, 1993: 42). 
Despite problems with the formula, it is clear that the revenue-sharing provisions of the 
SACU Agreement do offer substantial benefits to the smaller members. The revenue 
received from the common pool forms a significant part of their government revenue: 
55.1 per cent for Lesotho, 33.6 per cent for Namibia, 18.6 per cent for Botswana, and 
about 40 per cent for Swaziland in 1991-95 (World Bank, 1997a: 196-197; Zarenda, 
1997: 59). The indirect cost, of course, is that South Africa unilaterally determines the 
rates of duty. 4 
South Africa now finds the revenue-sharing provisions of the Agreement unacceptably 
draining (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1993: 42; McCarthy, 1994: 173; Zarenda, 1997: 
58-59). South Africa's share of the pool fell over period 1969/70 to 1992/93 from 
96.1 per cent to 66.4 per cent. The most marked reductions occurred after 1990, 
mainly as a result of rapid increases in Botswana's imports and the formalisation of 
Namibia's SACU membership after independence (Maasdorp, 1994: 20).5 Zarenda 
(1997: 59) reports that Namibia's separate SACU membership accounted for about a 
third of the drop. Further, it must be borne in mind that South Africa elected to pay the 
TBVC states (as if they were SACU members) out of its own share.s 
4 South African Reserve Bank administration of the common pool is not seen as a contentious issue. 
Indeed, the BLNS countries benefit by not having to incur the costs of revenue collection. 
Since most BLNS imports come from South Africa, it could be argued that rapid growth in these 
countries which, given their high import propensities, translates into rapid growth in imports, 
generates exports and hence income for South Africa. This could be regarded as some justification 
for South Africa's falling revenue share (McCarthy, 1994: 177). 
The percentage shares of the pool reported above are those which accrued to South Africa before 
any transfers were made to the TBVC states. According to these figures, South Africa's share in 
1990/91 was 74.6 per cent. After transfers to the TBVC states, South Africa's residual was reduced 
by some 20 percentage points to 54.8 per cent. It has been argued that it is the figures net of TBVC 
transfers which reflect South Africa's interpretation of its position (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1993: 
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More generally, the size of the revenue pool may shrink as tariffs are lowered under 
South Africa's offer to the WTO, with adverse implications for BLNS government 
revenue in particular. 7 However, the effect of the offer on tariff revenue is difficult to 
predict. McCarthy (1994: 179) suggests, for example, that lower tariffs and a more 
outward-oriented trade policy may result in larger trade volumes, and perhaps even an 
increase in revenue. Another consideration is that about half of the revenue pool is, in 
any event, comprised of excise duties. Official opinion in South Africa appears to be 
divided on whether lower tariffs will reduce the revenue pool or have a neutral effect 
(Davies, 1994: 11-12). 
By 1994, a complete re-negotiation of the SACU Agreement had been set in motion, 
reflecting the deep dissatisfaction of all parties with its present form. The revenue-
sharing provisions of the Agreement and the issue of consultation among member states 
are central aspects of the re-negotiations, which are scheduled to be completed in the 
near future. South Africa's concern that the revenue payments have become too 
onerous will be met by the BLNS perspective that the current formula provides 
inadequate compensation for trade diversion, polarisation and the loss of fiscal 
sovereignty. However, as the CET is lowered under South Africa's offer to the WTO, 
the issue of compensation for its price-raising effects (trade diversion) will be of less 
concern (Sisulu et al., 1994: 73). Likewise, if a suitable framework is agreed on for 
consultation and adequate participation by BLNS in SACU decision-making (perhaps via 
BLNS representation on the Board of Tariffs and Trade under a suitable voting system), 
then the issue of compensation for loss of fiscal discretion may also become less 
important. The question of compensation for polarisation will remain, however, and 
may be addressed via some kind of industrial development fund rather than the revenue-
42; McCarthy, 1994: 173). 
It is doubtful whether there was any meaningful consultation between South Africa and other SACU 
members regarding South Africa's offer. Zarenda (1997: 62-63) maintains that the BLNS countries 
were not consulted at all. However, Maasdorp (1994: 17) reports that a Joint Technical Group was 
set up in August 1993 to examine South Africa's draft offer and other matters related to the SACU 
re-negotiations. Stoneman (1994: 7) notes that the Working Group was set up at an extraordinary 
SACU meeting on 17 August 1993. The BLNS countries were invited to assist with the preparation 
of South Africa's offer on industrial goods, which was due by the end of August. The agricultural 
offer had already been made (without consultation). 
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sharing formula. 8 
Zarenda (1997: 60) has written that "SACU has not at any stage in its existence 
claimed to be a development-focused institution rather than a convenient political 
arrangement". However, McCarthy (1994: 170) argues that the architects of the 1969 
SACU Agreement sought to change its structure from a revenue distribution mechanism 
to a development-oriented arrangement. For the smaller members of SACU, 
nonetheless, the revenue-sharing provisions of the Agreement appear to have been of 
overriding importance, even since the 1969 Agreement. It should be noted, though, 
that while SACU revenue payments remain the main source of government revenue for 
Lesotho and Swaziland, they have become considerably less important for Botswana. 
As McCarthy (1994: 171) argues, thus, the tendency to treat BLNS as a homogeneous 
group within SACU is no longer appropriate. The current re-negotiations may provide 
the opportunity for regional economic development to become the main impetus of the 
SACU Agreement (McCarthy, 1994: 183). 
Some other southern African countries have reportedly expressed an interest in joining 
the SACU. Given the current conflict in the organisation over revenue-sharing, it is 
extremely unlikely that any new member would be admitted under the present revenue-
sharing provisions. Although this problem could perhaps be overcome through 
differentiated revenue-sharing arrangements for new members of the union, it does not 
appear that an enlarged SACU is being contemplated. 
1.2.2 The Common Monetary Area (CMA) 
The BLS countries adopted the use of South African currency in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and Namibia did so after the First World War. However, it was only 
in 1974 that the first formal monetary agreement, the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) 
More detail on the issues to be raised in the SACU re-negotiations can be found in Davies (1994), 
Maasdorp (1994) and Sisulu et al. (1994). Other important negotiating issues will doubtless include 
the lag in payments from the customs pool, whether excise duties should continue to be included in 
the pool. and the implications of a Secret Memorandum of Understanding attached to the 1969 
Agreement for the infant industry protection provisions of the arrangement. The effect of SACU on 
industrial development in BLNS (including the existence of the Secret Memorandum) is considered 
further in the discussion of polarisation in Section 5.4. 
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Agreement, was signed between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland; Botswana 
elected not to join. 
The Agreement allowed for: 
i) Lesotho and Swaziland to issue their own currencies for internal use, but the 
rand was to be used for foreign exchange transactions and was legal tender 
throughout the area; 
ii) free movement of capital among member countries; 
iii) access to South African money and capital markets; 
iv) allocation of foreign exchange from the South African Reserve Bank; 
v) compensation for interest that would have been earned by Lesotho and 
Swaziland on external reserves; 
vi) consultation on policy decisions, such as interest rate and exchange rate 
changes; 
vii) the right to authorise the transfer of capital and profits abroad (Maasdorp and 
Whiteside, 1993: 34). 
Member countries retained responsibility for their own monetary policy and control of 
their financial institutions, but South Africa was responsible for management of the rand 
and gold and foreign exchange reserves of the RMA. 
In 1986, in a move prompted by Swaziland's decision to de-link the lilangeni from the 
rand, the RMA Agreement was superseded by the Trilateral Monetary Agreement 
(TMA), establishing the Common Monetary Area (CMA). The rand was no longer 
officially legal tender in Swaziland, although it is still widely accepted there in practice. 
Exchange rate parity was no longer required between the rand and the Lesotho loti, and 
the rand and the lilangeni. The TMA was accompanied by two separate bilateral 
agreements concluded by South Africa with Lesotho and Swaziland respectively. 
In March 1992, the TMA was replaced by the Multilateral Monetary Agreement (MMA) 
after Namibia formally joined the CMA. A third bilateral agreement was concluded 
between South Africa and Namibia at the same time (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1993: 
34). 
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For South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, the SACU and CMA together almost 
amount to a common market. 9 The transformation of SACU into a common market 
("deepening" the level of integration) would involve Botswana joining the CMA and 
provision for the free movement of labour between SACU countries. Given South 
Africa's domestic unemployment problem and the need for internal restructuring, as well 
as the implications of a "brain drain" from BLNS, this is unlikely to be feasible. It has 
been argued that such a move may be desirable for Lesotho, given its dependence on 
migrant labour employment in South Africa (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1993: 45-46). 
1.2.3 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
SADC was established in 1980 as the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC) with nine members: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Namibia became the tenth 
member after independence in 1990. South Africa joined SADC four months after the 
April elections, in August 1994, and hosted the 1995 meeting where Mauritius was 
admitted as the organisation's twelfth member. 1O 
SADCC's original aims were to reduce its members' economic dependence particularly, 
but not only, on South Africa, and to encourage balanced regional development. 11 In 
view of the poor record of formal regional economic integration schemes in Africa 
(particularly the collapse of the East African Community), and elsewhere among 
developing countries, the founders of SADCC specifically opted for a loose association 
to promote co-operation and co-ordination rather than formal economic integration. 
SADCC thus began as a loose organisation facilitating sectoral and project co-operation 
in fields such as transport, agriculture and food security, mining, energy and tourism. 
Highest priority was initially accorded to projects in the transport and communications 
9 
10 
11 
A common market is a customs union which also allows the free movement of capital and labour 
among member countries. 
As noted earlier, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles joined SADC in September 1997. 
SADCC's origins date back to a call by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda in 1974 for the 
establishment of a "transcontinental belt of independent and economically powerful states". Its 
formation is also widely regarded as a response to South Africa's plans for a "Constellation of 
Southern African States" in the late 1970s (Leistner, 1995: 272). 
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sector, since this was where dependence on South Africa was most acutely felt. Of 
major importance, too, were the agriculture and food security and energy sectors; an 
increasing focus on industry and trade only emerged later, with an emphasis on 
strengthening intra-SADCC trade. Sectoral responsibilities were entrusted to the 
relevant ministries in member countries. 12 
While the founding SADCC countries' dependence on South Africa and the ROW was 
by no means been reduced,13 the following are included among the organisation's 
achievements in its first decade: 
i) to provide a conduit for foreign aid: SADCC was well-regarded by aid 
organisations, which were particularly interested in sponsoring regional transport 
and communications projects; 
ii) the annual consultative meeting focused the attention of donor countries on 
southern Africa and South Africa's role in the region; and 
iii) significant progress was made in the reconstruction and development of SADCC 
transport and communications networks (Maasdorp, 1990b: 21; Leistner, 1992: 
3; Davies et al., 1993: 29). 
After 1990, however, SADCC had to consider the implications of political change in 
South Africa, as its main raison d'etre would be challenged once apartheid was gone. 
This, together with calls from PT A/COMESA for a merger between the two 
organisations due to overlapping objectives, led SADCC to reassess its goals in the early 
1990s. 
A policy document submitted to a SADCC meeting in Maputo in January 1992 spelt out 
proposals for a move away from project co-operation towards trade integration, 
proposing a reduction of barriers to intra-SADC trade, greater co-ordination of external 
tariffs, freer movement of capital and labour, the creation of regional infrastructural 
12 
13 
Responsibilities were allocated as follows: Angola: energy; Botswana: animal disease and agricultural 
research; Lesotho: tourism; Malawi: fisheries; Mozambique: transport and communications; 
Swaziland: training; Tanzania: industry and trade; Zambia: mining; and Zimbabwe: agriculture and 
food security. When South Africa joined SADC, a new "portfolio" was created for it to co-ordinate: 
finance and investment. 
Bilateral and other links with South Africa either remained or increased, and it is reported that 80 to 
90 per cent of the organisation's projects are funded by outside donors (Leistner, 1995: 272). 
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authorities and a development bank, as well as the rationalisation of efforts to promote 
integration in southern Africa (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1993: 35). 
In August 1992, at the organisation's summit in Windhoek, representatives of the ten 
member countries signed a treaty transforming SADCC into the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). The treaty enshrined the new objectives of deeper 
economic co-operation and integration, and provided for the negotiation of regional 
protocols in various sectors, including trade. However, there was little sign over the 
next few years of any progress towards the implementation of these policies. Donors 
reportedly became increasingly critical of the lack of progress and political commitment 
of member states, as well as organisational inefficiency and bureaucracy (Leistner, 
1992: 4-5; Leistner, 1995: 272). 
South Africa's decision to join SADC in 1994 is consistent with the ANC's pre-election 
position of the important role the country has to play in the development of an 
appropriate institutional framework for regional co-operation and integration (Zarenda, 
1997: 60-62). Although South Africa is apparently cautious about moves towards trade 
integration within SADC,14 it has committed itself to the formation of a SADC FTA by 
signing the Trade Protocol in August 1996. 
1.2.4 The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States/Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA/COMESA) 
The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) 15 was 
formed in 1983, and currently has 23 members: all the SADC states, except Botswana 
and South Africa, plus Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zaire (Holden, 1996: 7). 
The PTA, a project of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), is part 
14 
15 
Holden (1996: 7) reports that the SADC trade protocol was not signed at the August 1995 summit 
largely because South Africa persuaded the other members that trade integration would probably lead 
to trade diversion (to South Africa). 
In a PTA, tariffs are lowered among member countries on selected commodities, but there is not yet 
free movement of goods and services within the area. 
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of the OAU initiative towards a continental common market. Its original purpose was 
to promote trade by gradually lowering tariff barriers, although it is ultimately intended 
to develop into a deeper integration arrangement, with eventual free trade and common 
market status for its members. As a move in this direction, a new treaty was signed 
by 20 member countries in December 1994, replacing the PTA with the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa {COMESA).16 Like SADC, in addition to its 
integration agenda, COMESA aims to promote co-operation in sectors such as transport, 
communications, agriculture and industry. 
In the move towards free trade, COMESA member states are expected to eliminate all 
tariffs on intra-regional trade on a common list of commodities by the year 2000. 
Various institutions have been set up to encourage intra-regional trade. The PTA 
Clearing House was established in 1984 to address the question of non-convertible 
currencies and the shortage of foreign exchange to pay for imports, facilitating the 
settlement of accounts between members in national currencies. A joint unit of account 
(UAPTA) was subsequently introduced to record receipts and payments. The PTA Trade 
and Development Bank was established in 1986 to provide trade and development 
project finance, and later began issuing UAPTA travellers' cheques. A monetary 
harmonisation programme has been adopted, which aims to achieve monetary union by 
2025. 17 
The establishment of the Clearing House and PTA Bank are considered to be COMESA's 
main accomplishments. The former handles about 50 per cent of intra-area trade, with 
the proportion settled in hard currency decreasing from 87 per cent in 1985 to 47 per 
cent in 1989. An industrialisation programme (with 52 projects in 1992), the 
simplification of customs procedures and easier trans-border transport are other positive 
achievements (Leistner, 1992: 6). 
The main problems are that intra-COMESA trade remains low at about 6 per cent of 
members' total trade, member states have in most cases not complied with decisions 
to reduce tariffs by target dates, transport and communications links remain weak, and 
16 
17 
According to Holden (1996: 8), Djibouti, Seychelles and Somalia have yet to sign the COMESA treaty. 
More detail on the PT A/COMESA institutions and the monetary harmonisation programme can be 
found in Maasdorp and Whiteside (1993: 24-271, ADS (1993a) and Holden (1996: 8). 
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most countries face acute shortages of foreign exchange. Other weaknesses include 
vast disparities in the levels of development of the organisation's member states, its 
unwieldy size and geographical dispersion, as well as overlapping membership of 
different regional groupings. 
There is obvious conflict between membership of SACU and COMESA, which partly 
explains South Africa and Botswana's decisions not to join the larger grouping. 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland have specifically been exempted from reciprocating 
COMESA tariff cuts (such as they are), because of their membership of SACU. 
However, dual membership is clearly not tenable. 
There has been increasing tension between SADC and COMESA as their objectives have 
converged. COMESA called for a merger in the early 1990s, which SADC considered 
to be premature. In 1994, countries with dual membership allegedly resolved to 
withdraw from COMESA, a decision which was to be finalised in 1996 (Holden, 1996: 
7).18 South Africa's decision to join SADC rather than COMESA, and the signing of 
the SADC Trade Protocol, appear to be the main reasons for the consolidation of SADC. 
1.2.5 The Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) 
The CBI, proposed at the Maastricht Conference on Africa in 1990, and sponsored by 
the World Bank and IMF, the European Union and the ADB, is a recent initiative to 
promote cross border trade and investment in eastern and southern Africa. There are 
currently fourteen participating countries: Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. 19 The CBI envisages the elimination of tariffs on intra-regional trade 
and the convergence of members' external tariffs to a trade-weighted average of 1 5 per 
cent, with a maximum of 25 per cent, by 1998 (Holden, 1996: 9). Some of the 
participants have expressed concern about the revenue implications of the proposals, 
18 
19 
Zimbabwe reportedly resolved to withdraw from COMESA in 1995, suggesting a firmer commitment 
to SADC (Leistner, 1995: 274). More recently, Lesotho and Mozambique indicated their intention to 
terminate their COMESA membership (Mayer and Thomas, 1997: 331). 
Every member of the CBI is a member of COMESA, but not vice versa. 
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while countries such as Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Uganda, which have 
already liberalised extensively, will not find compliance too onerous (Holden, 1996: 9). 
1.3 Bilateral agreements in southern Africa involving South Africa 
There are numerous bilateral agreements which exist between the SADC states. In a 
document compiled at the request of the South African Department of Trade and 
Industry, Kabemba (1996) outlines the essential features of fourteen such 
agreements. 20 The current position appears to be that existing bilateral trade 
agreements will continue to operate during the SADC FT A negotiations, but will cease 
to be effective once a higher level of integration is reached (Kabemba, 1 996: 4).21 
South Africa has bilateral trade agreements with Zimbabwe and Malawi, and a 
preferential tariff arrangement with Mozambique. A general feature of these agreements 
is their asymmetry: South Africa receives a small margin of preference, if any, in return 
for more favourable access to the South African market. 
1.3.1 The Zimbabwe agreement 
The preferential trade agreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe dates back to the 
1903 Customs Union Convention, which sought to establish a customs union among 
all British territories in southern Africa. 22 With the formation of the Union of South 
Africa in 1910, existing arrangements were terminated, and separate customs union 
20 
21 
22 
The initial objective was to include all bilateral agreements signed by SADC states, but this was not 
possible as the necessary information was not forthcoming from member countries. The objective 
was to assist in the negotiation of the SADC Trade Protocol, based on the South African 
government's view that "in order to design an effective and appropriate trade regime for the region, 
SADC member states need to have a clear idea of what exists on the ground and its implications for 
a multilateral framework such as SADC and the GATT" (Kabemba, 1 996: 3). 
According to Kabemba (1996: 2), some of the bilateral agreements surveyed in his study, between 
SADC countries with COMESA membership, such as Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, lapsed when 
the initial round of COMESA tariff reductions came into effect. For the members of SACU, there is 
a moratorium on any new agreements until the SACU re-negotiations are finalised (Kabemba, 1996: 
39). In the case of SADC, however, the Trade Protocol allows new agreements among member 
countries, provided they do not conflict with the provisions of the Protocol (SADC, 1996: 12). 
The agreement's common origin with SACU was noted in Footnote 2 above. 
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agreements were signed between South Africa and its future SACU partners on the one 
hand, and South Africa and Southern and North-Western Rhodesia on the other. 
In December 1948, a new customs union agreement was signed between South Africa, 
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi). 
This was reportedly the first arrangement to be notified as an "interim agreement 
leading to the formation of a customs union" to the newly-founded GATT (Pomfret, 
1988: 85; Kabemba, 1996: 43). The union lapsed a few years later, and gave way to 
various preferential trade agreements, the most recent of which was signed in 
November 1964 between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia after the dissolution of 
the Rhodesian Federation. The agreement was maintained after Southern Rhodesia's 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, and is still in operation today. It 
was reportedly extended by an exchange of letters in 1982 and amended in the same 
manner in 1986 (Kabemba, 1996: 44; Blumberg, 1994: 11). 
The Zimbabwe agreement provides for preferential rates of duty, rebates and quotas on 
certain goods traded between the two countries. 
Under Article 3, goods produced in the country of either party and specified in Annexure 
A (mainly agricultural and food products) may be admitted under import licence either 
i) free of duty, ii) into Zimbabwe at the "Column Crate" ,23 or iii) into South Africa at 
the most-favoured nation (MFN) rate (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 
1964: 11-13). 
Article 5 allows goods produced in Zimbabwe which are specified in Annexure B to be 
admitted into South Africa under a wide range of conditions. Annexure B is by far the 
most extensive of the three Annexures to the agreement, consisting of eleven parts, the 
first six of which mainly cover preferences for Zimbabwean textile and clothing items, 
but also some leather items. 
23 Part II of the most recently available Zimbabwe tariff book contains two columns of duties: general 
duties ("Column C") and most-favoured nation (MFN) duties ("Column 0"). The latter ostensibly apply 
to goods from WTO member countries and other countries with which Zimbabwe has trade 
agreements containing the MFN clause (Government of Zimbabwe, 1993: 3). However, there appears 
to be no difference between the Column C and Column 0 rates in this book. Blumberg (1994: 11) 
says of Column C: "It is understood, but not confirmed, that this is a preferential rate". It would 
appear that it is not, and it is unclear why it should be applied to South Africa rather than the 
supposed MFN rate. 
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The goods specified in these parts may be admitted into South Africa either free of duty 
or at the MFN rate rebated to a specified extent. The rebates granted range from 10 
to 50 per cent, but commonly lie between 1 5 and 30 per cent. Whether the specified 
goods are admitted duty-free, whether they are rebated at all, and, in some cases, the 
extent of the rebate, depend in some sections on the local content or, less frequently, 
the composition of the goods. Further, in some cases, the rebates apply (given any 
local content or composition requirements) only up to a certain specified value or 
quantity. 
The rest of Annexure B covers specified Zimbabwean goods, mainly other than textile 
and clothing items, which are admitted into South Africa either free of duty (in some 
cases up to a specified value only), or at the MFN rate rebated to a specified extent 
(between 5 and 25 per cent), or at a specified rate of duty. These sections cover a 
wide variety of goods, ranging from certain food products, through to wood and leather 
products, enamelware, metal furniture, pharmaceutical products, jewellery and some 
electronic equipment (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1964: 37-47). 
Article 6 allows goods produced in South Africa which are specified in Annexure C to 
be admitted into Zimbabwe either at the "Column D" rate,24 or at the "Column C" rate 
with a 5 per cent rebate 25 (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1964: 47-
53).26 
The provisions of this agreement are clearly asymmetrical. There are far more goods 
qualifying for preferential access into the South African market (Annexure B) than vice 
versa, and, in the cases where rebates are granted, the extent of the rebates in 
Annexure B (for Zimbabwean goods entering the South African market) is greater than 
in Annexure C (for South African goods entering the Zimbabwean market). 
24 
25 
26 
These include a wide range of items ranging from certain food products and textile and clothing items, 
bicycles and tricycles, kitchenware and lampware, oil cooking stoves, washing and ironing machines, 
glass products, certain medical preparations, leatherwork, rubber products and musical instruments. 
These include specified clothing items, electric cooking stoves, gold and silverware, jewellery, and 
certain footwear items. The latter are only rebated if the duty rate is ad valorem. 
As noted above, however, there appears to be no difference between the Column C and Column D 
rates in the latest available Zimbabwe tariff book. 
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Preferential rates accorded to Zimbabwe for textile and clothing items form an important 
part of the agreement as a whole (Annexure 8). The rebates give Zimbabwe an 
absolute margin of preference for certain products. However, in 1992, South African 
import duties on textile products were substantially increased, mainly to protect local 
industry from cheaper imports from the Far East. Although this did not affect 
Zimbabwe's absolute margin of preference in terms of the agreement, its relative 
preference was drastically reduced. This is illustrated by the example in Table 1.1 
below. 
Table 1.1: The effect of a change in South African import duties on Zimbabwe's 
relative tariff preference 
Absolute Absolute Relative Duty payable on 
normal duty Zimbabwean Zimbabwean import from 
preference preference Zimbabwe 
Pre-1992 30% 15% 50% 15% 
After rise in duty 90% 15% 17% 75% 
Source: Kabemba (1996: 69). 
Following sensitive discussions over several years, South Africa agreed in principle in 
August 1995 to reinstate Zimbabwe's relative margin of preference. 27 Finally, it was 
reported in August 1 996 that the existing duty payable on textile and clothing imports 
from Zimbabwe, which ranged from 63 to 78 per cent following the 1992 duty 
increases, would be cut to below 30 per cent from September 1996, and to 20 per cent 
by the year 2000. The 75 per cent Zimbabwean local content requirement was also 
reportedly relaxed, so that any product which had undergone two stages of processing 
in Zimbabwe would qualify for the tariff preference (Business Day, 6 August 1996). 
27 Zimbabwe rejected an offer made by South Africa at the time; the dispute was over the 75 per cent 
local content requirement, the extent of rebates, and quota levels. Further delay was caused by 
strong resistance to any agreement from the South African clothing and textiles industries, which 
were concerned about the level of imports from Zimbabwe originating in the Far East (SAPA, 1995, 
1996). 
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1.3.2 The Malawi agreement 
Concluded between Malawi and South Africa in 1990, this agreement provides for duty-
free access into South Africa of Malawian goods with a local content of at least 25 per 
cent, except for certain agricultural products and coffee, tea and sugar which require 
an import permit. South African goods imported into Malawi are still subject to duty, 
understood to be the MFN rate, although this has not been confirmed. Rules of origin 
for South African goods appear to depend on the percentage content prescribed in 
Malawian legislation at a given time (Kabemba, 1996: 19; Blumberg, 1994: 8). Rights 
and obligations under the agreement are therefore not reciprocal. 
Kabemba (1996: 19) argues that the trade agreement has enabled Malawi to increase 
its exports and attract South African investment. It favours sectors attracting high 
import duties in South Africa which are sufficiently developed in Malawi to provide a 
base for value-added manufacturing. 
1.3.3 The Mozambique concession 
The preferential tariff arrangement concluded between South Africa and Mozambique 
in 1989 is a non-reciprocal tariff concession granted by South Africa on a short list of 
specified goods of Mozambiquan origin. Goods are admitted duty-free (within specified 
quota limits) if the MFN rate is three per cent ad valorem or less, or at a ceiling rate of 
duty of three per cent if the ad valorem MFN rate is more than this. The local content 
requirement is 35 per cent, and goods range from fish and other seafood, cashew nuts 
and citrus fruit, through to textiles, wooden furniture, and tyres and tubes (GATT, 
1993: 50). 
The peculiar feature of the arrangement is that it applies only to goods of Mozambiquan 
origin for consumption in South Africa and Botswana. If they are re-exported to any 
other SACU member, the difference in duty must be paid. It is unclear why the 
agreement applies to goods destined for consumption in Botswana, but not Lesotho, 
Namibia and Swaziland (Kabemba, 1996: 28). 
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1 .4 Bilateral agreements between other SADC countries 
There are numerous other bilateral agreements between SADC countries, many of which 
simply make provision for MFN treatment, sometimes with a list of specified goods. 
Probably the more important in the past were those involving Zimbabwe, Zambia and 
Malawi, since intra-regional trade (excluding intra-SACU trade) is most significant for 
these countries, as shown in Chapter 2. As noted earlier, however, former bilateral 
agreements between Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe have reportedly lapsed, following 
tariff cuts undertaken in terms of COMESA obligations. This section will therefore focus 
on bilateral agreements between Zimbabwe and other SADC countries. 
1 .4.1 Zimbabwe and Botswana 
The trade agreement between Zimbabwe and Botswana is a successor to the 1956 
customs agreement between the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; and 
Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland. It allows for reciprocal duty-free and import 
licence-free access of qualifying locally-produced goods (Kabemba, 1996: 13). 
Kabemba (1996: 9-13) describes the agreement as "important" and "substantial", 
noting that trade between the two countries accounted for 14 per cent of total intra-
regional trade in 1991. 
1.4.2 Zimbabwe and Namibia 
Concluded in 1992, the trade agreement between Namibia and Zimbabwe is Namibia's 
only bilateral agreement with another SADC state. It provides for duty-free access of 
all locally-produced goods (with respect to customs but not excise duties). SACU 
approved the agreement, on condition that these goods are not re-exported within the 
Common Customs Area. The agreement itself makes provision for re-exportation, and 
is thus a potential vehicle for the re-export of Zimbabwean goods to Angola and other 
non-SACU countries in the region (Kabemba, 1996: 36-39). 
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Namibia has traditionally traded very little with the rest of Africa (except South Africa), 
due to its historical isolation. Since the agreement only came into force in May 1993, 
no assessment has yet been made of its effects on the volume of trade between the 
two countries (Kabemba, 1996: 39).28 
1 .4.3 Zimbabwe and Mozambique 
This agreement appears to be similar to the one between Zimbabwe and Botswana, 
providing for duty-free access of locally-produced goods. A list of products qualifying 
for such access is given in two annexures to the agreement (Kabemba, 1996: 31-34). 
1.5 Existing southern African arrangements and the World Trade Organisation 
The relevant WTO provisions on regional arrangements are contained in Articles XXIV 
and XXV of the original GATT, and the 1979 "enabling clause" which emerged from the 
Tokyo Round of negotiations. 
Preferential trade areas were outlawed under the GATT, except for those already in 
existence when it was signed in 1947 (Winters, 1991: 176).29 They contravene the 
cornerstone of the GATT, the Article I MFN clause, which requires that any preference 
granted by a contracting party to any other country should also be accorded to all other 
contracting parties, although a waiver may be granted in terms of Article XXV. 
Probably the most significant exception to the MFN rule, however, is to be found in 
Article XXIV of the GATT, which permits customs unions, FT As and "interim 
agreements" leading to the formation of a customs union or FT A, provided that they: 
28 
29 
Namibia is reportedly interested in signing a bilateral agreement with Zambia (Kabemba, 1996: 39). 
However, as noted above, SACU members have agreed on a moratorium on all new agreements until 
the SACU re-negotiations have been finalised. Whether this is pursued will also presumably depend 
on progress made in the SADC FTA negotiations. 
The "grandfather" clause permitting the continuation of existing preferential trade arrangements was 
included in the GATT at British insistence, to protect Commonwealth preferences (Pomfret, 1988: 
61 ). 
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i) cover "substantially all" of potential partners' mutual trade; 
ii) include a plan to dismantle intra-area tariffs within a reasonable time period; and 
iii) do not result in a higher average external tariff level than those which existed 
prior to their formation (Winters, 1991: 176). 
With respect to customs unions, Article XXIV recognises that establishing a CET may 
involve tariff increases by some members, and provides that compensatory adjustment 
(such as a reduction of tariffs on other products) may be required, if any of the 
increased tariffs conflict with a GATT binding (Kumar, 1995: 2). 
The provisions of Article XXIV have been strongly criticised for their vagueness and 
ambiguity. The" Understanding on Article XXIV", which emerged from the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations, seeks to address some of these criticisms.30 
Part IV of the GATT provides that developed countries do not expect reciprocity in 
negotiations to reduce or eliminate trade barriers with less-developed member countries 
(Kumar, 1995: 10).31 The policy, at the time, of granting special concessions to 
developing countries was further amplified by the 1979 "enabling clause", which not 
only allows more favourable treatment to be accorded to developing countries under the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)' but also makes provision for regional 
arrangements among these countries (Jackson, 1993: 123; Kumar, 1995: 10-11).32 
All SADC member countries are members of the WTO. South Africa is classified as a 
developed country, while the rest are developing or "least developed". South Africa's 
developed country status implies that the SACU Agreement, and its bilateral agreements 
with other SADC countries, do not fall within the ambit of the section of the enabling 
30 
31 
32 
A detailed analysis of Article XXIV and the other GATT provisions on regional arrangements is beyond 
the scope of this study. For more discussion, see Pomfret (1988: 60-101), Jackson (1993) and 
Kumar (1995). 
Part IV of the GATT, entitled "Trade and Development", was not part of the original Agreement, but 
was added as an amending protocol in 1965. 
The original GATT waiver permitting a GSP for developing countries was granted in 1971 for a period 
of ten years, but was extended indefinitely by the 1979 enabling clause (Pomfret, 1988: 87). For 
more on the GSP, see Pomfret (1988: 86-89). The enabling clause does not make any reference to 
Article XXIV, and the controversial question of whether it provides developing countries with the 
opportunity of forming regional arrangements outside Article XXIV is likely to be debated by the WTO 
working party examining MERCOSUR, which was notified in 1992 (Kumar, 1995: 11). 
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clause providing for regional arrangements among developing countries. Neither would 
a SADC FTA. However, these arrangements are in line with WTO principles with 
respect to Part IV of the GATT, and the section of the enabling clause providing for 
more favourable treatment of developing countries by developed countries. South 
Africa may nonetheless be vulnerable to demands from other developing countries for 
similar preferential treatment, since provisions for special treatment were endorsed in 
favour of all developing countries (Blumberg, 1994: 9; Kumar, 1995: 10-13).33 A 
SADC FTA incorporating South Africa would therefore have to be properly notified to 
the WTO and approved under Article XXIV. 34 
It appears that none of the southern African bilateral agreements have been notified to 
the GATTIWTO, with the exception of the trade agreement between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. The 1948 customs union agreement between South Africa, the Rhodesias 
and Nyasaland was, as noted earlier, the first arrangement to be notified to the newly-
founded GATT, and was approved under Article XXIV (Pomfret, 1988: 85; Kabemba, 
1996: 43). The subsequent preferential trade agreements were also notified to the 
GATT, which issued a series of waivers under Article XXV to accommodate them. No 
waiver was issued for the November 1964 agreement between South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia (although it was notified), because of Rhodesia's UDI. The last 
waiver lapsed in June 1965, and no amendment to the original agreement has been 
notified to the GATT since 1964 (Kabemba, 1996: 43-44; Blumberg, 1994: 11). 
The SACU Agreement has never been formally notified, nor has it undergone review 
under Article XXIV, evidently because the original agreement pre-dated the GATT's 
formation in 1947. Blumberg (1994: 7) reports, however, that there has recently been 
some pressure for such a review, particularly from the US, on the grounds that the 
agreement has substantially altered since then. 35 South Africa's Uruguay Round offer 
to the WTO may have addressed these concerns, in which case the Agreement could 
33 
34 
35 
This has evidently been a controversial issue in WTO discussions on the Lome Convention. 
Kumar (1995: 17) considers the possibility of South Africa applying for a change in its status, 
specifically with respect to its regional arrangements in southern Africa. In this event, Article XXIV 
approval for a SADC FTA would not be required. Such an option may not be unrealistic, since South 
Africa has been granted GSP benefits by a number of developed countries. 
Davies (1994: 12) suggests that the US considers the SACU CET to have become more restrictive 
to third countries, particularly since the 1969 Agreement. 
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continue to be regarded as falling under the grandfather clause. 
SACU countries remain WTO members in their own right.36 However, South Africa's 
developed country status has important implications for its less developed SACU 
partners. Developing and "least-developed" countries are often afforded longer phasing-
in periods to comply with WTO obligations. There are many such examples in the 
provisions of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. For example, the average tariff on 
agricultural products must be reduced by 36 per cent over a period of six years in the 
case of developed countries, 24 per cent over ten years in developing countries, while 
least-developed countries do not have to reduce their tariffs at all (Kumar, 1994: 53). 
BLNS membership of SACU therefore means that these countries are bound to the more 
stringent obligations required of developed countries with respect to tariff reductions, 
and, more specifically, to whatever "binding commitments" South Africa has negotiated. 
They consequently forgo some of their rights to more lenient treatment as developing 
or least developed countries (Blumberg, 1994: 7). 
Such a problem would not arise in the case of a SADC FT A, since there would be no 
common external tariffY This perhaps provides another reason, in addition to the 
problem of revenue-sharing considered in Section 1.2.1, for SADC to avoid a deeper 
level of integration. 
Further grounds for caution relate to the relative tariff levels of SADC member countries. 
According to the figures reported in IDC (1995b)' for example, the SACU CET is well 
below the SADC average in most sectors. This implies that if SACU were to join a 
SADC customs union with a CET set at the SADC average, it may have to raise its 
tariffs to meet the SADC CET, as would other countries in particular sectors. In such 
cases, as noted earlier, compensatory adjustments in favour of other WTO members 
could be required if any GATT bindings are violated. 
36 
37 
Under Article XXIV, a customs union notified to the WTO can itself be recognised as a WTO member. 
The European Union is, so far, the only arrangement which has followed this route, but also maintains 
individual membership. SACU could do the same, after proper notification (Kumar, 1995: 3). 
It has not been necessary to date to notify SADC to the WTO, since no tariff reductions have yet 
been implemented under the SADC Trade Protocol. However, once this process begins, notification 
will become necessary, given South Africa's developed country status. 
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COMESA seems to meet the requirements of an interim agreement leading to the 
formation of a customs union or FT A, under Article XXIV of the GATT. Further, all 
present members are developing countries, so that the organisation falls within the 
ambit of the 1979 enabling clause, under which the WTO need simply be notified of the 
arrangement, without any need for review (Blumberg, 1994: 25). If South Africa joined 
COMESA, however, the organisation would require Article XXIV approval. 
1.6 South Africa's trade negotiations with the European Union 
As shown by Mayer and Thomas (1997: 334-335), the European Union (EU) is a major 
trading partner for each SADC member country. Trade relations between the EU and 
all SADC countries except South Africa (SA) are governed by the Lome Convention, a 
trade and aid agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
states. Although South Africa's formal request for admission to the Lome Convention 
in November 1994 was turned down, its partial accession was ratified in April 1997, 
allowing the country to participate in the Lome re-negotiations, but excluding it from the 
trade provisions of the Convention (Graumans, 1997: 31). Instead, the EU proposed 
a bilateral free trade agreement with South Africa, involving reciprocal tariff concessions 
and covering, in accordance with WTO requirements, "substantially all trade" between 
the twO. 38 
The proposed SA-EU FTA will impact most directly on South Africa's smaller SACU 
partners, but will also have important implications for a SADC FT A. While the BLNS 
countries currently enjoy preferential non-reciprocal access to EU markets under the 
Lome Convention, their participation in a customs union with South Africa behind a 
common external tariff wall means that any concessions which South Africa gives the 
EU will effectively be granted by SACU as a whole. As Mayer and Thomas (1997: 337) 
note, this will transform BLNS preferential non-reciprocal access to EU markets into 
reciprocal access. Further, the reduction or elimination of duties on EU imports is likely 
38 The European Commission's specific proposal was that the FTA should cover at least 90 per cent of 
all trade, and that full reciprocity should be in place within ten years. It has been estimated that a 
90 per cent FT A would require the EU to eliminate duties on only three to seven per cent of imports 
from South Africa, beyond existing Uruguay Round commitments. By contrast, South Africa would 
have to eliminate duties on approximately 46 per cent of its imports from the EU (ERO, 1996; 
Kalenga, 1997: 2). 
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to have a notable impact on the common revenue pool, with adverse implications for 
government revenue in these countries. 39 
In the case of a SADC FTA, although effective rules of origin should prevent the re-
export of duty-free imports from the EU into South Africa to the rest of the region, 
competition from such imports (some of which are highly subsidised by the EU) in the 
South African market will constrain the rest of SADC's ability to exploit its own 
preferential access to this market (Keet, 1996: 560). 
While negotiations are still in progress on the SA-EU FT A, it was recently agreed that 
the arrangement will be asymmetrical, in the sense that the EU will lower tariffs more 
rapidly than South Africa; there will be special treatment for sensitive products and 
sectors; SADC countries will have equal or better access to the South African market 
than the EU; and provision will be made to support the costs of adjustment in the 
transitional period (Mayer and Thomas, 1997: 337). 
1 .7 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the essential features of existing southern African regional 
organisations and bilateral agreements, as well as their relation to the WTO provisions 
on regional arrangements, and the implications of South Africa's trade negotiations with 
the EU for both SACU and the proposed SADC FT A. 
It is apparent that, in existing regional arrangements involving South Africa, there is 
explicit recognition of the unequal size and levels of development of South Africa and 
its partners. In SACU, this is reflected in the revenue-sharing provisions of the 
Agreement and the provisions for infant industry protection by the smaller countries, 
despite their shortcomings. Similarly, a general feature of bilateral agreements involving 
South Africa is their asymmetry in favour of South Africa's regional trading partners in 
terms of tariff concessions granted. 
39 For a more detailed discussion of the implications of the SA-EU FTA for BLNS, see Kalenga (1997). 
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In Chapter 2, the focus of the discussion turns to outline the nature of these differences 
between the SADC economies more explicitly. Their implications for the formation of 
a SADC FT A will be considered in subsequent chapters. 
CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE SADC ECONOMIES AND THEIR TRADE RELATIONS, 
WITH INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
2.1 Introduction 
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This chapter describes some of the main features of the economies of the SADC region 
and their trade relations, with some international comparisons, as background to the 
analysis which is to follow. 
The case of SADC provides an extreme example of an attempt at regional trade 
integration among prospective partners differing greatly in per capita income, economic 
size and stage of development, and which together comprise a relatively small trading 
bloc. To illustrate this, the following three sections of this chapter describe the 
differences in per capita income, size, growth performance and sectoral structure 
between the SADC economies. 
Income per capita, reflecting diversity in the pattern of demand, is one indication of a 
country's stage of development. However, neither the stage of development as 
measured by per capita income (considered in Section 2.2) nor the overall contribution 
of manufacturing to GDP (outlined in Section 2.4) reflect the level of "advancement" or 
"sophistication" of a country's industrial sector, in the sense of its ability to produce a 
range of diverse products (Havrylyshyn and Civan, 1983: 119-120). Accordingly, 
Section 2.5 considers the comparative structure of manufacturing activity in the SADC 
countries in an attempt to assess differences in the level of industrial development in 
the region. 
The question which emerges from this discussion, to be considered in subsequent 
chapters, is whether, despite the inequalities described, it is possible that a FTA among 
SADC members would be mutually beneficial to South Africa and its partners, and that 
the benefits would be non-negligible. One reason this may be possible is that the 
importance of South Africa's SADC partners for South Africa's foreign trade, particularly 
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for its non-gold exports, is much greater than the size of their GDPs suggests. Section 
2.6 therefore examines the volume, direction and structure of southern African trade 
flows, with a particular focus on the two economies which dominate regional trading 
relations, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The discussion in this chapter is purposefully 
descriptive rather than analytical. 
2.2 Differences in per capita income 
Table 2.1 shows the per capita income levels of the members of SADC, as well as those 
of a number of other developing countries, derived from the World Bank (1995b, 
1997a). 
As the table shows, per capita incomes in the SADC region differ widely, with the group 
including two of the poorest countries in the world, Mozambique and Tanzania. In 
1995, Mozambique had the lowest recorded GNP per capita (US$80), while Tanzania 
was the third poorest after Mozambique and Ethiopia. Four other SADC countries 
(Malawi, Zambia, Angola and Zimbabwe) also fall into the World Bank's category of low-
income economies. Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and Botswana are classified as lower-
middle-income economies, with Namibia and Botswana tending towards the upper end 
of the category. South Africa and Mauritius are the only upper-middle-income SADC 
countries.' South Africa's GNP per capita of US$3160 was exceeded in SADC only 
by that of Mauritius (US$3380l, the richest country in the region. 
The relative poverty of SADC is underlined further by comparison with members of 
MERCOSUR2 and other developing countries listed in Table 2.1. The two richest 
members of SADC, South Africa and Mauritius, both had lower per capita incomes than 
Brazil, the second poorest member of MERCOSUR. Paraguay, the poorest member of 
MERCOSUR, had a GNP per capita of US$1690 in 1995, more than double that of 
Lesotho, also a lower-middle-income economy, and greater than the per capita incomes 
In terms of the World Bank classification, South Africa, as a middle-income economy, is regarded as 
a developing country. As noted in Chapter 1, however, it is considered to be a developed country 
in the WTO context. 
MERCOSUR comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Chile and Bolivia are associate 
members. 
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Table 2.1: Summary characteristics of the SADC countries, with international 
comparisons 
Area Population GNP per PPP estimates of Life Adult GOP 
capita GNP per capita expect. iIIit-
(thousands (millions) (US$) at birth eracy (US$mn) 
of square US=100 Int $ (years) (%) 
km) mid-1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995" 
Angola 1 247 10.8 410 4.9 1 310 47 - 3722 
Botswana 582 1.5 3020 20.7 5580 68 30 4318 
Lesotho 30 2.0 770 6.6 1 780 61 29 1 029 
Malawi 118 9.8 170 2.8 750 43 44 1 465 
Mauritius 2 1.1 3380 49.0 13210 70 17 3919 
Mozambique 802 16.2 80 3.0 810 47 60 1 469 
Namibia 824 1.5 2000 15.4 4150 59 - 3033 
South Africa 1 221 41.5 3160 18.6 5030 64 18 136035 
Swaziland 17 0.9 1 170 10.7 2880 58 23 1 038 
Tanzania 945 29.6 120 2.4 640 51 32 3602 
Zambia 753 9.0 400 3.5 930 46 22 4073 
Zimbabwe 391 11.0 540 7.5 2030 57 15 6522 
International comparisons 
SSA inc!. SA 24271 583.3 490 - - 52 43 296748 
Brazil 8512 159.2 3640 20.0 5400 67 17 688085 
Argentina 2767 34.7 8030 30.8 8310 73 4 281 060 
Paraguay 407 4.8 1 690 13.5 3650 68 8 7743 
Uruguay 177 3.2 5 170 24.6 6630 73 3 17847 
Mexico 1 958 91.8 3320 23.7 6400 72 10 250038 
South Korea 99 44.9 9700 42.4 11 450 72 <5 455476 
Thailand 513 58.2 2740 28.0 7540 69 6 167056 
Malaysia 330 20.1 3890 33.4 9020 71 17 85 311 
Indonesia 1 905 193.3 980 14.1 3800 64 16 198079 
Turkey 779 61.1 2780 20.7 5580 67 18 164789 
Portugal 92 9.9 9740 47.0 12670 75 - 102337 
Source: World Bank (1995b: 637-639; 1997a: 214-215,236-237,248). 
Note: "1993 for Swaziland. 
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of all but four of the twelve members of SADC. 
Furthermore, in SADC, the ratio of per capita income from richest to poorest nation was 
42: 1, compared to 8: 1 for the US and Mexico in NAFTA, and 5: 1 for Argentina and 
Paraguay in MERCOSUR (Table A-1 in Appendix 2).3 The divergence of per capita 
income levels in SADC is smaller in terms of the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
estimates of GNP per capita,4 which range from 13210 international dollars (Mauritius) 
to 640 international dollars (Tanzania), a ratio of 21:1 (Table 2.1).5 However, 
measured in international dollars, the ratio of highest to lowest per capita income within 
MERCOSUR is also reduced considerably, to 2.3: 1, and within NAFTA to 4.2: 1. Even 
in international dollars, thus, the spread between richest and poorest in SADC remains 
very high compared to these western hemisphere economic unions. 
The essential point of this sub-section, therefore, is that SADC is on the whole an 
association of poor countries which, as indicated by the wide range of per capita income 
levels, are at greatly varying stages of development. These factors could have 
significant implications for the feasibility of a mutually beneficial free trade arrangement 
amongst members of SADC. 
4 
Table A-1 also contrasts the disparities in GNP per capita within SADC to those within SACU and 
COMESA. The economies which make up COMESA are an even more strikingly heterogeneous group, 
with per capita incomes ranging from US$6620 for Seychelles to US$80 for Mozambique, a ratio of 
83:1. On the other hand, the corresponding range for the SACU countries is 4:1, a lower disparity 
than within either NAFTA or MERCOSUR. 
An important shortcoming of using GNP per capita to make international comparisons is the use of 
exchange rates as conversion factors from national currencies to the US dollar. The World Bank 
(1997a: 214-215) accordingly gives PPP estimates of GNP per capita, which have been included in 
Table 2.1. While GNP per capita estimates in "international dollars" differ significantly from those 
in US dollars, the ranking remains substantially intact, although there are some differences at the 
lower end of the scale. First to third poorest, ranked in terms of GNP per capita in US dollars, are 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Malawi, while in terms of international dollars the order is Tanzania, 
Malawi, then Mozambique. Note, too, that Botswana's PPP estimate of GNP per capita exceeds that 
of South Africa by more than 500 international dollars. Since GNP per capita on its own is an 
inadequate indicator of a country's level of development (Ingham, 1995: 13; World Bank, 1996: 224), 
Table 2.1 also contains data on life expectancy at birth and adult illiteracy rates in the region in an 
attempt to provide a more general picture of differences in levels of development within SADC. 
Note, however, the much greater difference between South Africa and Mauritius, the two richest 
southern African countries in US dollar terms. The corresponding PPP estimates are 5030 and 13210 
international dollars. The relative richness of Mauritius vis-a-vis South Africa is therefore significantly 
more pronounced under this measure. 
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2.3 Differences in economic size 
As Table 2.1 also shows, in terms of economic size (measured by GOP), SAOC is 
dominated absolutely by South Africa. Although Mauritius is the richest SAOC country 
in terms of per capita income, its population in 1995 was only 1.1 million compared to 
South Africa's 41.5 million, and its GOP only 2.9 per cent of South Africa's. After 
South Africa, the most populous countries in mid-1995 were Tanzania and Mozambique 
with 29.6 million and 16.2 million people respectively, but their per capita outputs were 
so small that together their GOPs were only 3.7 per cent of South Africa's. The two 
countries with the second and third largest economies in 1995, Zimbabwe and 
Botswana, had GOPs equal to only 4.8 per cent and 3.2 per cent respectively of South 
Africa's GOP. The combined GOPs of the other eleven members of SAOC was less than 
26 per cent of South Africa's GOP. 
South Africa, thus, is the economic giant of the southern African region. Its GOP, 
however, is relatively small by international standards. While South Africa's GOP in 
1995 was 46 per cent of the GOP of the whole of sub-Saharan Africa (including South 
Africa) it was only 48 per cent the size of Argentina's and less than one-fifth of Brazil's. 
In terms of the GOPs of member countries collectively, compared to other economic 
unions, SAOC is a very small economic bloc. 
What is being considered, therefore, is a proposal for regional trade integration involving 
a relatively large number of (mainly poor) countries, varying greatly in per capita income 
and economic size, and dominated by a country, South Africa, whose GOP in 1995 was 
about 19 per cent smaller than Thailand's, and, hence, not especially large. It therefore 
represents the case of a country which is large relative to its prospective partners in an 
economic union which is very small by world standards. 
2.4 Differences in growth performance and economic structure 
The economies of the southern African region also form an unusually diverse group in 
terms of growth performance and economic structure. 
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As Table 2.2 (page 39) shows, the growth performance of SAOC countries in the last 
two-and-a-half decades has been mixed compared to the averages for low-income and 
middle-income developing countries as a whole. None of the low-income members of 
SAOC has recorded GOP growth rates approaching the average for low-income 
developing countries as a whole. Mozambique and Zambia have performed particularly 
poorly, although the trend appears to have reversed in Mozambique since 1990. 
Tanzania has experienced fairly steady growth of around 3 per cent per annum for the 
three periods shown which, although below the average for low-income developing 
countries as a whole, compares favourably with the averages for the low-income 
countries excluding China and India since 1980. 
Amongst the lower-middle- and upper-middle-income SAOC countries, the growth 
performances of Botswana and Mauritius stand out, although growth has slowed in both 
countries since 1990. Real GOP growth in Botswana exceeded 10 per cent per annum 
and in Mauritius 6 per cent per annum between 1970 and 1990, and was over 4 per 
cent per annum in both countries in the period 1990-95. However, for both economies 
(as well as for Tanzania and Lesotho), this growth takes place off a very low base. 
South Africa's growth performance has been poor in both the SAOC and sub-Saharan 
African contexts. GOP growth rates fell and, in the period 1990-95, exceeded only 
those of Angola and Zambia, the two countries in which growth became negative. 
There is also great diversity in the production structures of SAOC countries. The 
contribution of agriculture to GOP in 1995 ranged from 5 per cent, for South Africa and 
Botswana, to 58 per cent for Tanzania. Manufacturing value-added (MVA) to GOP 
ratios varied from 3 per cent for Angola to 34 per cent for Swaziland (Table A-1 ).6 
Sector-specific growth performance in the SAOC region has been mixed (Table A-2al. 
In international terms, the agricultural sector in the region has performed comparatively 
poorly, with a few exceptions (the main ones being Tanzania after 1980 and Namibia 
in 1990-95), although agricultural growth rates have generally also been low elsewhere 
(Table A-2bl. Growth rates of industry in the SAOC region in the 1980s, and 
6 There is considerably less divergence in these ratios within NAFTA (4:1 for agriculture and 1.2:1 for 
manufacturing) and MERCOSUR (4:1 for agriculture and 1.5:1 for manufacturing) (Table A-1). 
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particularly of the manufacturing component of industry, tended to exceed those of the 
South American countries shown in the table, with the obvious exception of 
Mozambique and South Africa (as well as Namibia's non-manufacturing and Angola's 
manufacturing components of industry). In 1990-95, however, average annual growth 
rates in industry as a whole and manufacturing in particular became negative in Zambia 
and Zimbabwe, and remained so in Mozambique and South Africa. The manufacturing 
sector also contracted in Malawi, whereas Uruguay was the only comparator country 
to experience negative growth. 7 Nevertheless, in Lesotho, Mauritius and Botswana (the 
latter at least until 1990), the growth of industry, and especially of manufacturing, has 
approached or matched the performance of the rapidly-growing economies of Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. B 
It is, however, noteworthy that the rapid growth in industry or manufacturing 
experienced by SADC countries like Botswana, Lesotho and Mauritius in the last two-
and-a-half decades has occurred off a very low base. While South Africa's sectoral 
growth performance has been poor in comparison, it dominates the regional economy 
entirely in all sectors in absolute terms. For example, the combined value-added in 
agriculture of the whole SADC region in 1995 was only US$11.5 billion, of which 
US$5.5 billion, or 48 per cent, was accounted for by South Africa (World Bank, 1997b: 
138-140).9 
Notwithstanding the growth performance of some of South Africa's SADC partners, 
then, the point made at the end of Section 2.3 remains: a formal trade integration 
arrangement is being contemplated in southern Africa by a group of small countries 
dominated completely in all sectors by a comparatively large prospective partner country 
which, however, is itself small by international standards. 
9 
None of the comparator countries portrayed negative growth in the industrial sector as a whole in 
1990-95. 
The same can be said of the services sector in Botswana and, to a lesser extent, those of Lesotho 
and Mauritius. 
For an indication of South Africa's dominance in the southern African minerals sector, see ADB 
(1993c: 23-24). The comparative sizes of the SADC countries' manufacturing sectors will be 
considered in the next section. 
Table 2.2: 
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Average annual percentage growth rates of real GOP in SAOC, with 
international comparisons 
I II 1970-80 I 1980-90 I 1990-95 I 
Angola -9.2 3.7 -4.1 
Botswana' 14.5 10.3 4.2 
Lesotho 8.6 4.3 7.5 
Malawi 5.8 2.3 0.7 
Mauritius 6.8 6.2 4.9 
Mozambique -2.9 -0.2 7.1 
Namibia - 1.1 3.8 
South Africa 3.2 1.3 0.6 
Swaziland2 2.8 4.7 1.1 
Tanzania 3.0 3.8 3.2 
Zambia' 1.4 0.8 -0.2 
Zimbabwe 1.6 3.5 1.0 
International comparisons 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.8 1.7 1.4 
Brazil 8.1 2.7 2.7 
Argentina 2.5 -0.3 5.7 
Paraguay' 8.5 2.5 3.1 
Uruguay' 3.1 0.4 4.0 
Mexico' 6.3 1.0 1.1 
Thailand' 7.1 7.6 8.4 
Malaysia' 7.9 5.2 8.7 
Indonesia' 7.2 6.1 7.6 
Turkey 5.7 5.3 3.2 
Portugal' 4.3 2.9 0.8 
Low-income 4.3 6.0 6.8 
.. exel China and India 4.4 2.7 1.8 
Lower-middle-income 5.1 2.3 -1.5 
Upper-middle-income 5.9 1.3 2.6 
Source: World Bank (1995a: 164-165, 1995b: 636-639, 1997: 130-132); Jenkins et al. (1996: 42). 
Notes: 1 GOP at purchaser values. 
2 Own computations from World Bank (1995b: 636-639) and Jenkins et al. (1996: 42) for the periods 
1973-80, 1980-90 and 1990-94. 
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2.5 The size and structure of manufacturing activity in SADC 
The impact of the formation of a southern African FTA is likely to depend largely on its 
effects on manufacturing production and manufacturing trade within the region. The 
size and structure of manufacturing activity in the various SADC member countries, to 
be considered in this section, is thus of considerable importance for the outlook for 
trade integration in the region. 
The manufacturing value-added (MVA) of SADC as a whole was only US$30 billion in 
1994 (Table A-3). Although this accounted for over 70 per cent of the MVA of sub-
Saharan Africa including South Africa, it was small in comparison to most of the other 
developing countries included in the table. 
South Africa dominated manufacturing activity within SADC. The MVA of the other 
SADC countries combined was only 19 per cent of South Africa's MVA in 1994. The 
MVA of Zimbabwe, with the second largest manufacturing sector in the region, was 
only 5.8 per cent of South Africa's. 
The percentage shares of manufacturing in GDP in SADC and other developing 
countries, also shown in Table A-3, tell us little about the stages of industrialisation of 
the various member countries. Despite the relatively large proportional contributions of 
manufacturing to GDP in some of these countries, the manufacturing value-added of 
most of them is very small, as the table shows. 
As would be expected, given the small sizes of the MVA of the other members of SADC 
compared to South Africa, their manufacturing sectors are in general considerably less 
diversified. 
For all SADC countries, with the exception of Angola, Mauritius and South Africa, ISIC 
categories 311-314 (food, beverages and tobacco) accounted for more than 30 per cent 
of MVA in the period 1990-92 (Table 2.3). The Angolan case is explained by the 
overwhelming dominance of industrial chemicals, in particular of the petro-chemicals 
industry, which contributed 62.8 per cent of MVA in this period. 
Table 2.3: Structure of manufacturing in the SADC countries (percentage distribution of MVA), average 1990-92 
Food. Textiles Leather Wood Paper. Industrial Other Rubber Non- Iron Non-
beverages and and and printing chemicals chem- and metallic and ferrous 
and clothing footwear furniture and icals plastics minerals steel metals 
tobacco publishing 
Angola 18.0 1.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 62.8 0.0 3.0 8.2 0.2 0.0 
Malawi 44.6 14.4 1.6 3.5 6.4 4.7 10.2 2.9 3.4 0.0 0.0 
Mauritius' 27.0 51.0 8.0 1.0 1.0 b 5.0 b 1.0 c c 
Mozambique 50.1 20.3 1.9 5.7 3.8 2.7 1.0 1.3 5.6 0.1 1.8 
Tanzania 30.2 16.4 1.8 3.2 5.7 17.3 2.3 2.4 9.2 0.0 4.7 
Zambia 42.9 9.8 2.7 4.8 3.4 4.5 7.2 3.5 5.5 0.6 0.1 
Zimbabwe 30.5 13.1 2.5 2.8 4.8 3.2 4.4 4.8 3.3 17.4 0.5 
SACU 15.2 6.6 1.7 3.0 8.9 11.0 5.3 4.0 4.7 10.1 3.3 
Botswana' 54.0 9.0 - - 2.0 b 6.0 b - c c 
Lesotho' 71.0 12.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 b 6.0 b 2.0 c c 
Namibia' 65.0 6.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 b 7.0 b 6.0 c c 
Swaziland' 51.4 7.1 a 4.0 30.8 b 0.6 b 2.7 - -
South Africa2 15.3 5.8 1.4 2.8 11.0 11.3 6.6 4.0 5.0 7.2 3.3 
Zimbabwe2 40.2 11.0 2.6d 3.4 6.1 0.6 6.4 3.2 2.4 10.1· -
Source: IDe (1995a, 1995b); ADB (1993b: 251); eso (1993/4: 4-10). 
Notes: 1 1987 figures. from ADB (1993b: 251) for Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia, and from UNIDO (1992: 27) for Swaziland. 
21993 figures, from IDe (1995a) for South Africa and eso (1993/94: 4-10) for Zimbabwe. 
• Included in textiles and clothing. 
Metal 
products 
2.0 
5.0 
3.0 
1.6 
0.8 
8.0 
5.1 
6.8 
4.0 
3.0 
2.0 
-
6.4 
6.2' 
Machinery Other 
and manufa-
transport cturing 
equipment 
4.0 0.2 
3.4 0.0 
2.0 1.0 
3.7 0.2 
6.0 0.0 
6.9 0.1 
7.3 0.3 
16.5 2.6 
2.0 23.0 
- 2.0 
1.0 2.0 
3.3 -
17.8 1.9 
6.9g 1.0 
b Included in other chemicals. • Basic metal industries (iron and steel and non-ferrous metals). 
C Included in metal products. f Metal products and non-electrical machinery. 
d Footwear only (leather included in other manufacturing). 9 Electrical machinery and transport equipment. 
.p.. 
..... 
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ISIC categories 311-332, predominantly consumer goods industries,'o comprised 
between 48.9 per cent and 87.0 per cent of the MVA of all SADC countries, excepting 
Angola (19.8 per cent, for the reason stated above), and South Africa (25.3 per 
cent)." The ratio is highest for Mauritius (87 per cent in 1987) due to the 
predominance of textiles and clothing in its manufacturing structure. There are 
considerable variations in the relative importance of the textiles and clothing sectors in 
SADC countries: Mauritius is the extreme case, with textiles and clothing accounting 
for 51.0 per cent of MVA, followed by Mozambique (20.3 per cent), Tanzania (16.4 per 
cent), Malawi (14.4 per cent), and Zimbabwe (13.1 per cent), compared to only 5.8 per 
cent in South Africa (and 6.6 per cent in SACU as a whole). 
In the case of South Africa, ISIC sectors 351-356 (chemicals, rubber and plastics), 371-
381 (basic metals and metal products) and 382-385 (machinery and transport 
equipment) together accounted for 56.6 per cent of total MVA. Apart from the special 
case of Angola, the next highest ratio for these sectors was 42.7 per cent for 
Zimbabwe, due mainly to the importance of its iron and steel industry; followed by 
Tanzania, at 33.5 per cent, which had a relatively high ratio (17.3 per cent) for its 
industrial chemicals sector, and Zambia at 30.8 per cent due largely to metal products 
related to its copper industry, and to a lesser extent "other chemicals". The ratio for 
these sectors combined for Mauritius was only 1 0.0 per cent, the lowest of all the 
SADC countries.'2 
Thus, not only does South Africa have the highest proportion of its MVA contributed 
by sectors 351-356 and 371-385 combined, but its output is more diversified among 
these sectors. Other countries, like Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia, which have 
relatively high ratios for these sectors combined, generally have one important sector 
which stands out, usually related to a natural resource endowment. Only South Africa 
10 
11 
12 
These include food, beverages and tobacco; textiles and clothing; leather and footwear; and wood 
and furniture. 
The South African figure is for 1993. The corresponding share for SACU in the period 1990-92 was 
26.5 per cent. 
Industrial chemicals and/or other chemical products stand out in importance for a number of SADC 
countries. The extreme, special case already noted is that of Angola, where industrial chemicals 
account for over 60 per cent of MVA, followed by Tanzania (19.6 per cent for industrial chemicals 
and other chemicals together), South Africa (17.9 per cent), and Malawi (14.9 per cent). 
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has a significant proportion of MVA (17.8 per cent) in the machinery and transport 
equipment sectors. 
As the above suggests, the industrial structures of the other SADC countries and South 
Africa are by and large complementary. Zimbabwe's industrial structure, despite the 
dominance of iron and steel, is the second most diverse in the region, but still differs 
significantly from South Africa's. 
The question of whether the respective production structures of prospective members 
of a free trade area should be similar or dissimilar to one another, and hence competitive 
or complementary, looms large in the trade integration literature. Although, as will be 
seen in Chapter 4, the subject is controversial, competitiveness or complementarity of 
industrial structure is an important criterion by which the potential costs and benefits 
of regional trade integration are judged in the theoretical literature. It would perhaps be 
useful, thus, if it were possible to measure and express in a single number the similarity 
or dissimilarity of the industrial structures of prospective partners in a regional trade 
arrangement. 
One device for measuring differences in industrial structure is the index of regional 
divergence, which Krugman (1991: 75-77) has constructed for the major US regions 
and European Community countries, using industry shares in total manufacturing 
employment. His method was adopted by Holden (1996: 58-60), who constructed 
indices of national divergence for 1987 between South Africa and the other SADC 
countries, as well as Kenya, using sectoral shares of MVA from ADB (1993b: 251). 
Holden (1996: 58) defines the index of divergence Dj between South Africa and country 
j as: 
where 
and 
D. = r I S· - S. * I J I I 
Sj is the share of sector i in country j's MVA 
Sj* is the share of sector i in South Africa's MVA. 
The value of the index ranges from zero to two. If two countries had identical industrial 
structures, then sectoral shares of MVA would be equal for all i, and the index would 
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be zero. However, if two countries had entirely disparate industrial structures, then the 
index would be two (or 200 per cent), since each share in both countries would be 
counted in full (Krugman, 1991: 76). 
Holden's indices for the manufacturing sector were constructed using the ten ISIC 
groupings for which data were available from ADB (1993b: 251).13 However, a more 
precise picture of structural differences could be obtained using a lower level of 
aggregation (Krugman, 1991: 76). Table 2.4 shows indices of national divergence 
between SACU and other SADC countries for which data are available, based on the 
average MVA shares for the period 1990-92 for twenty-five ISIC categories from IDC 
(1995b).14 Holden's indices for 1987 are included for comparative purposes. 15 
For all countries for which data are available for 1987 and 1990-92, the index is higher 
in the second period. However, this will partly (and may substantially) be due to the 
greater level of disaggregation of the 1990-92 data, notwithstanding any changes in the 
sectoral composition of MVA within countries as a result of differential sub-sectoral 
growth rates between the two periods. The two sets of indices cannot therefore be 
used to give any indication of trend. 
It must also be emphasised that the above indices of national divergence do not permit 
one to state categorically that the manufacturing sector of one or other SADC country 
is complementary to or competitive with South Africa's. There is no specific value of 
the index which provides a dividing line between complementarity and competitiveness. 
In the absence of similar measures for other regional groupings, it is not possible to say 
whether the indices shown in Table 2.4 are high or low by international standards. 
13 
14 
15 
The indices were first calculated by Holden (1996: 58-60) between South Africa and all the COMESA 
countries for the main economic categories agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services. The data 
necessary to calculate the indices for the manufacturing sector alone were only available for the 
SADC countries and Kenya. 
While the average MVA shares in IDC (1995b) for the period 1990-92 are for SACU as a whole rather 
than South Africa, it is apparent from Table 2.3 that they correspond fairly closely to those for South 
Africa alone for 1993. 
Holden's (1996: 59) did not calculate an index of divergence between South Africa and Angola, 
possibly because the data in ADB (1 993b: 251) excluded Angola's petro-chemicals sector. 
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Table 2.4: Indices of national divergence between South Africa/SACU and other 
SADC countries 
I II 1987 I 1990-92 I 
Angola (0.64)" 1.18 
Botswana 1.28 na 
Lesotho 1.26 na 
Malawi 0.68 0.92 
Mauritius 1.26 na 
Mozambique 0.98 1.12 
Namibia 1.10 na 
Swaziland 0.95 na 
Tanzania 0.75 0.82 
Zambia 0.54 0.79 
Zimbabwe 0.51 0.62 
Source: Holden (1996: 59) for 1987, except Angola. Own computations from IDC (1995b) for 1990-92. 
Note: • Own computation from ADB (1993b: 251). Data exclude petro-chemicals. 
Table 2.4 thus only provides a ranking of the other SADC countries in terms of their 
similarity or dissimilarity relative to South Africa. It is noteworthy that for countries for 
which two indices (for 1987 and 1990-92 respectively) are available (not counting 
Angola), the ranking from most similar to South Africa/SACU to most dissimilar is much 
the same for both. The figures for 1990-92 thus confirm Holden's (1996: 58) 
conclusion that, of the SADC countries, Zimbabwe and Zambia's industrial structures 
most closely resemble South Africa's, though not as closely as the 1987 indices derived 
by Holden from more aggregated data suggest. Based on yet more disaggregated data, 
the indices of national divergence between Zimbabwe and South Africa (0.73 in 1985 
and 0.67 in 1990-92, not shown in Table 2.4) suggest a still greater degree of 
dissimilarity between the industrial structures of these two countries. 16 
The finding that the index of divergence is lowest for Zimbabwe and Zambia seems to 
accord with the discussion earlier in this section of the proportion of total MVA in the 
various ISIC sectoral categories. In the final analysis, however, the earlier discussion 
16 The latter calculations were based on MVA data from IDC (1995a) for South Africa and CSO 
(1993/94: 4-10) for Zimbabwe. 
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probably provides as good an indication as any of the degree of complementarity 
between South Africa and the other SAOC countries. As shown, there are significant 
differences between the respective sectoral structures of South Africa and other SAOC 
countries, including even Zimbabwe, suggesting, in the main, complementary rather 
than competitive structures. 
As noted above, similarity or dissimilarity of the respective industrial structures of 
prospective partners is one of the criteria by which the potential costs and benefits of 
regional trade integration are commonly judged. Its relevance, both in theory, and in 
particular to trade integration in southern Africa, is considered in later chapters. 
Another factor commonly said to have a significant bearing on the outlook for 
successful trade integration is the pattern of international trade of the prospective 
partner countries before the formation of the regional economic union. 
2.6 Southern African trading relations 
As noted in Section 2.3, the GOPs of the other members of SAOC are small relative to 
South Africa's, and the economic size of the region as a whole is small by international 
standards. Most of the economies of the region, including South Africa's, are relatively 
open, as measured by trade/GOP ratios, particularly compared to the Latin American 
countries (Table A-4). 
For instance, to illustrate this, although South Africa's GOP in 1995 was less than half 
Argentina's and less than one-fifth of Brazil's, its merchandise imports (US$30.6 billion) 
exceeded Argentina's merchandise imports (US$20.1 billion) and were almost three-
fifths of Brazil's (US$53.8 billion). South Africa's total exports (merchandise exports 
plus net gold exports) in 1995 were US$27.9 billion (with non-gold exports alone of 
US$22.3 billion), compared to the total exports of Argentina and Brazil of US$21.0 
billion and US$46.5 billion respectively.17 The rest of SAOC (that is, SAOC less South 
Africa), with average export/GOP and import/GOP ratios of 40.5 per cent and 45.9 per 
17 The figure for South Africa's non-gold exports comes from SARB (1996: S-80), converted to US 
dollars using the period average exchange rate from IMF (1996: 701). 
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cent respectively, had exports of US$13.1 billion and imports of US$14.9 billion. 18 
The total value of SADC's international trade in 1995 was therefore large relative to the 
size of the economies of the region. Of particular relevance to the problem of trade 
integration is the question of the size and structure of intra-SADC trade. 
2.6.1 Intra-SADC trade 
A complete set of data permitting calculation of the significance of intra-regional trade 
for all members of SADC is hard to come by. Table 2.5, showing the SADC countries' 
intra-regional trade as a proportion of total trade in 1993, has been constructed primarily 
from two sources which provide estimates of intra-SADC exports and imports (lDC, 
1995b; USAID, 1996: 65-66).19 Since the most significant bilateral intra-SADC trade 
flows involve SACU or Zimbabwe, use has also been made of comprehensive data sets 
for SACU and Zimbabwe's direction of trade from the Industrial Development 
Corporation of South Africa, Johannesburg, and from Zimtrade, Harare, respectively, 
converted from local currencies to US dollars using average exchange rates for 1 993 
from IMF (1996). 
USAID (1996: 65-66) provides matrices of bilateral trade flows between SADC 
countries for 1993 based on direction of trade data from IMF (1995). While the USAID 
data are fairly comprehensive, there are some important omissions, such as South 
Africa's trade with Zambia, and no data for Mauritius. In IDC (1995b), the gaps are 
more serious, since practically all bilateral trade flows which do not involve SACU or 
Zimbabwe (such as those between Malawi and Zambia, or Malawi and Mozambique) are 
reported to be zero. Further, there are no data for Mauritius, which was not a SADC 
18 
19 
In 1995, the non-gold exports of South Africa alone (US$22.3 billion) (SARB, 1996: S-80) were 
greater than those of SACU as a whole (US$20.6 billion) to the rest of the world (ROW) (see Table 
2.8 below). The figure for SACU of US$20.6 billion does not include South Africa's exports to the 
rest of SACU, but includes BlNS exports to the ROW. Since South Africa's exports exceeded 
SACU's exports in 1995, South Africa's exports to the rest of SACU in 1995 exceeded BlNS exports 
to the ROW. This was also the case in 1994, the most recent year for which these data are available, 
when South Africa's exports to the rest of SACU were US$4.7 billion (Obeng and McGowan, 1998) 
and BlNS exports to the ROW were US$3.9 billion (World Bank, 1996: 217; Table A-4). 
In Table 2.5, ES and MS are exports to and imports from SADC respectively; ER and MR are exports 
to and imports from the ROW respectively; while E and M are total exports and imports. 
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Table 2.5: SADC countries' intra-regional and extra-regional trade, 1993 
I II Exe0rts (US$mn) II Ime0rts (US$mn) II Total trade (US$mn) I 
Angola ES 3.24 MS 84.29 (ES+MS) 87.53 
ER 3968.33 MR 1581.21 (ER+MR) 5549.54 
E 3971.57 M 1665.50 (E+M) 5637.07 
(EStE) (%) 0.08 MStM (%) 5.06 (ES + MS)!(E + M) (%) 1.55 
Malawi ES 79.75 MS 260.53 (ES+MS) 340.28 
ER 273.78 MR 192.59 (ER+MR) 466.37 
E 353.53 M 453.12 (E+M) 806.65 
(ES/E) (%) 22.56 MS/M (%) 57.50 (ES + MS)/(E + M) (%) 42.18 
Mauritius ES 16.10 MS 231.90 (ES+MS) 248.00 
ER 1370.80 MR 1484.30 (ER+MR) 2855.10 
E 1386.90 M 1716.20 (E+M) 3103.10 
(ES/E) (%) 1.16 MS/M (%) 13.51 (ES + MS)/(E + M) (%) 7.99 
Mozambique ES 23.35 MS 498.76 (ES+MS) 522.11 
ER 175.95 MR 553.94 (ER+MR) 729.89 
E 199.30 M 1052.70 (E+M) 1252.00 
(ES/E) (%) 11.72 MS/M (%) 47.38 (ES + MS)/(E + M) (%) 41.70 
SACU ES 1885.59 MS 310.58 (ES+MS) 2196.17 
ER 21289.31 MR 17858.42 (ER+MR) 39147.73 
E 23174.91 M 18169.00 (E+M) 41343.91 
(ES/E) (%) 8.14 MS/M (%) 1.71 (ES + MS)!(E + M) (%) 5.31 
Tanzania ES 9.64 MS 51.15 (ES+MS) 60.79 
ER 449.44 MR 1253.41 (ER+MR) 1702.85 
E 459.08 M 1304.56 (E+M) 1763.64 
(ES/E) (%) 2.10 MS/M (%) 3.92 (ES + MS)/(E + M) (%) 3.45 
Zambia ES 44.58 MS 485.84 (ES+MS) 530.41 
ER 1123.42 MR 384.16 (ER+MR) 1507.59 
E 1168.00 M 870.00 (E+M) 2038.00 
(ES/E) (%) 3.82 MS/M (%) 55.84 (ES + MS)/(E + M) (%) 26.03 
Zimbabwe ES 446.27 MS 576.73 (ES+MS) 1023.00 
ER 865.79 MR 1231.77 (ER+MR) 2097.55 
E 1312.05 M 1808.49 (E+M) 3120.55 
(ES/E) (%) 34.01 MS/M (%) 31.89 (ES + MS)/(E + M) (%) 32.78 
Total SADC ES 2508.51 MS 2499.78 (ES+MS) 5008.29 
ER 29516.83 MR 24539.79 (ER+MR) 54056.63 
E 32025.34 M 27039.57 (E+M) 59064.91 
(ES/E) (%) 7.83 MS/M (%) 9.24 (ES+MS)/(E+M) (%) 8.48 
Sources: USAID (1996: 65-66); IDC (1995b, 1996); Zimtrade (1996). For table notes, see Footnote 19. 
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member at the time. Evans (1996) is the source of the Mauritius-SADC data used to 
construct Table 2.5. 20 
Table 2.5 therefore represents an attempt to construct as complete and accurate a 
picture as possible of intra-SADC trade using these various sources. The absolute 
values of total intra-regional exports and imports should, of course, be exactly equal. 
The discrepancy between total intra-SADC exports (US$2508.5 million) and intra-SADC 
imports (US$2499.8 million) is due to such discrepancies in the two main sources 
providing estimates of intra-SADC exports and imports (lDC, 1995b; USAID, 1996). 
Partly the discrepancies in these sources may be due to differences in exports and 
imports arising from differences in border valuation and taxes (USAID, 1996: 65). 
However, the difference between total intra-regional exports and imports shown in Table 
2.5 is very small, indeed negligible, and considerably smaller than in the case of the two 
studies referred to above. Despite the difficulties of using data from various sources, 
this fact seems to validate, and to warrant confidence in, the methods used in 
constructing Table 2.5 from the four sources described above. 
As Table 2.5 shows, in 1993, intra-SADC exports (the sum of exports by each member 
of SADC to other members of SADC) were 7.8 per cent of the total exports of members 
of SADC; intra-SADC imports (the sum of imports by each member of SADC from other 
members of SADC) were 9.2 per cent of the total imports of members of SADC; and 
intra-SADC exports plus imports were 8.5 per cent of total SADC trade. 
The intra-regional trade ratios shown in Table 2.5 exclude intra-SACU trade. A large 
proportion of trade amongst members of SADC takes place between South Africa and 
the other members of SACU. As Table 2.6 shows, intra-SACU exports and imports in 
1993 were both about 24 per cent of total SACU exports and imports respectively. 21 
This raises intra-SADC trade as a proportion of total SADC trade dramatically. Intra-
20 
21 
It should be noted that in Evans (1996: 9), the figures denoted as Mauritius' total exports and imports 
to and from SADC appear in fact to be imports and exports respectively. Further, Evans (1996) 
apparently does not attempt to reconcile differences between a country's exports to the rest of SADC 
with partner imports from that country. 
This is made up of South Africa's exports to BLNS (US$4234.56 million) and BLNS exports to South 
Africa (US$938.81 million). Intra-BLNS trade is evidently assumed to be negligible. Intra-SACU 
exports and imports are therefore both US$5173.37 million. The exchange rate used for conversion 
to US dollars is the period average for 1993, from IMF (1996). 
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SADC exports on this basis are 20.7 per cent of total SADC exports; intra-SADC 
imports are 23.8 per cent of total SADC imports; and intra-SADC trade is 22.1 per cent 
of total SADC trade. 
Table 2.6: 
I 
SACU 
Total SADC 
SADC countries' intra-regional and extra-regional trade, including intra-
SACU trade, 1993 
Exports (US$mn) II Imports (US$mn) II Total trade (US$mn) I 
ES 7058.96 MS 5483.96 (ES+MS) 12542.92 
ER 21289.31 MR 17858.42 (ER+MR) 39147.73 
E 28348.28 M 23342.37 (E+M) 51690.65 
(ES/E) (%) 24.90 MS/M (%) 23.49 (ES + MS)/(E + M) (%) 24.27 
ES 7681.88 MS 7673.15 (ES+MS) 15355.03 
ER 29516.83 MR 24539.79 (ER+MR) 54056.63 
E 37198.72 M 32212.94 (E+M) 69411.66 
(ES/E) (%) 20.65 MS/M (%) 23.82 (ES+MS)!(E+M) (%) 22.12 
Source: DTI (1996) for intra-SACU trade data, otherwise as for Table 2.5. 
The differences between the shares of intra-SADC trade in total SADC trade, excluding 
and including intra-SACU trade, indicate that intra-SACU trade is more important than 
intra-SADC trade involving the seven non-SACU members and SACU as a whole. From 
the point of view of the analysis of the effects of forming a SADC free trade area, 
however, it seems that it is intra-SADC trade excluding intra-SACU trade which may be 
more relevant, since the BLNS countries are already in a customs union with South 
Africa. So far as trade integration in SADC is concerned, the removal or reduction of 
trade barriers this will involve will apparently have no direct bearing on the access of the 
SACU countries to each other's markets. The formation of a SADC free trade area thus 
requires treating SACU as a single entity, entering into a regional arrangement with the 
seven non-SACU members of SADC. 
On this basis, as Table 2.7 shows, the degree of trade integration in SADC, as 
measured by these intra-regional trade ratios (8.0 per cent for exports and 8.3 per cent 
for imports in 1 994), is of the same general order of magnitude as in the Australia-New 
Zealand free trade area (ANZCERTA), the Andean Pact and COMESA, but is low 
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compared to all the other regional groupings shown in the table. 22 
Table 2.7: Intra-regional trade ratios for selected regional groupings, 1994 
(percentages) 
D Intra-regional trade/total trade Exports Imports 
EU 56.5 54.5 
NAFTA 48.4 37.4 
APEC 74.4 71.1 
ASEAN' 22.3 (5.0) 19.3 (7.0) 
ANZCERTA 8.8 7.9 
MERCOSUR 18.3 16.8 
Andean Pact 8.5 9.3 
CACM 20.2 12.6 
SADC2 8.0 8.3 
COMESA 6.8 5.5 
SACU3 18.25 (25.43)" 23.86 
Source: Page (1997: no page number); own computations for SACU. 
Notes: EU: European Union; APEC: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation; ASEAN: Association of South East 
Asian Nations; ANZCERTA: Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement; CACM: 
Central American Common Market. 
, Figures in brackets exclude Singapore. 
2 Excludes intra-SACU trade. 
3 1993 figure. Comprises trade between South Africa and BLNS, but excludes intra-BLNS trade. 
4 Excluding gold. 
Why is the existing degree of intra-regional trade in SADC (excluding intra-SACU trade) 
so low? Most SADC countries are mainly exporters of primary commodities sold on 
world markets and mainly importers of manufactured goods. Given the nature of their 
exports, as Table 2.5 shows, only small fractions of their exports go to other SADC 
22 The intra-regional trade ratios for SADC for 1994 from Page (1997) which presumably exclude intra-
SACU trade, shown in Table 2.7, are similar to those for 1993 in Table 2.5. Page (1997), following 
Anderson and Nordheim (1993), also relates a regional grouping's intra-area trade as a proportion of 
total trade to the group's share in total world trade to derive trade intensity indices. However, it 
seems that the absolute value of the index in any given year is not, on its own, particularly 
meaningful, since the maximum value an index can take differs between regions, depending on the 
group's share in world trade. It appears to be changes in these indices over time that would be more 
interesting. (I am indebted to Sheila Page of the Overseas Development Institute for these 
comments). 
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countries in the cases of Angola (O.1 per cent), Mozambique (11.7 per cent), Tanzania 
(2.1 per cent) and Zambia (3.a per cent). Exports to other SADC countries were 
relatively more important for Malawi (22.6 per cent), and especially in the case of 
Zimbabwe (34.0 per cent), whose manufacturing production and exports are relatively 
larger than in most other non-SACU SADC countries (Table A-4). After SACU, 
Zimbabwe had by far the largest exports to other members of SADC, and contributed 
17.a per cent of total intra-SADC exports. SACU (mainly South Africa) provided the 
great bulk (75.0 per cent) of intra-SADC exports, but given the size of SACU's total 
exports, this represented a relatively small proportion (a.1 per cent) of its exports in 
1993.23 The exports of Mauritius consist largely of manufactured goods (Table A-4), 
but perhaps due to its relative geographical remoteness, and the fact that it is highly 
specialised in traditional, low-wage industries, in which the other smaller members of 
SADC also seem to have a comparative advantage, exports to other SADC countries 
were also a relatively small proportion of the total exports of Mauritius. 
Imports from other SADC countries were relatively large proportions of total imports in 
Malawi (57.5 per cent), Mozambique (47.4 per cent), Zambia (55.a per cent) and 
Zimbabwe (31.9 per cent), but very small proportions of total imports in the cases of 
most other SADC countries (Table 2.5). Of the total intra-SADC imports of non-SACU 
SADC countries, a large proportion (a6.0 per cent) was supplied by South Africa. Since 
SACU's merchandise imports consist mainly of manufactured goods, given the relatively 
small level of manufacturing activity in the rest of the region, intra-SADC imports 
comprised a minute proportion (1.7 per cent) of SACU's total imports. As this 
discussion implies, SACU had a large balance of trade surplus with the rest of SADC. 
2.6.2 Direction and structure of SACU's trade, with particular reference to SACU's 
trade with the rest of SADC 
Since trade amongst SADC countries is dominated by South Africa and Zimbabwe, and 
since they are industrially the two most advanced economies in the region, it is 
instructive to consider the composition and direction of their trade in some detail. 
23 There is also reportedly a considerable volume of unrecorded trade in the region, particularly along 
the South African border. For more discussion, see Maasdorp and Whiteside (1993: 16-171. 
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SACU's trade relations, with particular reference to SADC, are considered in the present 
sub-section, while SACU's trade relations with Zimbabwe are considered in Section 
2.6.3. 
The discussion in these sub-sections is based on a detailed database of SACU's exports 
and imports at a four-digit ISIC level with each and every individual country with which 
it trades, provided by the IDC. The data in the tables referred to in the remainder of this 
chapter have been derived by the author from this detailed database for the purposes 
of the present study. Unless otherwise indicated, all other statistical information in 
these sub-sections is also derived from this source. 
Table 2.8 shows the percentage shares of SACU's non-gold exports going to various 
regions and, in certain instances, countries, in 1988-95. The bulk of SACU's non-gold 
exports goes to Western Europe, although this region's share of such exports declined 
significantly from 50.0 per cent in 1988 to 42.8 per cent in 1995. 
The second most important destination for SACU's non-gold exports in 1995 was East 
Asia, broadly defined to include Japan (but not China), which took almost one-fifth of 
SACU's non-gold exports in 1995. However, mainly because of a decline in the share 
going to Japan, the proportion of SACU's non-gold exports going to East Asia declined 
from 24.3 per cent in 1988 to 19.5 per cent in 1995. 
Of the regions listed in the table, the next largest market for SACU's non-gold exports 
in 1995, perhaps surprisingly, was provided by the non-SACU members of SADC. 
Furthermore, it is striking that the proportion of SACU's non-gold exports going to non-
SACU members of SADC has increased remarkably from 6.7 per cent in 1988 to 12.8 
per cent in 1995. Relative to the size of the economies of these non-SACU members 
of SADC, SACU's non-gold exports to them are clearly disproportionately large. 
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Table 2.8: Percentage shares of SACU's non-gold exports to each region/country 
Region/Country 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Australia and New Zealand 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.69 0.81 1.10 1.25 2.00 
Caribbean 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.24 0.24 0.56 0.22 
Central America 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.08 
China 0.24 0.48 0.42 0.41 1.22 1.21 0.96 1.20 
East Asia excl. Japan 13.47 14.76 15.23 15.22 12.97 12.59 13.01 12.28 
Eastern Europe 0.17 0.16 0.55 0.79 1.01 0.77 0.88 1.06 
Japan 10.81 12.22 11.48 9.78 7.46 6.32 7.34 7.24 
MERCOSUR 0.96 0.86 0.72 1.13 1.14 1.45 1.73 1.89 
Middle East 5.05 5.83 5.78 5.04 4.99 5.98 3.89 3.47 
North Africa 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.37 0.19 0.16 0.22 0.21 
NAFTA 7.93 7.64 6.39 5.81 7.39 7.99 8.44 8.77 
Oceania excl. ANZ 0.03 0.29 0.19 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 
SADC 6.69 7.71 8.60 10.49 11.35 10.90 10.68 12.84 
S.America excl. MERCOSUR 1.01 0.98 1.09 0.92 0.80 0.63 0.80 0.53 
South Asia 0.60 0.64 0.63 0.58 0.56 0.55 1.38 1.50 
SUb-Sah. Africa excl. SADC 1.92 2.26 2.76 2.23 2.44 2.67 4.09 3.88 
Western Europe 49.96 44.94 44.83 46.23 47.29 47.32 44.62 42.83 
I Total II 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 
Total non-gold exports 10996 11527 12194 13059 14880 15174 15170 20559 
(US$mn) 
Source: Own computations from IDC (1996). 
Note: ANZ: Australia and New Zealand. 
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The share of the non-SACU members of SADC in SACU's manufactured exports was 
higher in all years than their share of SACU's total non-gold exports, and has also 
shown a significant rising trend, from 8.9 per cent in 1988 to 15.4 per cent in 1995 
(Table A-5). This indicates that intra-SADC trade is mainly in manufactured goods. 24 
Table 2.9 shows that the composition of SACU's manufactured exports to the ROW 
(excluding SADC) and to SADC alone differ significantly. Iron and steel contributed the 
largest proportion (22.1 per cent) of SACU's manufactured exports to the ROW in 
1995, followed by chemicals (17.9 per cent), non-ferrous metals (14.1 per cent), paper 
and paper products (9.9 per cent), machinery (6.3 per cent), metal products (5.6 per 
cent), food products (5.3 per cent), and transport equipment (4.9 per cent). In the case 
of SACU's manufactured exports to SADC in 1995, however, the largest single sector 
was chemicals (26.3 per cent), followed by machinery (13.6 per cent). Iron and steel 
and non-ferrous metals, which feature so prominently in SACU's exports to the ROW, 
comprised much smaller percentages of SACU's manufactured exports to SADC (12.2 
and 1.8 per cent respectively), probably due to the significance of these sectors in 
Zimbabwe's industrial structure. The share of paper and paper products in SACU's 
manufactured exports to the rest of SADC (3.0 per cent) was also much lower than the 
share of this sector in SACU's exports to the ROW. 
Table 2.10 shows the proportions of SACU's manufactured exports in each sector 
which went to SADC in 1995. It is striking that in most sectors, excepting iron and 
steel, non-ferrous metals, paper and paper products, textiles, clothing, leather products 
and other manufacturing, SADC represents a relatively large market for SACU. SADC 
accounted for more than a quarter of SACU's chemicals and food products exports and 
almost a third of its total machinery and transport equipment exports. 
As noted earlier, SADC plays a much less important part in SACU's import trade than 
in SACU's exports. As Table 2.11 shows, in 1995, only 1.5 per cent of SACU's total 
imports were derived from the rest of SADC. The predominant sources of SACU's 
imports in 1995 were Western Europe (47.6 per cent), NAFTA (Canada, Mexico and the 
US) (13.5 per cent), Japan (10.1 per cent), and East Asia (excluding Japan and China) 
(9.9 per cent). 
24 Some 95 per cent of SACU's non-gold exports to SADC, worth about US$2.51 billion, were 
manufactured goods, and about 71.8 per cent of SACU's imports from SADC, worth about US$292.0 
million, were manufactured goods. SACU's imports of manufactures from SADC, thus, were small 
in absolute terms and relative to SACU's manufactured exports to SADC. 
Table 2.9: Composition of sACU's total manufactured exports (excluding sADC) and sACU's exports to SA DC alone (%) 
I II Total excluding SADC II SADC I 
Sector 1988 1990 1992 1994 1995 1988 1990 1992 1994 1995 
Food 7.29 8.01 7.15 7.00 5.33 5.76 8.20 10.35 9.19 8.53 
Beverages 0.42 0.62 0.92 1.98 1.53 1.66 3.45 4.36 4.23 2.60 
Tobacco 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.44 0.51 0.62 
Textiles 5.23 4.24 4.10 3.20 2.83 4.96 6.28 3.91 3.56 2.33 
Clothing 0.51 0.67 1.45 1.03 0.82 0.64 0.73 1.01 0.33 0.55 
Leather 0.63 0.91 0.94 1.72 1.35 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.07 
Footwear 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.21 
Wood 1.00 1.22 0.90 1.15 0.62 0.38 0.36 0.47 1.04 0.93 
Furniture 0.61 0.59 0.77 0.72 0.78 0.38 0.72 1.05 1.18 0.86 
Paper 9.30 8.42 7.42 7.16 9.87 5.07 4.31 3.29 7.04 3.03 
Printing/publishing 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.24 0.22 0.51 0.53 0.50 1.73 0.95 
Chemicals 12.40 9.84 14.20 16.66 17.87 22.29 21.51 19.29 18.88 26.32 
Rubber 0.28 0.19 0.29 0.42 0.53 1.82 1.59 1.73 2.01 1.74 
Plastics 0.23 0.28 0.39 0.51 0.56 1.66 1.44 1.44 2.16 1.51 
Pottery etc 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.16 
Glass 0.58 0.61 0.53 0.39 0.23 1.29 0.91 0.72 0.76 0.52 
Other non-metallic 0.26 0.57 0.79 0.96 0.94 1.37 1.68 1.62 1.68 1.08 
Iron and steel 30.90 32.22 27.39 27.29 22.07 10.30 9.25 6.91 7.44 12.18 
Non-ferrous 18.23 15.37 15.66 8.32 14.06 13.33 6.58 4.24 2.35 1.82 
Metal products 3.74 5.20 3.21 4.90 5.63 6.02 7.06 6.36 5.61 4.99 
Machinery 4.04 3.92 4.05 5.17 6.34 9.82 10.95 15.20 12.86 13.64 
Electrical machinery 1.15 1.67 1.59 2.31 2.49 2.99 3.81 3.99 4.04 4.72 
Transport equipment 2.17 4.23 7.18 7.73 4.86 8.35 8.89 11.40 11.49 9.47 
Scientific equipment etc 0.72 0.93 0.61 0.78 0.77 0.93 1.15 1.14 1.39 1.17 
Manufactured Exports 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Own computations from IDC (1996). 
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Table 2.10: Percentage share of SACU's manufactured exports to various regions/countries in 1995 (per ISIC sector) 
I Sector I ANZ EAS JAP ME NAFTA SA DC SAM SAS SSA WE Other Total % US$m 
Food 0.97 7.01 5.26 4.67 3.64 26.37 1.48 0.09 11.16 31.38 7.98 100.00 805 
Beverages 0.54 1.97 0.83 1.12 3.46 27.91 21.65 2.03 6.32 32.07 2.11 100.00 232 
Tobacco 0.12 2.82 0.00 0.00 0.01 64.29 0.00 0.00 26.90 5.19 0.67 100.00 24 
Textiles 4.62 16.92 4.87 2.89 9.72 15.47 3.48 1.83 2.86 35.23 2.11 100.00 374 
Clothing 0.45 0.77 0.01 2.06 30.91 12.97 0.14 0.00 4.28 47.64 0.77 100.00 105 
Leather 1.03 11.94 21.00 0.39 16.56 1.06 0.06 0.05 0.25 47.43 0.22 100.00 153 
Footwear 0.98 3.38 0.76 2.13 3.16 24.15 0.07 0.07 6.65 55.44 3.22 100.00 22 
Wood 0.48 16.18 3.19 1.56 7.94 24.84 0.71 1.47 10.01 33.29 0.32 100.00 93 i 
Furniture 1.64 1.94 0.22 2.27 5.83 19.72 0.15 0.09 9.66 57.40 1.10 100.00 109 
Paper 4.44 23.50 4.94 2.03 5.66 6.41 4.53 3.63 3.40 39.80 1.66 100.00 1178 
Printing/publishing 3.11 0.59 0.03 1.16 2.53 48.49 0.15 0.10 8.82 34.70 0.32 100.00 49 
Chemical 3.09 10.00 3.63 1.36 13.10 25.29 4.29 3.58 8.61 25.02 2.02 100.00 2588 
Rubber 1.60 4.93 0.10 0.81 13.20 42.31 1.53 0.27 9.75 24.82 0.68 100.00 102 
Plastic 2.19 3.50 0.24 2.89 2.54 37.49 3.09 0.42 10.29 35.84 1.49 100.00 100 
Pottery etc 1.19 0.61 0.76 8.65 5.17 50.14 0.68 0.00 7.51 25.06 0.21 100.00 8 
Glass 0.90 1.64 0.63 2.15 19.27 33.36 0.23 0.03 13.87 27.78 0.14 100.00 39 
Other non-metallic 2.10 11.48 16.42 7.08 3.54 20.22 2.26 0.25 6.99 28.86 0.80 100.00 132 
Iron and steel 0.89 23.87 11.58 5.51 13.29 10.96 2.52 3.28 3.57 23.22 1.33 100.00 2764 
Non-ferrous 0.82 17.64 15.01 2.55 23.72 2.80 0.39 0.94 0.62 33.33 2.19 100.00 1617 
Metal products 2.12 7.70 2.40 2.34 5.66 16.52 2.69 0.67 5.05 52.17 2.70 100.00 752 
Machinery 11.02 8.61 0.27 1.59 7.71 32.40 5.68 0.49 6.10 25.01 1.13 100.00 1047 
Electrical machinery 1.70 4.69 0.24 2.80 3.12 29.73 1.46 0.55 8.89 44.74 2.08 100.00 395 
Transport equipment 4.05 2.09 1.09 1.00 9.45 30.26 0.43 0.75 7.27 35.52 8.08 100.00 778 
Scientific equipment etc 2.63 9.16 0.94 2.13 12.96 25.36 1.16 1.58 6.00 35.43 2.66 100.00 115 
Other manufactures 0.24 4.86 0.32 3.54 3.56 0.83 0.10 0.04 0.11 86.27 0.14 100.00 2727 
Manufactured exports 2.38 12.22 5.37 2.93 10.14 15.39 2.56 1.70 4.68 40.56 2.07 100.00 16307 
Source: Own computations from IDC (1996). 
Notes: ANZ: Australia and New Zealand; EAS: East Asia excluding Japan and China; JAP: Japan; ME: Middle East; NAFTA: North American Free 
Trade Area; SAM: South America including MERCOSUR; SAS: South Asia; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa excluding SADC; WE: Western Europe. 
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Table 2.11: Percentage shares of SACU'S total imports from each region/country 
I Region/Country II 1988 I 1989 I 1990 I 1991 I 1992 I 1993 I 1994 I 1995 I 
Australia and New Zealand 1.03 1.30 1.13 1.33 1.45 1.42 1.61 1.82 
Caribbean 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.08 
Central America 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 
China 0.69 0.69 0.90 1.14 1.42 1.89 1.73 1.89 
East Asia excl. Japan 9.52 9.50 9.81 11.46 10.80 11.37 10.54 9.85 
Eastern Europe 0.38 0.31 0.36 0.44 0.84 1.05 1.44 1.13 
Japan 15.10 13.50 11.36 12.10 12.14 13.83 10.33 10.10 
MERCOSUR 1.60 1.85 1.67 1.60 2.18 1.51 1.78 1.88 
Middle East 1.30 1.44 1.06 1.03 1.02 1.39 4.67 8.22 
North Africa 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.39 
NAFTA 13.86 14.35 14.38 16.52 16.52 15.41 13.62 13.24 
Oceania excl. ANZ 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
SADC 1.49 1.48 1.54 1.51 2.29 1.88 1.96 1.50 
S.America excl. MERCOSUR 0.16 0.62 0.49 0.53 0.39 0.19 0.44 0.47 
South Asia 0.32 0.33 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.52 0.78 0.91 
Sub-Sah. Africa excl. SADC 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.38 0.36 1.06 0.91 0.85 
Western Europe 53.96 53.95 56.29 51.25 49.93 48.22 49.88 47.64 
I Total II 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 
I Total imports (US$mn) I 15259 14856 14779 15362 16291 16505 20677 27076 
Source: Own computations from IDC (1996). 
Note: ANZ: Australia and New Zealand. 
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SADC's share of SACU's manufactured imports in 1995 (1.2 per cent) was even lower 
than its share of SACU's total imports (Table A-6). 25 It is nevertheless interesting to 
compare the structure of SACU's manufactured imports from SADC with both the 
structure of SACU's manufactured imports from the ROW, and with the structure of 
SACU's manufactured exports to SADC. 
Table 2.12 shows the sectoral composition of SACU's manufactured imports from the 
ROWand from SADC respectively. As would be expected, in 1995, basic consumer 
goods imports (from food down to furniture in the table) are a much larger proportion 
(59.8 per cent) of SACU's imports from SADC than of SACU's imports from the ROW 
(11.3 per cent). Of the other individual manufacturing sectors, only in the case of 
rubber products, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and metal products was the share 
in SACU's imports from SADC greater than the share in SACU's imports from the ROW 
(probably due to imports in these sectors from Zimbabwe). 
As the discussion above suggests, there is also a substantial difference between 
SACU's manufactured exports to and imports from SADC, as Tables 2.9 and 2.12 
show. Some 16.7 per cent of SACU's exports to SADC consists of basic consumer 
goods (sectors 311-332), compared to the 59.8 per cent of SACU's imports from 
SADC. Of the other sectors, only in the case of printing and publishing, other non-
metallic mineral products, non-ferrous metals and metal products, are the shares in 
SACU's manufactured imports from SADC greater than the shares of SACU's exports 
to SADC. There thus appears to be a high degree of complementarity between SACU 
and the rest of SADC as a whole in so far as the composition of their trade with one 
another is concerned. This is what would be expected given the apparent 
complementarity of the production structures of South Africa and other SADC countries 
noted in Section 2.5 above. 
25 SADC's share of SACU's manufactured imports in 1995 in each ISIC sector is shown in Table A-7. 
Since SADC is a significant export market, but an insignificant source of imports for SACU, SACU's 
exports to SADC (US$2.64 billion) greatly exceeded SACU's imports from SADC (US$406.9 million) 
in 1995. SACU thus had a huge trade surplus of US$2.23 billion with the rest of SADC in 1995. 
Table 2.12: Composition of SACU's total manufactured imports (excluding SADC) and SACU's imports from SADC alone (%) 
I II Total excluding SADC II SADC 
Sector 1988 1990 1992 1994 1995 1988 1990 1992 1994 
Food 3.84 3.69 4.57 5.06 5.04 26.80 16.87 14.97 17.50 
Beverages 0.80 0.96 0.82 0.67 0.62 2.03 0.92 0.64 0.92 
Tobacco 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 
Textiles 3.70 4.28 4.15 3.56 3.27 10.37 16.05 16.21 15.72 
Clothing 0.45 0.42 0.54 0.46 0.34 3.75 3.93 3.37 4.94 
Leather 0.54 0.66 0.54 0.64 0.56 4.05 4.29 2.19 3.52 
Footwear 0.44 0.45 0.59 0.64 0.72 2.18 3.39 3.62 3.63 
Wood 0.74 0.82 0.79 0.80 0.73 4.07 7.25 7.51 7.61 
Furniture 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 1.13 1.16 1.56 3.31 
Paper 1.93 2.35 2.23 2.18 2.34 1.27 1.22 0.89 1.18 
Printing/publishing 0.96 0.94 1.21 0.89 0.80 1.38 0.78 0.50 0.38 
Chemicals 16.95 16.93 16.82 15.30 15.90 4.26 2.13 2.94 3.69 
Rubber 1.00 1.18 1.23 1.11 1.16 0.87 2.34 7.53 1.93 
Plastics 1.32 1.35 1.32 1.31 1.33 0.67 0.63 0.82 0.49 
Pottery etc 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.30 0.37 0.12 
Glass 0.44 0.52 0.55 0.46 0.46 0.05 0.29 0.08 0.30 
Other non-metallic 0.74 1.10 1.01 0.82 0.93 3.42 3.34 4.26 3.49 
Iron and steel 1.21 1.39 1.47 1.38 1.38 5.43 5.78 3.43 4.06 
Non-ferrous 0.79 0.95 0.88 0.80 1.51 2.72 5.31 5.87 6.91 
Metal products 4.38 4.30 3.96 3.04 3.11 10.10 10.50 12.44 6.72 
Machinery 26.05 25.91 24.48 24.56 23.12 1.80 2.03 2.35 4.06 
Electrical machinery 11.05 9.91 10.59 13.29 13.00 4.48 5.51 4.31 4.13 
Transport equipment 17.81 16.75 16.77 17.84 19.09 8.34 5.18 3.68 4.83 
Scientific equipment etc 4.53 4.77 5.10 4.87 4.28 0.60 0.75 0.39 0.47 
Manufactured Imports 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Own computations from IDC (1996). 
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2.6.3 SACU's trade with Zimbabwe 
As noted earlier, after SACU, Zimbabwe has the largest value of intra-regional exports 
and the highest intra-regional exports ratio; and its intra-regional imports are larger than 
those of any other member of SADC. After South Africa, too, it has by far the largest 
manufacturing sector in the region. The case of Zimbabwe, including its trade relations 
with SACU, thus, seems to warrant more detailed consideration. 
Some 96.7 per cent of SACU's exports to Zimbabwe consist of manufactured goods. 
Though somewhat less predominant, manufactures also comprise a substantial and 
increasing proportion (from 64.9 per cent in 1988 to 73.4 per cent in 1995) of 
Zimbabwe's exports to SACU. 
In 1995, the bulk of SACU's manufactured exports to Zimbabwe consisted of chemical 
products (22.7 per cent) and iron and steel (20.6 per cent), although as Table 2.13 
shows, the percentage contribution of iron and steel was unusually high in 1995. Other 
sectors contributing significant shares of SACU's exports to Zimbabwe in 1995 were 
machinery (16.4 per cent), transport equipment (11.6 per cent), electrical machinery 
(4.8 per cent), metal products (4.5 per cent) and non-ferrous metals (3.5 per cent), 
giving a combined share for these sectors (I SIC 372-384) of 40.8 per cent. The share 
of basic consumer goods sectors (lSIC 311-332) was 6.3 per cent. 
The largest contributions to Zimbabwe's manufactured exports to SACU, by contrast, 
were those of food products (22.1 per cent) and wood and wood products (11.2 per 
cent), with textiles (8.2 per cent), footwear (5.9 per cent), furniture (5.0 per cent) and 
leather products (4.3 per cent) also having significant shares (Table 2.13). These basic 
consumer goods sectors together comprised 59.5 per cent of Zimbabwe's manufactured 
exports to SACU. Chemical products (4.6 per cent) and iron and steel (5.5 per cent) 
comprised much smaller proportions of Zimbabwe's manufactured exports to SACU 
than of SACU's exports to Zimbabwe, and the combined share of ISIC sectors 372-384 
in Zimbabwe's manufactured exports to SACU was 21.3 per cent. 
Table 2.13: Composition of SACU's manufactured exports to and imports from Zimbabwe (percentage) 
I II Exports II Imports 
Sector 1988 1990 1992 1994 1995 1988 1990 1992 
Food 3.90 2.92 2.73 2.75 2.58 22.84 9.95 11.61 
Beverages 0.06 0.09 0.34 0.68 0.40 2.34 1.12 0.73 
Tobacco 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Textiles 5.54 10.12 5.12 3.95 2.31 11.87 18.43 16.37 
Clothing 1.00 0.70 0.21 0.12 0.19 4.32 4.66 3.48 
Leather 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.08 4.48 4.66 2.37 
Footwear 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.22 0.17 2.61 4.20 4.29 
Wood 0.15 0.20 0.37 0.48 0.29 4.33 5.12 7.54 
Furniture 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.23 0.24 1.33 1.43 1.83 
Paper 4.15 3.82 3.38 4.42 2.94 1.51 1.34 0.99 
Printing/publishing 0.25 0.34 0.32 0.84 0.67 0.36 0.69 0.57 
Chemicals 24.93 24.18 22.33 23.74 22.69 2.03 1.83 2.95 
Rubber 0.75 0.84 1.37 1.68 1.62 0.98 1.47 7.89 
Plastics 1.19 0.98 1.19 2.96 1.34 0.79 0.68 0.80 
Pottery etc 0.07 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.37 0.42 
Glass 1.15 1.07 0.58 0.54 0.56 0.06 0.34 0.09 
Other non-metallic 1.58 2.04 1.77 1.25 0.87 4.04 4.09 4.71 
Iron and steel 10.38 10.01 9.31 8.46 20.59 6.40 6.73 4.00 
Non-ferrous 18.10 15.57 11.95 5.26 3.52 1.66 6.29 6.04 
Metal products 4.18 5.48 5.67 4.69 4.48 11.93 12.61 14.50 
Machinery 9.59 10.50 16.71 15.81 16.40 1.36 2.11 2.31 
Electrical machinery 2.79 3.96 3.93 5.30 4.76 5.22 6.67 4.00 
Transport equipment 8.86 5.94 10.92 14.77 11.56 8.90 4.47 2.21 
Scientific equipment etc 1.15 0.99 1.38 1.60 1.59 0.39 0.70 0.25 
Manufactured exports 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Own computations from IDC (1996). 
Note: Excludes "other manufacturing". 
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According to Zimtrade (1996), in 1993,34.0 per cent of Zimbabwe's total exports went 
to other SADC countries. South Africa, with 14.4 per cent of Zimbabwe's total 
exports, was Zimbabwe's largest customer within SADC, and SACU as a whole took 
20.5 per cent of Zimbabwe's total exports. Other significant destinations for 
Zimbabwe's exports were her immediate neighbours, Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi. 
Imports from SADC comprised 31.9 per cent and from South Africa alone 27.2 per cent 
of Zimbabwe's total imports in 1993, with a further 3.4 per cent coming from other 
members of SACU (mainly Botswana), so that SACU as a whole supplied 30.6 per cent 
of Zimbabwe's imports (Zimtrade, 1996). 
2.7 Conclusion 
The main findings of this chapter are the following. First, SADC is on the whole an 
association of poor, economically small countries, which, as indicated by the very wide 
range of per capita income, are at greatly varying stages of development. Second, the 
respective industrial structures of South Africa and the other SADC countries are very 
different and hence apparently complementary to one another, but the differences 
compared to South Africa are least pronounced in the case of Zimbabwe. Third, as 
measured by trade/GDP ratios, the SADC economies are relatively open, so that despite 
the small size of their combined GDPs, compared for instance to MERCOSUR, the 
region's exports and imports are quite significant. Fourth, the degree of trade 
integration within SADC, measured by the ratio of intra-SADC to total trade (excluding 
intra-SACU trade), is low compared to most other regional unions considered above, 
though some individual countries (Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have 
relatively high intra-SADC trade ratios. Fifth, after Western Europe and East Asia, 
SADC was the largest market for SACU's non-gold exports, and SADC's share of 
SACU's exports of manufactures increased significantly in 1988-95, from 8.9 per cent 
to 15.4 per cent. However, SADC countries supplied only 1.5 per cent of SACU's 
merchandise imports in 1995. Sixth, there is apparently a high degree of 
complementarity between SACU and the rest of SADC as a whole in their trade 
relations, basic consumer goods, for instance, contributing 59.8 per cent of SACU's 
imports from SADC but only 16.7 per cent of its exports to SADC, with an essentially 
64 
similar trade complementarity between SACU and Zimbabwe, the country with the 
second largest economy and manufacturing sector in the SADC region. 
The question to be addressed in the remainder of this study is whether, given the 
features described above, a mutually beneficial free trade arrangement amongst the 
members of SADC, which will contribute to faster economic growth in the region, is 
attainable. 
CHAPTER 3 
SOME RECENT VIEWS ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
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There is a vast literature on the subject of trade integration in southern Africa, dating 
back several decades. Much of this literature has been concerned specifically with the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACUl, or in more recent times with COMESA 
(formerly the PTA) and SADCC. However, most recently, since the beginning of the 
process of political transition in South Africa in the early 1990s, research on this subject 
has become more directly concerned with the implications of a broader southern African 
economic grouping incorporating South Africa, the economically dominant country in the 
region. In particular, the implications of regional trade integration have increasingly 
become the focus of attention. The signing of the SADC Trade Protocol in August 
1996, referred to above, has given additional point to this question, which is also the 
particular focus of the present study. 
Despite the commitment of SADC members to a free trade area (FTA) in August 1996, 
the question of the likely effects and hence feasibility of a FT A among SADC countries 
is evidently at this stage in a controversial and unsettled state. Indeed, there is now 
apparently considerable disagreement on the desirability of such a FT A, although it 
appears that this has not always been the case. 
This chapter therefore examines the current state of the debate on economic integration 
in southern Africa. In Section 3.2, an attempt is made to synthesise the main features 
of the views taken in a number of recent studies on the viability of trade integration in 
the region. The aim of this chapter is to define as clearly as possible the strengths and 
weaknesses of the work on southern Africa published to date, with a view to a more 
in-depth analysis in subsequent chapters of the arguments, implicit or explicit, in these 
various studies, as well as in the general theoretical literature on regional trade 
integration, and empirical case studies of experience elsewhere in the world. 
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3.2 A survey of recent views on the desirability of a broader trade integration 
arrangement in southern Africa 
As Davies et al. (1993: 33) note, at the turn of the decade there appeared to be 
widespread support across the political spectrum for a regional integration programme 
leading to the formation of a southern African common market or economic community. 
Members of the South African government and business sector seemed to be in 
agreement with organisations such as SADC, PTA, the OAU, the United Nations ECA, 
the World Bank and others on the desirability of such a programme, although many 
different approaches lay behind the apparent consensus. 1 There was a tendency at the 
beginning of the 1990s to think that the economic case for a southern African economic 
union which included South Africa, and which involved, inter alia, free trade in the 
region, was almost self-evident, and that the formation of such a union had hitherto 
been prevented mainly by political factors. Gradually, however, more divergent views 
began to emerge: on the one hand, the position of South African officials and business 
became more tempered, while, on the other, regional organisations deepened their 
commitment to an integration programme which they hoped South Africa would join. 2 
Amongst the various attempts during the 1990s to deal systematically with the problem 
of regional trade integration, several of the more prominent, dealing specifically with the 
question of South Africa's incorporation into a SADC FT A or a yet wider regional union 
such as COMESA, are considered in this chapter. These are African Development Bank, 
ADB (1993)' Davies et al. (1993), World Bank (1991), Cassim and Zarenda (1995), 
2 
The business view was exemplified by comments made by Henri de Villiers, chairman of the Standard 
Bank, in Joffe (1990: 14), calling for a Southern African Economic Community and downplaying 
concerns about polarisation. In his view, natural polarisation was desirable for the sake of efficiency, 
and it would be quite possible to create structures within an economic community to distribute the 
costs and benefits more evenly. 
In an interview in 1992, for example, Chris Stals, Governor of the Reserve Bank, cautioned against 
the idea of "vast new common markets in Africa" on the grounds that "there's too great a divergence 
between the stages of development of the various countries, making it impossible to integrate the 
economies and placing a huge burden on the more advanced nations" (Financial Times, London, 17 
November 1992, cited in Davies et al., 1993: 33). A discussion document commissioned by the 
South African Chamber of Business in the same year was premised on the assumption that economic 
policy would "be pursued in the knowledge that the country's economic welfare depends far more 
on its ability to compete on overseas markets than on penetration of African markets", and that South 
Africa would not "readily cede sovereignty or resources to any supranational body" (Leistner, 1992: 
1 ). 
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Holden (1996)' and Mukherjee and Robinson (1996). Of these, only Holden (1996) 
appears to conclude unequivocally that a FT A in the region is undesirable, and that it 
would have negative welfare effects on the smaller member countries. However, while 
the other five studies all appear to favour trade integration, underlying them are diverse 
views on the likely effects of a full-blown, market-driven FTA. Mukherjee and Robinson 
(1996) see all the partner countries and the region as a whole benefitting. ADB (1993), 
Davies et al. (1993) and Cassim and Zarenda (1995) all appear to take the view that the 
smaller, non-SACU members of SADC would be adversely affected by a FTA, but that 
South Africa would benefit substantially. Even between the ADB (1993) study and 
Davies et al. (1993) on the one hand, and Cassim and Zarenda (1995) on the other, 
however, there seems to be a significant difference, as we shall see below.3 The World 
Bank (1991) supports a FT A in the region, but mainly, it seems, because it believes that 
this would facilitate multilateral trade liberalisation by southern African countries, which 
it envisages would be beneficial to them, rather than because of the likely benefits of 
regional trade integration as such.4 
Of the studies mentioned above, ADB (1993) is the most voluminous and detailed. 
Covering seventeen sectors from trade and manufacturing through to tourism, education 
and health, the three volume study considers the prospects and opportunities for 
economic integration in the subcontinent. The study envisages a regional programme 
4 
Whereas the first two of these studies apparently envisage that the gains to South Africa would be 
so large relative to the losses of the smaller countries that South Africa could compensate these 
smaller countries and yet remain better off, and that it should compensate them, Cassim and Zarenda 
(1995) are apparently sceptical about South Africa's ability to make good such losses if it is to benefit 
economically from the FTA. 
The survey in this chapter does not, in any sense, claim to be exhaustive. The aim is rather to 
provide an indication of the range of contrasting views in recent studies on the desirability and 
feasibility of a SADC FTA. A useful overview of recent research is given in Maasdorp (1995: 3-9). 
including the work of the Southern Africa Foundation for Economic Research (SAFER) and the Africa 
Institute for Policy Analysis (AIPA). The report on trade and investment for the 1992 SAFER project 
on southern African economic co-operation (Maasdorp and Whiteside, 1993), which includes the 
results of a survey of business views in the region on the usefulness of existing regional institutions, 
has been used elsewhere in this study. Two recent papers which focus on the provisions of the 
SADC Trade Protocol itself (Page, 1997; Mayer and Thomas, 1997) are drawn on in subsequent 
chapters. Other recent work has a particular SACU focus (Lundahl and Petersson, 1991; Mayer and 
Zarenda, 1994; Sisulu et a/., 1994). Lundahl and Petersson's (1991) substantial study on Lesotho 
in the Southern African Customs Union devotes two chapters to the theoretical analysis of trade 
integration, providing a thorough and systematic coverage of orthodox customs union theory and its 
extensions, as well as the non-traditional literature. Since its focus is specifically on SACU, it is not 
considered separately in this chapter, although it is used in the theoretical analysis in Chapters 4 and 
5. Major forthcoming studies include the results of an African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) 
project on regional integration and trade liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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incorporating elements of both trade integration and sectoral co-ordination. It concludes 
that integration and co-operation should proceed on "two parallel but connected tracks", 
the first being "sector coordination and cooperation" in power, transport and 
communications, environmental management and tourism, for example, which could 
proceed almost immediately, and the second being "market integration" which, "[g]iven 
the severe macro-imbalances which characterise SAR [the Southern African Region] 
economies at present ... will necessarily need to be more deliberate and cautious ... 
[W]hile an agenda for regional integration needs to be formulated urgently ... the pace at 
which regional agreement on major integration issues can be reached will be slower than 
the pace at which coordination can be achieved ... " (ADS, 1993a: 320-321). 
Although there is no quantification of the potential welfare effects of such a 
programme, "[t]he Study as a whole ... determines that there is likely to be a significant 
welfare gain emanating from regionalisation" (ADS, 1993a: 319). However, it 
envisages that the benefits of a full-blown FT A would be unequally distributed, and 
would accrue mainly to the more industrialised countries, in particular to South Africa, 
so that some forms of intervention at a supra-national or regional level would be 
necessary to prevent adverse effects on the other countries, or to compensate them for 
these effects. On this issue they state: 
" ... without in-built design of compensatory mechanisms to distribute these regional gains 
(Le. a regional investment and development policy) the pattern of their accrual, left to 
market forces alone, would mainly benefit South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Zimbabwe 
in the short and medium term. This pattern would be reinforced, at least until such time 
as major project investments in power, water and agricultural development in the region's 
northerly parts began to bear fruit, and other countries began to benefit from sales of 
their resources to the southerly parts" (ADB, 1993a: 319). 
The approach taken should therefore be "allowed to incorporate some elements of a 
'regional policy' which would be designed to influence, through incentives, the 
allocation and location of investment even at the cost of some loss from the full benefits 
of integration" (ADS, 1993a: 362).5 Such intervention should not, however, be 
pervasive: 
"Irrespective of the way in which the issue of equity is handled in the process of future 
integration in SAR, a strong interventionist thrust towards planning resource allocation 
and investment on a regional basis, as occasionally suggested by SADC, would seem to 
It notes that "[tjo the extent that this induces production in higher cost areas, such a policy would 
involve efficiency costs and would thus reduce the net benefits from integration" (ADB, 1993a: 303). 
be impracticable, inconsistent with SAPs, and untimely... Of course, significant public 
intervention will be necessary in southern Africa if [regional integration] is to be achieved. 
But outside a strictly limited public sector, its role must be to create the regional policy 
environment that will enable market-based integration to work" (ADB, 1993a: 303-304). 
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Thus, while essentially premised on a market-driven approach to integration, the study 
acknowledges a role for intervention in the operation of market forces (Keet, 1994: 2). 
But, for the reasons which they give, this role is seen as limited, and presumably 
insufficient to compensate the smaller members of SADC fully for the adverse impact 
on them of market-based trade integration. The study therefore does not propose a full-
blown FT A, but a highly asymmetrical arrangement in terms of which the onus for tariff 
cuts would fall more heavily on South Africa, at least initially. The study states: 
"Accelerated progress needs to be made on the PTA timetable for tariff cuts with tariffs 
on intra-SAR trade being reduced to zero as quickly as possible. The exceptions would 
be for manufactured goods from RSA and Zimbabwe (and possibly Kenya), which may 
require the application of a special regime of low tariffs for an interim period to allow time 
for other SAR countries to adjust and compete" (ADB, 1993a: 310). 
Although South Africa is not the only country singled out in this passage (the list is in 
fact extended elsewhere by the ADB (1993a: 269) to include Mauritius), the particular 
emphasis in the study is on asymmetry vis-a-vis South Africa. 6 
More careful consideration is therefore given to the impact of South Africa's 
participation in a regional union: "RSA's entry into PTA or even a more confined SADC 
market on the same terms as other members could have negative effects in achieving 
efficiency gains and retard the emergence of a more reasonable distribution of regional 
industrial capacity if its market share was increased at the expense of other regional 
exporters" (ADB, 1993a: 322). The study's specific proposal to minimise the impact 
on other emerging regional producers is "for a regional tariff regime vis-a-vis RSA which 
restricted cuts to 50 per cent of those applied within the PTA for a transitional period 
The study notes that such asymmetry is a feature of South Africa's bilateral agreements with other 
SADC states. However, it questions the contribution these bilaterals could make to a market 
integration programme in their present form, since they do not specifically address non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs), which it views as the main constraint on expanding intra-regional trade (ADB, 1993a: 291). 
While the ADB (1993a: 290) notes that the effect of tariffs will become more prominent as NTBs 
such as import quotas and licensing are removed in the process of structural adjustment, NTBs have 
been more broadly defined to include, inter alia, foreign exchange shortages, the lack of convertible 
currencies, overvalued exchange rates, and transport problems and costs (Maasdorp, 1995: 10-11). 
Inability to pay, as a consequence of foreign exchange shortages and non-convertible currencies, is 
a more significant constraint on expanding trade between South Africa and the rest of the region, 
since quantitative restrictions have been substantially relaxed in South Africa (Bell, 1993). For more 
discussion on NTBs in the region, see Maasdorp and Whiteside (1993: 18-23). 
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of ten years. Such a measure would still give RSA preferential access to the regional 
market relative to ROW. But it would restrict the potential negative effects of increased 
RSA exports to the region on the industries of other SAR countries" (ADB, 1993a: 322). 
Thus, while South African products sold in the rest of the region would face a 
preferential tariff which is gradually reduced over time, "products from the rest of the 
region should enter South Africa free of tariffs. This asymmetry would be part of the 
compensatory mechanism for achieving equity and inter-dependence. It would reduce 
pressure to achieve equity via cash transfers" (ADB, 1993a: 266-267). Fiscal 
compensation (as employed in SACUl is, on its own, "unlikely to be attractive to the 
less advanced countries, unless it is so generous that it is also unattractive to the more 
advanced countries who will constitute the net contributors" (ADB, 1993a: 303). The 
preferred alternative compensatory mechanism appears to be the proposed regional 
policy, designed to influence the allocation of investment by incentives. But, as noted 
above, the ADB apparently sees the scope for this as too limited to provide sufficient 
compensation on its own. 
Factor mobility is also regarded as important in this respect. The study argues that 
"[t]he trade deficits that other SAR countries are likely to incur vis-a-vis RSA and 
Zimbabwe will need to be offset by capital inflows and remittance[s]. .. in the medium 
term" (ADB, 1993a: 319).7 
The question of the appropriate tariff regime vis-a-vis South Africa aside, the study 
recommends what it calls "multi-speed market integration" in accordance with what has 
become known as the "variable geometry" of the region. Any attempt at market 
integration on a uniform basis would hold back a group of countries which may be able 
to integrate more quickly. As a more flexible approach, "it would be possible to 
envisage a core group prepared to implement or maintain a customs union with a 
common external tariff". At the same time, "[a] wider group at the periphery might 
constitute itself as a free trade area, and be linked with the former in a free trade 
agreement along the lines of the EC-EFTA arrangement" (ADB, 1993a: 295). A revised 
SACU within a broader, less integrated arrangement such as a SADC PTA or FTA would 
This point is also raised by Cassim and Zarenda (1995: 22-23). 
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be an example. 8 
The ADB study considers the evolution of an appropriate institutional framework for the 
implementation of its integration strategy (Keet, 1994: 3-4; Maasdorp, 1995: 3-4). 
Two elements are important here. The first is the role of existing regional organisations, 
specifically SACU-CMA, SADC and COMESA, and how to resolve the existing conflict 
between them (ADB, 1993a: 358-362).9 The second is whether a southern African 
bloc should seek special relations with countries and other regional blocs beyond the 
subcontinent. The ADB suggests that "[n]ew kinds of external links ... may be needed 
if intra-regional trade and investment ... and ultimately outward-oriented policies are to 
be promoted. A revised form of SAR association with the EC involving some reciprocal 
arrangements could have several beneficial effects in making commitments to trade 
Iiberalisation virtually irreversible and encouraging intra-SAR trade and cross-border 
investment" (ADB, 1993a: 363).10 
The ADB study evidently considers that the incorporation of South Africa into a regional 
union would contribute significantly to its prospects for success: "The entry of a 
democratic RSA into the regional community ... multiplies, by several times, the potential 
for economic gains to be accrued both from expanding the regional market, and from 
cooperating on infrastructural investment and sectoral developments, in a SAR that 
includes RSA ... " (ADB, 1993: 286). 
In essence, thus, the view of the ADB (1993) is that a market-based, full-blown FTA 
among SADC countries would not be beneficial to all the partner countries. The 
benefits would accrue mainly to South Africa, while most of the other countries would 
incur significant losses. However, implicit in the ADB study is that the potential gains 
to South Africa from such a market-based FT A would be such that it could afford to 
more than compensate the losers (through regional policies, by enhancing factor 
10 
The implementation of a PTA or FT A (although not easy in itself, as the experience of COMESA 
shows) would reduce the need for compensation either for revenue losses or loss of fiscal discretion 
(ADB, 1993a: 294-295). 
One other institutional proposal is a possible wider regional role for the South Africa-based 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). 
Some of the implications of such an association for SACU and SADC were considered in Section 1.6 
above. 
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mobility, and by agreeing to a highly asymmetrical programme of tariff cuts); and that 
it should in fact provide such compensation. 
A study undertaken by the Macroeconomic Research Group (MERG), like the ADB study, 
also has a strong focus on the role South Africa could (and in their view ought to) play 
in a regional arrangement. However, the MERG report (Davies et al., 1993) provides 
a more forceful argument for the benefits which South Africa itself could obtain from 
such participation. 
Davies et al. (1993: 3) reject the common perception that, given the small size of the 
SADC economies, the benefits for South Africa would be of only marginal significance 
in its efforts to promote growth and development. Like the ADB, they stress the 
region's importance as a destination for South Africa's manufactured exports. 
However, they consider in more detail the potential benefits for South Africa from closer 
co-operation in regional natural resource and infrastructural projects (particularly regional 
water projects); construction and engineering contracting; minerals and mining (with a 
focus on the potential for resource-based industrialisation with a regional dimension, 
which could yield significant economies of scale); agriculture and food security; and 
technical, scientific and managerial areas (Davies et al., 1993: 3-12). 
Davies etal. (1993: 22) also envisage increased exports to South Africa as "potentially 
making a significant contribution to efforts by neighbouring states to restructure their 
economies on a more productive and competitive basis". However, in reaching this 
conclusion, they (like the ADB) clearly have in mind something very different from a 
FT A, or indeed even from a PTA. They rather envisage an asymmetrical arrangement 
providing for "greater access to the South African market for a range of their 
[neighbouring countries'] products" which would "also contribute towards creating a 
more balanced trade relationship", 11 together with "an agreed regional development 
programme which would ... very likely involve some special provisions, incentives and 
allocation of regional funds to encourage the channelling of investment to the most 
impoverished areas" (Davies etal., 1993: 22-25). This would include "programmes to 
promote a more balanced location of industries and a more equitable distribution of 
" 
This would involve "not only a lowering of tariff barriers, but also much more real and effective 
access to the South African market for a range of manufactured goods as well as agricultural 
products and raw materials" which have been subject to NTBs (Davies et al., 1993: 23). 
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investment; some financial, technical and other contribution by South Africa to regional 
programmes; [and] more equitable arrangements in a range of existing relations and 
institutions ... " (Davies et al., 1 993: 22). 
The MERG report appears to favour what it calls a "modified development integration 
approach" to regional relations (Davies et al., 1993: 43). Under development 
integration, trade integration is complemented by "efforts to promote coordinated 
regional industrial development; the establishment of regional funds or banks giving 
special priority to the least developed members; measures to give less developed 
members greater preference in access to regional markets and facilities and a longer 
period to reduce tariffs" (Davies et al., 1993: 37). In explaining its proposal for a 
modified approach, the report argues that pressures for market integration, together 
with the failure or lack of progress of schemes based on the project co-operation and 
development integration models, indicate the need for their modification or extension. 
Project co-operation, while important, is not regarded as sufficient basis, on its own, for 
the promotion of regional integration, as it addresses neither trade issues nor questions 
such as currency convertibility.12 The development integration approach should be 
modified to "promote greater political commitment", by involving constituencies other 
than the business sector, such as organised labour (Davies et al., 1993: 40-41). 
Other elements of the report's proposed regional programme include "[t]he 
establishment of funds to stimulate retraining and investment in depressed regions and 
provide assistance to disadvantaged regions and groups ... ; [a] reform of immigration 
laws to protect those forced by political or economic necessity to live outside their own 
countries ... ; [and t]he creation of space within integration agreements to allow for some 
management of trade and a level of protection, at least on an interim basis ... " (Davies 
et al., 1993: 42). 
Davies et al. (1993: 46) argue that "[t]he real issue is ... to identify that combination of 
cooperation, coordination and integration, realistic and feasible under prevailing 
conditions, which can best advance the goals of contributing to growth and 
development". In their view, disparities in the size and levels of development of the 
12 The project approach to economic integration is outlined in Balassa and Stoutjesdijk (1975), and is 
broadly agreed to have informed the former SADCC's approach to economic co-operation. 
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economies of the region imply that "a laissez faire approach towards promoting 
integration could well reproduce or even exacerbate tendencies towards polarisation ... " 
(Davies etal., 1993: 47). To promote a more balanced pattern of regional development, 
South Africa's partners might be expected to push for "measures to empower the least 
developed countries to participate more effectively in regional trade; special incentives 
to encourage investment in the least developed areas and various other devices to tilt 
the balance of advantage in favour of the least developed partners in key areas" (Davies 
et al., 1993: 47). 
Davies et al. (1993) do show an awareness that South Africa's capacity, on its own, 
to support such an ambitious programme of economic development in the region as a 
whole is not unlimited. They note that a regional integration programme could "flounder 
if it becomes merely a mechanism for weaker partners to place ever increasing demands 
on the stronger", and that" ... a democratic South Africa will not have the resources to 
sustain on its own an ambitious regional programme" (Davies et al., 1993: 47). They 
argue, therefore, that it must be "supported by external resources, particularly to 
finance programmes aimed at the most impoverished countries" (Davies et al., 1993: 
48). Nevertheless, as several of the remarks of Davies et al. (1993)' quoted above, 
make clear, they envisage substantial unreciprocated concessions by, and resource 
transfers from, South Africa to other members of SADC. Despite this, it appears that 
they believe that such arrangements would still leave South Africa as a net beneficiary, 
for they state that "the principle of mutual benefit ... must underpin a regional 
programme" (Davies et al., 1993: 48). 
Like the ADB study, thus, Davies et al. (1993) are of the view that the formation of a 
market-based free trade arrangement amongst southern Africa countries would result 
in substantial benefits for South Africa, but would be detrimental to its smaller and 
poorer partners. A highly asymmetrical arrangement involving significant trade and 
other concessions (including reform of immigration laws), as well as unrequited resource 
transfers, will need to be provided by South Africa to prevent its partners losing from 
regional integration. As their stipulation of the "principle of mutual benefit" suggests, 
Davies et al. (1993) apparently believe that, despite these concessions and transfers, 
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South Africa would on balance emerge as a net beneficiary of such an arrangement. 13 
Cassim and Zarenda's (1995) conclusion about the likely effects of a FTA is essentially 
the same as that of the ADB (1993) and Davies et al. (1993)' in that it also envisages 
that South Africa would gain and its smaller, and poorer, partners would lose. They 
state: 
"Although regional integration agreements ... could bring potentially large benefits to the 
Southern African economy, the asymmetry between South Africa and the rest of the 
region, the diverse macro-economic behaviour of SADC countries, limited and uneven 
industrial capabilities and highly dispersed tariff could readily abort a fully-fledged market 
driven regional programme" (Cassim and Zarenda, 1995: 30). 
Cassim and Zarenda (1995) thus apparently regard the large size and relatively 
advanced stage of development of South Africa compared to its prospective partners 
as an obstacle to trade integration in southern Africa. Like the ADB (1993) and Davies 
et al. (1993), they envisage that measures would be needed "to ensure that the 
differential impact on the gross domestic product does not aggravate disparities in 
productivity per capita and real incomes among the populations of different countries" 
(Cassim and Zarenda, 1995: 22). However, there is an important difference between 
the position taken by Cassim and Zarenda (1995), on the one hand, and ADB (1993) 
and Davies etal. (1993) on the other. Cassim and Zarenda (1995: 23) are apparently 
doubtful whether South Africa could bear the burden of the highly asymmetrical 
arrangement which they see as necessary if the smaller and poorer countries are not to 
lose as a result of regional integration. They argue that" ... South Africa's dilemma 
stems from the difficulty it faces addressing gross inequalities within the country ... 
While South Africa, as the giant of the region, has to shoulder the responsibility of 
ensuring regional economic development, the high level of unemployment in the country 
constrains South Africa's ability to transfer wealth to the region" (Cassim and Zarenda, 
1995: 23). Further, " ... this asymmetry between South Africa and the rest of the region 
puts undue burden on an economy that itself is fragile by international standards" 
(Cassim and Zarenda, 1995: 30). 
By contrast with all three studies considered so far, Holden (1996) comes out strongly 
against southern African trade integration. She focuses on the likely effects of South 
13 Like the ADS (1993), Davies et al. (1993: 49-59) give detailed consideration to the appropriate 
institutional framework for such a regional programme. 
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Africa joining COMESA, but her conclusions are apparently also intended to apply to any 
customs union or free trade area in the region. She concludes that, given the 
composition of trade in the region, the main likely effect of South Africa joining 
COMESA, with the adoption of a common external tariff, would be trade diversion, with 
large, adverse redistributive effects from other members to South Africa. These 
redistributive benefits to South Africa notwithstanding, Holden (1996) takes the view 
that since South Africa's main trading partners are the high income, developed countries 
of the world, South Africa has little incentive to seek preferential treatment in the 
region, and that, whereas the costs to the smaller members of a southern African 
regional trading bloc are likely to be large, the benefits for South Africa would be 
minimal. Holden (1996: 64) concludes that "preferential trading arrangements are no 
substitute for multilateral trade liberalization particularly when the preferences are given 
to a more dominant economy". 
In that it states a preference for multilateral trade liberalisation, Holden's (1996) view 
is similar to that of the World Bank (1991). By contrast with Holden, the World Bank 
(1991) gives some support for a FTA in the region, but mainly, it seems, because it is 
believed that this would facilitate multilateral trade liberalisation by sub-Saharan Africa, 
rather than because of the likely benefits of regional trade integration as such. The 
study states that while "temporary increases in regional preferences are acceptable", 
this should occur within the context of a "general and significant lowering of external 
protection", which would ensure that "regional preference would indeed be temporary" 
(World Bank, 1991: paragraph 15, cited in Davies et al., 1993: 38). The report's basic 
premise thus appears to be that "regional trade liberalisation should be an intermediary 
stage towards generalliberalisation" , with the central aim being the" greater integration 
of Africa into the world trading system" (World Bank, 1991: paragraphs 14 and 
76.6.18, cited in Keet, 1994: 8). The World Bank study thus promotes regional 
integration in Africa "only [as] a useful means" towards the promotion of generalised 
liberalisation (World Bank, 1991: paragraph 2.12, cited in Keet, 1994: 8). 
Contrasting sharply with the studies discussed above is that of Mukherjee and Robinson 
(1996). They recognise that "South Africa's smaller neighbors in the region fear that 
an expansion in manufactured goods trade with South Africa could lead to significant 
de-industrialization or that it could even halt efforts of individual countries to rehabilitate 
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their industrial sectors" (Mukherjee and Robinson, 1996: 18). These smaller countries 
"fear that this could accelerate a process of unbalanced industrial growth, with most 
of the gains accruing disproportionately to South Africa" (Mukherjee and Robinson, 
1996: 18). However, such fears are apparently regarded as groundless. Having argued 
that "[d]eveloping countries considering forming a trade pact should include at least one 
large and preferably rich trading partner in the agreement, if it is to lead to an 
economically significant increase in trade", Mukherjee and Robinson (1996: 17-18) 
state: "Studies of other regional trading arrangements which include at least one large, 
preferably rich, economy indicate that they tend to be trade creating, with significant 
benefits for all partners". In the context of their discussion, it seems that they believe 
that the presence of South Africa in a SADC FTA would satisfy the condition for 
success of a "large, preferably rich" partner, and that for this and other reasons 
"[c]urrent trends in Southern Africa favor increased integration". Their position is 
weakened somewhat by the qualifier that successful trade integration "is by no means 
assured", but, of all the studies considered, only Mukherjee and Robinson (1996) seem 
to be of the view that a market-based FT A could be beneficial to all the member 
countries, large and small alike. 
On the basis of a very different analytical approach involving the use of a static partial 
equilibrium simulation model, Evans (1996: 45), in contrast to Holden (1996), concludes 
that the adverse effects of a FTA in the region "are likely to be limited whilst the gains 
widespread". Therefore, "the case for a rapid transition to the FTA is ... strong, provided 
special provision is made for the few countries with particular difficulties" (Evans, 1996: 
45). He finds that the impact of the formation of a SADC FTA on total demand, import-
competing production and employment would be minimal. There would be a small 
decrease in imports from the rest of the world, but a marked increase in intra-regional 
exports and imports of over 11 per cent. On the basis of these results, and in stark 
contrast to Holden's findings, Evans (1996: 2) concludes that "strong intra SADC trade 
creation effects" will occur on the formation of a FT A. 
Evans (1996: 10) finds that the balance of payments of SADC as a whole improves, and 
that Mauritius and South Africa in particular experience large balance of payments gains, 
but that there is some worsening of the balance of payments positions of Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe, in the "worst-case" scenario. Furthermore, Malawi and Mozambique 
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lose the bulk of their customs revenue, while Zambia and Zimbabwe also experience 
significant revenue losses. Thirdly, while the incidence of adverse sectoral effects is 
found to be small, Malawi and Zimbabwe each have five sectors which are adversely 
affected, and Mozambique three (Evans, 1996: 12). Finally, Mozambique is the only 
country which suffers an overall employment loss in the "worst-case" scenario. These 
are thus presumably the "few countries with particular difficulties" . 
Like Davies et al. (1993)' but unlike Cassim and Zarenda (1995), Evans (1996) 
apparently considers that it will be possible for the gainers from the FT A (mainly South 
Africa) to make the "special provision" to which he refers, either to prevent the 
particular difficulties of the few losers, or somehow to compensate them for their 
losses, and yet still on balance gain. 
Another simulation of the potential effects of the formation of a SADC FT A is that of 
the IDC (1995b). Acknowledged by the IDC to be a rough simulation (and described by 
Cassim and Zarenda (1995: 22) as "a rather quick and dirty analysis"), the simulation, 
unlike that of Evans (1996), is based on a static general equilibrium model. The IDC 
concludes that a FTA in the region would lead, on average, to an overall increase in 
GOP, although some countries would be made worse off. As in the Evans model, the 
results show that South Africa (SACU) has the most to gain from a FT A. Malawi, 
Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe lose in terms of GOP and employment, with 
Zimbabwe most adversely affected, followed by Zambia. 14 All countries except 
Zimbabwe are able to expand their manufacturing exports. The IDC suggests measures 
to soften the impact of adjustment, stressing policies to facilitate the role of the private 
sector, stating that the "whole region will gain if all governments [are] equally dedicated 
to competitive enhancing policies". 
Taken together, the simulation models of Evans (1996) and the IDC (1995b) seem to 
suggest that the formation of a SADC FTA will impact most adversely on Zimbabwe, 
Malawi, and Mozambique. 15 
14 
15 
Mauritius was not included in the simulation, as it only became a SADC member in August 1995. 
A subsequent simulation of the effects of the formation of a SADC FT A was undertaken by Evans 
(1997a), using essentially the same partial equilibrium model as his earlier study, but with a 
considerably improved database. The results and implications of these studies are analysed in more 
detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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There do not appear to have been any other significant attempts to date to quantify the 
possible effects of a SAOC FT A, although gravity models have commonly been used to 
consider whether the extent of trade has been influenced by membership of existing 
regional organisations, or how it could be affected by new ones (Cassim and Zarenda, 
1995: 18; Holden, 1996: 26-40; USAIO, 1996: 27-30; Mukherjee and Robinson, 
1996).16 The results of these exercises may be used to predict changes in trade and 
GOP at the aggregate level when new arrangements are formed, but do not facilitate the 
estimation of the sectoral and distributional impact of a FTA. 
3.3 Conclusion 
So far only the views and conclusions of recent studies on the economic desirability and 
feasibility of a southern African FTA have been considered. The discussion suggests 
that there are wide differences of opinion on this question. The arguments, implicit or 
explicit, in these various studies, as well as in the general theoreticai literature on 
regional trade integration, and empirical case studies of experience elsewhere in the 
world, are considered in the next and subsequent chapters. 
16 In these models, trade is usually a function of the GDPs of the countries in question, population and 
distance, with a dummy variable for the existence of trade agreements. The most detailed study is 
that of Holden (1996: 26-40), who finds no evidence that regional groupings have had any significant 
bearing on South Africa's direction of trade. However, as she notes, the use of more reliable intra-
SACU trade data could produce a different result. 
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CHAPTER 4 
KEY THEORETICAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE ANALYSIS OF TRADE INTEGRATION 
AMONG UNEQUAL PARTNERS IN A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Introduction 
As shown in Chapter 2, SADC is on the whole an association of poor, economically 
small countries, differing greatly in per capita income levels and hence in stage of 
development, dominated by a richer, larger and economically more advanced country, 
South Africa. Given this, the case of trade integration in southern Africa raises in stark 
form the "controversial question", considered by Behar (1995: 18) in his analysis of 
MERCOSUR, "of the advantages and disadvantages of integrating countries which differ 
widely in size and levels of industrialization". 
Other features of SADC noted in Chapter 2 are that, as indicated by their industrial 
structures and patterns of trade specialisation, the economies of the members of SADC 
are largely complementary to one another, and the existing degree of trade integration, 
as measured by the intra-regional trade ratio, is comparatively low. These factors also 
raise crucial questions about the feasibility of successful trade integration in southern 
Africa. 
As the discussion in Chapter 3 above indicates, these questions are raised implicitly in 
the existing literature on southern African trade integration. The views and conclusions 
reached in these studies, and hence apparently their answers to these questions, 
however, vary considerably. Furthermore, there is very little effort in most of these 
existing studies to address the key questions formally and systematically. 1 It is not 
clear therefore how these diverse views and conclusions were derived, whether they 
are consistent with the theory and, therefore, whether they have been properly 
established. 
The major exception, noted in Chapter 3, is Lundahl and Petersson's (1991) study on Lesotho in the 
Southern African Customs Union. 
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The key questions referred to above, however, are clearly fundamental ones, which 
must be carefully considered in any analysis of regional integration in southern Africa. 
The discussion which follows in this and subsequent chapters thus represents an 
attempt to address these questions, and hence in effect to assess some of the 
conclusions reached in existing studies. 
4.2 The conventional trade creation-trade diversion framework 
The welfare effects of trade integration are conventionally assessed with reference to 
Viner's (1950) concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. Trade creation refers to 
the replacement of relatively high-cost domestic production with lower-cost imports 
from a partner, while trade diversion refers to the replacement of cheaper imports from 
the rest of the world (ROW) with relatively more expensive imports from a partner. In 
terms of this framework, a customs union or free trade area (FT A) will be welfare-
improving provided trade creation outweighs trade diversion when the arrangement is 
formed. 2 
Viner's (1950) analysis was extended by Meade (1955), Lipsey (1957, 1960) and 
Gehrels (1956-57) to include the so-called "consumption effects" of the formation of 
a customs union or FTA. Implicit in Viner's (1950) analysis was the assumption that 
goods are consumed in fixed proportions independent of the structure of relative prices 
(Lipsey, 1960: 499). This suggested that the formation of a customs union would only 
have "production effects", via its influence on the location of world production. 
Lipsey (1957, 1 960) and others argued, however, that the formation of a customs union 
would necessarily lead to a change in relative prices, and hence substitution between 
commodities (Lipsey, 1960: 501). There may, therefore, be favourable consumption 
effects as a result of customs union formation, if consumers benefit from a price 
reduction on partner imports through the elimination of intra-union tariffs. The price 
reduction would raise the consumption of imports, causing a gain in consumer surplus, 
termed the "consumption effect". This led to a rather futile debate in the literature 
Second-best theory dispelled the pre-Vinerian view that customs unions were necessarily welfare-
improving since they represented a partial move towards free trade (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956/57). 
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about whether a trade-diverting customs union (in the Vinerian sense) could be welfare-
improving, settled by Johnson (1974), who re-defined trade creation to include both 
Viner's original "production effect" (the cost saving on goods previously produced 
domestically) as well as this positive consumption effect (Corden, 1984: 113; Pomfret, 
1988: 109).3 
The Viner-Meade-Lipsey analysis has given rise to a set of "orthodox conditions" for a 
customs union or FT A to be welfare-improving, some of which have been touched on 
in the existing literature on southern African trade integration. However, they have 
generally not been systematically examined in the studies discussed in the previous 
chapter. Using the analysis of Holden (1 996) as a point of departure, these conditions 
will therefore be considered at various stages in the discussion below. 
4.2.1 The Holden (1996) case: no initial domestic production and incomplete displace-
ment of ROW imports by the partner country 
Of the various studies surveyed in Chapter 3, Holden (1996) is analytically the most 
formal, making use as it does of the traditional Vinerian approach to the analysis of 
regional trade integration, and is therefore the most explicit about how its conclusions 
were derived. Holden (1996) thus provides a useful framework and starting point for 
further consideration of a range of factors relevant to the analysis of the likely effects 
of trade integration in the SADC region. The argument of Holden (1996: 51-54) and the 
assumptions on which it is based are thus set out in the present section. The 
apparently necessary qualifications and extensions of this argument in the light of these 
underlying assumptions are considered under various headings in subsequent sections. 
Figure 4.1 is a reproduction of the diagram on which Holden (1996: 51-54) bases her 
analysis, with the partner country as South Africa, but the home country as SADC 
(excluding South Africa), rather than the PTA/COMESA. DsADC is the rest of SADC's 
The conditions under which a positive consumption effect may occur in the case of a FT A will be 
considered in Section 4.2.2. Note, however, that in the case of a customs union, the consumption 
effect need not be positive. If a country has to raise its tariff levels to meet the common external 
tariff, its consumers will face a higher price for the good, resulting in a loss of consumer surplus as 
consumption falls (Lundahl and Petersson, 1991; 162). 
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import demand for the product, while SSA is South Africa's supply of the imported good 
facing the home country, drawn to reflect rising costs of production. Sw is the supply 
curve of the ROW, reflecting production under constant costs. The usual assumption 
is therefore made that the ROW is the more efficient supplier of the product (Holden, 
1996: 51).4 
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Figure 4.1 : No initial domestic production and only partial displacement of ROW 
imports by the partner 
Source: Holden (1996: 53). 
Before the formation of the FTA, imports from both South Africa and the ROW are 
subject to tariffs, and the relevant supply curves are (SSA +t) and (Sw+t). With an 
effective supply curve of HA(Sw + t), imports are 002 , of which 00, are supplied by 
South Africa and 0,02 by the ROW. The rest of SADC earns tariff revenue of 
(Pw + t)BCPw' If a FT A is formed between South Africa and the rest of SADC, the South 
African supply curve shifts to SSM while the ROW supply curve remains at (Sw+t). The 
new effective supply curve is JE(Sw + t), and imports from South Africa increase to 003 
while imports from the ROW fall to 0 30 2 , 
4 Even if production in the ROW was subject to rising costs, Sw would appear horizontal in the home 
market under the small country assumption (Cooper and Massell, 1965a: 743). 
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Since South African imports do not entirely displace imports from the ROW, the price 
remains (Pw +t). The rest of SADC loses tariff revenue on the initial imports from South 
Africa, as well as on the imports from the ROW which have been displaced. This 
amounts to {Pw + t)EFPw' and is the deadweight loss resulting from the increased outlay 
on the initial imports from South Africa (OO,) and displaced imports (0,03).5 The 
deadweight loss to the rest of SADC will in this case be greater, the higher the initial 
tariff and the more elastic the partner supply curve {Schiff, 1996: 10-11 ).6 
South African exporters gain the area {Pw + t)EDPw as increased producer rents. Thus, 
the home country's loss of customs revenue on initial imports from its partner is 
transferred to partner producers, together with some of the loss of customs revenue due 
to trade diversion. However, the deadweight loss to the home country (the rest of 
SADC) outweighs the gain to partner producers, so the deadweight loss to the FT A (and 
hence the world) is shown by the triangle EFD, and is due to the trade diversion of 
0,03 , 
Holden (1996: 52) notes that if South Africa, rather than the ROW, is the most efficient 
producer, then the formation of the FTA will reduce price to Pw ' In this case, the home 
country will gain area BGC {equal to the increase in consumer surplus {Pw + t)BGPw 
minus the loss of customs revenue which would be (Pw + t)BCPw since initial imports 
would have all come from South Africa). However, she argues that this is not a likely 
scenario, since it has been shown that industry and agriculture in South Africa exhibit 
rising costs of production (Fallon and de Silva, 1994). 
It is apparently on the strength of this argument that Holden (1996: 61) arrives at the 
conclusion that the smaller members of a southern African free trade arrangement 
would lose and South Africa would gain at their expense. Given the assumptions 
underlying the argument, to be considered below, which result in there being only trade 
diversion, this conclusion follows simply from the fact that imports from within the 
6 
Holden (1996: 51-54), drawing on Schiff (1996: 8-11), therefore considers the case where the 
deadweight loss due to the increase in outlay on the amount 003 of the home country's initial imports 
is equal to the loss of customs revenue. As wi" be shown below, however, this is not necessarily 
the case. 
The importance of the initial share of imports from the partner wi" be considered separately in Section 
4.2.3 below. 
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SADC region are a larger proportion of the imports of the smaller members of the region 
than they are of South Africa's. Hence it is said that "if trade diversion predominates, 
then the formation of a free trade area would redistribute income from those economies 
that can least afford it to the wealthier South Africa" (Holden, 1996: 61). 
Holden's (1996: 51-54) analysis, however, depends on the assumption that the home 
country's (that is, the rest of SADC's) supply of a single homogeneous good is initially 
entirely provided by imports and, furthermore, that upon formation of the FT A, the 
partner country displaces imports from the ROW partially, but not completely. Thus the 
domestic price remains unchanged at the tariff-inclusive world price level. The home 
country therefore loses tariff revenue on both initial imports from the partner country 
and on imports from the ROW which have been replaced by imports from the partner 
due to trade diversion, but gains nothing. As shown below, if either of these 
assumptions does not hold, then Holden's (1996) conclusions do not follow. 
4.2.2 Incomplete versus complete displacement of ROW imports by the partner 
The question of whether production in industry and agriculture in South Africa exhibit 
rising or falling costs does not, in fact, affect the issue. Even if the South African 
supply curve is upward sloping (that is, the ROW is still the most efficient supplier of 
the product), imports from South Africa could entirely displace imports from the ROW, 
resulting in a lower price after integration. This case, which is not considered by Holden 
(1 996)' is illustrated in Figure 4.2, where DSADC and (Sw + t) show the rest of SADC's 
import demand and the ROW's supply of the good as before. Now, however, the tariff-
inclusive South African supply curve is given by (SSA + t)2' With an effective supply 
curve of HA(Sw + t), initial imports are 002, of which 00, is supplied by South Africa, 
and only 0,02 by the ROW. The rest of SADC earns tariff revenue as before of 
(Pw+t)BCPw' If a FTA is formed between South Africa and the rest of SADC, the South 
African supply curve shifts to SSA2' while the ROW supply curve remains at (Sw+t). In 
this case, imports from South Africa entirely displace imports from the ROW. Price falls 
to PFTA, and demand increases to 003 , as do imports. 
The loss of customs revenue (Pw+t)BCPw is now offset by a gain in consumer surplus 
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of (Pw + t)BEPFTA due to the fall in price. The portion of the initial customs revenue given 
by the area (Pw + t)BFPFTA is transferred from the government to consumers, and 
therefore does not represent a loss of real income. The net consumer surplus gain of 
BEF must be weighed against the increase in outlay on the initial level of imports, given 
by PFTAFCPW ' in order to ascertain the net welfare effect of the FTA on the home 
country.7 If BEF is larger than PFTAFCPw , the net impact will be beneficial. The more 
elastic DsADc and SSM and the higher the initial tariff, the larger will BEF be relative to 
PFTAFCPw' 
Price 
(SSA +t)2 
(P vit) I-H----=,..:..A;.=:::=--B--=:,.Ic---~------ (Sw +t) 
SSA2 PFTA _____________________________________ , ______________________ E! ____________________ _ 
P
w ---------=~D~I===---~~----~~~---------:~ 
I------------~------~----~---------------
o Q1 O,z Quantity 
Figure 4.2: No initial domestic production and complete displacement of ROW 
imports by the partner 
It must be stressed, then, that in the case where consumer gains are obtained due to 
a fall in price, the loss to the home country is not equivalent to the loss of customs 
revenue, as it was in the case considered by Holden (1996: 51-54) and Schiff (1996: 
8-11). The loss to the home country is rather the increased outlay on initial imports of 
OQ2 on which revenue was previously earned, which is less than the total customs 
revenue loss, since a portion of the revenue loss is transferred from government to 
Note that the area PFTAFCPw is made up of the increased outlay on the initial level of imports from the 
partner OQ, and the increased outlay on imports displaced from the ROW due to trade diversion Q,Q2' 
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consumers as part of an increase in consumer surplus when the price in the home 
country falls. Further, the loss due to the increased outlay on initial imports is not all 
a deadweight loss, since it must be balanced against the net consumption gain (that is, 
the total increase in consumer surplus less the transfer) which obtains when the price 
falls. 8 Thus, whether there is a net gain or loss to the home country depends on the 
size of the loss due to the increased outlay on initial imports relative to the net gain in 
consumer surplus. 
In Figure 4.2, the additional producer rent accruing to South Africa is shown by the area 
PFTAEDPw' Therefore, part of the home country's loss of PFTAFCPw due to the increased 
outlay on initial imports is transferred to South African exporters. The loss for the FTA 
as a whole from trade diversion will thus only be GCD, as Figure 4.2 has been drawn. 
This is more than outweighed by the gain of BEF which goes to the home country's 
consumers. The net effect on the FTA as a whole will then, in this case, clearly be 
beneficial. 9 
The case considered by Holden (1996: 51-54), drawn from Schiff (1996: 8-11), is 
therefore quite specific. It was used by Schiff (1996) to illustrate his argument that 
some of the orthodox "conditions" for a beneficial FTA or customs union do not hold 
in general. In his (and Holden's) case, depicted in Figure 4.1, the deadweight loss to 
the home country and the FT A as a whole is larger the higher the initial tariff and the 
more elastic the partner supply curve. Schiff (1996: 11) thus argues that "[b]oth the 
higher initial MFN tariff and the more elastic supply of imports from the partner country 
generates [sic] welfare effects for the FT A members which are opposite to those 
mentioned in the studies cited... Thus, we have shown that the argument made in the 
literature does not hold in general". While this in indeed the case, neither Schiff (1996), 
at this stage, nor Holden (1996) specify that these results occur because their case 
does not allow for the partner to displace ROW imports entirely. As the analysis of 
9 
The latter is Lipsey's "consumption effect" which, following Johnson's (1974) definition, is 
considered to be part of trade creation. 
Casella (1995: 2) notes that, in this framework, a small country would generally experience a greater 
change in relative prices than a large country, and hence a larger welfare gain. It may be argued, 
thus, that since South Africa is more likely to displace a small SADC country's imports from the ROW 
completely than vice versa, a small partner could benefit from trade creation in importing sectors, and 
from the transfer of tariff revenue from South Africa in exporting sectors if, as seems likely, it were 
unable to displace South Africa's imports from the ROW completely, so that the South African 
domestic price remained unchanged. 
88 
Figure 4.2 shows, if the partner displaces ROW imports completely, then a higher initial 
tariff and more elastic supply of imports from the partner country do generate more 
favourable welfare effects for the home country and the FTA as a whole. 
4.2.3 The "natural trading partner" argument 
Schiff (1996: 5-11) also considers the traditional view that countries which are 
"natural" trading partners, in the sense that they already trade disproportionately 
amongst themselves, are more likely to gain from a FTA. More specifically, he argues 
that the opposite holds from the point of view of an individual member country on the 
import side; that is " ... an individual country benefits more from a PTA if it imports less 
from its partner countries (with imports measured either in volume or as a share of total 
imports)" (Schiff, 1996: 6, emphasis added). 
This can be illustrated with reference to Figure 4.1. If (SSA + t) cuts (Sw + t) to the right 
of point A (with the same slope), that is if initial imports from the partner 00, are a 
larger proportion of total imports 002 ceteris paribus, then SSA would cut (Sw +t) to the 
right of point E. The deadweight loss to the home country, measured by the loss of 
customs revenue, would then be higher.'o However, this would only be the case if the 
partner was unable to displace ROW imports completely; that is, provided SSA cut 
(Sw + t) to the left of point B. If complete displacement occurred, then the home country 
would benefit more, the greater the initial share of imports from the partner, ceteris 
paribus. For example, if (SSA+t)2 in Figure 4.2 cut (Sw+t) to the right of point A (but 
to the left of point B), then price would fall to below PFTA (but above Pw) when the FTA 
was formed, and the consumption gain of BEF would increase relative to the welfare 
loss to the home country of PFTAFCPw." 
Thus, a larger initial share of imports from the partner, like a more elastic supply curve 
10 
11 
Note, however, that the size of the welfare loss to the FTA as a whole from trade diversion (triangle 
EFD in Figure 4.1) is not affected here by a higher initial share of imports from the partner, since price 
remains at (Pw +t) (Schiff, 1996: 10). 
The loss to the FTA as a whole from trade diversion (triangle GCD in Figure 4.2) would also be lower, 
the higher the initial share of imports from the partner, whereas in the case of incomplete 
displacement it was unaffected. 
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and a higher tariff, has an adverse effect on home country welfare when the partner is 
unable to displace ROW imports completely, but a beneficial effect on welfare when 
complete displacement occurs.12 Therefore Schiff's (1996: 6) statement, cited earlier, 
that an individual country benefits more if it imports less from its partner, does not hold 
in general either, as he seems to imply, in the same way that a more elastic supply 
curve and a higher initial tariff do not necessarily generate welfare improvements for the 
home country. 
In sum, it can therefore be seen that the outcome for the home country could be very 
different from the case considered in Holden (1996: 51-54) and Schiff (1996: 8-11) if 
the partner country is able to provide the entire demand of the home country at a duty-
free price lower than the tariff-inclusive world price (but still higher than Pw). In this 
case, in terms of the conventional approach to the analysis of trade integration, there 
will be both costs of trade diversion and gains from trade creation (via the consumption 
effect) in the home country. It does not seem possible now to say, a priori, whether the 
home country gains or loses. It will depend, empirically, on the demand and supply 
elasticities, and the height of the tariff being removed, as well as the initial share of 
imports from the partner. 13 In the southern African context, it is conceivable that 
South Africa, for example, would be able to displace ROW imports into the rest of 
SADC completely in some product categories. 
One may also consider a case where imports are initially entirely supplied by the ROW, 
but the partner still completely displaces ROW imports after the FTA is formed. This 
would occur, for example, if the tariff-exclusive partner supply curve is perfectly elastic 
above the world price but below the tariff-inclusive world price. In this case the 
domestic price will, of course, also fall when the FT A is formed. The consumption 
effect will be larger the closer the tariff-exclusive partner supply curve is to the world 
supply curve, the higher the initial tariff and the more elastic the import demand curve. 
The idea of a perfectly elastic supply curve for South African exports to the rest of 
SADC may be a plausible case to consider given their relative sizes. 
12 
13 
It may indeed be argued that the larger the initial share of imports from the partner, the more likely 
it is that complete displacement of ROW imports will occur. 
In the case of products which are not perfectly homogeneous, one would also have to consider the 
degree of substitutability between partner and non-partner imports. This aspect is considered further 
in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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4.2.4 Trade deflection 
Schiff (1996: 27-28) does raise the possibility of complete displacement of ROW 
imports by the partner in the context of his discussion of the additional welfare effects 
which may arise from the formation of a FTA as a result of "trade deflection". 
If the tariff imposed by the partner country on its imports from the ROW (tp) is lower 
than the tariff imposed by the home country on imports from the ROW (t) then, in the 
absence of rules of origin in the FT A agreement, the partner country would be able to 
sell imports from the ROW in the home country market. The home country would lose 
control over its trade policy with respect to the ROW, and its effective tariff on ROW 
imports would become t p. FT A agreements therefore commonly include rules of origin 
limiting imports from the partner to goods actually produced in the partner country, to 
prevent such trade deflection (Schiff, 1996: 27). 
However, even if such rules of origin are successfully implemented, "indirect" trade 
deflection may arise if the partner country does not just sell its excess supply (003 in 
Figure 4.1) to the home country, but also sells all or part of its output for its own 
domestic market to the home country, importing its domestic requirements or any 
shortfall from the ROW (Schiff, 1996: 27; Robson, 1987: 25). In such a case, the 
partner will sell more than 003 to the home country, with implications for the welfare 
impact of the FT A. 
The possible effects can be illustrated with reference to Figure 4.1. If the partner 
country's output, while exceeding 003, was less than 002 at price (Pw+t)' then the 
home country would still import from the ROW. The deadweight loss for the home 
country from the FTA would then be higher than (Pw + t)EFPw due to the additional 
displacement of imports on which no revenue is earned after the FTA is formed. 
Alternatively, if output from the partner exceeds 002 at (Pw+t)' imports from the ROW 
will be completely displaced and the price will fall below (Pw + t), though not below 
(Pw+tp), the replacement cost in the partner country (Schiff, 1996: 28).14 Here, the 
14 If partner output exceeded home country demand at price !Pw +tp ), then the price would be !Pw +tp ), 
and the partner would only sell part of its output to the home country. 
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welfare loss to the home country may be higher or lower than (Pw + t)EFPw depending 
(as in Figure 4.2) on the relative size of the customs revenue loss and the efficiency 
gains from the lower price. The home country may indeed gain if t p is sufficiently low. 
Further, the partner country will earn additional customs revenue on its imports from the 
ROW (Robson, 1987: 27). 
4.2.5 Initial domestic production 
It was shown in Section 4.2.2 above that, in the case where the home country's 
demand for a single homogeneous good is entirely provided by imports, Holden's (1996) 
analysis precludes a trade creation gain via the consumption effect, by not allowing for 
complete displacement of ROW imports by the partner. furthermore, Holden (1996) 
and Schiff (1 996) do not consider the situation where home country demand is initially 
supplied partly by domestic production and partly by imports. In this case, as the 
discussion below illustrates, additional gains from trade creation are possible via the 
"production effect" (Vinerian trade creation), if complete displacement of ROW imports 
occurs. 
Two cases will be considered, the first where domestic demand is initially satisfied by 
domestic production and imports from the ROW only, and secondly, the case where 
there is domestic production and initial imports from both the partner and the ROW.'5 
In Figure 4.3, the home country's demand curve and the ROW supply curve (with and 
without the tariff) are depicted as before. Since there is initial domestic production, SH 
is the home country's domestic supply curve, and (SH+ Mp) is an aggregation of the 
home country's supply curve and the partner's (tariff-free) supply of the good to the 
home country. Before the FTA is formed, the effective supply curve is JA(Sw +t), and 
domestic demand of 002 is satisfied by domestic production 00, and imports from the 
ROW 0,02 at the tariff-inclusive world price (Pw+t). Tariff revenue of ABeD is earned 
on imports from the ROW. 
15 Although the second case is less frequently illustrated in the theoretical literature, it is probably the 
most usual empirical scenario, and therefore merits consideration. 
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Figure 4.3 has been drawn in such a way that, when the FTA is formed, imports from 
the ROW are entirely displaced by the partner country. The effective supply curve 
becomes JK(SH + Mp). Price falls to PFTA and demand increases to OQ3' Domestic 
production falls to OQ4' while imports increase to Q4Q3 and come from the partner. 
Thus, Q4Q, domestic production has been replaced by imports from the partner, Q,Q2 
imports from the ROW have been displaced, and Q2Q3 additional imports are obtained 
from the partner due to the fall in price. 
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Figure 4.3: Initial domestic production and imports from the ROW 
Consumer surplus increases by (Pw+t)BEPFTA of which area (Pw+t)AFPFTA is a transfer 
from home country producers to consumers. Triangles AGF and BEH represent net 
gains due to the release of resources from inefficient domestic production (Viner's 
production effect) and the consumption effect respectively, and thus make up the trade 
creation benefit to the home country. Of the tariff revenue loss ABCD, area ABHG is 
a transfer from the home country's government to consumers, while area GHCD is the 
increase in outlay on the initial imports from the ROW which have been displaced by the 
partner. Area GHCD therefore represents the loss to the home country due to trade 
diversion. The net welfare effect on the home country will depend on the size of 
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(AGF + BEH) versus GHCD, which in turn will depend on the elasticities of the demand 
and supply curves and the height of the initial tariff. The more elastic DH, SH and Mp, 
and the higher the initial tariff, the larger the gains from trade creation relative to the 
loss from trade diversion. 
The partner country earns producer rent on replaced domestic production 0 4 0" 
displaced imports from the ROW 0,02 and additional imports 0 20 3 • Therefore, part of 
the home country's loss of GHCD due to displaced ROW imports is transferred to the 
partner country as surplus, and the loss to the FT A as a whole from trade diversion will 
be smaller than GHCD. The net welfare effect on the FTA as a whole thus depends on 
the size of the trade creation gains to the home country and the gains to partner 
producers versus the loss to the FTA from trade diversion. 
Note that if the partner country were unable to displace ROW imports completely (that 
is, if (SH + Mp) cut (Sw + t) to the left of point B in Figure 4.3), then price would remain 
at (Pw + t). Domestic production and consumption would be unaffected by the FTA, and 
there would be no gains from trade creation. There would, however, be a deadweight 
loss to the home country equal to the customs revenue previously earned on ROW 
imports which have been displaced due to trade diversion. The scenario is similar in this 
sense to the case of incomplete displacement considered by Holden (1996: 51-54) and 
Schiff (1996: 8-11), illustrated in Figure 4.1, which implies that the deadweight loss to 
the home country from trade diversion would be greater, the more elastic the partner 
supply curve and the higher the initial tariff. However, the presence of domestic 
production (and hence, by implication, greater competitiveness of structure between 
partners) suggests that, for a given domestic demand at a given tariff-inclusive world 
price, there will be fewer imports on which customs revenue could be lost.'6 
Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 4.3, if there is complete displacement of ROW imports 
by the partner country once domestic production is included, then there will be an 
additional source of gain for the home country in terms of the orthodox analysis of trade 
integration, not considered by Holden (1996) and Schiff (1996), namely the cost saving 
16 This leads to the orthodox conclusion that a customs union is more likely to raise welfare the lower 
the proportion of foreign trade relative to domestic purchases (Lipsey, 1960: 508). 
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on inefficient domestic production (Vinerian trade creation) .'7 
As argued in Section 4.2.3, it is likely that, in the southern African context, South 
Africa, for example, would be able to displace ROW imports entirely in some product 
categories. It is also likely that this could occur in sectors where there is initial domestic 
production in the home country. Thus the scenario where trade creation gains are 
obtained as a result of both the production and consumption effects is clearly of 
relevance in the case of the formation of a FT A among southern African countries. 
It can also be noted, with reference to Figure 4.3, that if the initial tariff in the home 
country is prohibitive (that is, initial domestic demand is satisfied only by domestic 
production with imports completely excluded), then there will necessarily be a fall in 
price when the FTA is formed.'8 In this case, with no imports which can be displaced, 
there will be no welfare loss to the home country, only trade creation gains from both 
the consumption and production effects (Robson, 1987: 24-25). 
Finally, the case where the home country's domestic demand is initially provided by 
domestic production and imports from both the partner and non-partner countries may 
be considered. As before, the important issue is whether the partner is able to displace 
ROW imports completely or not. 
In Figure 4.4, SH and Sw are the home and world supply curves respectively, while 
(Sw + t) is the tariff-inclusive world supply curve, as before. SH + (Mp + t) is the sum of 
the home country's supply curve and the partner's supply to the home country inclusive 
of the tariff. Mp is the partner's supply curve without the tariff, so that (SH+ Mp) is, 
once again, the tariff-free FT A supply curve of the good to the home country. Before 
the FTA is formed, the effective supply curve is KLM(Sw+t). Domestic demand of 003 
is satisfied by domestic production DO" imports from the partner 0,02, and imports 
from the ROW 0203. Tariff revenue of ABeD is initially earned on all imports. 
17 
18 
This gain will be greater, the larger the proportion of domestic production relative to imports, ceteris 
paribus (see Footnote 1 6 above). 
This would occur if the tariff-inclusive world supply curve (Sw + t) passed through, or lay above, the 
point of intersection of SH and DH in Figure 4.3, and provided, of course, that the tariff-free (SH + Mp) 
curve lay below this intersection. 
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When the FT A is formed, the supply curve becomes NR{SH + Mp). Imports from the 
ROW are completely displaced and price falls to PFTA • Domestic demand increases to 
004 , domestic production falls to 005 , imports rise to 0 50 4 and come entirely from the 
partner. Of the 0 5 0 4 imports, 0 50 1 are replaced domestic production, 0 10 2 are the 
initial imports from the partner, 0 20 3 are replaced imports from the ROW, and 0 30 4 are 
new imports from the partner as a result of the fall in price. 
The welfare effects are as follows. The fall in price causes an increase in consumer 
surplus of {Pw + t)BEPFTA , of which {Pw + t)AFPFTA is a transfer from domestic producers 
to consumers and ABHG (formerly part of tariff revenue) is a transfer from the 
government to consumers. Areas AGF and BEH are the net welfare gains from trade 
creation comprising, respectively, the cost saving on inefficient domestic production and 
the increase in consumer surplus from the additional consumption at PFTA • 
Price 
..---..---
.-----
------------
..... ---
__ ------------ S H +( M p +t) 
__ (Mp+t) 
----- __ -- M p 
(P +t) _----A---
W _------- L 
M ------------ (Sw +t) 
----------
P 
FTA 
K 
P w _------
N 
o 
F 
--
I H -~ --------------
R _----
(SH +Mp) 
---- J C 
o 
Quantity 
Figure 4.4: Initial domestic production and imports from both the partner and the 
ROW 
The loss to the home country is depicted by area GHCD, of which GIJD is the increased 
outlay on existing imports from the partner country and IHCJ is the increased outlay on 
imports displaced from the ROW due to trade diversion. Both result from the fact that 
customs revenue is no longer earned on the initial level of imports Q103' Thus, in the 
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case where initial imports are obtained both from the partner and the ROW (as opposed 
to the case illustrated in Figure 4.3, where initial imports came only from the ROW), the 
welfare loss to the home country is the sum of that due to trade diversion and that due 
to the loss of tariff revenue previously earned on initial imports from the partner.'9 
Note once again, however, that not all of the initial customs revenue earned on imports 
is lost, but only that portion which is not transferred to consumers (in other words, the 
increased outlay on initial imports, whatever the source). 
The net welfare effect on the home country will depend, as before, on the size of AGF 
plus BEH versus GHCD, which in turn will depend on the elasticities of the demand and 
supply curves and the height of the initial tariff. 
The partner country gains additional producer surplus on replaced domestic production, 
displaced ROW imports and new imports, as well as on initial imports supplied to the 
home country which now earn PFTA rather than Pw per unit. Of the loss to the home 
country (area GHCD), area GIJD (the increased outlay on existing imports from the 
partner country) and part of area IHCJ (the increased outlay on imports displaced from 
the ROW due to trade diversion) are transferred as rent to partner producers. The loss 
to the FTA as a whole will thus be less than IHCJ, and will be lower, the larger the 
initial share of imports from the partner and the greater the proportion of domestic 
production relative to imports. 
The net welfare effect on the FTA as a whole will depend, as before, on the size of the 
trade creation gains to the home country and the gains to partner producers versus the 
loss to the FT A as a whole from trade diversion. 
Note, once again, that in the case of incomplete displacement of ROW imports, price 
would remain at (Pw +t). Domestic production and consumption would be unaffected 
by the FT A, and there would be no gains from trade creation. The deadweight loss to 
the home country would be made up of the loss of customs revenue on ROW imports 
displaced due to trade diversion and initial imports from the partner. 
19 This should not be taken to imply that the loss is necessarily larger than in the previous case, since 
the combined volume of imports from the two sources may be the same as before. 
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In sum, the case considered by Holden (1996: 51-54) and Schiff (1996: 8-11), outlined 
in Section 4.2.1, assumes that the home country's supply of a single homogeneous 
good is entirely provided by imports. This implies perfect complementarity between the 
home country and its trading partners in a given sector. With reference to the Viner-
Meade-Lipsey condition that "[t]he more competitive the partners are, in the sense of 
producing similar goods, the more likely it is that trade creation will occur", Holden 
(1996: 60-61) concludes that, in southern Africa, "complementarity implies that the 
possibilities for trade creation are low". 20 
While this may be so, the analysis of Section 4.2.2 shows that, even in the case of 
perfect complementarity, trade creation gains via the consumption effect are possible 
if the partner country is able to displace imports from the ROW completely. 
Once domestic production is introduced into the analysis, implying the more realistic 
scenario of at least some degree of competitiveness in structure, the gains from trade 
creation will be even greater, if complete displacement of ROW imports occurs, as a 
result of Viner's production effect. 
The analysis of Holden (1996: 51-54) therefore considers neither complete displacement 
of ROW imports in the absence of domestic production (thereby precluding a trade 
creation gain for the home country via the consumption effect) nor complete 
displacement of ROW imports in the presence of domestic production (precluding trade 
creation gains via both the production and consumption effects). It would appear, 
however, that both of these cases would be relevant in considering the potential impact 
of a FTA between a small SADC country and South Africa, since it seems possible that, 
at least in some sectors, South Africa would be able to displace ROW imports entirely. 
4.2.6 Summary and conclusion 
It has been argued above that the traditional trade creation-trade diversion analysis does 
not enable one to say a priori that a free trade arrangement amongst countries of very 
20 Holden (1996: 61) refers to the "indices of national divergence" between South Africa and the other 
countries in the region, discussed in Chapter 2 above, as evidence of this complementarity. 
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unequal size and per capita income levels, whose trade with one another is initially a 
small proportion of their total trade, cannot be mutually beneficial to all the prospective 
partner countries. This applies even if, as in the southern African case, the production 
structures and comparative advantages of such partners are highly complementary 
rather than similar and hence competitive. The outcome depends importantly on 
whether the imports of the smaller countries from the ROW are displaced entirely or 
only partially by imports from prospective partners when a FTA is formed. If displaced 
entirely, the smaller countries, and not only the dominant partner, could well benefit 
from the formation of the FTA. While, as noted, this conclusion applies even to 
countries with complementary production structures and comparative advantages, the 
probability of a mutually beneficial free trade arrangement, in accordance with the Viner-
Meade-Lipsey analysis, is enhanced by some degree of similarity and hence 
competitiveness amongst prospective members. 
Whether imports from the ROW will be entirely displaced by imports from the partner 
country depends in turn on the magnitudes of the demand and supply elasticities, the 
height of the tariff and the initial share of imports from the partner. This is an empirical 
matter rather than a purely theoretical one, which is considered in these terms in 
Chapters 6 and 7 below. There are some reasons, however, to think that the conditions 
necessary for net welfare gains, as viewed in the traditional analysis considered above, 
could well apply in the case of the smaller SADC countries. 
4.3 Non-traditional perspectives on competitiveness versus complementarity of 
structure 
As noted above, the conventional Vinerian view is that successful trade integration 
requires that economies should be competitive initially with the potential to become 
complementary on the formation of a regional FTA. Viner's case for competitiveness 
is that, firstly, if countries have similar production structures they will initially be 
importing the same goods, in which neither country has a comparative advantage, and 
will continue to do so after integration, thus limiting trade diversion. Secondly, with a 
large degree of overlap in the classes of commodities produced under tariff protection 
in each country, the most efficient country will capture the union market, resulting in 
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a re-allocation of resources in a more efficient direction (Lipsey, 1960: 498-499). Thus, 
increased trade among partner countries post-integration will be more likely to involve 
beneficial trade creation. On the other hand, if their protected industries are 
complementary, a FTA will tend to result in replacement of imports from the ROW by 
imports from each other (trade diversion)' and efficiency will suffer. 21 
Indeed, as noted earlier, one of the considerations leading to Holden's (1996) negative 
view of the outlook for mutually beneficial trade integration in southern Africa is that 
the production structures of the countries in the region are complementary rather than 
competitive. It has been seen that this is not an insuperable obstacle to successful 
integration, even in terms of the conventional trade creation-trade diversion framework, 
but that within the traditional framework competitive structures are more favourable 
than complementary ones. 
There are, however, other non-traditional perspectives on this which suggest that 
complementarity, rather than being a disadvantage, may have positive implications for 
trade integration. 
4.3.1 The effect of integration on the pattern of trade 
Robson (1987: 194) notes that orthodox customs union theory is concerned with the 
gains that may be derived from changing the existing pattern of trade. Indeed, the 
orthodox view that economies should be competitive with the potential to become 
complementary implies that the formation of an integration arrangement will change the 
structure of production and trade in such a way that the economies become 
complementary on union. 
21 Makower and Morton (1953), writing after Viner (1950), pointed out that the gains from trade 
creation would be larger the greater the difference in the cost at which a common commodity is 
produced in the two countries (Lipsey, 1960: 499). Although they defined competitive economies 
as those with similar costs and complementary economies as those with large cost differences, and 
were therefore able to conclude that the gains from a customs union, if they occurred at all, would 
be larger between complementary economies, Lipsey (1960: 499) notes that "the conclusions of 
Viner and Makower and Morton are in no sense contradictory". The gains will be greater with large 
cost differences provided a common commodity is produced (in other words, given that trade creation 
is going to occur). 
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Cassim and Zarenda (1995: 7), drawing on the analysis of Srinivasan etal. (1993), raise 
a line of argument against this notion. Srinivasan et al. (1993: 52) suggest that 
integration agreements themselves have had relatively little long-term effect on trade 
patterns from an ex post point of view, with the exception of the European Community 
between 1960 and 1970. Cassim and Zarenda (1995: 7) infer from this that "possibly 
successful agreements are more likely to occur between countries which ex ante exhibit 
high levels of trade complementarity". This seems to imply that if trade patterns are 
unlikely to change as a result of regional integration, then it would be preferable for the 
economies involved to be complementary before the arrangement is formed. 
However, Srinivasan et al. (1993: 52) do not appear to be arguing, at this point, that 
integration arrangements have little impact on trade patterns or the structure of trade 
between the member countries of a particular regional group. Rather, their empirical 
analysis shows that the share of global trade taking place within regions (that is, the 
volume of intra-bloc trade relative to world trade) has not increased significantly in the 
post-war period, and hence that recent concerns over the impact of the "new 
regionalism" on the global economy have been overstated. 
On the other hand, both Whalley (1993: 352) and Srinivasan et al. (1993: 53) argue 
that the formation of new regional arrangements in North America and elsewhere has, 
for the smaller countries involved, been driven primarily by a desire for "safe-haven" 
trade agreements to secure access (as opposed to necessarily improving access) to the 
markets of large neighbouring trading partners, due to fears of higher trade barriers in 
the future. 22 As such, these arrangements are more "defensive than integrationist in 
nature", and the extent to which they involve genuine new liberalisation is in doubt 
(Srinivasan et al., 1993: 53). If this is the case, then Cassim and Zarenda's (1995: 7) 
suggestion that trade patterns within regions will change little on integration may 
follow, implying that initial complementarity may indeed be favourable. For these 
reasons, it is argued that the traditional trade creation-trade diversion framework is not 
well suited to the analysis of more recent regional integration arrangements (Srinivasan 
et al., 1993: 53). 
22 For the larger countries, Whalley (1993: 352) points to a frustration with lack of progress in 
multilateral negotiations as an important factor. 
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In the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Brown et al. (1992: 
12-13) note that the initial complementarity between Mexico and the US implies that 
the FT A can be expected to stimulate production in labour-intensive sectors in Mexico, 
the relatively labour abundant country, and shift labour into capital-intensive sectors in 
the United States (US) and Canada. In such a case, a FTA will tend to accentuate 
existing complementarity, rather than transform competitiveness into complementarity. 
Brown et al. (1992: 13) argue that a FTA could be significantly more disruptive to the 
smaller partner, Mexico, as it will tend to specialise in a narrower range of labour-
intensive goods, thereby incurring the costs of labour reallocation to the sectors in 
which it has a comparative advantage. On the other hand, the costs of any inter-
sectoral reallocation of resources would arguably be far lower in the US, since it is 
unlikely, given the relative sizes of the two economies, that even a substantial increase 
in Mexican exports would significantly affect US production in most sectors (Brown et 
al., 1992: 13). This suggests that integration between countries of unequal size which 
ex ante exhibit high levels of trade complementarity may be more costly for the smaller 
countries. Since the reallocation of resources is in line with comparative advantage, it 
would be considered "efficient" in terms of orthodox analysis. However, the adjustment 
costs of such a reallocation are not taken into account in the traditional framework. 23 
It is noteworthy however that, according to Brown et al. (1992: 13), it is nonetheless 
expected that all the members of NAFT A will gain from the formation of the FT A, 
despite the possible costs associated with the inter-sectoral reallocation of resources. 
This conclusion rests, firstly, on a strong presumption that an improved international 
allocation of production will follow, as members specialise in sectors in which they have 
a comparative advantage. Since much of the trade of Canada and Mexico already takes 
place within North America, the potential for trade diversion will be low, despite 
Mexico's initial complementarity. Further, the intended relaxation of Mexican controls 
on capital flows into the country will serve to offset factor endowment differences 
between Mexico and its trading partners, thereby reducing its degree of specialisation 
in labour-intensive goods. 24 
23 
24 
The question of adjustment costs will be considered further in Chapter 5 below. 
The implications of a concomitant liberalisation of capital flows on member countries' adjustment to 
a new integration scheme will also be considered further in Chapter 5 below. 
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Finally, a number of authors have questioned the relevance of the static orthodox trade 
creation-trade diversion framework to an analysis of the welfare effects of economic 
integration among developing countries (Mikesell, 1963: 211-213; Jaber, 1970-71; 
Robson, 1987: 194-197; Lundahl and Petersson, 1991: 187-219). For example, 
Robson (1987: 195) argues that, in terms of the orthodox criteria for a beneficial 
customs union, including the existence of competitive rather than complementary 
structures, integration among developing countries "may appear at best to be irrelevant 
and at worst to be positively harmful, except possibly for the more developed of such 
countries". However, this assumes that the rationale for trade integration among 
developing countries centres on the gains to be derived from changes in the existing 
pattern of trade, based on the existing pattern of production. Yet what is relevant, he 
argues, is not so much the impact of integration on the existing patterns of production 
and trade, but rather on those patterns which are likely to emerge, as industrialisation 
proceeds, in the absence of integration (Robson, 1987: 195). 
In a similar vein, Jaber (1970-71: 261-262) argues that the criterion of competitiveness 
versus complementarity is not relevant at all in the developing country context, because 
"[i]t presumes a developed economic structure which, when integrated, would readjust 
through a 'creative destruction' process that ends up by the survival of the most 
efficient producer". However, such economic structures are not characteristic of 
developing countries. In the words of Mikesell (1963: 212): 
" ... it would not be correct to say that the outlook for achieving economic welfare gains 
through a customs union of Central American states is poor because the members are at 
such a low stage of industrialization that they are actually not competitive at the present 
time; nor would it make much sense to argue that because they all produce coffee and 
bananas and hence are actually competitive, this augurs well for a net increase in welfare 
from the creation of a customs union ... As industrialization proceeds, they are going to 
be more competitive; but what these countries should strive for is a pattern of investment 
which will introduce a substantial degree of complementarity for the future". 
The implication of this is that what is relevant for developing countries, whose industrial 
structures are still evolving, is not the existing but rather the emerging degree of 
competitiveness and the potential complementarity for the future. 
The arguments in this sub-section all suggest that, in the case of developing countries, 
initial complementarity need not be unfavourable to mutually beneficial trade integration. 
103 
4.3.2 Cost competitiveness 
Wonnacott and Lutz (1989: 29) call the traditional competitiveness criterion "the most 
controversial of Viner's conclusions", and put the case for the opposite view; that is, 
for complementarity to be favourable for trade integration. 
Wonnacott and Lutz (1989: 29) argue that at first glance, in terms of orthodox trade 
theory, it may seem that a FTA or customs union would be desirable if members' 
economies are complementary, since they would then seem to be "natural trading 
partners". They note that it is therefore surprising that one of the conclusions of the 
conventional analysis is that "the less the degree of complementarity - or the greater the 
degree of rivalry - of the member countries with respect to protected industries", the 
more desirable a FTA would be (Wonnacott and Lutz, 1989: 29). 
In making the case for initial complementarity, Wonnacott and Lutz (1989: 30) argue 
that if economies are complementary, there will be major differences in comparative 
advantage between them. According to orthodox trade theory, this means that for 
every additional dollar's worth of trade created between partner countries as a result of 
reduced protection between them in a FTA, the gains will be large. The gains per 
dollar's worth of additional trade will be tend to be greater than where production 
structures and comparative advantages are similar. 
The crucial point therefore is that it is important to look not only at the additional trade 
resulting from the formation of a FTA, but also at comparative cost differences, and 
hence at the gains for each dollar of new trade. These gains do not depend simply on 
whether the economies are complementary or competitive in structure. The central 
issue, according to Wonnacott and Lutz (1989: 30), is the cost competitiveness of the 
prospective partners relative to the ROW.25 Complementarity is desirable provided the 
countries' industries are close to or below world cost levels, because "the gains per unit 
of trade creation will be large, and the costs per unit of trade diversion small" 
25 This is slightly different to the issue raised by Makower and Morton (1953) of comparative cost levels 
between member countries (see Footnote 21 above). 
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(Wonnacott and Lutz, 1989: 30).26 
4.3.3 Regional integration as an instrument of industrialisation 
Some of the limitations of the traditional trade creation-trade diversion framework were 
raised in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 above. In particular, it was noted in Section 4.3.1 
that the orthodox theory provides an inappropriate framework for considering the effects 
of trade integration among developing countries. This conclusion is linked to a more 
fundamental criticism, namely that the Viner-Meade-Lipsey analysis fails to provide an 
economic rationale for the formation of customs unions (Cooper and Massell, 1965a; 
Johnson, 1965; Krauss, 1972; Robson, 1987: 45-48). 
The question of the motivation for customs unions was first examined by Cooper and 
Massell (1965a) in their analysis of the relative merits of discriminatory versus non-
discriminatory tariff reduction. Cooper and Massell (1965a) demonstrate that the gains 
from trade creation in the orthodox model are simply due to the reduction in tariffs 
which takes place between partner countries. These gains, they argue, may be obtained 
through unilateral tariff reduction (UTR), without any accompanying loss due to trade 
diversion. 27 A welfare-improving customs union is thus only beneficial because net 
trade creation represents a move towards free trade. Free trade itself would be yet 
more beneficial. 28 
26 
27 
28 
Note, however, that in practice the tariff-inclusive world price may not reflect the domestic price, due, 
for example, to competition between domestic producers. The South African motor vehicle industry 
may be a case in point. 
The argument can be illustrated with reference to Figure 4.3 above. If there is a unilateral tariff 
reduction by the home country such that the tariff-inclusive world price falls to PFTM then domestic 
consumption and production will adjust to the same levels as in the FTA case. The trade creation 
gains AGF and BEH will be the same, but the original level of imports 0,02 (as well as additional 
imports) will come from the ROW, and there will therefore be no trade diversion. 
Cooper and Massell (1965a: 742) purposefully rule out possible terms of trade effects, which 
Johnson (1965: 280) has called the only valid economic argument for customs unions in the classical 
framework. While this aspect is not considered here, on the grounds that terms of trade effects are 
unlikely to be an important source of gain from trade integration among a group of developing 
countries, it has been extensively analysed elsewhere in the literature (Mundell, 1964; Arndt, 1968, 
1969; Krauss, 1972; Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1981). It is more important to note that Wonnacott 
and Wonnacott (1981) provide a incisive criticism of the so-called "UTR proposition", in the absence 
of terms of trade effects. The proposition that UTR is superior to customs union formation, as 
articulated by Cooper and Massell (1965a), focuses on the effects of the removal of the home 
country's tariffs on imports, but ignores the advantages to the home country of improved access to 
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According to Cooper and Massell (1965a: 746-747), the traditional framework therefore 
"fails to show why a customs union may be acceptable when a tariff reduction is not, 
and it fails to analyse how a customs union may more efficiently serve the ends 
previously served by non-preferential protection". What is required, they argue, is an 
analysis of the relative efficiency of discriminatory and non-discriminatory tariff systems 
as protective devices. This necessitates the recognition of a prior rational argument for 
the existence of protection, which orthodox customs union theory fails to provide. 
In this context, Cooper and Massell (1965b) consider how membership of a customs 
union, by allowing participants to draw on each other's markets, may enable developing 
countries to achieve the objective of a higher level of industrial production than would 
be viable in the absence of protection, at a lower cost than would be the case under 
non-preferential tariff policy. 
The Cooper-Massell (1965b) approach thus allows for the existence of a preference for 
industrial development, which implies that economic planners may be willing to forego 
some national income in order to obtain an increase in industrial production. 
Consequently, in order to compare alternative production possibilities, the level of 
industrial production associated with each level of income needs to be taken into 
account (Cooper and Massell, 1965b: 463). 
The analysis assumes that planners are indifferent between any two industries and that 
diversification of the industrial sector is not a policy objective. The demand for 
industrial production is therefore satisfied by choosing the lowest cost industries. 
Further assumptions include full employment, constant costs, competitive pricing and 
constant terms of trade (Cooper and Massell, 1965b: 463). 
The analytical framework is illustrated in Figure 4.5, where 0 is the planners' demand 
curve depicting the "price" they are willing to pay for an increase in industrial production 
in terms of national income foregone. The stepped curve S is the marginal excess cost 
of producing locally for each industry, and is obtained by ranking industries by cost in 
the partner country's market which follow the partner's tariff reductions. It further assumes that the 
ROW has no tariffs, and that there are no transport costs in trade with the ROW. Once these 
assumptions are dropped, it can be shown that the home country can obtain gains from a customs 
union which are not possible with UTR (Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1981: 705). 
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ascending order. Since all industry requires protection by assumption, industrial output 
cannot be exported, so the level of industrial production is constrained by domestic 
demand. An expansion of industrial production therefore involves a move up the steps 
in the curve, where each step corresponds to a successively higher-cost industry. The 
intersection of D and S at point P gives the optimum level of industrial production OV. 
Associated with this level of industrial production is a set of tariffs which are sufficient 
to induce domestic production in each industry to the left of point V, but which provide 
no protection to industries on the right of point V. 29 The marginal cost of protection 
to the economy (or the cost of protecting the marginal industry) is shown by the 
distance VP in Figure 4.5, while the total cost of protection is the area OSPV (Cooper 
and Massell, 1965b: 463-464). 
Marginal 
cost of 
industry 
Sf--........ 
o 
Figure 4.5: Demand for industry 
Source: Cooper and Massell (1965b: 463). 
o 
v 
Industrial Production 
Consider, now, the formation of a customs union between two countries, A and B. To 
simplify the analysis, it is assumed that domestic demand for each industrial product is 
29 Under constant costs, and given the assumption that all industries require protection, an industry will 
either supply the entire domestic market (if protected by a prohibitive tariff), or will not operate at all. 
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the same, and is equal in the two countries. The essential question is whether there is 
any set of common external tariffs "that will make both countries better off relative to 
individually optimal policies of non-preferential protection" (Cooper and Massell, 1965b: 
466). 
If planners in the two countries are indifferent not only to the composition of industrial 
production, but also to its distribution within the union, they will choose an "efficient" 
set of common external tariffs, defined as "one that provides any specified level of 
industrial production in the [customs union] - irrespective of the composition and 
distribution of this production - at the lowest cost in terms of combined national income 
foregone by the two countries" (Cooper and Massell, 1965b: 466). 
The gains from specialisation in such a union are illustrated in Figure 4.6a (page 109). 
Before the formation of the customs union, the supply curves in each country are SA 
and S8. 30 Assuming that each country has planned industrial production equal to OM, 
without the union Country A would produce shoes and hats, its two lowest cost 
industries, with tariffs of OA1 and OA2 respectively, while Country B would produce 
coats and shirts, with tariffs of OB1 and OB2 respectively. Total industrial production 
in the two countries would be OP. 
If a customs union is formed between A and B, the union supply curve would be Su, 
depicting a new hierarchy of industries for the customs union as a whole. With the 
pooling of markets when a customs union is formed, each country's lowest cost 
industry can now produce twice the pre-union level of output, to supply both markets. 
Both countries are therefore able to specialise in the good in which they have an intra-
union comparative advantage, so that OM shoes will be produced in Country A, while 
MP coats will be produced in Country B. 
In this way, the initial combined level of industrial production OP can be obtained at a 
lower cost, by foregoing the production of higher-cost hats and shirts. The cost saved 
by Country A is given by the area CDEF in Figure 4.6a, while the cost saved by Country 
B is GHIJ. Further, given the industrial cost structures of the two countries, each 
30 Since domestic demand is the same for each product, and equal in the two countries, the steps in 
the supply curves are all of equal length. 
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conveniently ends up with the original planned level of industrial production OM. 
Suppose, however, that the competitive structures of the two countries were those 
depicted in Figure 4.6b. In this case, although the same ranking of industries applies 
in each country, the two least-cost industries are both located in Country A. Here, the 
implementation of an efficient tariff, which ignores the distribution of industry between 
the two countries, will result in the production of OM shoes and MP hats in Country A, 
while Country B will get no industry at all. If planners' preferences are such that each 
country wishes to obtain OM industrial production (that is, if the more realistic 
assumption is made that planners are no longer indifferent to the distribution of industry 
within the union), then Country A will be producing an excess of MP units over and 
above what it desires, thereby incurring further cost without additional benefit. 31 
Country B will have no industry, and would pay almost anything to produce OM units 
of output. The outcome with an efficient tariff is therefore not Pareto-optimal, since the 
welfare of both countries could be raised by eliminating Country A's hat production 
(Cooper and Massell, 1965b: 468). 
There is, however, still scope for a mutually beneficial customs union if a tariff is chosen 
which allows each country to produce the specified level of industrial production in the 
most economical way, by, for example, protecting a third industry in Country B which 
can be produced at a lower cost than the same industry in Country A, even though it 
may operate at a higher cost than the union's two least-cost industries (both located in 
A). 
31 This can be illustrated by assuming that the (perfectly inelastic) planners' demand curve for industrial 
production in each country is a vertical line passing through point M in Figure 4.6b. 
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Cooper and Massell (1965b: 469) thus define a "quasi-Pareto-optimal" common external 
tariff such that" [g]iven the level of industrial production in each country, joint national 
income is maximised". In Figure 4.6b, only a quasi-Pareto-optimal (but not efficient) 
tariff which protects shoes and coats will provide each country with the desired level 
of industrial production OM, while maximising joint national income. Country A will 
therefore produce OM shoes and Country B will produce MP coats, because although 
B's coat production is more expensive than A's hat production, coat production is 
Country B's least-cost industry. Each country is still able to produce the specified level 
of industrial production at a lower cost than before the formation of the customs union, 
as was the case in Figure 4.6a. 
Finally, suppose that there is a greater degree of overlap in the classes of goods initially 
produced under protection in each country; that is, the industrial structures of the two 
countries are more similar. As Figure 4.6c illustrates, since neither country is permitted 
to produce a good which can be produced more cheaply in the partner country, a more 
"competitive" economic structure (in the orthodox sense) may be problematic. Country 
B now has an intra-union comparative disadvantage in its three lowest-cost industries 
(hats, shoes and dresses), and is therefore unable to produce them in a customs union 
with Country A. In order for Country B to obtain its desired level of industrial 
production it will have to produce ties, the lowest cost industry in which it has an intra-
union comparative advantage, while Country A will produce shoes. 
It can thus be seen that, under quasi-Pareto-optimality, the formation of a customs 
union results in a new hierarchy of industries for each country, and hence new country 
supply curves, containing only those industries in which it has an intra-union 
comparative advantage. While the ranking of these industries will remain the same, an 
industry which is established on union, even a relatively high-cost one such as ties in 
Figure 4.6c, must operate at twice the initial planned level of production in order to 
supply the entire union market. 
Although a given common external tariff will determine the level of industrial production 
in each country, as well as joint national income, it will not specify the level of income 
in each country, since there is scope for redistributing income within the union without 
altering the tariff. However, if income distribution is left to market forces, the cost of 
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each protected industry will be shared equally by the member countries, so that the cost 
of establishing a given industry is reduced by half from each country's point of view, 
with the other half paid for by consumers in the partner country. This implies a 
divergence between private (in this case "national") and social ("customs union") costs 
of industrialisation. Thus, as Figure 4.6c illustrates, there are external diseconomies 
associated with industrialisation which, if ignored, will mean that a quasi-Pareto-optimal 
tariff will result in a non-Pareto-optimal outcome (Cooper and Massell, 1965b: 468-
469). 
In these circumstances, to achieve a Pareto-optimal solution, the two countries could 
negotiate a joint reduction in industrial production, or design a system of compensation 
whereby each country pays full income compensation to its partner for the relatively 
high-cost goods sold in the partner's market. This will entail the choice of a "Pareto-
optimal" tariff, defined as a set of common external tariff rates such that "[g]iven some 
rule for redistributing income, the tariff results in levels of industrial production in each 
country such that neither country's welfare can be raised without a reduction in the 
other country's welfare" (Cooper and Massell, 1965b: 471). 
In the Cooper-Massell (1965b) analysis, the gains to a member country from the 
formation of a customs union depend on what happens to both national income and 
industrial output, which in turn depends on the common external tariff that is chosen. 
Under a Pareto-optimal tariff, combined with a rule for distributing income, if each 
country has an intra-union comparative advantage in its lowest cost industries, allowing 
it to produce a given level of industrial production more cheaply, then both will 
necessarily gain from a customs union. On the other hand, if either country has an 
intra-union comparative disadvantage in its lowest cost industries, it will be made worse 
off. In the latter instance, however, it may still be possible for the country that gains 
to offer additional compensation to the loser which would leave both countries better 
off. Alternatively, some kind of protection within the union may be allowed, through 
the formation of a partial customs union. 
Cooper and Massell (1965b: 475-476) conclude that the potential gains from a customs 
union will be larger if: "(1) [t]here is a steeply rising marginal cost of protection in the 
two countries, (2) the countries have a strong preference for industry, (3) the countries 
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are complementary, and (4) neither country dominates the other in industrial production 
generally" . Even if the last condition does not hold, gains are still possible if 
compensation is made to the disadvantaged country, or if a partial customs union is 
formed. 
The third condition, namely that the potential gains from a customs union will be larger 
if there is initial complementarity, is in direct contrast to the orthodox notion that 
competitiveness in the products initially produced under protection is more likely to 
result in the formation of a beneficial customs union. The conventional criterion, 
however, rests on the traditional view of trade creation as welfare-improving and trade 
diversion as welfare-reducing. 
The Cooper-Massell (1965b) analysis departs from the orthodox framework by allowing 
for a possible preference for industry and by regarding tariffs as policy instruments 
rather than exogenous variables. This requires a somewhat modified interpretation of 
the welfare implications of trade creation and trade diversion. More specifically, trade 
diversion is not necessarily bad, since although it may reduce national income, industrial 
production is expanded to supply the partner's market. It cannot be said whether this 
will raise or lower welfare without reference to the country's indifference curves 
showing the trade-off between industrial production and national income. Further, to 
consider the case of trade creation, suppose that Country A is a lower cost producer 
than Country 8 in all industries, so that production shifts to A when a union is formed. 
While Country 8 obtains its industrial goods more cheaply than under non-preferential 
protection, its industrial sector has been lost. Country 8 is therefore not necessarily 
better off, although the actual position again requires some knowledge of its 
preferences. 
EI-Agraa (1989: 25) argues that while trade creation and trade diversion may both yield 
a gain in this framework, trade diversion will be preferable to trade creation for the 
preference-granting country, since it does not entail a sacrifice in domestic industrial 
production. This view emerges from Johnson's (1965) independent analysis of tariff 
policy in the presence of public goods, in which he argues that "discriminatory tariff 
reduction has the advantage over non-discriminatory tariff reduction [in] that it permits 
a country to offer its partner an increase in exports and industrial production without 
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suffering any loss of its own industrial production, through diverting imports from third 
countries to the partner" (Johnson, 1965: 274). This point is reiterated by Lundahl and 
Petersson (1991: 211) as follows: 
" ... assuming that the partners of a customs union have differing comparative advantages 
in various products, a country with a small domestic market, a strong preference for 
industrial production but weak international competitiveness, may find that trade diversion 
may even be preferable to trade creation in the two countries, because it increases 
production within the union". 
In conclusion, the analysis in the present section has illustrated how trade integration 
may enable two or more economies to protect a given amount of industry at a lower 
real cost. While the orthodox criterion that initial competitiveness of structure is more 
beneficial to customs union formation no longer applies, it is apparent from the cases 
illustrated in Figures 4.6a and 4.6b that the comparative cost structures of the partner 
countries are still important. Further, cost competitiveness vis-ii-vis the ROW will be 
relevant in determining the compensation required for the excess cost of industrial 
goods sold in partner country markets. 
Robson (1987: 53) notes that although the Cooper-Massell (1965b) and Johnson (1965) 
analyses demonstrate that customs union formation may be more efficient than non-
discriminatory tariff policy when there is a rational motive for protection, they do not 
provide an economic rationale for integration, in the sense of a first-best case, unless 
the use of direct subsidies to industry has been ruled out. Johnson (1965: 259, 263), 
Cooper and Massell (1965b: 474) and Robson (1987: 53-54) all point to the variety of 
budgetary, institutional and political constraints which result in tariff policy generally 
being favoured. As Robson (1987: 53) notes, such constraints "may effectively mean 
that customs unions may represent the only practicable means of achieving the gains 
in question". 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that neither in terms of the traditional trade creation-trade 
diversion analysis, discussed in Section 4.2, nor in terms of the non-traditional 
perspectives considered in Section 4.3, can it be said a priori that a free trade 
arrangement amongst developing countries cannot be mutually beneficial to its 
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participants. This is so even amongst countries of very unequal size and per capita 
income levels, whose trade with one another is initially a small proportion of their total 
trade. In the traditional analysis, this applies even to countries with complementary 
comparative advantages, although, within this framework, the likelihood of mutually 
beneficial gain is enhanced by some degree of similarity in economic structure. 
However, some of the arguments considered in Section 4.3 suggest that, from a non-
traditional perspective, complementarity of structure may in fact be conducive to 
successful trade integration. In particular, Cooper and Massell (1965b) argue that 
regional integration may permit its members to achieve the objectives of protection at 
a lower cost than under non-preferential tariff policy, and that this may be more readily 
attained when the economic structures of prospective partner countries are 
complementary rather than competitive. 
The conclusions in this chapter have all been derived from analysis based on the 
assumption of perfect competition. The discussion in the next chapter considers issues 
relevant to trade integration under imperfectly competitive conditions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FURTHER THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES: 
IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND DYNAMIC EFFECTS 
5.1 Introduction 
Both the orthodox and non-traditional perspectives on the effects of regional trade 
integration considered in Chapter 4 are derived from analysis based on the assumption 
of perfect competition. However, there is a growing literature that addresses the 
question of the effects of trade in an imperfectly competitive setting, which suggests 
the possibility of benefits from trade significantly in excess of those associated with the 
"conventional" gains from trade, largely because of economies of scale (Greenaway, 
1991: 168). This literature stresses the role of market imperfections such as oligopoly, 
non-constant production costs and product differentiation, all of which are clearly 
pervasive features of the real world. The effects of integration in the context of 
imperfect competition thus appear to be worthy of consideration. 
Section 5.2 examines the implications of regional trade integration in the presence of 
internal economies of scale. The discussion in this section focuses on the inter-industry 
resource reallocation effects of integration under increasing returns to scale. A major 
feature of the growing literature on the effects of trade in the context of imperfect 
competition, however, is the recognition of product differentiation, which, together with 
economies of scale, allows for the prospect of intra-industry specialisation and trade in 
differentiated goods. Section 5.3 therefore relaxes the assumption of homogeneous 
products to consider the potential for, and implications of, intra-industry resource 
reallocation as a result of trade integration. 1 
Although intra-industry specialisation is predominant among industrial countries, Greenaway (1991: 
166-167) argues that it features both in North-South and South-South trade, and is, in the latter 
instance, at least in part, fashioned by integration arrangements. Further, the evidence suggests that 
intra-industry trade becomes more prevalent as industrialisation proceeds, and will therefore increase 
in importance in the trade of developing countries. Therefore, while the current extent of intra-
industry trade between a group of developing countries, such as those in SADC, may be very low, 
some consideration of this aspect nonetheless seems to be important. 
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The analysis in Chapter 4 and the first two sections of this chapter considers only the 
static welfare effects of economic integration. It has often been suggested that the 
dynamic effects of integration, namely, the possible ways in which integration may 
affect the rate of growth of GNP of the participating countries, are of considerable 
importance, particularly in the developing country context (Jaber, 1970-71: 256). This 
aspect is considered in Section 5.4, while Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 Economies of scale 
According to Cline (1982: 233)' possible benefits from economies of scale constitute 
"one major economic motive for integration". This has particularly been emphasised in 
the context of trade integration among developing countries, due to the small size of 
national markets (Pearson and Ingram, 1980: 994; Corden, 1984: 123; Lundahl and 
Petersson, 1991: 173). Nevertheless, there appears to have been no serious attempt 
to incorporate the question of potential benefits from economies of scale systematically 
into the debate on trade integration in southern Africa. 2 For example, while Holden 
(1996: 55-56) makes reference to possible benefits from dynamic external economies 
on integration, her comparative static analysis, by focusing only on the case where 
imports from the prospective partner country are produced subject to rising costs, does 
not consider internal economies of scale as a potential source of benefit from southern 
African trade integration. 3 
As will be seen below, it is often argued that the enlarged market in a regional union 
between countries of unequal size or levels of development will, in sectors where scale 
economies are important, mainly benefit producers in the larger countries, who are likely 
to capture the entire union market (Lundahl and Petersson, 1991: 185). Thus, in the 
case of SADC, any gains from the exploitation of regional economies of scale would be 
likely to accrue to South Africa, to the detriment of its smaller partners. However, it 
appears that whether large or small countries will benefit (lose) most in terms of 
2 
3 
Two main exceptions are worthy of note. The first is the study of Lundahl and Petersson (1991: 173-
186; 193-202) on Lesotho in the SACU, drawn on in the discussion below, and the second is a recent 
paper by Holmes and Evans (1997: 54-64), which makes a preliminary investigation into the potential 
for scale economies in the SADC region. 
The question of dynamic external economies is considered in Section 5.4 below. 
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increased exports (imports) is controversial. 
In his study of economies of scale and economic integration in Latin America, Cline 
(1982: 275) states that "it is the smaller countries that stand the most to gain from 
regional economies of scale". His empirical analysis shows that the Latin American 
market as a whole is large enough to achieve minimum efficient scale (MES) in most 
products. While the same applies to Brazil and Mexico with their relatively large national 
markets, medium-sized countries such as Chile and Peru have markets which are too 
small to achieve MES in most products, and the smaller countries have markets which 
are incapable of reaching MES in any products except the two with the lowest optimal 
scale, cotton fabrics and shoes (Cline, 1982: 252). 
According to Cline (1982: 252), this suggests that most countries would benefit from 
economic integration as a way of achieving a market size sufficient to exploit economies 
of scale. However, the magnitude of these gains depends not only on the size of the 
domestic market relative to MES, but also on the degree of excess cost caused by 
producing at below optimal scale. Cline (1982: 253-262) calculates this excess cost 
by estimating the unit cost of producing for the domestic market relative to the unit cost 
of producing for the regional market. He finds that the highest excess costs occur in 
small countries, in products which require large market size and which have high excess 
cost at low scale. Small countries therefore stand to gain the most from production for 
the regional market, because they incur higher excess costs than large countries by 
producing for their domestic markets at below MES. 
Cline (1982: 262) notes that even if MES can be achieved in the national market, if only 
one firm can operate efficiently monopoly behaviour will result in production at below 
optimal scale. The monopoly welfare costs of producing for the domestic market are 
therefore also important, and can be avoided by co-ordinating production regionally so 
that several firms compete at the regional level, or by refraining from domestic 
production and importing from the rest of the world {ROW).4 After calculating the 
number of firms of MES which can be accommodated in domestic markets in each 
product, Cline (1982: 268) concludes that "monopoly is a serious potential problem if 
production is limited to national markets". The welfare costs of monopoly therefore 
4 The question of the choice between integration or free trade with the ROW is considered below. 
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provide another reason, in addition to technical economies of scale, for Latin America 
to consider regional integration. 
Cline (1982: 272) estimates that the combined costs of sub-optimal scale and monopoly 
resulting from production for the domestic market range from 1.3 per cent of GNP in 
Brazil to as much as 13.6 per cent of GNP in Uruguay, and 8.6 per cent on average for 
the eleven smallest countries in the region. Both the technical and monopoly costs of 
production could, by contrast, be minimal in a large regional market such as Latin 
America. Cline (1982: 272) therefore concludes that "[f]or Latin America, ... economic 
integration could provide substantial benefits from increased economies of scale and 
elimination of monopoly costs, in comparison with purely domestic production in each 
country for the national market. These potential benefits are greatest for the small 
countries of the region, the countries least capable of achieving efficient scale on their 
own". The benefits of integration would average 8.6 per cent of GNP for the smaller 
countries, as cited above, 5.3 per cent of GNP for the few middle-sized countries, and 
even 3.4 per cent of GNP for the largest countries in the region, Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico. 
The question of whether producers in large or small countries are likely to benefit most 
from the exploitation of economies of scale in a regional market has also been 
considered by Casella (1995: 2), who notes the usual view that firms located in large 
countries are likely to be able to produce at lower costs than firms in smaller countries 
in sectors in which scale economies are significant, given their larger domestic markets. 
However, she then considers the impact on countries of different size which are already 
part of an existing arrangement of the enlargement of the trade bloc. In relation to the 
European Union, Casella (1995: 2-3) argues: 
"It may appear at first that firms in large countries would have a privileged position. 
Because they have lower costs, they should be able to gain disproportionately large 
shares of the new trade, and realize larger extra profits than firms in small countries ... 
Yet, this view is mistaken because it neglects the original cause of the difference in 
economic performance between large and small countries. By increasing the size of the 
market to which all firms have relatively easy access, the enlargement of the trade bloc 
decreases the importance of the domestic market and plays in favor of the small 
countries" . 
Her analysis shows that the relative sales of firms in large countries fall as the trade 
bloc expands. On the other hand, firms in small countries experience a reduction in their 
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relative cost disadvantage and hence an improvement in their competitiveness vis-a-vis 
large countries. The source of the initial competitive advantage of the large countries 
(that is, their larger domestic markets) should therefore not be taken as given. 
In contrast to the arguments of Cline (1982) and Casella (1995), however, others either 
explicitly or implicitly take the view that because of the larger size of its (protected) 
domestic market, a larger partner will have a cost advantage, and on formation of a 
regional union will be likely to capture the entire regional market in sectors in which 
scale economies are important (Lundahl and Petersson, 1991: 177; Corden, 1972). The 
question then is whether the smaller countries will benefit by giving up production of 
scale-intensive goods and importing them from larger partner countries which in the 
initial pre-union situation have lower unit costs. 
This aspect is considered in Corden's (1972) pioneering theoretical analysis, which 
extends Viner's (1950) trade creation-trade diversion framework to incorporate 
economies of scale into customs union theory. The analysis assumes a single actual or 
potential producer in each country, a homogeneous product, and the presence of 
internal economies of scale, so that unit costs decrease as production expands and the 
firm's average cost curve is downward-sloping over the relevant output range. 5 As 
Figure 5.1 illustrates, each country's average cost curve is assumed to reach its 
minimum point above the ROW export price {PEl, so that neither country exports to the 
ROW. Further, neither country initially exports to the other because of their tariffs and 
relatively high costs (Corden, 1972: 466). 
It is important to stress the implications, in this context, of the assumption that the 
domestic and imported good are perfect substitutes. In the presence of decreasing 
costs, the case of a single homogeneous good implies that the domestic market will 
either be supplied entirely by imports or entirely by domestic production (Vousden, 
1990: 116; Lundahl and Petersson, 1991: 175).6 
The countries forming the union are assumed to face given cost-insurance-freight (c.i.f) import and 
free-on-board (f.o.b.) export prices set by the ROW, with the export price below the import price 
because of transport costs and the ROW's tariff. 
As Vousden (1990: 116) notes, this "all-or-nothing" outcome appears to be at variance with the 
reality that many importables are sourced both from domestic production and imports, although it 
follows logically from the assumption of a single homogeneous good. The situation where domestic 
and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes for one another in the presence of decreasing costs, 
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Figure 5.1: Made-to-measure tariffs and economies of scale 
This can be illustrated with reference to Figure 5.1, where DH is the domestic demand 
curve, ACH is the local producer's average cost curve, and Sw is the world supply curve 
of imports to the home country. If, as shown, the price of imports from the ROW (Pw) 
lies below the break-even price PH (at which average revenue equals average cost), and 
the firm's average and marginal cost curves lie everywhere above the export price PE, 
then, in the absence of protection, the domestic firm will not produce at all. 7 If a tariff 
of tH is imposed such that the tariff-inclusive import price is just equal to average cost 
(that is, so that (P w + tH) = PH), the domestic producer will be able to produce OOH at 
zero profit, with imports wholly excluded. This is Corden's (1972, 1974) "made-to-
measure" tariff, which is just sufficient to induce enough domestic production to satisfy 
domestic consumption without giving rise to excess profits. In contrast to the situation 
of increasing costs, described in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4, there is no tariff revenue 
(since there are no imports) and no producer surplus (since PH equals average cost). A 
7 
allowing for the simultaneous local production and import of differentiated goods, will be considered 
in Section 5.3 below. 
Domestic demand will be satisfied by OQF imports at a price Pw' 
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tariff below tH would not be high enough to make domestic production viable, and would 
simply be a revenue tariff. On the other hand, a tariff higher than tH would merely 
increase the firm's monopoly power, resulting in excess profit, lower output and a 
higher price to consumers. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the domestic 
price is determined by the tariff-inclusive world price (Corden, 1972: 467; Robson, 
1987: 35).8 
Now consider the formation of a customs union between two countries, where the 
partner is larger than the home country but both are small relative to the ROW. Figure 
5.2 illustrates the demand and cost conditions in the two countries, where the 
difference in their economic size is reflected by their respective demand curves DH and 
Dp, with the partner country having a relatively larger domestic market. Further, the 
partner country is assumed to be more efficient than the home country, so that its 
average cost curve lies below the home country's cost curve at each level of output. 
DH+ P is the horizontal sum of the two countries' demand curves, depicting total union 
demand for the homogeneous good. 
Suppose that there is initially domestic production in both countries, with made-to-
measure tariffs of PWPH in the home country and PwPp in the partner country. The home 
country's domestic demand is satisfied by OOH domestic production at the tariff-
inclusive price PH' while the partner country's demand is satisfied by domestic 
production of OOp at a price Pp, with imports wholly excluded. On union, the partner 
country has a cost advantage and will capture the entire union market. Total union 
demand of OOu will be provided by the partner country at a cost Pu, lower than the cost 
in either country pre-union, and requiring a tariff of PwPu. Consumption will increase to 
OOH2 in the home country and OOp2 in the partner country. 
The welfare effects are as follows. The home country, which loses its industry, 
experiences a trade creation gain of PHABPu comprising the production effect (area 
PHACPu' due to the replacement of relatively inefficient domestic production with 
cheaper imports from the partner) and the consumption effect (area ABC, due to the 
In practice, in the case of a tariff higher than t." the world price plus the tariff (which would be higher 
than PH in Figure 5.1) sets only the upper limit of the price which a domestic producer may charge; 
it may pay a profit-maximising producer to charge less. For example, a monopolist's optimum price, 
while exceeding PH' may be below this tariff-inclusive world price. 
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Figure 5.2: A customs union with economies of scale 
Source: Robson (1987: 37). 
additional consumption induced by the lower domestic price).9 The partner country 
now obtains its domestic requirements at a lower cost. Corden (1972: 467) terms this 
the cost reduction effect to distinguish it from trade creation, since it refers to the 
cheapening of an existing source of supply, rather than a shift to a lower-cost source 
of supply in another country. The cost reduction effect is depicted by area PpFGPu in 
Figure 5.2, and also consists of a production component (area PpFJPu, the saving on the 
original amount of domestic production which is now obtainable at a lower price) and 
a consumption component (area FGJ, the gain in consumer surplus resulting from 
additional consumption at the lower price). Further, the partner country obtains a gain 
from its exports to the home country at a price exceeding Pw, denoted by area GHIK 
(equal to PuBDPw) (Robson, 1987: 36-38). In this case, in terms of orthodox static 
analysis, both countries gain from the formation of the customs union, although the 
home country loses its domestic industry. 
Suppose, however, that prior to union there is initial production in one country only, 
Krauss (1972: 433) notes that the production component of the trade creation gain is twice as large 
in the case of decreasing costs as when the supply curve is upward-sloping. 
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with the other importing its requirements from the ROW. If this production takes place 
in the relatively more efficient partner country, while the home country imports the 
amount PwE from the lowest-cost source (the ROW), the formation of a customs union 
will result in a loss of consumer surplus to the home country of PuBEPw, since imports 
from the partner will necessarily be more expensive than imports from the ROW. Of the 
home country loss, area PuBDPw denotes the trade diversion effect, as the new (lower) 
amount consumed (PwD = OOH2) is obtained at a higher cost. Area BED is an adverse 
consumption effect, reflecting the loss of consumer surplus on consumption foregone 
at the higher price (Corden, 1972: 470). The partner country will gain areas PpFGPu and 
GHIK as before. Note, therefore, that the home country's loss due to trade diversion 
(PuBDPw = GHIK) represents a transfer to the partner country, and is not lost to the 
union as a whole. The net welfare impact on the union as a whole will thus be 
beneficial if the partner gain of PpFGPu outweighs the home country loss of BED. 
On the other hand, if initial production occurs only in the higher-cost home country, with 
the partner importing PwL from the ROW, then it is likely that the formation of a 
customs union will result in a "production reversal", so that the established producer 
ceases production while the partner country captures the entire union market (Robson, 
1987: 38-39). This results in a trade creation gain for the home country of PHABPu, as 
described earlier, although its domestic industry is lost. Partner country consumers 
suffer a consumer surplus loss of PuGLPw, of which GLK is an adverse consumption 
effect, as before, and PuGKPw is a trade suppression effect. The (reduced) domestic 
demand in the partner country is now met by domestic production rather than imports 
from the ROW. Therefore, trade suppression, like trade diversion, involves a move from 
a lower-cost to higher-cost source of supply, although the higher-cost source in this 
case is the domestic producer rather than a producer in another member country. While 
Robson (1987: 39) seems to suggest that the partner country loses as a result of the 
formation of the customs union, given these adverse effects on its consumers, Lundahl 
and Petersson (1991: 195) note that the trade suppression loss to partner consumers 
(PuGKPw) is balanced by a gain of the same magnitude to the newly-established partner 
producer. Further, consumers in the home country pay the partner producer more than 
the world price for the product, thereby effectively transferring income represented by 
area PuBDPw (equal to GHIK) to the partner country. Therefore, while partner 
consumers lose consumer surplus of PuGLPw when the union is formed, the partner 
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producer gains area PuHIPw on domestic sales and on exports to the home country at 
a price in excess of the world price Pw ' Both the home and partner country thus 
benefit, in this case, from the formation of the union. 
If there is initially production in neither country, so that both import their requirements 
from the ROW, the formation of a customs union may induce production in one. The 
country in which production is established will experience a net gain, since (as outlined 
above) the loss to consumers due to trade suppression will be exactly offset by an equal 
gain to the newly-established producer, while the loss due to reduced consumption will 
be more than outweighed by the gains made on exports to the other country (Lundahl 
and Petersson, 1 991: 1 96). However, the country in which production is not 
established will incur a net loss, due to trade diversion and reduced consumption. 
Further, it can be seen from Figure 5.2 that the country which gains (the partner, in this 
case) would be unable to compensate the other, since the latter's net loss of PuBEPw 
necessarily exceeds the partner's net gain of GHIL. 
From the analysis above, it is apparent that with made-to-measure tariffs any gains or 
losses from the four effects (trade creation, trade diversion, cost reduction and trade 
suppression) are borne by consumers. Interestingly, Corden (1972) appears not to 
recognise the gains to the union producer from exports to its partner or from 
establishing production at home, identified by Robson (1987: 38) and Lundahl and 
Petersson (1991: 195-196). By focusing only on the gains or losses from the four 
effects, he concludes that, in the absence of tariff revenues and excess profits, "all 
gains and losses [from the union] will be borne by consumers" (Corden, 1972: 469).10 
Robson (1987: 39) notes that the comparative static framework outlined above is of 
limited use in determining which of a number of possible equilibrium positions will result 
when a customs union is formed. In the case of a homogeneous good whose 
production is subject to economies of scale, with only one actual or potential producer 
in each country, it may be expected that a single firm will capture the entire market on 
union. However if, for example, the good is produced under identical cost conditions 
10 Winters (1991: 183) points out that if tariffs are exogenous rather than made-to-measure, then the 
domestic prices faced by consumers will not be altered by the union. In this case, any benefits from 
lower costs will accrue, not to consumers, but rather to producers as excess profits, while the losses 
will be reflected as a loss of tariff revenue (see Corden, 1972: 467-469). 
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in both countries, as illustrated in Figure 5.3, then the analysis is unable to demonstrate 
which firm it will be. Although pre-union production costs may differ between the two 
countries due to differences in national market size, Figure 5.3 shows that in principle 
a firm in either country could produce for the union market since their costs would be 
identical at Q u. While Corden (1972: 474) notes that the actual outcome will depend 
on a number of dynamic considerations, he nonetheless implies that the firm with the 
larger domestic market initially will have an advantage in the post-union situation, and 
will therefore be more likely to capture the entire market. The possibility, considered 
by Casella (1995), that the small country might be able to expand its scale of 
production, thus lowering its unit costs, improving its relative competitiveness and 
capturing an increasing share of the regional market, is not seriously contemplated. 
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Figure 5.3: Economies of scale and equal costs of production in the member 
countries 
Source: Lundahl and Petersson (1991: 177). 
Lundahl and Petersson (1991: 185) suggest that in the presence of economies of scale, 
given the assumption of a single actual or potential producer in each country prior to 
union, the outcome whereby union demand is provided either entirely by imports from 
the ROW or else by a single producer within the union rests on the assumption of a 
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homogeneous good. They thus imply that in order for producers in both member 
countries to gain from the exploitation of economies of scale, it is necessary to extend 
the analysis to allow for product differentiation." However, an alternative outcome 
to one producer capturing the entire market in the case of a homogeneous good may 
be suggested by the work of Brander (1981). In this model, the homogeneous good is 
initially produced by a single, identical firm in each country in the absence of trade, with 
constant marginal costs, but falling average costs. Once trade is allowed, each firm is 
assumed to make a separate decision regarding its sales to each national market and to 
follow Cournot behaviour, taking the other firm's output as fixed in each country 
(Brander and Krugman, 1983: 314). Although firms would not expand output in their 
own markets (since this would depress the price on existing sales), as long as price 
exceeds marginal cost in the rival's home market, there would be an incentive for each 
firm to sell there until, with symmetric firms, each has a fifty per cent share of each 
market (Krugman, 1990: 86). 
Brander and Krugman (1983) show that, even in the presence of transport costs, two-
way trade in the same product may occur, provided that price exceeds marginal cost 
plus the cost of transportation. In this case, the firm will have a smaller share of the 
foreign than the domestic market because of transport costs, and will thus perceive 
itself as facing a higher elasticity of demand for its exports than for domestic sales. It 
will therefore be willing to sell abroad at a lower mark-up over marginal cost than at 
home (Krugman, 1990: 86). The result is "reciprocal dumping" or two-way trade in 
homogeneous goods (Brander and Krugman, 1983: 320). While such cross-hauling is 
necessarily a waste of transport resources, the pro-competitive effect of trade forces 
price down closer to marginal cost, and is therefore welfare-improving. 
Although this phenomenon is discussed in the context of a move from autarky to free 
trade, and not in the context of trade integration per se, it does illustrate that, in the 
case of a homogeneous good whose production is subject to economies of scale, where 
there is initially one producer in each country, there may be room for both firms to 
supply the regional market even if they have different costs, by adjusting market share. 
While such trade is a waste of transport resources, it may be welfare-improving for both 
" Casella's (1995) conclusions do, in fact, derive from a model incorporating differentiated goods. This 
aspect is considered further in Section 5.3 below. 
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countries if the pro-competitive effect dominates the loss due to transport costs. 
Further, it is possible to show that trade is necessarily welfare-improving if there is free 
entry, since profits will be zero (with price equal to average cost plus transport costs) 
and cross-hauling will not occur if transport costs are too high. As long as cross-hauling 
lowers price in both markets, reciprocal dumping will be beneficial (Vousden, 1990: 
135). 
The implicit assumption of Corden (1972) and Lundahl and Petersson (1991: 177, 185) 
in the case of homogeneous products, that firms in large countries will have an 
advantage post-union in sectors where economies of scale are important, due to their 
larger domestic markets, also seems to underlie Behar's (1991, 1995) empirical work 
on Latin America, even though, like Casella (1995)' his analysis allows for product 
differentiation. 
In his analysis of the Argentine-Brazilian Free Trade Agreement, Behar (1991: 548) finds 
that the Brazilian market is large enough to reach MES in most products, while the 
converse is true for Argentina. He concludes from this, in accordance with Cline 
(1982), that Argentina, the smaller partner, would potentially reap large gains in some 
sectors from exploiting economies of scale in a larger integrated market. However, he 
notes that, in practice, the magnitude and distribution of these gains depend not only 
on obtaining access to a broader market, but also on the effect of greater competition 
from the partner country on domestic firms (Behar, 1991: 549).12 
In his subsequent empirical analysis of MERCOSUR, Behar (1995: 19) argues that the 
expansion of intra-MERCOSUR trade on integration does raise competition in each 
market, resulting in a loss of domestic market share for all members. He states that 
"[olverall, the dimension of these losses ... is inversely correlated to the size of the 
country", suggesting that "integration would reinforce market power for firms located 
in Brazil" (Behar, 1995: 19-20). With reference to Cline (1982) and Behar (1991), he 
concludes that the main reason for this is "the high likelihood for Argentine and 
Uruguayan firms to incur inefficiency costs in the form of suboptimal production scale" 
12 Cline's (1982: 272) estimates of the potential benefits to the smaller countries of producing for a 
larger regional market do not consider their ability to compete with firms in partner countries. 
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(Behar, 1995: 20).13 
Despite his view, cited earlier, that smaller countries stand to gain more than large ones 
from the exploitation of regional economies of scale, Cline (1982) provides a possible 
justification for the position taken by Corden (1972) and Behar (1995). He states that 
"[h]ypothetically, any country, however small, could produce any product, however 
large its economies of scale, and sell its production to the world market without regard 
for the domestic market", but that "[i]n practice, there is little historical evidence of 
development success based on manufacturing production at scale levels far in excess 
of national market size" (Cline, 1982: 246-247). He thus concludes that the size of the 
domestic market should provide the best guide as to whether or not a country is well 
positioned to take advantage of economies of scale. 
Furthermore, Cline (1982: 275-276) appears to contradict his own earlier contention 
that small countries will tend to benefit most from regional economies of scale when he 
says that "the product sectors showing the smallest returns to scale would be prime 
candidates for specialization by the smaller countries". However, this statement seems 
to reflect the point raised by Behar (1991, 1995), noted earlier, that although the 
smaller countries would potentially stand to gain the most because of the higher excess 
cost of operating at below optimal scale, the effect of increased competition from larger 
partners in a regional union will be significant. The suggestion that smaller countries 
specialise in sectors with smaller returns to scale thus appears to be made in an attempt 
to shed light on "the kinds of intraregional trade that could emerge to provide benefits 
to both groups of countries" (Cline, 1982: 275, emphasis added). There may, 
evidently, be gains from economies of scale even in these sectors since, if scale is 
important at all in a given sector, research has shown that "the degree of returns to 
scale is very high at small scale, and then diminishes as larger scale is reached (the L-
shaped cost curve)" (Cline, 1982: 243). Firms in larger countries can then be left to 
specialise in activities requiring greater scale, so that both groups of countries may 
benefit from economies of scale in a larger regional market. 
13 Behar (1995: 20-21) notes, however, that the adverse effect of inadequate market size on the 
competitiveness of Argentine and Uruguayan firms may be mitigated by a number of factors, such 
as new trade opportunities offered by integration, greater price shocks on the Brazilian market due 
to higher pre-integration tariffs, and inter-country differences in the costs of labour, raw materials and 
electric power. 
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Cline's (1982) investigation of the possible scale-economy benefits of trade integration 
among a group of developing countries may be related to the analysis of Cooper and 
Massell (1965b)' considered in Section 4.3.3 above. Cline (1982: 273) notes that the 
problem of insufficient domestic market size to support an efficient scale of production 
in any sector could be avoided by importing such products from the ROW in exchange 
for exports of primary products or manufactured goods for which the country does have 
an adequate domestic market. However, such a strategy would appear to forego 
potential gains for the region. In the light of the difficulties posed by a reliance on 
primary commodity exports, and accepting that the countries of Latin America wish to 
pursue industrialisation through import substitution, Cline (1982: 273-274) argues that 
such a pursuit "will be much more efficient if it is based on regional integration instead 
of isolated national markets". This view, akin to that of Cooper and Massell (1965b), 
sees integration as a development strategy based on inward-oriented production for the 
regional market. 14 
The validity of the scale motive for economic integration among developing countries 
has been questioned by Mazzeo (1984: 235-237), who argues that economies of scale 
entail the widespread use of modern capital-intensive technology, whereas labour is 
generally the more abundant factor in developing countries. Cline (1982: 238-245) 
investigates the relationship between factor intensities and returns to scale in an 
attempt to address the question of whether economies of scale are less important in 
developing countries than industrial countries, given their sharply different relative factor 
prices, but finds the empirical evidence inconclusive. 15 In the case of Latin America, 
specifically, however, the available empirical studies suggest that economies of scale 
are at least as great in Latin America as in industrial countries. 
Both the theoretical and empirical analysis in this section suggests that there are 
benefits to be derived from the exploitation of economies of scale in an integrated 
14 
15 
Robson (1987: 196) notes that while the optimal strategy may be first to supply domestic markets 
then move directly into world markets, the possibilities of exporting manufactures to world markets 
rather than protected regional markets will be limited for many less developed countries. There may 
be considerably less uncertainty in a regional union if market-swapping is taking place, especially if 
there is a common currency. 
More specifically, he finds little evidence "that small-scale production is relatively more efficient (or 
less inefficient) in developing countries than in industrial countries because of a correlation between 
scale economies and capital intensity" (Cline, 1982: 240). 
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regional market. Further, it seems that it cannot be concluded, a priori, that the 
enlarged market in a regional union among countries of unequal size and levels of 
development will, in sectors in which scale economies are important, mainly benefit 
producers in the larger countries. The regional context to which much of the empirical 
discussion in this section refers, however, is that of Latin America, so that the question 
remains of the relevance of this analysis to the SADC situation. 
It seems improbable that no actual or potential industrial production of SADC members, 
in any individual sector, involves significant scale economies. In the case of South 
Africa, for example, using the OECD classification of manufacturing industries, Nordas 
(1996: 719) finds that as much as 70 per cent of manufacturing value-added is either 
resource-intensive (38 per cent) or scale-intensive (33 per cent). Since the resource-
intensive industries also happen to be largely scale-intensive, there appears to be a 
significant potential to exploit economies of scale, given access to a larger market. 
Nordas (1996: 730) argues that the poor productivity and growth performance of a 
number of sectors in South African manufacturing industry can be explained in part by 
unexhausted economies of scale due to a small and stagnant domestic market.16 
According to Nordas (1996: 729), "the scale-intensive industries in South Africa are far 
from the point where economies of scale are exhausted, and potential gains from this 
source ... are substantial". 
If this is so, then the essential question is whether the demand of other SADC 
countries, in sectors in which scale economies are important, is large enough to make 
a significant difference to the scale at which South African plants operate when they 
supply the SADC market. The answer would involve determining the size of the 
regional market relative to the size required to achieve minimum efficient scale, as Cline 
(1982) and Behar (1991) have done for Latin America. 17 Estimates of the cost 
reduction benefits of integration, identified in Corden's (1972) theoretical analysis 
above, could then be obtained by estimating the unit cost of producing for the domestic 
market relative to the unit cost of producing for the regional market. Such calculations 
16 
17 
Indeed, a commonly stated objection to South Africa's past regime of import substitution is that the 
domestic market is too small to support plants of minimum efficient scale (Fallon and de Silva, 1994: 
74-79). 
For a discussion of alternative measures of national or regional market size, as well as the market size 
required to achieve minimum optimal scale, see Cline (1982: 247-253) and Behar (1991: 546-549). 
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should also take account of any estimated increase in demand as a result of the FT A 
itself. 
For the smaller SADC countries, it may seem less likely that scale economies could be 
important. However, a study by Pearson and Ingram (1980) of the welfare effects of 
integration between Ghana and the Ivory Coast, based on the Corden (1972) 
framework, finds that both countries receive significant gains from cost reduction, due 
to economies of scale in industries which expand on union. According to Pearson and 
Ingram (1980: 1002), the widespread presence of under-utilised capacity in the 
industrial sectors of Ghana and the Ivory Coast provides a basis for significant 
economies of scale. Using individual firm data from the industrial sectors of the two 
countries, estimates are made of per unit cost reductions from expanding production to 
serve the regional market. These cost reduction effects are found to be significant in 
a number of sectors. 18 The overall welfare gains from integration for Ghana and the 
Ivory Coast are roughly 33 and 22 per cent, respectively, of the value of pre-integration 
gross output in world prices. About one-fifth of these gains have their source in 
Corden's (1972) cost reduction effects (Pearson and Ingram, 1980: 1007).19 
If it is possible, as this discussion suggests, that scale economies could be important 
in some sectors in both South Africa and the smaller SADC countries, an indication of 
relative cost competitiveness in these sectors in the different countries would be 
important in determining the distribution of any gains from this source. Using a 
competitiveness index based on relative labour productivity and labour costs in South 
Africa and the United States (US), Nordas (1996: 725-728) finds that, in terms of this 
index, relatively competitive sectors vis-ii-vis the US are non-ferrous metals, iron and 
steel, paper and printing, and shipbuilding, all of which are either resource-intensive 
(non-ferrous metals) or scale-intensive (the remainder). The ADB (1993b: 279-282) 
provides some measures of the relative competitiveness of South African and 
Zimbabwean industry, which suggest that Zimbabwe could compete with South Africa 
18 
19 
The most significant scale economies are found in sectors with the lowest rates of capacity utilisation 
prior to integration: footwear, paper and food. 
Pearson and Ingram's (1980) widely cited study is an interesting synthesis and extension of the 
Corden (1972) and Cooper-Massell (1965b) analyses, focusing on the production effects of 
integration and stressing the importance of local industrial production. It also incorporates the 
presence of domestic divergences between private and social costs, drawing on Corden's (1974) 
theory of domestic divergences. 
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in some sectors in which scale economies are likely to be significant, such as paper, iron 
and steel, and foodstuffs. 20 The problem of assessing the potential benefits from the 
exploitation of economies of scale when a SADC FTA is formed is touched on again in 
Section 7.5. 
5.3 Economic integration and intra-industry trade 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Both the Viner-Meade-Lipsey analysis and the Cooper-Massell approach, considered in 
Chapter 4, suggest that trade integration will lead to increased inter-industry 
specialisation among member countries. This applies even when Corden's (1972) 
analysis of economies of scale, discussed in Section 5.2 above, is incorporated into the 
framework (Robson, 1987: 41). However, early empirical studies of the effects of 
Western European integration (Verdoorn, 1960; Balassa, 1966; Grubel, 1967) found a 
marked expansion of trade within industries or sectors, suggesting a significant amount 
of intra-industry specialisation, a phenomenon barely acknowledged in the theoretical 
literature at that time. 
Robson (1987: 42) notes that the inability of orthodox customs union theory to 
incorporate the possibility of intra-industry trade stems from the assumption of 
homogeneous products, which precludes a country from exporting and importing the 
same goOd. 21 Relaxation of this assumption, enabling the recognition of product 
differentiation and consumer demand for variety, together with the incorporation of 
scale economies, allows for the prospect of intra-industry specialisation and trade in 
differentiated goods. According to Krugman (1982: 197-198), this creates the 
possibility for reciprocal tariff reductions to lead to increased sales within an industry 
by producers in both countries, so that a particular country may expand both its imports 
20 
21 
The measures of competitiveness used by both Nordas (1996) and the ADB (1993b) have severe 
limitations, as these studies acknowledge, and should be interpreted with caution. 
Recall, however, that in Brander and Krugman's (1983) reciprocal dumping model, considered in 
Section 5.2 above, oligopolistic rivalry between firms allows for the possibility of intra-industry trade 
in homogeneous goods. Intra-industry trade in homogeneous products may also result from border 
trade related to lower transport costs, or may be due to seasonality or entrepot trade (Winters, 1991: 
62). However, these factors alone cannot explain the recorded levels of intra-industry trade. 
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and exports in a specific sector, which could in turn make trade liberalisation "relatively 
easy to achieve". The welfare implications of potential intra-industry specialisation 
which may arise as a consequence of regional trade integration thus appear to be 
worthy of consideration. 
The purpose of the present section, therefore, is to ascertain the relevance of the "new 
trade theory" to the question of the potential benefits of trade integration in southern 
Africa. 22 There is little evidence of any such analysis in the existing literature on the 
region, with the exception of Simson (1987: 122-140), whose study of intra-industry 
trade in South Africa considers the welfare and commercial policy aspects of intra-
industry trade, with brief reference to economic integration.23 
The discussion is organised as follows. In Section 5.3.2, the question of whether, or 
in what circumstances, trade liberalisation may lead to increased intra-industry 
specialisation is considered. Secondly, in Section 5.3.3, the welfare implications of 
intra-industry resource reallocation are examined. Finally, the potential for increased 
intra-industry specialisation in a regional union is explored in Section 5.3.4. 
5.3.2 Sources of intra-industry trade 
Greenaway (1989: 32) argues that there is no a priori reason why trade liberalisation 
per se (whether regional or multilateral) should specifically stimulate the growth of intra-
industry rather than inter-industry trade. To the extent that liberalisation promotes trade 
expansion in general, it may indeed result in more intra-industry trade, but may equally 
22 
23 
Following the approach of Greenaway (1991: 158) in his discussion of the role of these theories in 
explaining developing countries' trade, the "new trade theory" should be taken to refer here to the 
post-1979 literature on imperfect competition and international trade, with its emphasis on the role 
of market imperfections such as oligopoly, scale economies and product differentiation, noted in 
Section 5.1. The relevance of the technology theories of international trade, specifically the product 
cycle theories of Vernon (1966) and Hufbauer (1970), will be touched on in Section 7.4.3. 
This area is therefore even more under-researched in the SADC context than the scale economies 
question on its own. It is touched on briefly in Lundahl and Petersson (1 991 : 180-181) with respect 
to Lesotho and South Africa in the Southern African Customs Union, while the scope for intra-industry 
trade within SADC is referred to by Evans (1997a: 7) as an important field for future research. 
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stimulate more inter-industry trade. 24 In order to explore whether liberalisation (be it 
regional or multilateral) may stimulate intra-industry trade to a greater degree than inter-
industry trade, Greenaway (1989: 32) argues that pre-union market structures in the 
potential partner countries need to be considered more closely. 
A number of features of both the structure of demand and the structure of production 
have been identified in the literature as possible sources of intra-industry trade. These 
are worthy of consideration, since the presence of such characteristics in the economies 
of potential partner countries in a regional arrangement would suggest that trade 
liberalisation may lead to increased intra-industry specialisation, which could in turn 
have positive implications for welfare. 
On the demand side, preference diversity (demand for variety) and overlapping demand 
have emerged as important sources of intra-industry trade. Firstly, the more uniform 
the distribution of preferences across products within a particular category, the greater 
the potential for intra-industry exchange in that category. This applies to both the 
horizontal product spectrum and the vertical product spectrum. An even distribution of 
preferences across the horizontal product spectrum implies diverse preferences for 
alternative combinations of a given set of attributes, whereas in the case of the vertical 
product spectrum it implies diverse preferences for alternative quality gradings 
(Greenaway, 1989: 32-33). The usual view is that product differentiation is mainly 
horizontal (Behar, 1991: 535-536), in which case greater demand for variety is 
associated with higher per capita income levels, suggesting that the possibilities for 
intra-industry trade will be greater among high-income countries (Havrylyshyn and 
Civan, 1983: 119; Robson, 1987: 42). 
However, where product differentiation is defined by differences in quality, the demand 
for a variety of products (across the vertical spectrum) has been associated with 
unequal income levels (Falvey and Kierzkowski, 1987: 144, 158; Lancaster, 1979: 
24 Greenaway (1989: 32) points out that trade liberalisation itself may be more extensive in an 
integration arrangement than under multilateral or unilateral liberalisation. The formation of a regional 
arrangement is often accompanied by the removal of non-tariff barriers, such as administrative 
barriers to trade, as well as tariff barriers. Reduction of uncertainty may also be important, 
particularly if the regional arrangement is more "credible" than multilateral arrangements. However, 
these issues will affect the degree of trade expansion in general, and will not necessarily alter the 
relative importance of intra-industry trade and inter-industry trade. 
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221). This type of product differentiation is therefore likely to be of interest in 
considering the potential for intra-industry trade among countries at unequal levels of 
development. Balassa (1979: 261) suggests that, in the case of vertical product 
differentiation, the attributes of the varieties traded will reflect the factor endowments 
of the countries concerned, so that, for example, the less developed countries may 
export lower-quality varieties (requiring mainly unskilled labour) to the more developed 
countries, in return for higher-quality varieties. 
The second important demand factor is the extent of preference overlap between 
potential partner countries, as envisaged in Linder's (1961) theory of overlapping 
demands. It has been argued that the greater the degree of overlap, the greater the 
potential for intra-industry trade (Greenaway, 1982: 46-47). The Linder hypothesis 
suggests that countries with similar per capita income levels can be expected to have 
similar tastes or preference structures, and hence larger "overlapping demands", 
implying greater scope for intra-industry trade (Winters, 1991: 67; Carbaugh, 1995: 
84). 
In sum, therefore, on the demand side, intra-industry trade is likely to be most prevalent 
among countries with high and similar per capita income levels (capturing both diversity 
and overlap of preferences). The scope for intra-industry specialisation in a regional 
union between countries with low, but similar, per capita income levels, and between 
countries with unequal per capita income levels, will be considered further, in the light 
of this, in Section 5.3.4 below. 
Turning to the supply side, intra-industry trade involves the exchange of goods with 
similar factor requirements, unlike the inter-industry trade based on comparative 
advantage predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, which involves the exchange of 
goods with different factor requirements (Havrylyshyn and Civan, 1983: 113). 
Therefore, it is likely that countries with similar factor endowments will engage in intra-
industry trade, while countries with very different factor endowments will engage in 
inter-industry trade (Krugman, 1981: 964).25 
25 Recall, however, Balassa's (1979: 261) suggestion, noted earlier, that intra-industry trade in 
vertically-differentiated products reflects factor endowment differences between countries at unequal 
levels of development. 
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Since much intra-industry trade takes place between countries with similar factor 
endowments, producing similar but differentiated goods, diversity on the supply side is 
also important. Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983: 119) note that the more "advanced" or 
"sophisticated" the industrial sector of the economy, the greater will be its ability to 
produce a wide range of diverse (and probably heterogeneous) products.26 While they 
acknowledge that product diversity is not necessarily the same as product 
differentiation, Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983: 121) assume that diversity is "a pre-
condition for heterogeneity or at least that economies which have reached the level of 
advancement in which differentiated demand and supply exist must have also attained 
a large degree of diversity in production". 
Krugman (1982: 198) notes that, in intra-industry trade theory, an "industry" is defined 
as a group of products which are all produced with similar factor intensities. The 
pattern of inter-industry specialisation, and, therefore, whether a country is a net 
exporter or importer in a particular industry, thus depends on the conventional notion 
of comparative advantage. However, because of economies of scale in production, 
each country specialises in a limited subset of products within each industry (intra-
industry specialisation). The resulting intra-industry trade implies that countries which 
are net exporters will still be gross importers in a particular industry, because foreigners 
are producing differentiated goods (Krugman, 1982: 197-198). 
Grimwade (1989: 134-135) argues, therefore, that it is not product differentiation per 
se which gives rise to intra-industry specialisation. If average costs increase with 
output, then it would pay producers to produce the whole range of products demanded 
by the consumer. It is the presence of decreasing costs which makes it unprofitable for 
producers to manufacture all the possible varieties of a product. 27 
26 
27 
In their own empirical work, Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983: 120-121) use a measure of industrial 
advancement to capture the supply side of the stage of development as distinct from the demand side 
(measured by the level of per capita income). For countries with a rich resource endowment, for 
example, they argue that per capita income may overestimate the extent of development of the 
industrial base, necessitating an alternative measure of advancement to capture the supply side of 
the level of industrial development. They suggest two proxies: the contribution of manufacturing to 
GDP, or an index of concentration of manufactured exports. The latter would appear to be the better 
proxy, since the former, as noted in Chapter 2, does not adequately capture diversity, and hence says 
little about stage of development. 
It should be noted, however, that Falvey (1981) and Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) show that 
product differentiation can be consistent with the assumption of constant returns to scale, provided 
that the former is defined in terms of product quality (vertical product differentiation) (Behar, 1991: 
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It may be expected, then, theoretically at least, that the existence of a demand for 
variety and overlapping demands, together with decreasing costs, will facilitate intra-
industry specialisation (Krugman, 1979; Greenaway, 1989: 33). Grimwade (1989: 34) 
notes, however, that a number of empirical studies (Caves, 1981; Balassa, 1986) have 
found a negative relationship between economies of scale and the level of intra-industry 
trade. He argues, however, that the type of economies of scale used in these studies 
is the economies of large plant size, proxied, for example, by the minimum efficient 
scale (MES). Industries in which such economies of scale are important, such as steel 
and petro-chemicals, are often characterised by a low degree of product differentiation, 
and will hence depict relatively low levels of intra-industry trade. On the other hand, 
the type of economies of scale which leads to intra-industry specialisation is that 
associated with long production runs, which can be achieved in comparatively small but 
specialised plants. Relatively high levels of intra-industry trade can be expected in 
industries where significant cost savings result from longer production runs. 
Some of the particular features of the structure of demand and the structure of 
production, considered above, which have been identified as important sources of intra-
industry trade, are summarised by Robson (1987: 42) as follows: 
"The existence of similar and therefore competitive, as opposed to complementary, 
production structures is clearly a necessary condition for intra-industry specialization to 
arise. If there is also some similarity of demand conditions among the member countries, 
reflected in overlapping tastes, and if goods are produced with economies of scale, so 
limiting the amount of product diversity that domestic producers can accommodate 
profitably, there will be an incentive to horizontal specialisation within industries in order 
to benefit from the economies of large-scale production". 
The argument that competitive production structures are necessary for intra-industry 
specialisation immediately suggests that the scope for such specialisation among SADC 
countries would be limited. However, as noted earlier, Balassa (1979: 261, 267) argues 
that there is scope for horizontal specialisation (in vertically-differentiated products) 
between countries at different levels of development, with less developed countries 
specialising in product varieties which utilise unskilled labour, and importing higher-
535). The existence of product differentiation in the presence of constant returns to scale will be 
considered further in Chapter 7. 
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quality varieties in return. 28 This aspect will be considered further in Section 5.3.4 
below. 
The observation, in the 1960s, that trade liberalisation among industrial countries was 
accompanied by the expansion of two-way trade within industries or sectors, was noted 
in Section 5.3.1 above. It was also noted, at the beginning of the present sub-section, 
that while trade liberalisation may promote trade expansion ir;, general, and hence 
increase the amount of intra-industry trade, there is no a priori reason to suppose that 
the lowering of trade barriers per se will increase the ratio of intra-industry trade to total 
trade. Indeed, empirical analysis has found little evidence of such a Iink.29 Caves 
(1981: 213-214, 218) stresses the lack of a theoretical rationale for such a relationship, 
but points to the likely influence of the variability of tariff rates on the degree of intra-
industry trade.30 He does find (weak) support for the view that a lower variance of 
tariff rates within industries results in a higher level of intra-industry trade, while Balassa 
and Bauwens (1987: 932) find a highly significant inverse relationship between tariff 
dispersion and intra-industry trade. 
The discussion above suggests that trade barriers themselves may not be the most 
significant factor explaining variations in intra-industry trade. Rather, as Caves (1981 : 
204) argues, intra-industry trade may depend more importantly on the various structural 
features of markets considered earlier in this sub-section, and on the behaviour of firms 
within these markets. Nevertheless, as will be seen in Section 5.3.4, there may be 
reasons why trade liberalisation in a regional union could stimulate the expansion of 
intra-industry trade relative to total trade. It is therefore important to examine the 
28 
29 
30 
It should be clarified that both horizontal product differentiation (reflecting slight differences in 
product characteristics, and depending on consumer tastes) and vertical product differentiation 
(reflecting differences in product quality, and depending on consumer income) give rise to horizontal 
specialisation (reductions in product variety) (Kierzkowski, 1984: 2-3). Vertical specialisation, on the 
other hand, involves the production of parts, components and accessories for assembly in different 
countries (Balassa, 1979: 259-260). 
Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1975: 462) find a significant inverse relationship between the level of intra-
industry trade and the height of trade barriers across sectors in the US, although this need not imply 
an increase in the relative importance of intra-industry trade when trade barriers are removed. Caves 
(1981) finds no corresponding empirical relationship for the DECD; nor do Balassa and Bauwens 
(1987: 930), in their multi-country study of 38 developed and developing countries. 
Caves (1981: 214) argues that the association between trade liberalisation and expanding intra-
industry trade may be a short-run relationship, and may therefore not appear in cross-sectional 
analysis "where only long-run relationships are expected to hold". 
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welfare implications of increased intra-industry specialisation which may follow the 
removal of trade restrictions. 
5.3.3 The welfare effects of intra-industry specialisation 
As the discussion in the previous sub-sections suggests, an extensive literature has 
emerged since the mid-1970s in an attempt to develop a theoretical explanation for 
intra-industry trade (see, for example, Dixit and Norman, 1980; lancaster, 1980; 
Falvey, 1981; Helpman, 1981; Krugman 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982; Brander and 
Krugman, 1983; Helpman and Krugman, 1985). The focus in this sub-section, 
however, is specifically on the theoretical literature which considers the implications of 
intra-industry specialisation in the context of trade liberalisation. 
The welfare effects of intra-industry specialisation may be considered, firstly, in terms 
of the gains from trade in differentiated goods and, secondly, in terms of the 
implications of intra-industry specialisation for the costs of adjustment to trade 
liberalisation. 
According to Gray (1973: 27), the gains from trade in differentiated products "are to 
be found in the wider choice offered to consumers in the different nations, in the 
possibilities of an exchange of scale economies among nations, and perhaps the most 
important, in the exposure to foreign competition of domestic industries". The gains 
from intra-industry trade arising from the availability of a greater variety of products and 
the exchange of scale economies, noted in Section 5.3.2 above, have been highlighted 
by Krugman (1979, 1981) and Greenaway (1982). Further, Greenaway (1982: 51) 
argues that the X-efficiency gains emphasised by Gray (1973: 27) may particularly 
follow increased intra-industry exchange when autarkic or protected markets are 
oligopolistic or monopolistic. 31 
Perhaps more interestingly, it has been suggested that the costs of adjustment to trade 
liberalisation are likely to be less if tariff reductions lead to intra-industry rather than 
31 This aspect is also stressed by Balassa (1979: 257), and was noted in Section 5.2 in relation to 
Brander and Krugman's (1983) model of intra-industry trade in homogeneous goods. 
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inter-industry specialisation (Balassa, 1979: 267; Krugman, 1981, 1982; Greenaway, 
1982: 52; Behar, 1991: 532-533). For example, Behar (1991: 533) argues that 
although inter-industry specialisation may be efficient in the long run, "it necessarily 
produces serious dislocation in both production and employment in the short run". On 
the other hand, the adjustment process would be less disruptive with intra-industry 
specialisation. There are two aspects to this view. 
Firstly, it may be argued that, in the case of goods which are substitutable in 
production, it will be easier for firms to switch between the production of close varieties 
than to reallocate resources to another type of industry (Willmore, 1979: 201; Caves, 
1981: 204; Behar, 1991: 533). Caves (1981: 204), for example, suggests that "the 
growth of intra-industry trade is attractive as a process of adjustment, because 
production can become more efficient without a high concurrent cost of transferring 
factors of production to different locations and lines of work". 
Secondly, the distributional effects of trade liberalisation may not be so dramatic under 
conditions of intra-industry specialisation. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts 
that, in the case of inter-industry specialisation in the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework, the abundant factor gains from trade while the scarce factor loses 
absolutely (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). However, the models of Krugman (1981, 
1982) show that, in the presence of increasing returns, with products that are close but 
not perfect substitutes, both productive factors may gain from trade. 
In Krugman's (1982) model of two-way trade in the context of monopolistic 
competition, the pattern of inter-industrial specialisation is determined by factor 
proportions, so that the model incorporates an element of comparative advantage. 
However, the existence of economies of scale and differentiated products ensures that 
there is also intra-industry specialisation and trade, which does not depend on 
comparative advantage (Krugman, 1982: 197). Trade liberalisation then allows 
producers in each country to expand both their exports and imports within an 
industryY 
32 Krugman (1982: 199) notes that the definition of an industry has been a major problem in modelling 
intra-industry trade, particularly with respect to whether a "supply-side" or "demand-side" concept 
should be used. In Krugman (1982), industries consist of products which are relatively close 
substitutes on both the supply and demand side. He argues that this is an empirically reasonable 
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The products of each industry in Krugman's (1982) model are produced with industry-
specific labour, and each country has a different endowment of sector-specific labour 
supplies. A country's net export position in a given industry (that is, whether it has an 
overall comparative advantage or disadvantage in that sector) depends on its relative 
endowment of the industry-specific factor. However, a country will still import even 
when it has a comparative advantage, and will still export when it has a comparative 
disadvantage. The importance of intra-industry trade within a sector depends on the 
degree of product differentiation within that sector and on the strength of comparative 
advantage (Krugman, 1982: 203-204). 
Krugman (1982: 203-204) argues that producers in both countries will oppose unilateral 
trade liberalisation, since foreign competition will lower the return to the industry-
specific factor, usually without a compensating consumption gain. However, reciprocal 
tariff reductions will not only benefit producers in the country with a comparative 
advantage, but may also raise the welfare of producers in the country with a 
comparative disadvantage. 
This may be explained as follows. Since different countries produce commodities which 
are imperfect substitutes for one another, the removal of trade barriers will offer 
consumers a wider choice. If this induces them to spend a larger share of their income 
on a particular industry's products then, if products are sufficiently differentiated and 
comparative advantage is weak, the return to that industry's specific factor may 
increase in the country with a comparative disadvantage. 33 
Krugman (1982: 206-207) concludes that in industries where comparative advantage 
33 
assumption, since products with similar characteristics are likely to have similar inputs. Willmore 
(1979) distinguishes between intra-industry trade in products which are close but imperfect 
substitutes in production, consumption or both, which he terms Type A, Band C goods respectively. 
He argues that intra-industry trade expansion in Type A or C goods will involve very low adjustment 
costs, but that the benefits of intra-industry specialisation and longer production runs are more likely 
to occur in the case of Type A goods than Type C goods (Willmore, 1979: 200-201). 
The approach used by Krugman (1982) is similar to that of Jones (1971), in the sense that it allows 
for industry-specific factors (unlike the Heckscher-Ohlin model). While Jones (1971: 9) shows that 
the return to the scarce factor may increase as a result of trade, his result differs from that of 
Krugman (1982) in that the scarce factor which gains is that which is specific to the industry in 
which the country has a comparative advantage (that is, the industry for which relative prices 
increase when trade is opened). The specific factor in the industry with a comparative disadvantage 
loses absolutely in the Jones (1971) model. 
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is strong and product differentiation is weak, producers in the country with a 
comparative disadvantage stand to lose from trade liberalisation. However, producers 
in both countries will gain from mutual or bilateral trade liberalisation in an industry if 
neither country has too great a comparative advantage and if products are strongly 
differentiated within that industry, since it is then possible for both productive factors 
to gain from trade. This suggests that the adjustment to trade liberalisation is likely to 
be easier when the growth in trade is of the intra-industry type rather than the inter-
industry type, which in turn is more likely to be the case between countries with similar 
factor endowments. 34 
The theoretical predictions of Krugman (1981, 1982) find some support in Brown et 
al.'s (1992) empirical analysis of NAFTA. According to Brown etal. (1992: 14), "the 
expected realisation of economies of scale due to a more competitive environment 
within the NAFT A could potentially raise the real return to both capital and labour in all 
three countries". This can be illustrated with reference to the profit-maximising 
condition for the employment of factors, namely that a firm will hire each factor up to 
the point where the return to that factor is equal to its marginal revenue product. For 
an imperfectly competitive firm, this is given by: 
where rj is the return to factor i, MR is the firm's marginal revenue, MPj is the marginal 
physical product of factor i, and €> 0 is the firm's perceived elasticity of demand (Brown 
et al., 1992: 14). 
Trade liberalisation will tend to lower the return to the scarce factor by reducing its 
marginal product, as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts. However, if it also leads 
each firm to perceive a more elastic demand curve, then the real return to each factor 
(measured by r/P) may increase, even though factor i's marginal physical product falls. 
34 Krugman (1982: 198) concedes that his model depends on a number of special assumptions about 
utility and production functions, which are necessary to model a monopolistically competitive market 
structure. Indeed, Simson (1987: 124) points to the lack of a general model which shows that 
countries gain from trade in the presence of increasing returns and product differentiation. According 
to Krugman (1982: 198), it is therefore necessary in models of intra-industry trade to "be satisfied 
with illustrating propositions rather than proving them". While their generality is not firmly 
established, the results are nevertheless intuitively appealing. 
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Thus, in the case of increasing returns, as firms move down their average cost curves, 
the average product of both factors may increase, and although the relative return to 
one factor could fall, both factors may gain in absolute terms (Brown et al., 1992: 
14).35 
From the discussion in the present sub-section, it appears that the welfare benefits of 
intra-industry exchange lie not only in the gains from trade in differentiated products, 
but also in the lower costs of adjustment to trade expansion of the intra-industry type. 
More specifically, in contrast to the traditional outcome, there may be what Simson 
(1987: 136) has called "an extra gain from trade", since it is possible for both 
productive factors in a particular country to benefit from the removal of trade 
restrictions. 
5.3.4 The prospects for intra-industry specialisation in a regional union 
Krugman's (1982) analysis, considered in Section 5.3.3 above, suggests that producers 
in both countries will favour reciprocal trade liberalisation over unilateral trade 
liberalisation in industries in which products are differentiated, due to the possibility of 
an "extra" gain from intra-industry exchange. Such reciprocal tariff reductions could 
take place either in a multilateral framework or in the context of the formation of a 
regional integration arrangement. The question to be considered in the present sub-
section, therefore, is whether there is any reason to suppose that the potential for intra-
industry specialisation may be higher in a regional rather than multilateral setting, 
particularly in the case of developing countries. 
A number of studies have addressed the question of the specific relationship between 
economic integration and intra-industry trade. According to Greenaway (1991: 167), 
such studies have often found a tendency for intra-industry trade to be higher among 
countries involved in an integration arrangement, whether developing or developed 
(Willmore, 1974; Balassa, 1979; Balassa and Bauwens, 1988), although the theoretical 
35 According to Behar (1991: 533), the view that the distributional consequences of trade in 
differentiated products are not as serious as those associated with inter-industry trade has been 
corroborated by Norman (1990), in a comparison of the welfare effects of tariff reductions in the 
European Community and the European Free Trade Association under alternative market conditions. 
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analysis of the link between the two is poorly developed. 36 
Despite the lack of a theoretical point of reference, Greenaway (1989: 33) identifies a 
number of possible causal connections between economic integration and intra-industry 
trade, most of which relate to the sources of intra-industry trade considered in Section 
5.3.2. For example, he argues that, if the potential partner countries in a regional union 
have similar preference structures prior to integration, and produce similar, but 
differentiated products, "a greater stimulus will be given to intra-industry exchange than 
would be the case with multilateral liberalisation" (Greenaway, 1989: 33). Thus, the 
presence of similar factor endowments, similar per capita incomes and similar demand 
structures between potential partners in an integration arrangement will provide an 
important basis for the expansion of intra-industry trade, as observed in the European 
Community. Further, if access to a larger protected market through integration allows 
producers to lengthen production runs and effectively "exchange" scale economies, as 
discussed in Section 5.2 above, then the existence of demand for variety and 
overlapping demands together with decreasing costs may facilitate a greater degree of 
intra-industry specialisation than would otherwise be expected. 
A final possible causal link between economic integration and intra-industry trade, 
considered by Greenaway (1989: 33-34), is primarily relevant to the analysis of 
common markets, and relates to the possible concomitant relaxation of controls on 
factor movements in a regional unionY If economic integration is accompanied by the 
liberalisation of capital flows, foreign direct investment may result in intra-firm trade 
which is recorded as intra-industry trade, either via horizontal or vertical specialisation. 
In this view, factor movements and intra-industry trade are considered to be 
complementary, with intra-industry trade emerging as a result of the activities of the 
multinational corporation in the international market (Agmon, 1979: 50).38 
36 
37 
38 
Ethier and Horn (1984: 210) note that the extension of theoretical models of product differentiation 
and intra-industry trade to customs union theory is clearly called for. 
This aspect was briefly considered in Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4, in the context of Mexico's 
accession to NAFT A. 
The conventional view of the relationship between factor movements and commodity trade is that 
they are substitutes rather than complements (Mundell, 1957). However, Markusen (1983: 355) 
argues that this may be a special result which only holds when there is a Heckscher-Ohlin basis for 
trade. He shows that when the basis for trade is something other than differing relative factor 
proportions, then factor movements and commodity trade may be complements. For further 
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Having identified various possible deterministic links between economic integration and 
intra-industry trade, Greenaway (1989: 34-36) provides a comprehensive overview of 
the empirical evidence on the relationship between the two phenomena, distinguishing 
between existing documentary and econometric studies. The former consider trends 
in intra-industry trade over time, and include the work referred to in Section 5.3.1 above 
on European integration (such as Balassa, 1 966) and on Latin American integration 
(Willmore, 1974, 1979; Balassa, 1979). In an attempt to overcome the anti-monde 
problem (that is, the question of whether the growth of intra-industry trade would have 
been as rapid in the absence of integration), these studies have tended either to examine 
intra-bloc intra-industry trade relative to total intra-industry trade, or to compare the 
growth of intra-industry trade in countries participating in an integration arrangement 
with that in comparable countries which are not members of a trading bloc. 
Econometric studies have attempted to find evidence of integration effects in cross-
sectional analyses of intra-industry trade (Balassa, 1979; Havrylyshyn and Civan, 1983; 
Balassa and Bauwens, 1987). Integration effects are tested using dummy variables, 
which, in most cases, turn out to be statistically significant (Greenaway, 1989: 35-36). 
For the purposes of the present study, the empirical work of Willmore (1974, 1979) and 
Balassa (1979), linking the growth of intra-industry trade to economic integration among 
developing countries, is of particular interest. Balassa's (1979) study of intra-industry 
trade in Latin America finds that, for the most part, the degree of intra-industry 
specialisation in the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFT A) countries is greater 
with LAFT A partners than with other developing or developed countries. This has been 
linked to the so-called complementarity agreements, originally designed to provide a 
framework for specialisation among LAFTA countries in particular product varieties, but 
which, under modified rules, subsequently became vehicles for preferential tariff 
reductions between signatories, and did not necessarily involve product specialisation 
(Balassa, 1979: 251). Intra-industry specialisation is found to be greater than average 
in electrical machinery and equipment, non-electrical machinery, and chemicals, sectors 
in which there are a large number of complementarity agreements. 
discussion of factor movements and intra-industry trade, see Agmon (1979) and Greenaway (1989: 
34). 
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Intra-industry specialisation within the Central American Common Market (CACM) is 
also found to be higher than between the CACM countries and other developing or 
developed countries, and is greatest in textiles and clothing, fabricated metal products, 
and miscellaneous manufactured goods, followed by paper and paper products. Balassa 
(1979: 255) argues that the extent to which the CACM, whose members are at lower 
levels of development than the LAFTA countries included in the study, shows a higher 
degree of intra-industry specialisation than LAFT A reflects the more extensive 
liberalisation of intra-regional trade which has taken place in the CACM, involving the 
elimination of tariffs on nearly all intra-bloc trade in manufactures. 
In contrast to the studies of Willmore (1974, 1979) and Balassa (1979), Havrylyshyn 
and Civan (1983: 127-128) find that the Latin American integration schemes do not 
appear to have had a significant impact on intra-industry trade. They argue that the 
most important reason for these contradictory results is that the dependent variable in 
their study is the level of global intra-industry trade, rather than bilateral intra-industry 
trade, as in the other studies. Although trade integration may increase the degree of 
intra-bloc intra-industry trade, if the integration scheme is essentially trade-diverting this 
will be offset by a reduction in extra-bloc intra-industry trade. Havrylyshyn and Civan 
(1983: 119) therefore argue that the net effect of economic integration on intra-industry 
trade will depend on whether trade creation or trade diversion predominates. While 
membership of a "successful" integration scheme, defined as one which results 
primarily in trade creation, such as the European Community, will tend to raise intra-
industry trade, schemes which result in significant trade diversion, such as those in 
Latin America, are likely to have little net effect on intra-industry trade, and may even 
lower it. 39 
Greenaway (1989) concludes that the empirical evidence, taken together, suggests a 
causal link between economic integration and intra-industry trade, but that theoretical 
analysis of the underlying mechanisms is still unsatisfactory. As Behar (1991: 532) 
notes, "intra-industry trade may be stimulated by economic integration, but this effect 
is mediated by factors such as preference diversity and overlapping demand, decreasing 
39 Balassa (1979: 259) does note that since the tariff reductions in LAFTA were undertaken on a 
preferential basis, they tended to be trade-diverting. However, he argues that the more complete 
removal of tariffs on intra-CACM trade in manufactures lead on balance to trade creation, which 
provided a comparatively greater stimulus to intra-industry specialisation. 
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costs in production and intra-firm trade, oligopolistic competition and product 
differentiation" . 
It was noted in Section 5.3.2 that the prospects for increased intra-industry 
specialisation are likely to be greater among countries with high and similar levels of per 
capita income. Balassa (1979: 258), however, argues that countries with relatively low 
but similar per capita income levels have much to gain from intra-industry trade in the 
context of a regional union, because industrialisation will occur in the framework of a 
larger market, allowing increased specialisation and greater competition, and avoiding 
the establishment of relatively high-cost industries to serve protected national markets. 
The ease of adjustment in the case of intra-industry specialisation, in contrast to the 
adjustment costs of inter-industry specialisation, provides an argument for trade 
integration between these countries (Balassa, 1979: 266). 
While integration will be more difficult between countries at different levels of 
development, particularly when the more advanced members of the group have 
industrialised behind high tariff barriers, Balassa (1979: 266-267) argues that there is 
nevertheless scope for reaping benefits from horizontal and vertical specialisation in a 
regional union among unequal partners. 
As in the case of economies of scale, considered in Section 5.2 above, the empirical 
evidence of the importance of intra-industry specialisation in a regional arrangement 
among developing countries, discussed in this section, relates essentially to the Latin 
American regional context. The question again arises, therefore, of the relevance of this 
analysis to the SADC situation. It is interesting to note, however, that even in the case 
of the CACM, whose members are at lower levels of development than the LAFT A 
countries included in Balassa's (1979) study, intra-industry trade is generally found to 
be higher within the bloc than between the members of the bloc and other developed 
or developing countries. 
In the southern African context, it would be useful to examine the current extent of 
intra-industry trade between SADC countries in relation to the levels of intra-industry 
trade between SADC countries and their external trading partners, as Balassa (1979) 
has done for Latin America. It would also be instructive to consider the factor intensity 
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of these countries' trade with each other in relation to their trade with the rest of the 
world. It may perhaps be suggested that if the factor intensities of trade, as well as per 
capita income levels, are more similar among southern African countries (or among a 
subset of southern African countries) than between these countries and their trading 
partners in the rest of the world, then regional liberalisation could provide benefits from 
intra-industry specialisation which may not be readily attainable through multilateral 
liberalisation. This question will be considered further in Section 7.5. 
5.4 Dynamic effects 
The preceding analysis in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 4, has focused on the static 
resource reallocation effects of regional integration. It is often argued, however, that 
the dynamic effects of integration, while less extensively analysed and not readily 
quantifiable, are of greater importance, particularly in the developing country context 
(Jaber, 1970-71: 256; Lundahl and Petersson, 1991: 197).40 
As noted in Section 5.1 above, the dynamic effects of economic integration refer to the 
possible ways in which integration may influence the rate of growth of GNP of the 
member countries in a regional union, in contrast to the static effects which result in a 
once-and-for-all welfare change. These dynamic effects have been defined to include 
the possible exploitation of dynamic external economies in a larger union market; the 
effect of integration on the volume and location of investment; the effect on economic 
efficiency of increased competition and reduced uncertainty; and the polarisation effect, 
which refers to "the cumulative worsening of the relative, or absolute, economic 
position of a member country or some regions in the integrated area" (Jaber, 1970-71: 
254). 
According to Robson (1987: 32-33), some of these factors can only doubtfully be 
termed "dynamic". Indeed, the whole issue of the "dynamic" effects of integration is, 
40 Jaber (1970/71: 256), for example, argues that "[tlhe emphasis should be put on dynamic rather than 
static effects in evaluating the desirability of economic integration among LDCs. The present 
economic structure is not acceptable and each LDC is trying individually to introduce positive 
changes. These changes are not marginal but structural. Their net effect will not be felt over a short 
period of time. Accordingly, any evaluation of economic integration schemes should concentrate on 
potential or dynamic effects". 
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he argues, fraught with difficulty, and insufficiently analysed. There is, however, a 
useful distinction to be made between the effects of market enlargement due to regional 
integration which result at a point in time, and those that operate continuously and 
depend on the lapse of time. The latter have been termed "economies of time" by 
Corden (1974: 249), and include dynamic external economies, which lower average 
costs as the length of time over which the output is produced increases, as well as the 
cumulative changes that are part of the process of polarisation, referred to above 
(Robson, 1987: 32).41 These two aspects of the dynamic effects of integration will 
be the focus of the discussion in this section, after a brief consideration of the possible 
effects of integration on the volume and location of investment. 
It has been argued that foreign direct investment (FDI) may be an essential catalyst for 
the dynamic benefits of integration identified in the regional integration literature 
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997: 12). Theoretical analysis of the possible impact of 
integration on foreign investment is, however, poorly developed and inconclusive, 
although some general observations can be made. Firstly, regional trade liberalisation 
may have a differential impact on foreign investment by "insiders" and "outsiders", 
depending on the motivation for FDI. Intra-regional FDI flows of the tariff-jumping 
variety are likely to fall with the removal of intra-area tariffs. However, if integration 
leads to trade creation, then intra-regional FDI may increase in some member countries 
in response to changes in the regional structure of production. This has been termed 
"investment diversion" by Kindleberger (1966) (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997: 5-6). The 
removal of intra-regional tariffs may also result in "investment creation" (an inflow of 
FDI from the rest of the world), if external suppliers lose export markets as a result of 
trade diversion. 42 In the presence of internal free trade, the location of new FDI into 
41 
42 
Corden (1974: 249) notes that the distinction should be emphasised between "economies of time" 
or dynamic economies and the essentially static concept of economies of scale, considered in Section 
5.2 above, which results in falling costs as the scale of output at any point in time increases (with 
given factor prices). Dynamic external economies result when a firm's production creates benefits 
for other firms for which they do not pay, leading to lower costs for the industry as a whole over 
time. Such benefits may include" on-the-job" training which is relevant to the industry in general, as 
well as the diffusion of knowledge, both of which may generate favourable spread effects to the rest 
of the economy or the region (Corden, 1974: 257-264). 
Investment diversion is therefore a response to trade creation, while investment creation is a response 
to trade diversion. External FDI flows may also increase if they were initially restricted by inadequate 
national market size. 
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the region will depend on the comparative advantages of the member countries. 43 
Secondly, if the motive for FDI is internalisation of firm-specific intangible assets rather 
than the avoidance of trade barriers, the removal of tariffs will not reduce the incentive 
to engage in FDI, and may in fact stimulate overall investment flows between member 
countries by facilitating the more efficient operation of multinationals across regional 
borders. 44 Although, in this case, integration seems likely to exert a positive effect on 
aggregate FDI flows both into and within the region, it is possible that some member 
countries will experience a reduction in investment, as FDI will tend to concentrate in 
countries in which investment conditions are most favourable. 45 The actual outcome 
is ultimately an empirical question, and will depend on the degree to which trade and 
investment flows are liberalised in the regional union, on the locational advantages of 
the countries in question, and on the motivation for FDI.46 A concentration of 
investment in some parts of the union could exacerbate any tendency towards 
polarisation within the area, considered further below. 
Lundahl and Petersson (1991: 197-198) argue that the formation of an integration 
arrangement may permit the exploitation of dynamic external economies in a larger 
regional market, thereby lowering the costs of infant industry protection during the 
learning period and allowing optimum capacity to be reached in a shorter period of time. 
The benefits of dynamic economies will facilitate the gradual reduction and eventual 
elimination of tariffs, thereby offsetting the costs of protection and trade diversion. This 
43 
44 
45 
46 
In the FTA case specifically (where there will be internal free trade but no common external tariff), 
foreign investors may move funds to countries with lower tariffs on raw materials and intermediate 
goods, resulting in "investment deflection" (EI-Agraa, 1989: 49). 
Internalisation via the establishment of foreign affiliates will occur when the alternatives of exporting 
or licensing carry comparatively high transactions costs. For more discussion, see Dunning (1981)' 
whose eclectic theory of FDI suggests that a country's net international investment position is 
determined by three sets of factors: ownership, locational and internalisation (OLl) advantages. 
More specifically, countries with unprotected and efficient markets prior to integration are likely to 
experience the greatest increases in foreign and domestic investment. This is because countries with 
lower trade barriers will be less likely to be hosting tariff-jumping FDI that may be withdrawn or 
diverted on integration. At the same time, those sectors characterised by high levels of protection 
and weak locational advantages may experience a reduction in both foreign and domestic investment. 
To the extent that South African multinationals, for example, have operated in neighbouring countries 
like Zimbabwe to avoid trade barriers, the formation of a SADC regional union may reduce intra-
regional FDI. However, there may be a net increase in intra-regional FDI flows of the efficiency-
seeking type. It is difficult to envisage that a SADC FTA would have a significant impact on FDI 
flows from outside the region, although there may be some investment deflection. 
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may essentially be seen as an extension of the Cooper-Massell (1965b) argument for 
regional integration as a means of achieving industrialisation, considered in a static 
framework in Section 4.3.3. 
According to Lundahl and Petersson (1991: 202), dynamic external economies may 
provide a case for regional integration among countries at unequal levels of 
development, since favourable spread effects may be induced from the more advanced 
centres to the less developed regions and to the integrated area as a whole.47 
However, it is widely argued that any favourable dynamic effects from integration may 
be outweighed by adverse polarisation effects for some members in a regional union 
among countries at unequal levels of development (Vaitsos, 1978: 739, 746; Robson, 
1987: 169-175; Lundahl and Petersson, 1991: 202). Indeed, the issue of polarisation 
has been a prominent theme in the literature on the effects of trade integration in 
southern Africa, particularly with reference to the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU).48 By contrast, Holden (1996: 54-56), drawing on the analysis of Krugman 
(1 991 ), suggests that polarisation may not be inevitable in an integration arrangement 
involving South Africa and the smaller SADC countries. 
Krugman (1991: 83) examines the question of whether smaller countries should fear 
economic integration "lest their industry be pulled into the inevitably larger cores of their 
larger neighbours". His analysis suggests a U-shaped relationship between economic 
integration (taken to be the absence of transport costs or barriers to trade) and welfare 
in the peripheral areas of a regional union, so that close integration is beneficial, but a 
limited move towards integration may be harmful. 
This may be explained using the example of a region consisting of a "central" nation 
(South Africa), in which wages and hence production costs are relatively high, but 
which has access to a larger market, and a "peripheral" nation (Malawi), with low labour 
costs, but poorer market access. Suppose that the location of production for an 
industry is chosen simply to minimise the sum of production and transport costs 
47 
48 
These effects include technological diffusion and a higher demand for imports generated by the 
growth of the more advanced centres. 
See, for example, Lundahl and Petersson (1991: 202-207), Mayer and Zarenda (1994: 36-38) and 
McCarthy (1994: 175-180). 
152 
(Krugman, 1991: 96-97).49 In terms of production costs alone, it is cheaper to 
produce the good in Malawi, where wages are lower. However, it is cheaper to produce 
the good in one location only, rather than in both, because of economies of scale. 
Further, production in South Africa (the central nation) involves lower transport costs 
than production in Malawi, while production in both countries reduces transport costs 
to zero. 
When transport costs are high enough to outweigh the economies of scale benefit of 
producing in one location only, production will take place in both countries. On the 
other hand, if transport costs are very low, production will take place in the lower-wage 
country, Malawi. However, if transport costs are at an intermediate level, they may be 
low enough to make the concentration of production to reap economies of scale 
worthwhile, yet still high enough to make market access outweigh production cost as 
a determinant of location, so that production shifts to the higher-cost central nation, 
South Africa. The relationship between transport costs and the peripheral country 
Malawi's output in this industry is therefore U-shaped. This implies that if trade barriers 
are substantially reduced in a regional union, peripheral low-wage countries should not 
lose industry to the core; however, a partial move towards integration may induce 
polarisation. 
According to Krugman (1991: 84-87), therefore, polarisation of industrial activity is not 
inevitable, and will depend on the size of the larger core, the level of transport costs, 
the degree of economies of scale and the share of "footloose" industries. This implies 
that it cannot be concluded, a priori, that the integration of South Africa with the 
smaller SADC countries will result in polarisation. 
Robson (1987: 74) notes that, from an ex post point of view, it is difficult to determine 
the extent to which polarisation can be attributed to the effect of integration per se, 
rather than to the impact of structural factors that would have produced a similar result 
even in the absence of integration. The question of the degree to which SACU has 
resulted in the polarisation of development is a case in point, particularly in view of the 
length of time for which the union has been in existence. 
49 As Holden (1996: 55) notes, transport costs may be interpreted in the broader sense to include a" 
barriers to trade. 
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There has been much debate in the southern Africa literature about whether the 
practical workings of SACU per se have been the major constraint on the industrial 
development of the smaller SACU countries (Maasdorp, 1982: 90-95; Lundahl and 
Petersson, 1991: 218-219; ADB, 1993b: 266-270). While the ADB (1993b: 267) 
argues that the workings of SACU have been a major factor behind the shallow 
industrial structures of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS), it also 
emphasises the "natural" constraints on industrial deepening in these countries, such 
as the small size of domestic markets, skills shortages, geographical remoteness and 
high transport costs. Other reasons given for the inability of the BLNS countries to take 
advantage of access to the larger customs union market include the economies of scale 
and agglomeration benefits of locating close to the larger, more developed South African 
market, as well as competition from the former homelands as a result of subsidies 
offered under South Africa's regional industrial development programme (ADB, 1993b: 
268). 
Problems related to the SACU Agreement directly have mainly revolved around the use 
of the provisions of the Agreement relating to industrial development. 50 While it has 
been argued that the BLNS countries have not taken full advantage of these provisions, 
their use was made difficult by a Secret Memorandum of Understanding attached to the 
1969 Agreement, whose existence only came to light in the late 1980s, requiring 
applicants for protection in the smaller countries (not South Africa) to demonstrate that 
they were in a position to supply at least 60 per cent of the SACU market (Maasdorp 
and Whiteside, 1993: 44; Blumberg, 1994: 3).51 Mayer and Zarenda (1994: 37) argue 
that there is widespread support for the view that the Secret Memorandum "has been 
the single largest constraint to industrial development in the BLNS countries", while 
Holden (1996: 62) suggests that further research into the determinants of 
industrialisation in the BLNS countries is needed before any conclusions can be drawn. 
50 
51 
These include Article 6, allowing for infant-industry protection by the smaller countries for up to eight 
years; Article 7, allowing the specification of "pioneer" industries in the smaller countries and the 
period for which they should receive tariff assistance and relief; and Article 11, allowing the 
prohibition of imports "for economic, social, cultural and other reasons" (Maasdorp, 1982: 91-92). 
South Africa's use, in the past, of Article 11 to prevent certain projects from going ahead in the 
smaller countries has also been seen as a deliberate attempt to frustrate their industrial development 
(ADS, 1993b: 268). A further problem often cited as a contributing factor to polarisation is the 
smaller countries' lack of fiscal discretion, noted in Chapter 1, as customs and excise policies for the 
union are determined by South Africa (Mayer and Zarenda, 1994: 37). 
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A further consideration is that many South African and overseas firms were established 
in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland during the sanctions period (ADB, 1993b: 267; 
Holden, 1996: 62).52 Holden (1996: 62) argues that there is no evidence of such 
firms relocating back to South Africa, while there is evidence of increasing investments 
by South African firms in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi. She suggests, 
therefore, that the reduction of trade barriers, including transport costs, in southern 
Africa may well encourage the location of firms in lower-wage areas, implying that 
polarisation is not an inevitable outcome.53 
5.5 Conclusion 
As noted in Section 5.1, the theoretical analysis in Chapter 4 considers only the static 
welfare effects of economic integration based on the assumption of perfect competition. 
Any assessment of the potential effects of trade integration, particularly in the 
developing country context, needs to go further, however, to incorporate an analysis 
of imperfectly competitive market structures and the dynamic effects of integration. 
In Section 5.2, the comparative static framework of Chapter 4, in which production is 
subject to constant or rising costs, was extended to include the possibility of internal 
economies of scale. While the exploitation of economies of scale in a larger regional 
market is seen as a major motive for integration, the important question, for the 
purposes of this study, is whether the enlarged market in a regional union among 
countries of unequal size and levels of development will, in sectors in which scale 
economies are important, mainly benefit producers in the larger countries. The 
discussion in this section suggests that it cannot be concluded, a priori, that this will 
be the case, and that the smaller countries may in fact be the major beneficiaries, 
because of the higher excess cost they incur of operating at below optimal scale. 
Further, it may be argued that the presence of scale could enhance the advantages of 
52 
53 
These countries have also benefited from access to overseas markets under both Lome and GSP 
preferences. 
As noted in Chapter 3, investment flows from South Africa to the rest of SADC are seen as an 
important way of offsetting trade imbalances in the region. 
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a protected regional market over non-preferential tariff policy as a means of achieving 
industrialisation more efficiently. 54 
The discussion in Section 5.3 considered the implications of increased intra-industry 
specialisation as a result of regional integration, by allowing for product differentiation 
in the presence of increasing returns. While intra-industry trade is predominantly a 
feature of trade between high-income countries at a similar stage of development, the 
analysis suggests that there is scope for intra-industry specialisation between similar 
low-income countries, as well as between countries at unequal levels of development. 
An analysis of the welfare implications of intra-industry specialisation shows that there 
may be gains from intra-industry trade in excess of those predicted by conventional 
trade theory, largely because of economies of scale and product differentiation. Further, 
the adjustment to trade liberalisation is likely to be easier when the ensuing trade 
expansion is of the intra-industry type. While the costs of adjustment are entirely 
ignored in the comparative static analysis of customs unions, Robson (1987: 44) argues 
that they should be included in any complete welfare appraisal. 
Given the potential benefits of intra-industry specialisation, the prospects for achieving 
these gains in a regional union among developing countries was considered. The 
evidence on Latin America suggests that there may be more scope for intra-industry 
specialisation in a regional union with other developing countries than in the case of 
generalised multilateral liberalisation. Empirical analysis is required to investigate the 
relative levels of intra-regional and extra-regional intra-industry trade in SADC, as well 
as the factor intensity of trade between SADC members relative to their trade with the 
rest of the world. These issues are examined further in Section 7.5. 
Finally, the possible dynamic effects of economic integration were examined in Section 
5.4. While this whole area is fraught with difficulty, the polarisation aspect is a 
prominent theme in the southern African literature on trade integration. The question 
of polarisation essentially relates to what Foroutan (1993: 259) has called the "cost" 
of trade creation, namely the possible loss of industrial activity by less-developed 
54 Robson (1987: 48-52) adapts the Cooper-Masse" (1965b) analysis, considered in Section 4.3.3, to 
Corden's (1972) economies of scale framework. 
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members if industry migrates to the more advanced countries in the union, considered 
in these terms in Section 4.3.3. However, the discussion in Section 5.4 suggests that 
polarisation of development may not be inevitable in a regional union among countries 
of unequal size and levels of development. This in turn has important implications for 
the current debate about the question of compensation in a regional FT A involving 
South Africa and the other SADC countries, considered further in Chapter 8. 
It is apparent from the discussion in Chapters 4 and 5 that a full assessment of the 
likely effects of the formation of a SADC FTA on member countries in the aggregate, 
and on individual sectors within member countries, would need to account for a wide 
range of factors. As Page (1997: 6-7) notes, both the theoretical and empirical analysis 
of the effects of the formation of a regional bloc have to be based on a large number 
of assumptions, and the data are never good enough for the calculations required. In 
the absence of a thorough and complete welfare assessment, it does not seem possible 
to conclude, a prior;, that the smaller SADC members will necessarily lose from joining 
South Africa in a FTA. 
Of the studies considered in Chapter 3, only Evans (1996, 1997a,b) and IDC (1995b) 
have attempted a sectoral analysis of the effects of the formation of a SADC FT A. 
Despite the limitations of these studies, to be considered in subsequent chapters, some 
quantification of the possible effects of the FT A is important, to determine whether 
there is likely to be a need for compensation within the union, and whether the benefits 
will be large enough for those who gain to compensate those adversely affected. 55 
The studies of Evans (1996, 1997a,b) appear to be the most analytically ambitious 
attempts to address, empirically, the question of the economic desirability of a southern 
African FT A. Evans (1996) is apparently the only study available to date (apart from 
IDC's rough simulation) which gives detailed sectoral effects of the formation of a SADC 
FT A for each country. Given the debate about the sectoral and distributional 
implications of a southern African regional union incorporating South Africa, the results 
of the Evans studies, and the method by which they were derived, warrant careful 
consideration. 
55 Other studies which have attempted to quantify the welfare effects of trade integration in southern 
Africa have focused on SACU (Bourne, 1989; Leith, 1992). 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE REGIONAL TRADE MODEL FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA 
6.1 Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 5, one of the most analytically ambitious studies available to date 
of the likely effects of regional trade integration in southern Africa is that of Evans 
(1996). This study's important contribution is that it appears to be the only serious 
attempt so far to provide quantitative estimates of the impact of a SADC FT A on each 
of the individual members of SADC. Furthermore, the study does this on the basis of 
estimates of the effects on member countries for each of 27 individual sectors of the 
economy. It thus appears to be the only available study which addresses quantitatively 
the critical questions currently occupying policy-makers and researchers in the region 
of the potential sectoral and distributional effects of the formation of the FT A.' 
In view of this, the way in which the results of Evans (1996) are arrived at calls for 
careful consideration. The aim of this chapter, thus, is to explain in some detail, indeed 
in rather more detail than is provided in the study itself, the nature of the simulation 
model employed by Evans in arriving at his estimates of the impact of a SADC FT A on 
member countries. 
With this as essential background, an attempt is made in Chapter 7 to provide a critical 
assessment of Evans' quantitative estimates and the inferences drawn from them. The 
analysis will draw on similar empirical studies conducted for other regional groupings, 
as well as on some of the considerations raised in Chapters 4 and 5. Ultimately what 
is at stake is the validity of Evans' conclusion that the gains from the formation of a 
FTA among members of SADC are likely to be widespread, and the adverse effects 
limited. 
As noted in Chapter 3, Evans (1997a) undertook a subsequent simulation of the effects of a SADC 
FT A, with an improved database. Although the detailed simulation results for each sector were not 
reported in the second study, the results of both simulations are considered in the discussion which 
follows. 
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Evans (1996) uses a static, partial equilibrium model to estimate the effects of the 
formation of a SADC FTA on output, trade, employment and customs revenue for 27 
sectors in eight SADC countries using data for the period 1990-92 or, in some cases, 
1991-93.2 The effects of the formation of the FTA are estimated for two scenarios: 
a "worst-case" or "no-growth" scenario, and an alternative scenario characterised by 
3 per cent growth in both SADC and the ROW, as well as a 3 per cent reduction in 
tariffs faced by SADC exporters in ROW markets. 
In the "growth" scenario, the assumed 3 per cent growth rate does not result from the 
formation of the FT A itself, and the estimated effects on output, trade and employment 
therefore do not seem to reflect the effects of the formation of the FTA as such. 
Moreover, while the "growth" scenario also reflects the effects of a 3 per cent reduction 
in tariffs faced by SADC exporters in ROW markets (presumably due to the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round), it involves no corresponding reduction in SADC 
tariffs faced by ROW exporters, despite the fact that the tariffs which will be applied 
by SADC countries when the FT A is formed will also be significantly different from 
those which have been assumed.3 Furthermore, Evans' own policy recommendations 
appear to be based on the results he obtains for the so-called "worst-case" scenario. 
The discussion below therefore focuses on this case. 
In the "worst-case" scenario, Evans (1996: 9) finds that the formation of a SADC FTA 
results, in SADC as a whole, in only a 0.2 per cent increase in total demand, a 0.1 per 
cent fall in import-competing production, and has a negligible effect on employment. 4 
Intra-regional imports increase by 16.9 percent and intra-regional exports rise by 11.9 
3 
4 
The BLNS countries were excluded from the 1996 simulation for data reasons. In the 1997 
simulation, the SACU database had been completed, allowing the model to be estimated for the seven 
SADC countries outside SACU, and for SACU as a whole (Evans, 1997a: 3-4). 
In the later simulation, the tariffs levels used reflect "the stylised fact that the SAPs [in all SADC 
countries except Angolal ... have reduced tariffs to a rough equivalence with SACU for 1996, except 
where country tariffs are lower than SACU" (Evans, 1997a: 3). The question of the tariff estimates 
used by Evans (1996, 1997a) will be considered further in Chapter 7. 
The corresponding results for the subsequent simulation were a 0.3 per cent increase in demand, a 
0.2 per cent fall in import-competing supply, and a 0.09 per cent increase in employment (Evans, 
1997a:11). 
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per cent. 5 SADC's imports from the ROW decrease by 1.3 per cent overall, while 
exports to the ROW are unchanged. The overall SADC balance of payments position 
therefore improves, but there is a net loss of customs revenue for SADC as a whole of 
8.4 per cent (US$303.8 million).6 In absolute terms, demand increases by US$252.8 
million, import-competing production falls by US$90.7 million, imports from the ROW 
fall by US$255.2 million, intra-SADC imports increase by US$353.7 million, and intra-
SADC exports expand by US$204.9 million.7 On the basis of these results, Evans 
(1996: 2) concludes, in contrast to many other studies, that the formation of the FTA 
will lead to "strong intra SADC trade creation effects". 
Although the effect on SADC as a whole is important, the overriding consideration for 
SADC members is the impact of the FTA on individual countries and on "sensitive" 
sectors within SADC. The question of the distribution of the gains and losses resulting 
from the formation of the FTA is therefore arguably the more important issue, and will 
be the focus of the subsequent discussion. This has been stressed by Page (1997: 9), 
who notes that although the aggregate effects of the FTA may not be large, the effects 
for individual industries or producers in particular countries may be larger. 
The remainder of this chapter will examine the structure and mechanics of the Regional 
Trade Model for Southern Africa (RTMSA). While Evans (1996) reports detailed 
simulation results for each sector in each SADC country included in the exercise, and 
6 
These should, of course, be equal (see Section 2.6.1). However, Evans (1996: 7) notes that "no 
attempt was made to reconcile exports recorded by a reporting country, and the recorded imports 
from that country reported by her SADC trading partners". Initial intra-regional imports and exports 
are given as US$2092.9 million and US$1721.6 million respectively (Evans, 1996: 9). In the 
subsequent 1997 simulation, it was generally "assumed that the import estimates were correct and 
the exports were adjusted using the accounting identify (sic) that SADC imports and exports in each 
sector must be the same" (Evans, 1997a: 3). Here, initial intra-SA DC imports and exports are given 
as US$1 099.8 million and US$11 00 million respectively, both of which increase by 18.5 per cent on 
formation of the FTA (Evans, 1997a: 11). 
In Evans (1997a: 11), there is a negligible change in the level of imports from the ROW (reported as 
0.0 per cent to one decimal place). However, there is a worsening of the overall SADC balance of 
payments position, which suggests an increase in imports from the ROW (albeit a small one), since 
exports to the ROW are not affected in the "worst-case" scenario. This important difference in the 
direction of change in ROW imports in the two simulations, which has implications for the trade 
diversion consequences of the FTA, will be considered further in Chapter 7. Evans (1997a: 11) 
reports a customs revenue loss of 6.0 per cent for SADC as a whole. 
Again, the absolute changes in intra-SA DC imports and exports should be equal (see Footnote 4 
above). In the later simulation, overall demand increases by US$431.2 million and import-competing 
production falls by US$240.9 million, while intra-SA DC imports and exports each increase by 
US$203.5 million. 
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outlines the structure of the import side of the model, there is no in-depth explanation 
of how relative price changes resulting from the removal of intra-SADC tariffs, in a given 
sector, work through the model to affect the key economic variables under analysis. 
More specifically, it is not clear from the report how the structure and assumptions of 
the RTMSA influence the magnitude and direction of change of these key variables 
when a FTA is formed. It is important to understand how the results were obtained in 
order to see why particular countries or sectors gain or lose in terms of the criteria used 
in the study, and to be able to assess the usefulness of such simulation exercises. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 examines the workings of 
the import side of the RTMSA. An attempt is made to clarify how the model's structure 
and assumptions affect the direction and magnitude of the changes in a country's 
imports from SADC and the ROW, domestic import-competing supply and domestic 
demand for importables in a given sector when intra-SADC tariffs are removed. In 
Section 6.3, the method of calculation of the effects of the FTA on customs revenue 
is outlined given the direction of change in imports from the two sources predicted by 
the model. Section 6.4 considers the export side of the RTMSA, specifically the method 
of calculation of a country's change in exports in a particular sector on formation of the 
FTA. In Section 6.5, an attempt is made to clarify the balance of payments implications 
of the FTA in the light of the model's assumptions, while Section 6.6 examines the 
calculation of the effects of the FT A on employment. The aim in each section is to 
draw out the implications of the model's structure and assumptions, which will be 
considered further in Chapter 7. Section 6.7 concludes. 
Evans (1996: 9) defines the key economic variables under consideration as follows: 
D 
SM 
M 
Ms 
MR 
E 
Es 
ER 
L 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
domestic demand for importables 
import-competing production (domestic production for domestic use)8 
total imports 
imports from SADC 
imports from the ROW (thus M = Ms + MR) 
total exports 
exports to SADC 
exports to the ROW (thus E = Es + ER) 
employment. 
Denoted as SM in the tables containing the simulation results (Evans, 1996: 9, 37-44), but as S in the 
technical annex (Evans, 1996: 59-65), 
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The simulation results (Evans, 1996: 9, 37-44) indicate the initial values and percentage 
changes in these variables which follow the formation of the FT A. The initial values of 
gross output are not shown separately by Evans (1996)' but can be calculated as the 
sum of initial import-competing production and exports. 9 It is useful for the purposes 
of the discussion to spell out the following relationships which hold between the 
variables, but which are not stated explicitly in the study: 
D = 
SM 
GO + M - E 
GO - E where GO = gross output. 
Thus, 
D 
GO 
= 
= 
SM + M = SM + Ms + MR and 
SM + E = SM + Es + ER· 
6.2 The import side of the RTMSA 
The import side of the RTMSA uses the Armington (1969) formulation where goods 
from different sources of supply are treated as imperfect substitutes (as opposed to the 
more standard trade specification where domestically and foreign-produced goods are 
perfect substitutes), allowing for product differentiation by country of origin, and hence 
intra-industry trade (Dervis et al., 1982: 219-221, 233). The Armington methodology, 
in which the elasticity of substitution between different sources of supply is treated as 
constant, has been useful in estimating the effects of relative price changes (due, for 
example, to changes in trade policy) on the balance between imports and domestic 
production in import-competing sectors (Evans, 1996: 31). 
Evans (1996) introduces further substitution into the Armington formulation, whereby 
imports from within SADC and from the ROW are also imperfectly substitutable and 
responsive to relative price changes. 1o The Armington functions are therefore twice 
nested: at the first level, a composite import commodity Mj is defined which is made up 
10 
The percentage change in gross output in each sector which occurs when the FT A is formed is not 
shown either, but will equal the percentage change in employment in each sector, given the 
assumption that the output/employment ratio remains constant (see Section 6.6 below). This, of 
course, does not imply that the absolute changes in output and employment will be equal. 
In this respect, the structure of the model is similar to that developed by Corado and de Melo (1986) 
to analyse the impact of a country joining a customs union, which they apply to an ex ante 
examination of the effects of Portugal's accession to the European Community. 
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of imports from within SADC and from the ROW, while at the second level, the 
composite import is then imperfectly substitutable for import-competing production. 
The latter stage defines a composite importable commodity Dj which is a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation of the composite import and import-
competing production. As in Corado and de Melo (1986: 155), the elasticities of 
substitution between the two sources of imports on the one hand, and between 
aggregate imports and domestic production on the other, are constant, but not 
necessarily equal. Total domestic supply is then the sum of import-competing 
production and aggregate imports, while domestic demand is determined by a demand 
function in which the price of the composite good and income are arguments (Evans, 
1996: 60). Once each variable has been defined in the base period, its variation in 
response to relative prices changes resulting from the removal of intra-SADC tariffs can 
be determined. 
Section 6.2 is divided into four main subsections. Section 6.2.1 corresponds to the first 
level of nesting in the model, and derives expressions for the changes in imports from 
SADC and the ROW when a FTA is formed. Section 6.2.2 corresponds to the second 
level of nesting, and examines the effect of relative price changes on the balance 
between imports and domestic production. In Section 6.2.3, expressions for the 
changes in the levels of domestic demand and its components are derived. Section 
6.2.4 considers how the model's assumptions influence the magnitude and direction of 
the changes in these variables. 
6.2.1 Share of imports from SADC and the ROW in aggregate imports 
At the first level of nesting, for each commodity i, Evans (1996: 60) defines an 
aggregate or composite import M j which is a CES aggregation of imports from SADC 
(MSj ) and imports from the ROW {MRj)." Given the prices of imports from the two 
sources, the problem facing the user or buyer is noted by Dervis et al. (1982: 222) to 
" The CES aggregation function is given by: 
where BMi and 0Mi are parameters, and 1/(1 +PMi) = aMi is the elasticity of substitution between 
imports from the two sources (Evans, 1997b). 
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be "mathematically equivalent to that facing the firm wishing to produce a specified 
level of output at minimum cost". The solution is to find a ratio of "inputs" (MSi to MR) 
so that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) equals the ratio of the price of imports 
from the ROW to the price of imports from SADC (PMR/PMSi)' 
The first-order condition for cost minimisation gives: 
(1 ) 
where P MSi and P MRi are the prices of imports from SADC and the ROW respectively 
(Evans, 1997b; Dervis et al., 1982: 222).12 
In Section 6.2.1.1, the variation in the ratio of imports from the two sources (mSRi ) 
when relative prices change is determined. This allows for the derivation in Section 
6.2.1.2 of expressions for the calculation of the proportionate changes in the levels of 
imports from the two sources when a FT A is formed. 
6.2.1.1 The change in the ratio of imports from the two sources 
In order to find the variation in the ratio of imports from the two sources (mSRi) when 
relative prices change, the first order condition is log differentiated, yielding: 
(Evans, 1997b).13 
This can be explained more intuitively by defining the (constant) elasticity of substitution 
between imports from SADC and imports from the rest of the world as: 
12 
13 
aMi = % Ll(MsiMRiL 
% Ll (P MR/P MSi) (2) 
The first-order condition can be expressed by MRSMSi.MRi = (PMR/PMSi) (Henderson and Quandt, 1980: 
14). 
A A indicates a log differential. 
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rather than using the form O'Mi = 1/( 1 + PMi) defined in the study. 
In this way it can clearly be seen that the change in the ratio of imports from SADC to 
imports from the ROW depends on the change in the relative price of imports from the 
two sources and the elasticity of substitution O'Mi. 14 The elasticity of substitution is 
assumed by Evans (1996: 34) to be 2.5 (evidently across all sectors in all SADC 
countries), indicating a fairly high degree of substitutability between imports from within 
SADC and from the ROW.15 
In the case of a FTA, the removal of a country's tariff on imports from SADC in a 
particular sector will lower the price of imports from SADC (raising the relative price of 
imports from the ROW).16 If, for example, the relative price ratio (PMR/PMSi) increases 
by 20 per cent, then, with an elasticity of substitution of 2.5, the ratio mSRi (i.e. Ms/MRi) 
will increase by 50 per cent. 17 
With initial import prices set equal to one, P MRi = dtMRi and P MSi = dtMsi (Evans, 1997b). 
Since P MRi = 0 in the FTA case, it follows that: 
mSRi = O'Mi(PMRi - P MSi) 
-O'Mi(PMSi)' 
For a given elasticity of substitution, the increase in the ratio of imports from SADC to 
imports from the ROW (m SRi) will be greater, the higher the fall in the price of imports 
from SADC (PMSi) on formation of the FTA, and hence the higher the initial tariff. The 
increase in m SRi can be calculated, given the initial tariff data and the assumed elasticity 
of substitution between imports from the two sources. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
An infinite elasticity of substitution would mean that imports from the two sources were perfect 
substitutes, while an elasticity of substitution equal to zero would indicate perfect complements. 
The model's elasticity assumptions will be considered more fully in Chapter 7. 
In the case of a customs union, the change in relative prices would also be affected by the level at 
which the common external tariff against the ROW is set. 
Note that UMi as defined in (2) will be positive. 
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6.2.1.2 The change in imports from SADC and the ROW individually 
The functional forms outlined above allow for the derivation of expressions to determine 
the proportionate changes in imports from SADC and the ROW resulting from the 
removal of intra-SADC tariffs. 
From (1) it can be seen that rTISRi = MSi - M Ri • Hence: 
(3) 
where MSi is the proportionate or percentage change in imports from SADC. 
The proportionate change in composite imports can be written as: 
(4) 
where eMSi and eMRi are the respective value shares at initial prices of imports from SADC 
and imports from the ROW in total imports of good i; that is, eMSi = (PMsiMs/P MiMi) and 
eMRi = (PMRiMR/P MiMi) (Evans, 1997b). 
An expression for the proportionate change in imports from the ROW can be found by 
substituting MSi from (3) into (4) which yields, after some manipulation: 
This can be re-arranged to give: 
(5). 
Substituting MRi from (5) into (3) gives: 
(Evans, 1997b) (6). 
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The proportionate changes in the levels of imports from the two sources can thus be 
found by calculating the proportionate change in composite imports. The latter is 
determined from the next level in the Armington aggregation. 
6.2.2 Share of composite imports and domestic production in total domestic use 
At the second level of nesting in the RTMSA, an aggregate or composite commodity Dj 
is defined which is a CES aggregation of composite imports (Mj) and domestic 
production for domestic use (SM;). 18 In an analogous manner to the former level, the 
user will find the ratio of M j to SM; so that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) equals 
the ratio of the price of the domestically-produced commodity to the price of the 
imported commodity (PSM/P Mj) (Dervis et al., 1982: 222). 
The first-order condition for cost minimisation by users of imported and domestic goods 
gives: 
rMSi (7) 
where PSMi and PM; are the domestic and composite import good prices respectively 
(Evans, 1997b; Dervis et al., 1982: 222).19 
In a similar manner to the previous level, Section 6.2.2.1 determines the variation in the 
ratio of composite imports to domestic production (r Ms;l when relative prices change, 
allowing the derivation of expressions for the calculation of the proportionate changes 
in composite imports and import-competing production when a FTA is formed. 
However, it is found that to calculate the variation in this ratio, the impact of the 
removal of intra-SA DC tariffs on the price of the composite import good needs to be 
determined. This is dealt with in Section 6.2.2.2. 
18 
19 
The CES aggregation function is given by: 
where BOi and aOi are parameters, and 1/(1 +POi) = aOi is the elasticity of substitution between 
composite imports and domestic production (Evans, 1997b). 
The first-order condition can be expressed, similarly as before, by MRSMi,SMi = (PSM/PMi), 
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6.2.2.1 The change in the ratio of imports to domestic production 
As before, to find the variation in the ratio of imported to domestically-produced goods 
(rMSi) when relative prices change, the first order condition is log differentiated, yielding: 
(Evans, 1997b). 
Once again, it is useful to define the constant elasticity of substitution between imports 
and domestic production as: 
a Oi = %6.(Mi~;l 
%6.(PsM;lP Mi) (8). 
The change in the ratio of imports to domestic production for domestic use therefore 
depends on the change in the relative price of domestic to foreign goods and the 
elasticity of substitution aOi. The elasticity of substitution between composite imports 
and domestic production is assumed by Evans (1996: 34) to be 0.5 for capital and 
intermediate goods, and 2.5 for "other" (mostly consumer) goods (once again, evidently 
across all SADC countries). This indicates that imports and domestic production are 
less substitutable (i.e. more complementary or "non-competing") in capital and 
intermediate good sectors than in other sectors. 
Further, the price elasticity of domestic supply is assumed to be infinite, due to the 
assumption of excess capacity in the manufacturing sectors of the SADC region (Evans, 
1996: 33-34). This feature of the model, which is considered more carefully in Chapter 
7, implies that there will be no adjustment in the domestic price when tariffs are 
removed (Corado and de Melo, 1986: 155). Thus f'SMi = 0, and rMSi = -aO;F'Mi. 
Given the assumption of excess capacity, then, the change in the ratio of imports to 
domestic production (r MSi) depends on the constant elasticity of substitution between 
composite imports and import-competing production (aOi ) and the change in the 
composite import good price (PMi). Since a Oi is given, the impact of the removal of intra-
SADC tariffs on the price of the composite import good needs to be determined, in order 
to see how the ratio r MSi is affected in the case of a FT A. 
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6.2.2.2 The change in the composite import price due to the removal of the intra-
SADC tariff 
Since imports from SADC of commodity i are one component of the "aggregate" or 
composite import commodity M; (made up of imports from SADC and imports from the 
ROW), the fall in the relative price of imports from SADC when intra-SADC tariffs are 
removed will lower the average price of the "aggregate" import M;. Total differentiation 
of the cost function derived from the CES aggregation function in Section 6.2.1 yields 
an expression for the variation in the composite import good price: 20 
where OMS; is, once again, the value share of imports from SADC in total imports of 
commodity i (Evans, 1997b; Dervis et al., 1982: 238).21 The variation in the 
aggregate import price can be seen as a weighted sum of the variation in the prices of 
imports from the two sources, with their respective value shares serving as the weights. 
In the FT A case (when PMR; = 0), the responsiveness of the aggregate import price PM; 
to a given fall in PMS; depends on the value share of imports from SADC in total imports 
of the good (OMS;)' The higher this share, the larger is the fall in the aggregate import 
price. The fall in the average import price in this case is therefore some proportion of 
the fall in the price of imports from SADC, the proportion being larger, the larger the 
initial share of imports from SADC in total imports. 22 
Equally, for a given value share OMS;' the fall in the aggregate import price will be larger, 
the larger the fall in the price of imports from the SADC source (i.e. the higher the initial 
tariff). The greatest reduction in the price of the composite import good (i.e. the 
20 
21 
22 
The cost function derived from the CES aggregation function is: 
P Mi = (1/BMi)[OaMiPMS?·aMi) + (1_O)aMiPMRif1·aMi))'/C1.aMi) (Dervis et a/., 1982: 232). 
Note that (1-eMSi) = e MRi, the value share of imports from the ROW in total imports, defined earlier. 
Assuming there is a tariff on good i, the composite import price PMi will necessarily fall in the FTA 
case, because the initial tariff is retained on imports from the ROW. In the case of a customs union, 
the change in PMi will also be influenced by any difference between the level at which the common 
external tariff (CET) is set and the initial tariff level. Such a difference would affect P MRi, which may 
increase or fall, depending on whether the initial tariff on the good is raised or lowered to meet the 
CET. 
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greatest PMi) can thus be expected in those sectors with a relatively high initial tariff in 
which the value share of imports from SADC in total imports is relatively high. The fall 
in PMi can be calculated, given the initial tariff data and the initial share of imports from 
SADC in total imports. 
Recall from Section 6.2.2.1 that the change in the ratio of imported to domestically-
produced goods in the case of a FTA can be expressed as rMSi = -GOiPMi. Since GOi ' as 
defined in Expression (8), is positive, the fall in the composite import good price will 
clearly raise the ratio of imports to domestic production (rMSi).23 For a given elasticity 
of substitution, the increase in the ratio of aggregate imports to domestic production will 
be greater the higher the fall in PMi, and hence the higher the initial tariff and share of 
imports from SADC in total imports. 
The magnitude of the substitution elasticity GOi itself determines the responsiveness of 
the ratio rMSi = (M/SMi) to changes in the relative price of imported goods brought about 
by the formation of the FTA (Dervis et al., 1982: 222). Recall that the elasticity of 
substitution between imports and domestic production is assumed to be 0.5 for capital 
and intermediate goods and 2.5 for consumer goods. Clearly, then, for a given fall in 
PMi, the increase in rMSi will be five times smaller in intermediate and capital good sectors 
than in other sectors, indicating that imports are less substitutable for domestic 
production. 
The increase in rMSi can now be calculated, given the fall in the import price calculated 
above, and given the assumption that domestic supply is perfectly elastic, as well as the 
assumed magnitudes of the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic 
production. 
23 In terms of Expression (8), given the assumption of excess capacity, the fall in the composite import 
good price (PMi) when the tariff on imports from SADC is removed will raise the relative price ratio 
(PSM/PMil. and hence the ratio of imports to domestic production (M/SMi)' Note that although the ratio 
rMSi = (M/SMi) increases, this does not necessarily mean that import-competing production SMi will fall 
(see Section 6.2,4,3 below). 
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6.2.3 Changes in domestic demand, imports and import-competing supply 
In the model's final stage, changes in the actual levels of domestic demand, imports and 
import-competing supply when relative prices vary can be determined, given the 
increase in the ratio of imported to domestically-produced goods calculated above. In 
Section 6.2.3.1, an expression for the proportionate change in domestic demand Di is 
derived. In order to solve this expression, it is apparent that the change in the price of 
the composite good POi needs to be determined. This is dealt with in Section 6.2.3.2. 
Finally, expressions are derived for the proportionate changes in aggregate imports Mi 
and import-competing production SMi in Sections 6.2.3.3 and 6.2.3.4 respectively. 
6.2.3.1 The change in domestic demand OJ 
It was noted at the beginning of Section 6.2 that demand for the composite commodity 
Di is a function of its price and the level of income: 
from which one can write: 
(Evans, 1997b). 
fdi is the price elasticity of demand for the composite good and <Pi is the income 
elasticity of demand. The price elasticity of demand is assumed by Evans (1997b) to 
be -0.8 for agricultural, intermediate and capital goods, and -1.3 for other goods, in all 
SADC countries. 24 In the "worst-case" scenario, on which the discussion is based, 
the change in domestic demand can be written as Oi = fd;F'Oi' 
In order to determine the change in demand for the composite good Di, it is necessary 
to find the effect of the change in the composite import price PMi on the price of the 
composite commodity POi when intra-SADC tariffs are removed. 
24 The portion of the change in domestic demand Dj which is due to a change in income, i.e. (tP8'j), is 
only relevant in the so-called "growth" scenario. The income elasticity of demand is assumed to be 
0.75 for agricultural, intermediate and capital goods, and 1.25 for other goods (Evans, 1997b). 
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6.2.3.2 The change in the price of the composite commodity due to the change 
in the composite import price 
Since aggregate imports are one component of the composite commodity 0i (comprised 
of aggregate imports and import-competing production), the fall in PMi will, given the 
assumption of excess capacity, lower the price of the composite good POi' Proceeding 
as before, total differentiation of the cost function derived from the CES aggregation 
function in Section 6.2.2 yields the following expression for the variation in POi: 
where 0Mi is the value share of imports in total domestic demand for good i; that is 
(PMiMJPOPi).25 The variation in the price of the composite commodity (I\i) can thus 
be seen as a weighted sum of the variation in the prices of the composite import good 
and the domestically-produced good, with their respective value shares in composite 
domestic demand serving as the weights. 
Given the assumption of excess capacity, which implies that PSMi=O, the variation in 
the price of the composite commodity POi can be written as 0MiPMi (Evans, 1997b). The 
responsiveness of the composite good price POi to a given fall in PMi thus depends on the 
import share 0Mi' The higher the import share, the larger is the fall in the composite 
good price. The fall in the composite good price is thus some proportion of the fall in 
the aggregate import price, the proportion being larger, the larger the initial import share. 
Further, for a given import share 0Mi' the fall in the price of the composite good will be 
larger, the greater the fall in the aggregate import price PMi. Recall from Section 6.2.2.2 
that the largest fall in the aggregate import price in the FTA case can be expected when 
the value share of imports from SAOC in total imports is relatively high and the initial 
tariff is relatively high. Thus, given the assumption of excess capacity, the greatest 
reduction in the composite good price POi can be expected in those sectors with a high 
import share, in which imports from SAOC form a relatively high proportion of total 
25 Note that (1-8M;) 
(PSM;SM/POP;), 
8SM;' the value share of import-competing production in domestic demand, 
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imports, and which have relatively high initial tariffs.26 
The fall in Po; can be calculated, given the fall in PM; determined in Section 6.2.2.2, and 
given the initial share of imports in total domestic demand. 
Recall from Section 6.2.3.1 that the change in demand for the composite good in the 
"worst-case" scenario can be written as 0; = Ed;I\;. Given the assumed price elasticity 
of demand for the composite good and the fall in Po; calculated above, the increase in 
demand for the composite good, resulting from the fall in the import price when the FT A 
is formed, can be determined. For a particular elasticity, the increase in D; will be 
greater, the larger the fall in Po;' 
The magnitude of the price elasticity of demand for the composite good itself will 
determine the responsiveness of demand to a given change in the composite good price. 
If Ed; is large, a given fall in Po; will result in a substantial increase in D/7 
The determination of the proportionate change in total domestic demand allows for the 
derivation of expressions for the proportionate changes in its components, aggregate 
imports M; and import-competing production SM;' when relative prices vary. 
6.2.3.3 The change in composite imports M j 
It was noted in Section 6.2.1.2 that in order to calculate the proportionate changes in 
imports from SADC and the ROW individually which result from the formation of the 
FT A, the proportionate change in composite imports had to be determined from the next 
level in the Armington aggregation. 
Domestic demand for commodity i is the sum of composite imports and domestic 
production for domestic use. The total derivative of this is: 
26 
27 
The implications of the assumption of excess capacity will be considered further in Chapter 7. 
It will also be seen, in Section 6.2.4 below, that the relative magnitudes of the price elasticity of 
demand and the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic production are important in 
determining the net effect of a FT A on the components of Dj, namely import-competing production 
SMj and composite imports M j. 
173 
Hence, the proportionate change in demand for the composite good can be written as: 
(Evans, 1997b) (9). 
Recall that r MSi denotes the ratio of imported to domestically-produced goods (M/SMi)' 
Hence, rMSi = Nli - SMi' This can be re-arranged to give: 
(10). 
Substituting SMi from (10) into (9) yields: 
After some manipulation, this can be re-arranged to give an expression for the 
proportionate change in aggregate imports: 
(Evans, 1997b) (11). 
The proportionate change in aggregate imports Mi when a FT A is formed can be 
calculated, given the change in demand determined in Sections 6.2.3.1 and 6.2.3.2, and 
the change in the ratio of imports to domestic production rMSI determined in Sections 
6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2. This in turn allows for the calculation of the proportionate 
changes in imports from SADC and the ROW individually (MSi and MRi ), using the 
expressions derived earlier in Section 6.2.1.2. 
The magnitude and direction of change of Mi, MSi and MRi will be considered in Section 
6.2.4 below, in the light of the assumptions of the RTMSA. 
6.2.3.4 The change in import-competing supply SMi 
An expression for the proportionate change in import-competing supply on formation of 
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the FT A can be found by substituting Expression (11) for the change in imports back 
into Expression (10), yielding, after some manipulation: 
(Evans, 1997b) (12). 
As with the variation in composite imports, the proportionate change in import-
competing supply SM; can now be calculated, since all its components are known. The 
magnitude and direction of change of SMi will also be considered in Section 6.2.4 below, 
in the light of the model's assumptions. 
6.2.4 The magnitude and direction of change of the key variables, given the 
assumptions of the RTMSA 
As noted in Section 6.1, Evans (1996, 1997a,b) does not examine how the structure 
and assumptions of the RTMSA influence the magnitude and direction of change of the 
key economic variables when a FTA is formed. The present, final section relating to the 
import side of the RTMSA attempts to address this by using the model's equations to 
derive expressions for the proportionate changes in these variables solely in terms of 
elasticities, shares and the change in the composite import price PM; when intra-SADC 
tariffs are removed. 
Since the direction of change in the composite import price is unambiguous in the case 
of a FT A, depending only on the size of the tariff removed and the initial share of 
imports from SADC, and since the assumed magnitudes of the various elasticities are 
known, these expressions will clarify the implications of the model's assumptions for 
the results obtained from the simulations. 
6.2.4.1 Domestic demand OJ 
Recall that, in the "worst-case" scenario, the expression for the proportionate change 
in domestic demand is given by 0; = Ed;PO;' Further, given the assumption of excess 
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capacity, Po; = 6M;PM;. The proportionate change in domestic demand can thus be 
written as: 
(13). 
6.2.4.2 Composite imports M; 
Recall from Expression (11) that the proportionate change in composite imports is given 
by M; = 0; + f MS;( 1-6M;). Further, given the assumption of excess capacity (which 
implies that PSM; = 0), the proportionate change in the ratio of composite imports to 
domestic production fMS; = -aO;PM;' Thus: 
M; = 0; + f MS;( 1-6M;) 
d~ A 
= E ;Po; - ao;I""'M;(1-6M;) 
~ d ~ 
= - ao;(1-6M;) PM; + E ;Po; 
~ d ~ 
= - ao;(1-6M;) PM; + E ;6M;PM; 
d ~ 
= (- ao;( 1-6M;) + E ;6M;) PM; (14). 
The portion (- ao;( 1-6M;)) PM; of Expression (14) depicts the increase in M; due to the 
substitution of M; for SM; when relative prices change, while the portion (Ed;6M;) PM; 
reflects the increase in M; due to the rise in demand for the composite good 0;. 
Although both effects work in the same direction, their relative importance depends on 
the relative sizes of the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic 
production and the price elasticity of demand for the composite good, as well as on the 
import share. 
For consumer good sectors, ao; = 2.5 and Ed; = -1.3. Thus: 
M; = (- 2.5(1-6M;) - 1.36M;) PM; 
= {- 2.5 + 2.58Mi - 1.38Mi} PMi 
= (- 2.5 + 1.28Mi) PMie 
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Since the import share must lie between zero and one (i.e. 0 ~ 8Mi ~ 1), it is clear that 
(- 2.5 + 1.28Mi) ~ O. Given that the composite import good price PMi falls when the 
intra-SADC tariff is removed, composite imports increase by between -1.3PMi and -
A d A A 
2.5PMi (or, more generally, by between € iPMi and - aOiPMi)' 
For intermediate and capital good sectors, aOi = 0.5 and €di = -0.8. Thus: 
Mi = (- 0.5(1-8M;l - 0.88Mi) PMi 
(- 0.5 + 0.58Mi - 0.88Mi) PMi 
Since (0 ~ 8Mi ~ 1), it can be seen that (- 0.5 - 0.38Mi) ~ O. Given that the composite 
import good price PMi falls when the intra-SADC tariff is removed, composite imports 
still increase, but by between -0.5PMi and -0.8PMi. Note that the increase in Mi is less 
in these sectors for a given fall in PMi , since demand is less responsive to price changes 
(the absolute value of ~i is lower) and Mi and SMi are less substitutable (shown by the 
lower aOi)' 
6.2.4.3 Import-competing supply 8 Mi 
Recall from Expression (12) that the proportionate change in import-competing 
production is given by SMi = Oi - rMSi8Mi' Further, as before, the assumption of excess 
capacity yields: rMSi = -aOiPMi ' Thus: 
SMi = 0i - r MSi8Mi 
d A A 
= € iPOi + (aOiPMi)8Mi 
= (aoi8M;l PMi + €diPOi 
= (aoi8M;l PMi + (€di8Mi) PMi 
d A (aoi8Mi + € i8Mi) PMi (15). 
It can be seen from this expression that there are two opposing influences on the 
direction of change in import-competing production. The first is a substitution effect, 
whereby the fall in the import price induces a substitution of imports for domestic 
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production. This is depicted by the term (aDi8Mj ) PMj in Expression (15), and is a negative 
influence. However, Dervis et al. (1982: 237) note that the demand for the 
domestically-produced good is a derived demand, since it enters the CES aggregation 
function of Section 6.2.2. Therefore, the fall in the import price, which lowers the price 
of the composite good PDj, induces an increase in demand for the composite good Dj, 
which implies an increase in demand for the domestic good SMj' This second effect, 
termed a "price effect" by Dervis et al. (1982: 237), is depicted by the term (Edi8Mj) PM; 
in Expression (15) (which equals EdjpDj), and exerts a positive influence on SMj' 
The net effect of a FT A on import-competing production thus depends on whether this 
price effect outweighs the substitution effect or vice versa, which, as is demonstrated 
below, depends on the relative magnitudes of the price elasticity of demand for the 
composite good Edj and the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic 
production a Dj (Dervis et al., 1982: 240). 
As before, for consumer good sectors, aDj = 2.5 and Edj = -1.3. Thus: 
SMj = (2.58Mj - 1.38Mj) PMj 
= (1.28Mj) PMj · 
Since (0 :s; 8Mj :s; 1), it is clear that (1.28M;l ~ O. Given that the composite import good 
price PMj falls when a FTA is formed, import-competing production in these sectors will 
fall by between 0 and 1.2PMi. 
For intermediate and capital good sectors, aD; = 0.5 and Edj = -0.8. Thus: 
SMj (0.58Mi - 0.88M;! PMi 
= (-0.38Mj) PMj· 
Since (0 :s; 8Mi :s; 1), it follows that (-0.38Mj) :s; O. Given that the composite import 
good price PMi falls, import-competing production in these sectors will increase by 
between 0 and -0.3PMj. Note that the change (increase) in SMj is less in these sectors 
than the change (fall) in SMj in the other sectors, since although Mj and SMj are less 
substitutable (aD; is lower), demand is also less responsive to price changes (shown by 
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the lower absolute value of ~;l. 
It can thus be seen that if the substitution elasticity outweighs (the absolute value of) 
the demand elasticity, the substitution of imports for domestic production will outweigh 
any tendency for SMi to increase in response to the rise in demand for the composite 
good 0i' The net effect in this case is a fall in import-competing production. This will 
occur in consumer good sectors in the RTMSA. 
In intermediate and capital good sectors, however, the elasticity of substitution between 
imports and import-competing production (0.5) is less than the absolute value of the 
price elasticity of demand for the composite good (0.8). Therefore, both composite 
imports and import-competing production increase in these sectors when the FT A is 
formed. 
Import-competing sectors can thus be divided into import complements and import 
substitutes, depending on the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign 
goods as well as on the sectoral elasticity of demand for the composite good (Oervis et 
al., 1982: 240).28 In intermediate and capital good sectors where aDi < I Ed;!, the 
formation of a FTA will cause import-competing production to increase when composite 
imports rise, and foreign and domestic goods can be seen as complements or non-
competing. For other sectors, where if aDi > I Edi I, import-competing production falls 
when a FTA is formed, and foreign and domestic goods are substitutes. 
6.2.4.4 Imports from the rest of the world MRj 
Recall from Expression (5) that the proportionate change in imports from the ROW is 
given by MRi = Mi - mSRi8MSi' Further, the proportionate change in the ratio of imports 
from SAOC to imports from the ROW is m SRi = aMi(PMRi - PMSi )' In the FTA case, tariffs 
are retained on ROW imports, implying that PMRi = O. Therefore m SRi = - aMiPMSi' Thus: 
28 According to Dervis et al. (1982: 240), this "reflects the traditional distinction between competitive 
imports and noncompetitive imports, but ... allows for variations in the degree of substitutability rather 
than the simple and extreme classification that treats imports as either perfect substitutes or perfect 
complements for domestic production". 
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Now, recall that the variation in the price of the composite import good is given by 
PMi = 8MSiPMSi + (1-8MS;lPMRi' Thus, in the FTA case (when PMRi=O), it follows that 
PMi = 8MSiPMSi' Therefore: 
MRi = Mi + aMi8MSiP MSi 
= Mi + aMiPMi · 
Substituting Mi from (14) yields: 
(16). 
As in the case of the change in import-competing production, there are opposing 
influences on the direction of change in imports from the ROW when a FTA is formed. 
These have important implications for the trade diversion consequences of a FT A. 
The demand for imports from the ROW is also a derived demand, since it enters the CES 
aggregation function in Section 6.2.1. Therefore, although the removal of intra-SADC 
tariffs will induce a substitution of MSi for MRi, there is also a "price" effect similar to 
that in Section 6.2.4.3, whereby the fall in the price of imports from SADC, which 
lowers the composite import price PMi, induces an increase in demand for composite 
imports Mi' This influence tends to increase the demand for imports from the ROW. 
The terms (- aDi(1-8Mi )) PMi and (e-di8Mi) PMi in Expression (16) exert a positive influence 
on the direction of change in MRi. Both derive from the increase in composite imports 
when a FT A is formed, depicted by Expression (14). The former results from the 
substitution of Mi for SMi' while the latter is the price effect referred to above. 
The other term in Expression (16), aMi PMi, reflects the substitution of MSi for MRi when 
intra-SADC tariffs are removed, and thus exerts a negative influence on the direction of 
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change in M Ri • 
Despite these opposing influences, it can be shown that, given the magnitudes of the 
elasticities which have been assumed, the net effect of the formation of a FTA will be 
a decrease in imports from the ROW. 
As before, for consumer good sectors, O'Oi = 2.5 and Edi = -1.3, while the elasticity of 
substitution between imports from the two sources aMi is also assumed to be 2.5. 
Thus: 
MRi = (-2.5(1-8Mi) - 1.38Mi + 2.5) PMi 
(-2.5 + 2.58Mi - 1.38Mi + 2.5) PMi 
(1.28Mi) PMi' 
Since (0 $; 8Mi $; 1), it follows that (1.28MJ ;::: O. Given that the composite import good 
price falls, imports from the ROW will fall by between 0 and 1.2PMi • 
The assumption of equal elasticities of substitution between imports from the two 
sources and between composite imports and domestic supply produces an anomalous 
result for these sectors. Since O'Oi = aMi = 2.5, the expression: 
MRi = (- O'Oi( 1-8Mi) + Edi8Mi + aMi) PMi 
(- O'Oi + 0'0i8Mi + Edi8Mi + aMi) PMi 
effectively becomes: 
which is equal to 8Mi, the proportionate change in import-competing production. 
For intermediate and capital good sectors, O'Oi = 0.5 and Edi = -0.8. However, the 
elasticity of substitution between imports from the two sources aMi is still assumed to 
be 2.5. Thus: 
MRi (-0.5(1-0Mi) - 0.80Mi + 2.5) PMi 
(-0.5 + 0.50Mi - 0.80Mi + 2.5) PMi 
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With (0 :::;; 0Mi :::;; 1), it can be seen that (2 - 0.30Mi) will be positive. As before, imports 
from the ROW will fall when a FTA is formed, but by between 1.7PMi and 2PMi . This is 
because composite imports increase by less than in other sectors, due to the lower UOi 
and absolute €di, while the substitution of MSi for MRi is just as strong. The positive 
influences on the direction of change in MRi are therefore weaker, while the negative 
substitution effect is the same. 
Note that for these sectors UOi is not equal to UMi' so the earlier anomaly disappears, and 
the proportionate change in SMi will not equal the proportionate change in M Ri. The two 
variables will, indeed, move in opposite directions. 
If MSi and MRi were allowed to be less substitutable in some sectors, imports from both 
sources could increase when a FTA was formed (Corado and de Melo, 1986: 158). 
This question will be considered further in Chapter 7. 
6.2.4.5 Imports from SADC MSi 
Recall from Expression (6) that the proportionate change in imports from SADC is given 
by MSi = Mi + mSRiOMRi· Further, as above, in the FTA case, m SRi = -UMi(PMS). Thus: 
MSi Mi + mSRiOMRi 
Mi - UMi(PMSi)OMRi 
Substituting Mi from (14) yields: 
MSi = (-uoi (1-0Mi) + €diOMi)PMi - (UMiOMRi) PMSi 
d ~ ~ [(-UOi( 1-0Mi ) + € iOM)OMSi]P MSi - [UMiOMRi] PMSi 
= [(-uoi (1-0Mi ) + €diOMi)OMSi - UMiOMRi] PMSi 
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(17).29 
The term [-aOi(1-8Mi)8MSi] PMSi in Expression (17), which equals [-aoi (1-8Mi)] PMi, depicts 
the increase in MSi due to the substitution of Mi for SMi (see Expression (14)). This 
reflects trade creation via the production effect. The portion [€di8Mi8MSi] PMSi ' which 
equals [€di8Mi] PMi , depicts the increase in MSi due to the rise in demand for the composite 
good Di (see Expression (14)), reflecting trade creation via the consumption effect. In 
accordance with the discussion in Section 4.2.2, trade creation will be greater, the 
higher the initial share of imports from the partner 8MSi' the higher the initial tariff (giving 
a larger fall in PMSi), and the more elastic demand.30 Trade creation will be enhanced, 
the higher the degree of substitutability between imports and domestic production (i.e. 
the higher aOi)' 
Finally, the term [-aMi ( 1-8Msi)] PMSi in Expression (17) shows the increase in MSi due to 
the substitution of MSi for M Ri. This indicates the trade diversion effect of the FT A, 
which, plausibly, will be lower if the initial share of imports from SADC (8MSi) is large. 
Trade diversion will be higher, the greater the substitutability between imports from 
SADC and imports from the ROW (aMi)' 
The relative magnitudes assumed for the elasticities of substitution and the elasticity 
demand therefore have important implications for the trade creation-trade diversion 
consequences of the FT A. This aspect will be considered further in Chapter 7. 
6.2.4.6 Summary 
Section 6.2.4 has attempted to use the equations of the RTMSA to clarify the 
magnitude and direction of change in the key economic variables when a FTA is formed, 
given the assumed magnitudes of the model's various elasticity parameters. In Section 
29 
30 
Note that, unlike Expressions (13) to (16), this equation is in terms of PMSi rather than PMi • Of course, 
PMSi falls unambiguously when intra-SADC tariffs are removed. 
In this framework, however, as the discussion in Chapter 7 shows, complete displacement of imports 
from the ROW by the partner is not a necessary condition for trade creation to occur. 
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6.2.4.5, specifically, manipulation of the expression for the proportionate change in 
imports from SADC when intra-SADC tariffs are removed facilitates the distinction 
between the increase in MSi which can be attributed to trade creation, and that which 
results from trade diversion. Since the assumed values of the elasticities are known, 
conclusions may be drawn about the likely trade creation-trade diversion consequences 
of the FTA in particular sectors. This is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
6.3 Changes in customs revenue on formation of the FTA 
The customs revenue (CR) earned by a SADC member before the formation of the FT A 
is simply the sum of the revenue derived from imports from the rest of SADC (MSi) and 
imports from the ROW (MRi ). This can be written as 1:0 (MSiO + M RiO ), where to is the initial 
tariff rate, and M SiO and MRiO are the initial values of imports from SADC and the ROW 
respectively. 
Once the FT A is formed, CR will no longer be earned on either existing or additional 
imports from SADC, since the intra-SADC tariff is removed. The new CR is therefore 
derived only from MRi , which has itself fallen. The new level of CR will thus be to 
(MRiO + MRi), where MAio is the initial value of imports from the ROWand MRi is the 
proportionate fall in MRi when the FTA is formed. 
The change in CR is therefore the difference between the new CR and the initial CR: 
.6.CR = to (MRiO + MRi) - to (MSiO + M RiO) 
= to (MRi - M SiO )' 
The proportionate change in CR is thus: 
CR = [to (M Ri - MSiO)]/[to (MSiO + MRiO )] 
(MRi - MSiO)/(MsiO + M RiO) 
(MRi - MSiO)/MiO where MiO is the initial total level of imports. 
Therefore, the percentage fall in CR will be greater, the higher the initial level of imports 
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from SADC and the larger the proportionate fall in imports from the ROW. 
The loss of customs revenue on initial imports from SADC and displaced ROW imports 
is not entirely a deadweight loss to the country. Since the price of imports from the 
SADC source has fallen, part of the loss in customs revenue will be transferred to 
domestic consumers as increased surplus. This question, which relates to the analysis 
in Section 4.2.2, but which is not addressed by Evans (1996, 1997b), will be 
considered further in Chapter 7. 
6.4 The export side of the RTMSA 
The import side of the RTMSA captures the effects of the removal of the home 
country's tariffs on imports from SADC on the components of that country's domestic 
demand (import-competing production, imports from SADC and imports from the ROW), 
as well as on domestic demand in the aggregate. The export side, on the other hand, 
considers the impact on the home country's exports to SADC {Es;l of the removal of 
tariffs by other SADC countries. 31 
The RTMSA retains the assumption of excess capacity on the export side, giving 
perfectly elastic export supply. The expansion of exports as the FT A is formed will 
consequently have no effect on import-competing production. 32 Evans (1996: 34) 
states that" ... export supply is ... considered to be responsive to falling tariffs within the 
SADC FTA, to improved market access in the ... ROW, and to expanding incomes" .33 
Since intra-SADC imports of commodity i are initially equal to intra-SADC exports of 
commodity i, it follows that the change in the total level of intra-SADC imports of 
commodity i when a FT A is formed must equal the change in the total level of intra-
SADC exports of that commodity. 
31 
32 
33 
The formation of the FTA itself does not alter SADC members' terms of access to ROW markets. 
Hence exports to the ROW (ERi) are unaffected in the "worst-case" scenario. 
The implications of this assumption are considered in Chapter 7. 
The effects of improved market access to the ROWand rising incomes on the level of exports are 
only relevant in the so-called "growth" scenario. 
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For each sector, therefore: 
k= 1 ... 8 
where MSik is the level of imports from the rest of SADC of commodity i by SADC 
country k, and ESik is the level of exports to the rest of SADC of commodity i by SADC 
country k (Evans, 1997b). 
Therefore, when intra-SADC tariffs are removed: 
(Evans, 1997b). 
To calculate an individual country's change in exports to the rest of SADC when a FTA 
is formed, the change in total intra-SADC exports dEsi is allocated between countries 
according to their initial market share. Therefore: 
(Evans, 1997b) 
where dEsik is the change in country k's exports of commodity i to the rest of SADC, 
dEsi is the change in total intra-SADC exports of commodity i, and 
(JESik is the initial share of country k's exports in total intra-SADC exports of 
commodity i. 
The implications of the structure of the export side of the RTMSA, in particular the use 
of constant market shares to calculate the impact of the removal of tariffs on a 
country's exports to SADC, will be considered further in Chapter 7. 
6.5 The change in the balance of payments 
Given the assumptions of the RTMSA, the formation of a SADC free trade area results 
in an equiproportionate increase in intra-SADC imports and exports from the same base 
and a fall in imports from the ROW, with no change in exports to the ROW in the 
"worst-case" scenario. The balance of payments (BOP) position of SADC as a whole 
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should therefore necessarily improve vis-a-vis the ROW. 34 
Recall from Section 6.2.4.2 that, given the RTMSA assumptions, composite imports Mi 
increase when a FTA is formed. This implies that the absolute increase in intra-SADC 
imports (M si) exceeds any absolute fall in imports from the ROW (MRi). A particular 
country's BOP will therefore improve as long as the absolute increase in its exports to 
SADC (Esi) exceeds the absolute increase in total imports (Mi). The change in the BOP 
can be written as follows: 
dBOP 
where Esio is the initial level of exports to SADC, while Msio and M Rio are, as before, the 
initial level of imports from SADC and the ROW respectively. 
6.6 The employment effects of the formation of a FTA 
The employment effects of the formation of the SADC FT A depend on its impact on 
domestic industry (import-competing production and exports). The important 
assumption made here by Evans (1996: 65) is that the output per worker ratio (GO/l) 
remains constant before and after the formation of the FT A. 
The simulation results indicate the percentage changes in import-competing production 
and exports to SADC which follow the formation of the FT A. It is thus possible to 
calculate the new gross output, from which the new level of employment can be found, 
given the assumption that the ratio of output to employment remains constant. As 
noted in Section 6.1 (Footnote 9), the proportionate change in gross output will equal 
the proportionate change in employment, but the absolute changes will obviously differ. 
Clearly, any decrease in employment due to a fall in import-competing production (SMi) 
will be offset to some extent by an increase in employment as a result of higher exports 
34 This section is really concerned with the effect of a FTA on the balance of trade. Further, the model 
assumes no exchange rate adjustment to a trade surplus or deficit (Evans, 1997a: 4). 
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to SADC {Esi).35 However, the percentage increase in ESi may not be sufficient to 
offset the negative employment effects of a fall in SMi completely. In the South African 
textiles sector, for example, the proportionate decrease in SMi is given by Evans (1996: 
41) as 1.3 per cent, while the percentage increase in ESi is 20.4 per cent. Nevertheless, 
the net effect on employment is still negative (-0.5 per cent), since initial import-
competing production is US$1107.2 million while the initial level of exports to SADC 
is only US$35.0 million. 36 
The method of calculating the employment effects of a FT A clearly depends on the 
assumption that the ratio of output to employment in a given sector does not change 
over the period within which the FTA is formed. The feasibility of this assumption 
would presumably depend on how quickly the FTA was formed, but is probably 
reasonable for a comparative static simulation in which there is an "instantaneous" 
removal of tariffs. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The technical analysis in the present chapter has laid the foundation for a critical 
assessment in Chapter 7 of the elasticity and other assumptions underlying Evans' 
simulations. While these have been outlined by Evans (1996: 34), their basis has not 
been discussed in the study. However, in order to derive inferences for policy from the 
results of such simulations, it is important to examine the realism of these assumptions 
in the southern African context. 
35 
36 
For sectors where import-competing production increases when the FTA is formed (when imports and 
domestic production are complementary), the net effect of the formation of the FT A on output and 
employment can only be positive. 
In general, of course, SMi is much higher in absolute terms than Esi, so a higher percentage change 
in ESi would be required to offset any negative employment effects of a fall in SMi' This point is 
considered further in Chapter 7 in relation to Evans' (1996) own interpretation of the impact of the 
FTA on domestic industry. 
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CHAPTER 7 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRADE MODEL FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA 
7.1 Introduction 
Given the interest of policy-makers in the refinement and development of the Regional 
Trade Model for Southern Africa (RTMSA) in the short term, the aim of this chapter is 
to provide a critical assessment of the results obtained to date, and of the conclusions 
drawn from these results regarding the desirability of the formation of a SADC free 
trade area (FTA). In particular, the discussion will consider the implications of the 
underlying structure and assumptions of the model, with reference to similar empirical 
studies conducted for other regional groupings as well as the theoretical analysis in 
Chapters 4 and 5 above. Such an assessment of the RTMSA is made difficult by the 
fact that both the model itself and the database used in the simulations are already in 
the process of being refined and developed. While some of the considerations raised 
in this chapter are likely to be addressed as this work proceeds, it is nonetheless useful 
to highlight the areas in which modifications and extensions appear to be most 
necessary. 
Section 7.2 considers the model's estimates of the effects of the FTA on customs 
revenue, the balance of payments (BOP) and domestic industry in SADC member states. 
The focus in this section is on the inferences drawn from the results of the RTMSA 
concerning the desirability of trade integration in the SADC region. Section 7.3 
examines the question of the appropriate tariff levels to use in the simulations, in the 
light of the tariff reductions currently under way as a result of the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations, and given the possibility that the ultimate outcome of the SADC 
Trade Protocol may be an asymmetrical preference agreement rather than a full-blown 
FTA. 
Section 7.4 considers the underlying structure and assumptions of the RTMSA, drawing 
on similar empirical studies which make less restrictive assumptions and may therefore 
provide some insight into the implications of the model's formulation. More specifically, 
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the discussion will focus on whether the RTMSA assumptions bias the simulation results 
in any systematic way, so that the effects of the FTA appear to be more or less 
favourable than they would under alternative assumptions. 
Finally, Section 7.5 provides a preliminary analysis of the directions in which the model 
could usefully be extended to take account of some of the important factors relevant 
to an assessment of regional trade integration in southern Africa, considered in earlier 
chapters, but which have not been modelled to date. Section 7.6 concludes. 
As noted by Evans (1997a: 3), the simulation results are obviously affected by the 
quality of the data used, as well as the assumptions made. While there were major data 
problems in the 1996 simulation which call this set of results into serious question, the 
database for the model is continually being improved, and the quality of the results of 
further simulations will be strengthened on this count. 1 It is clearly of fundamental 
importance to develop an accurate database of disaggregated intra-SADC trade flows 
and of trade flows between SADC countries and the rest of the world (ROW), as well 
as appropriate sectoral output and tariff data. 2 
7.2 Simulation results and interpretation 
7.2.1 The implications of losses in customs revenue 
It was noted in Chapter 6 that Evans (1996: 10) finds that, in the "worst-case" 
scenario, there is a net loss of customs revenue for SADC as a whole of 8.4 per cent 
(US$303.8 million) on formation of a SADC FTA, with some severe revenue losses 
The main source of the data used by Evans (1996) is IDC (1995b), supplemented by other sources, 
such as IMF (1995). The trade data used in the 1996 simulation is particularly problematic, firstly 
because, as noted in Section 2.6.1, IDC (1995b) reports virtually all intra-SADC trade flows which 
do not involve SACU or Zimbabwe to be zero, and, secondly, because of some serious gaps in the 
external trade figures of member countries, especially Malawi and Mozambique. 
In the simulations to date, sectoral GDP figures from SADC member countries have been used for 
production, after a "rough" adjustment using the South African input/output table. As Evans (1996: 
7) notes, gross output figures are required to match with the trade data, and it would obviously be 
better to use specific country sources for this transformation. 
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recorded for individual countries. 3 In the 1997 RTMSA simulation, the overall customs 
revenue loss for the region is 6.0 per cent (US$134.2 million), while the results for 
individual countries are far less extreme (Evans, 1997a: 11). Two reasons may be 
suggested for this difference. Firstly, a considerably improved database is used in the 
second simulation, portraying a more accurate picture of regional versus external trade 
flows for individual SADC countries. Secondly, a slight overall increase in imports from 
the ROW is reported for a number of countries, with ROW imports falling (marginally) 
in only one country, Mauritius. This implies that, for most countries, customs revenue 
is only lost on the initial level of imports from SADC when a FTA is formed, and that 
this loss is offset in some cases by additional revenue earned on new imports from the 
ROW.4 
It was noted in Section 6.3 that the loss of customs revenue predicted by the RTMSA 
on initial imports from SADC and any displaced imports from the ROW is not entirely 
a deadweight loss to the country. Since the price of imports from the SADC source has 
fallen with the removal of intra-SADC tariffs, part of the loss of customs revenue, as 
the traditional analysis in Chapter 4 shows, will presumably be transferred to domestic 
consumers as increased surplus. There is an important difference, however, between 
the two frameworks. In the conventional analysis, considered in Chapter 4, the 
assumption of perfect substitutability in use between imports and domestic production, 
and between imports from different sources, not only precludes two-way trade within 
a particular sector, but also implies the "law of one price" (Dervis et al., 1982: 219). 
In other words, the domestic price of tradables is determined by world prices, and a 
particular product will have the same price (adjusted for tariffs) whether it is produced 
domestically or imported, and irrespective of the source of the imports. 
4 
In the 1996 simulation, Malawi and Mozambique lose 95.0 and 96.1 per cent of their customs 
revenue respectively. As noted by USAID (1996: 31), this is because, according to Evans' (1996) 
data, most of their imports come from other SADC countries, which would not be subject to any duty 
after the formation of the FTA. Interestingly, however, the USAID study does not question the import 
figures for Malawi and Mozambique, despite the fact that their own trade matrix (USAID, 1996: 66) 
provides a very different picture of Malawi and Mozambique's imports from SADC relative to their 
imports from the ROW, as do other sources. 
Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with high initial shares of imports from SADC in total imports, lose 
23.9,28.7 and 32.2 per cent of their customs revenue respectively (Evans, 1997a: 11). Despite a 
similarly high share of imports from SADC in total imports, Mozambique only loses 5.8 per cent of 
its customs revenue. This may be due to the offsetting effect of the reported increase in imports 
from the ROW for this country. The question of the direction of change in ROW imports when the 
FT A is formed will be considered further in the next and subsequent sections of this chapter. 
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In these circumstances, as shown in Chapter 4, complete displacement of ROW imports 
by the partner is a necessary condition for a fall in price, and hence for an increase in 
consumer surplus to offset the loss of customs revenue. However, when domestic and 
imported goods, and foreign goods from different sources, are not perfectly 
substitutable, as in the Armington (1969) formulation adopted by Evans (1996, 
1997a,b), then two-way trade within a given sector is possible, and goods from these 
various sources of supply may have different prices (Dervis et al., 1982: 221). 
Therefore, in contrast to the analysis in Chapter 4, complete displacement of ROW 
imports by the partner country is not a necessary condition for a trade creation gain. 
It may be argued, then, that since the price of imports from the SADC source falls when 
a FT A is formed, there will be an increase in consumer surplus to offset the loss in 
customs revenue on initial imports from the partner, even if imports from the ROW are 
not entirely displaced. Indeed, if the supply of imports from the rest of SADC is 
perfectly elastic (as the excess capacity assumption seems to imply), then it appears 
that the loss of customs revenue on initial imports from SADC will be completely offset 
by the increase in consumer surplus when the price of imports from SADC falls. There 
will in fact probably be a net gain in consumer surplus due to the additional consumption 
of the SADC import at the lower price. Although the price of imports from the ROW 
remains the same in the FTA case, it seems that the loss of customs revenue on any 
imports from the ROW displaced by the partner will also at least be partially offset by 
a consumer surplus gain, since the SADC substitute is obtained at a lower price. 5 
In an assessment of the welfare implications of the FTA, thUS, it must be borne in mind 
that the loss of customs revenue predicted by the RTMSA will not all be a deadweight 
loss. Only that part of initial customs revenue which is not offset by an increase in 
consumer surplus may be considered a loss, and even then this loss would have to be 
weighed against any net increase in consumer surplus as a result of trade creation. 6 
Further, according to Page (1997: 7), any welfare appraisal should occur in terms of an 
unchanged fiscal revenue assumption, since tariff revenue may be replaced by value-
The degree to which any loss of customs revenue on imports from the ROW is offset by an increase 
in consumer surplus will presumably depend on the strength of the substitution effect, bearing in mind 
that imports from the two sources are not perfect substitutes. 
The interpretation of the results of the RTMSA with respect to trade creation and trade diversion will 
be considered further in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
added or sales taxes, or by income tax: 
"Offsetting consumer gains and tax losses is uncertain and conceptually wrong as the 
logical assumption is that the government's revenue target is not changed by entering a 
trade agreement. There will still be a consumer gain (if there is any home production of 
the traded good) because the tax will have a wider base, and therefore a lower rate". 
7 .2.2 The effect on the balance of payments 
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It was shown in Section 6.2.4.4 that there are opposing influences on the direction of 
change of imports from the ROW when intra-SADC tariffs are removed. Despite this, 
given the elasticity assumptions of the RTMSA, the formation of a SADC FT A should 
result in a fall in imports from the ROW (MRi). There will also be an increase in intra-
SADC imports (MSi ) matched by an equal proportionate increase in intra-SADC exports 
(see Section 6.2.4.5 and Section 6.4). In the "worst-case" scenario, there is no change 
in market access to the ROW when a FTA is formed, and hence no change in exports 
to the ROW. Since SADC imports from the ROW should fall, given the model's 
elasticity assumptions, the balance of payments (BOP) position of SADC as a whole vis-
a-vis the ROW should necessarily improve. 
As noted in Chapter 6, in the 1996 simulation, the BOP position of SADC as a whole 
reportedly improves, as expected, by US$1 02.5 million on formation of the FTA (Evans, 
1996: 9). However, in the 1997 simulation there is a slight worsening of the overall 
SADC BOP of US$7.6 million (Evans, 1997a: 11), which implies a (small) net increase 
in imports from the ROW. It is difficult to understand this result, since, as the 
discussion in Section 6.2.4.4 shows, given the magnitudes of the elasticities assumed 
for the RTMSA, the substitution effect of MSi for MRi should outweigh any tendency for 
MRi to increase in response to the increased demand for aggregate imports Mi or the 
composite good Di. 
According to Evans (1997a: 13), the RTMSA shows no decline in imports from the 
ROW mainly because there is no exchange rate adjustment. However, it would seem 
that any exchange rate adjustment would be a "second round" effectin response to the 
emergence of a surplus or deficit as a result of the FT A. The FT A itself should result 
in an overall reduction in imports from the ROW, and hence an improvement in the 
193 
overall SADC BOP position vis-a-vis the ROW. If the elasticity of substitution between 
imports from the two sources was lower in some sectors, then, as noted in Chapter 6, 
the substitution of MSi for MRi could be weaker than the increase in MRi due to higher 
demand for aggregate imports Mi or the composite good Di• Imports from both sources 
could therefore increase when the FTA is formed. In this case, if there was a net 
increase in ROW imports for the bloc as a whole, the BOP position of SADC with 
respect to the ROW would deteriorate. 
It was noted in Section 6.5 that the impact of a FTA on the BOP of an individual SADC 
country will depend on the absolute increase in composite imports (made up of the 
absolute rise in MSi less any absolute fall in M Ri) versus the absolute increase in exports 
to SADC for that country. In assessing their likely relative magnitudes, the height of the 
tariffs which are removed is clearly important, in the first instance. Stern (1979: 39) 
argues that it may be expected that relatively high-tariff countries would experience a 
greater stimulus to their imports than their exports when tariffs are removed, and hence 
to experience a worsening of their trade balances. 7 However, as Stern (1979: 41) 
notes, the size of tariff changes is not the only determinant of changes in the balance 
of trade. Other significant factors include the relative importance of trade in the various 
economies, as well as the initial balance of trade. In the context of regional 
liberalisation, as opposed to the framework of multilateral liberalisation explored by 
Stern (1979), a country's initial balance of trade with the rest of the bloc specifically 
becomes important. 
Stern (1979: 42) finds a significant positive correlation, in most cases, between the sign 
of the initial trade balance and the simulated changes in trade balances across countries 
for each industry and across industries for each country. In other words, an initial trade 
deficit is generally worsened by the removal of tariffs and vice versa. As Table 2.5 
illustrates, all SADC members except SACU have a deficit in their trade with the region, 
due to the importance of imports from SACU in total intra-SADC imports. Accordingly, 
the increase in imports from the rest of SADC for an individual country when the FT A 
is formed will, except in the case of SACU, take place off a higher base than any 
increase in exports to the rest of SADC. It is, however, not the increase in imports from 
SADC per se which is important here, but rather, as noted earlier, the increase in 
If exchange rate adjustment is allowed, this would be reflected in a depreciation of their currencies. 
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composite imports {that is, the net effect of the change in imports from both SADC and 
the ROW).s 
From the discussion in Section 6.2.4.2, it is apparent that the relative increase in 
composite imports in different countries when the FT A is formed depends on the height 
of initial tariffs and the share of imports from SADC in total imports, 8MSi (which 
together determine the magnitude of the fall in the composite import price PMi), as well 
as the share of imports in total domestic use (8Mi). 9 While some elasticities differ 
between sectors, all are assumed to be the same across countries. 
Countries with high initial tariffs and a large share of imports from SADC in total imports 
can be expected to experience the largest increase in composite imports, since, as noted 
in Section 6.2.2.2, this implies the greatest reduction in composite import prices. The 
percentage changes in composite imports in each country are not shown separately in 
Evans (1996, 1997a), but can be calculated from the initial import data and the 
percentage changes in imports from the two sources which are reported. The largest 
overall percentage increases in composite imports occur in Malawi, Mozambique, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, the countries with the highest shares of imports from SADC in 
total imports and the highest average tariffs. 10 
While, according to Evans (1997a: 11), Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia each 
experience overall export expansion to the rest of SADC of over 17 per cent {and as 
much 44.8 per cent in the case of Malawi}, these increases take place off too Iowan 
export base to prevent the BOP position of these countries from deteriorating when the 
10 
As will be seen below, a large proportionate increase in imports from the SADC source translates into 
only a small proportionate increase in composite imports if the share of imports from SADC in total 
imports is low, as in the case of SACU. 
According to the data in Evans (1997a: 11), the share of imports in total domestic use (8Mi) at the 
country level is comparatively low (less than 15 per cent in most cases, and exceeding 21 per cent 
only in Mauritius). However, it is not particularly useful to generalise about the effect of high versus 
low import shares on the increase in composite imports at the country level, since the effect differs 
across sectors depending on whether imports are substitutes or complements to domestic production. 
Despite the caveat in the previous footnote, it is interesting to note that these are also the countries 
with the lowest shares of composite imports in domestic supply at the country level. As noted in 
Section 6.2.4.2, the increase in composite imports due to the substitution of imports for domestic 
production is greater, for a given substitution elasticity, when the import share 8Mi is low. 
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FTA is formed, especially in the case of Mozambique and Zambia. 11 
In accordance with the observation of Stern (1979: 42) in a multilateral setting, the BOP 
position of countries with an initial deficit in their SADC trade generally worsens 
following the removal of intra-SADC tariffs, while that of SACU, with an initial surplus, 
improves. The exceptions are Mauritius and Tanzania. In the case of Tanzania, an 
extremely small share of imports from SADC in total imports coupled with the lowest 
average tariff in the region translates into a negligible percentage increase in composite 
imports. With relatively low export expansion to SADC off a small base, there is no 
discernable change in Tanzania's small initial deficit in its regional trade. Mauritius is 
the only country in which an initial trade deficit improves on formation of the FT A. 12 
A discussion of the BOP implications of the FT A for individual SADC countries raises the 
question of the use of initial market shares to calculate the impact of the removal of 
tariffs on a country's exports to the rest of SADC, noted in Section 6.4. This method 
appears to be rather arbitrary, since factors such as the height of the tariffs removed 
in particular export markets in different countries and the elasticities of export demand 
are likely to be important. Further, if the export effects of the FTA are determined on 
the basis of constant market shares, it is unclear why Zimbabwe experiences one of the 
lowest overall percentage increases in exports to SADC when it is initially the second 
largest regional exporter .13 
11 
12 
13 
In Zimbabwe, there is a 1 2 per cent increase in exports to SADC off a comparatively high base 
(Zimbabwe is the second largest regional exporter after SACUl, although this is also insufficient to 
offset the increase in composite imports when the FTA is formed, and Zimbabwe's balance of 
payments position also worsens (by US$3.0 million). While Angola experiences a very small 
percentage increase in composite imports, it experiences a low percentage increase in exports to 
SADC off an extremely small base (US$2.0 million)' and therefore also suffers a worsening of its BOP 
position. 
In the case of Mauritius, a relatively low share of imports from SADC in total imports (despite a 
comparatively high average tariff compared to SACU and Tanzania) translates into a small increase 
in composite imports. Export expansion of 30.8 per cent off the third largest regional export base 
(US$41 million) allows the country's BOP position to improve by US$4.5 million. A far greater trade 
balance improvement occurs for SACU. As noted above, the high percentage increase in imports 
from SADC (42.5 per cent) translates into a less than one per cent rise in composite imports, due to 
the small share of imports from SADC in SACU's total imports and SACU's comparatively low 
average tariff. The absolute increase in composite imports is more than outweighed by the 19.9 per 
cent increase in exports to SADC off a large base, so that SACU's BOP position improves by US$24.6 
million. 
The question of treatment of exports in the RTMSA will be considered further in Section 7.4 below, 
when implications of the assumption of excess capacity are examined. 
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The discussion in this sub-section highlights the limitations of using a partial equilibrium 
approach to assess the macroeconomic implications of the FT A. According to Robson 
(1987: 20), the use of partial equilibrium analysis requires that a sector must be small 
enough so that changes affecting it would not impact elsewhere in the economy. He 
argues that it would be inappropriate to try to determine the consequences for the 
economy as a whole of the formation of a FT A by simply aggregating the outcomes for 
each sector that have been determined on the basis of partial equilibrium 
assumptions. 14 In the light of this, it is perhaps more useful to consider the predicted 
effects of the FT A at the sectoral level. 
7.2.3 The effect on domestic industry 
It was noted at the beginning of Chapter 6 that Evans (1996: 12) finds the incidence 
of adverse sectoral effects on the formation of a SADC FTA to be small.15 An 
"adverse sectoral effect" is defined as a decrease in import-competing production of 
more than two per cent. By this criterion, Malawi and Zimbabwe each have five sectors 
which are adversely affected and Mozambique three. Table 7.1 shows the sectors 
affected in this manner, labelled 1. 
In considering the impact of a SADC FTA on domestic industry, the definition of an 
adversely affected sector as one which experiences a fall in import-competing 
production exceeding two per cent does not, on its own, seem satisfactory. The impact 
on gross output in a given sector will be the net effect of the change in import-
competing production and exports resulting from the FT A. The net impact on domestic 
industry will in turn determine the effect of the FT A on domestic employment. It is 
therefore not particularly useful to consider the impact of the FT A on import-competing 
production and exports to SADC separately, as Evans (1996: 10-13) does. 
14 
15 
There is a significant branch of the theoretical literature which adopts a general equilibrium approach 
to the analysis of customs unions. See, for example, Vanek (1965), Berglas (1979), Collier (1979), 
and Lloyd (1982). 
Since detailed sectoral results for each country are only available in Evans (1996), the 1996 
simulation will form the basis of the discussion in this sub-section. Although, as noted earlier, the 
data problems in this version were severe, the focus of the discussion is rather on the inferences 
drawn from the results regarding the effect of the FT A on domestic industry. 
Table 7.1: 
EJ 
Malawi 
leather' 
Footwear' 
Furniture' 
Plastics' 
Metals' 
Agriculture2 
Food2 
Beverages2 
Tobacco2 
Textiles2 
Paper3 
Rubber3 
Machinery3 
Elec mach3 
Transport3 
Mozambique 
Agriculture' 
Plastics' 
Metals' 
Food 2 
Beverages2 
Textiles2 
Clothing2 
Oth NMMp2 
Ind chems3 
Iron&steel3 
Machinery3 
Elec mach3 
Transport3 
Oth manuf3 
South Africa 
Tobacco' 
Agriculture2 
Textiles2 
Clothing2 
Leather2 
Zambia 
Food2 
Beverages2 
Textiles2 
Clothing2 
Furniture2 
Plastics2 
Metals2 
(Continues) 
197 
Impact of the formation of a FT A on domestic industry and employment in 
SADC countries ("worst-case" scenario) 
SMIO %dSMI dSMI Es,o %dEs, dES! llo %dl, dl, 
US$mn US$mn US$mn US$mn '000' '000 
2.4 -7.2 -0.173 0.0 23.5 0.000 0.3 -7.2 -0.022 
22.2 -2.7 -0.599 0.9 3.0 0.027 0.7 -2.5 -0.018 
12.1 -2.7 -0.327 0.0 8.1 0.000 0.9 -2.6 -0.023 
40.0 -3.5 -1.400 0.0 18.5 0.000 0.9 -3.5 -0.032 
89.9 -4.0 -3.596 1.7 14.0 0.238 3.1 -3.6 -0.112 
2125.2 -0.1 -2.125 41.7 9.4 3.920 695.9 0.1 0.696 
808.2 -0.4 -3.233 0.0 10.5 0.000 69.8 -0.4 -0.279 
138.7 -0.5 -0.694 25.4 14.6 3.708 5.4 1.8 0.097 
138.9 0.0 0.000 14.6 21.3 3.110 14.3 2.0 0.286 
207.8 -1.6 -3.325 0.9 34.4 0.310 17.3 -1.5 -0.260 
31.7 1.8 0.571 0.0 16.0 0.000 0.7 1.8 0.013 
21.2 2.8 0.594 0.0 13.8 0.000 0.4 2.8 0.011 
59.7 4.8 2.866 1.9 13.2 0.251 1.0 5.3 0.053 
39.9 4.7 1.875 0.1 13.4 0.Q13 0.2 4.7 0.009 
93.5 6.1 5.704 0.1 12.3 0.012 1.1 6.1 0.067 
52.6 -6.8 -3.577 83.0 9.4 7.802 2.3 2.8 0.064 
3.7 -15.8 -0.585 0.0 18.2 0.000 0.1 -15.7 -0.016 
84.0 -2.6 -2.184 1.1 14.0 0.154 1.6 -2.3 -0.037 
4659.0 -0.4 -18.636 0.0 11.0 0.000 46.5 -0.4 -0.186 
144.5 -1.9 -2.746 0.8 14.6 0.117 2.3 -1.8 -0.041 
836.2 -0.8 -6.690 1.7 24.0 0.408 14.4 -0.7 -0.099 
278.6 -0.7 -1.950 0.1 12.2 0.012 5.1 -0.7 -0.036 
72.5 -1.1 -0.798 20.9 14.9 3.114 1.7 2.2 0.037 
99.9 1.4 1.399 0.2 12.7 0.025 2.7 1.4 0.038 
4.1 2.9 0.119 0.0 0.0 0.000 0.1 2.9 0.003 
65.2 2.2 1.434 0.3 13.2 0.040 1.3 2.2 0.029 
114.1 1.8 2.054 3.2 13.6 0.435 2.3 2.1 0.048 
6.3 5.2 0.328 3.0 12.7 0.381 0.1 4.7 0.005 
13.9 3.9 0.542 0.0 0.0 0.000 0.3 3.9 0.012 
402.3 -3.6 -14.483 2.3 15.6 0.359 5.4 -3.3 -0.178 
7796.2 -0.1 -7.796 23.4 11.2 2.621 613.8 -0.1 -0.614 
1107.2 -1.3 -14.394 35.0 20.4 7.140 97.7 -0.5 -0.489 
1173.2 -0.1 -1.173 4.9 14.3 0.701 124.3 -0.1 -0.124 
144.1 -1.7 -2.450 1.1 18.1 0.199 11.5 -0.9 -0.104 
1261.4 -0.2 -2.523 0.0 10.2 0.000 15.6 -0.2 -0.031 
1799.3 -0.1 -1.799 7.2 14.3 1.030 3.5 0.0 0.000 
438.4 -0.2 -0.877 0.1 24.4 0.024 5.4 -0.2 -0.011 
269.2 -0.2 -0.538 0.0 10.9 0.000 7.8 -0.2 -0.016 
136.7 -0.4 -0.547 0.0 6.2 0.000 1.6 -0.4 -0.006 
91.9 -0.7 -0.643 0.0 18.6 0.000 0.5 -0.7 -0.004 
558.3 -0.3 -1.675 0.1 14.0 0.014 4.0 -0.3 -0.012 
Table 7.1 cont: 
Sector SMIO 
US$mn 
Zimbabwe 
Plastics1 145.1 
Pottery1 4.0 
Glass1 15.0 
Oth NMMp1 98.0 
Metals1 224.3 
Agriculture2 1919.6 
Food2 1087.8 
Textiles2 450.8 
Clothing2 163.0 
Leather2 12.6 
Mining3 430.0 
Paper3 84.0 
Ind chem3 101.5 
Oth chem3 245.5 
Rubber3 88.8 
Iron&steel3 726.0 
Non-ferr3 19.1 
Machinery3 40.4 
Elec mach3 119.9 
Transport3 179.3 
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Impact of the formation of a FTA on domestic industry and 
employment in SADC countries ("worst-case" scenario) 
%dSMI dSMI EslO %dEsl dESI L10 %dLI dLI 
US$mn US$mn US$mn '000· '000 
-2.6 -3.773 11.8 7.8 0.920 4.9 -1.8 -0.088 
-2.7 -0.108 3.9 3.7 0.144 0.9 0.5 0.005 
-7.7 -1.155 2.1 7.7 0.162 1.0 -4.2 -0.042 
-4.4 -4.312 4.9 6.0 0.294 7.8 -3.8 -0.296 
-2.6 -5.832 88.9 6.7 5.956 15.3 0.0 0.000 
-0.2 -3.839 59.1 7.9 4.669 15.9 0.0 0.000 
-0.5 -5.439 3.2 8.4 0.269 30.3 -0.5 -0.152 
-1.9 -8.565 1.9 23.2 0.441 24.9 -1.8 -0.448 
-0.4 -0.652 0.3 9.6 0.029 18.2 -0.4 -0.073 
-1.8 -0.227 2.1 23.3 0.489 1.1 1.5 0.017 
0.5 2.150 3.5 2.8 0.098 38.0 0.5 0.190 
2.0 1.680 0.6 6.5 0.039 5.0 2.0 0.100 
3.4 3.451 6.2 1.9 0.118 3.3 3.2 0.106 
1.1 2.701 74.7 5.0 3.735 5.8 1.9 0.110 
1.1 0.977 43.0 7.6 3.268 3.6 3.2 0.115 
0.7 5.082 1.3 4.2 0.055 16.1 0.7 0.113 
5.3 1.012 1.0 4.5 0.045 1.4 3.1 0.043 
2.2 0.889 19.4 6.1 1.183 2.6 3.3 0.086 
1.0 1.199 0.0 7.2 0.000 6.1 1.0 0.061 
1.0 1.793 7.6 6.5 0.494 7.8 1.2 0.094 
Source: Evans (1996: 38-44) for initial levels and percentage changes; own computations from Evans (1996: 
38-44) for absolute changes. 
Notes: SMiO is initial import-competing production, EsiO initial exports to SADC, and LiO initial employment; 
oth NMMP are other non-metallic mineral products. 
Mauritius is excluded, as there are no data available for import-competing production in this country 
in Evans (1996). Angola and Tanzania appear to experience no significant sectoral effects according 
to the 1996 results, and have therefore also been excluded from the table. 
a There appears to have been a printing error in the initial sectoral employment levels reported by 
Evans (1996: 41) for South Africa which, from beverages downwards, are identical to those reported 
for Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe figures (and those for the other countries) correspond to the sectoral 
employment data in IDC (1995b). The employment data for South Africa in Evans (1996: 41) has 
therefore been replaced in the table above by the data for South Africa in IDC (1995b) to calculate 
the absolute changes in employment. It appears that the percentage changes in employment reported 
for South Africa were calculated using the correct data set. 
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In order to determine which sectors will be most adversely affected by the FTA, it is 
necessary to look at comparative absolute changes in import-competing supply and 
exports in sectors where import-competing production falls, to ascertain the net impact 
on gross output. A sector in which the percentage increase in exports to SADC 
exceeds the percentage fall in import-competing production could obviously still be 
adversely affected if the export expansion takes place from a relatively small initial base. 
For this reason, Table 7.1 includes sectors (marked 2) in which, although import-
competing production falls by less than two per cent, the initial size of production is 
such that there is a relatively large absolute reduction. Depending on what happens to 
exports, such sectors may experience more significant adverse effects on output and 
employment than sectors in which import-competing production falls by more than two 
per cent, but off a lower base. For example, in Malawi's textiles sector, import-
competing production falls by 1.6 per cent, so that the sector is not considered to be 
"adversely affected" by the formation of the FTA. However, while exports to SADC 
expand by 34.4 per cent, the resulting absolute increase in exports to SADC is not large 
enough to offset the absolute reduction in import-competing production. Gross output 
therefore contracts, as does employment. Indeed, the decline in the actual level of 
employment in this sector exceeds that in any of the sectors in Malawi identified by 
Evans (1996) as adversely affected. 
A favourable sectoral effect on the export side is defined by Evans (1996: 11-12) as a 
greater than five per cent increase in exports to SADC on formation of the FT A. On its 
own, this is once again not an adequate criterion, as the study acknowledges, since 
"strong export growth on a low initial amount" translates into a "small absolute benefit" 
(Evans, 1996: 12). In order to determine which sectors are likely to be most favourably 
affected by the FT A, it is once again necessary to consider the net impact on gross 
output (that is, both import-competing production and exports) particularly since, in 
sectors in which imports and domestic production are complementary, the positive 
effect on gross output of export expansion to the rest of SADC may be reinforced by 
an increase in import-competing production (see Section 6.2.4.3). Some of the sectors 
experiencing an increase in both import-competing production and exports to SADC 
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when the FTA is formed (marked 3) are included in Table 7.1.16 
The table shows the initial levels of import-competing production, exports and 
employment in the chosen sectors, as well as the absolute changes in these variables 
brought about by the formation of the FTA, in an attempt to clarify the impact of the 
FTA on domestic industry.17 
It is apparent from the table that defining an adversely affected sector as one which 
experiences a greater than two per cent fall in import-competing production is 
inadequate. For example, in the case of agriculture in Mozambique, although import-
competing production falls by 6.8 per cent, the sector experiences a net expansion in 
output and employment once the effect on exports is taken into account. More 
importantly, it can be seen that the incidence of adverse sectoral effects, in the sense 
of a contraction in output and employment, is rather more widespread than just the 
thirteen sectors across three countries identified in the study. In particular, once the net 
effect on import-competing production and exports is taken into account, there are a 
number of sectors in each of the countries included in the table which experience a 
significantly larger contraction in output and employment than the adversely affected 
sectors identified in the study. In South Africa, for example, according to the criterion 
used by Evans (1 996)' there are no identified problem sectors on the import side. 18 
However, the absolute contraction in employment in agriculture and textiles (both of 
which experience a less than two per cent reduction in import-competing production) 
16 
17 
18 
The sectors included are generally those experiencing a greater than one percent expansion in import-
competing production when the FT A is formed, although two sectors in Zimbabwe in which import-
competing production increases by less than one per cent (mining and iron and steel) have also been 
included, since the increases occur on a comparatively large initial base. 
While Evans (1996: 37-44) reports the initial values of the variables in each sector for each country, 
and the percentage changes induced by the removal of intra-SA DC tariffs, he does not report absolute 
changes. As noted in Section 6.6, the percentage change in gross output when the FTA is formed 
will equal the percentage change in employment in a given sector, since it is assumed that the output 
per worker ratio remains constant. The absolute changes in output and employment will clearly differ, 
however. The latter are shown in the last column of Table 7.1, while the former can be calculated 
as the sum of the absolute changes in import-competing production and exports shown in the third 
and sixth columns of Table 7.1 respectively. Note that for sectors in which there are no initial 
exports to SADC, the percentage change in import-competing production will equal the percentage 
change in employment. 
Although there was a 3.6 per cent reduction in import-competing production in the tobacco sector 
in South Africa, tobacco was excluded from the table showing the sectoral effects of the FTA (Evans, 
1996:11). 
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exceeds the reduction in employment in any other sector in any country included in 
Table 7.1. 
It appears, therefore, that the incidence of adverse sectoral effects on formation of a 
SADC FT A may be more widespread than the study suggests. For the countries 
included in Table 7.1 , such effects are concentrated in sensitive sectors such as textiles 
and clothing, as well as in food and agriculture, all of which are sectors with relatively 
significant shares of both import-competing production and employment in most 
countries. 
In the orthodox analysis of the costs and benefits of regional trade integration, 
considered in Section 4.2, a reduction in import-competing supply reflects the 
production effect of trade creation, and is thus considered to be welfare-improving. 
However, as noted in Section 5.5, while adjustment costs are ignored in the 
comparative static analysis of customs unions, they should be included in any complete 
welfare appraisal of the effects of integration. As Behar (1995: 18) notes, prospective 
partners in a regional union of developing countries are likely to be concerned "by the 
costs of managing th[e] adjustment more than by some hypothetical change in national 
income". Further, as the Cooper-Masse II analysis in Section 4.3.3 illustrates, the 
contraction of domestic industry accompanying trade creation may not be considered 
to be welfare-improving, particularly for a developing country wishing to pursue 
industrialisation. 
Sectors which are favourably affected by the formation of a SADC FT A, in the sense 
that output and employment expand, are those in which either the expansion of exports 
to SADC (in absolute terms) outweighs a reduction in import-competing supply, or those 
in which export expansion is accompanied by an increase in import-competing 
production when the FTA is formed. 19 For sectors in the first category, the overall 
impact illustrates the importance of taking into account the effect of the reduction in 
partner country tariffs in an appraisal of the costs and benefits of integration. As noted 
in Chapters 4 and 5, the benefit to the home country of export expansion when partner 
tariffs are eliminated is often neglected in the traditional analysis. 
19 It was noted in Section 6.6 that for sectors in which imports are assumed to be complementary to 
domestic production the effect of the formation of the FT A on output and employment will be 
unambiguously positive. 
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Table 7.1 illustrates the point raised earlier that a greater than five per cent expansion 
in exports to SADC on formation of a FTA does not translate into a significant benefit 
when this increase occurs off a very small base. This is the case for most sectors in 
the table, with the exception of agriculture. As the complete results of Evans (1996: 
37-44) show, South Africa is the major beneficiary of export expansion within the 
region followed (though not closely) by Zimbabwe. 20 
Finally, the industries in which both import-competing production and exports expand 
on formation of a FT A are intermediate and capital good sectors where imports and 
domestic production are assumed to be complementary. There are some significant 
increases in output in these sectors, as Table 7.1 shows, particularly for Zimbabwe (in 
sectors such as iron and steel and chemical products)' although the output expansion 
generally translates into relatively small absolute increases in employment because the 
initial level of employment in most of them is comparatively low. 21 
It seems that sectors in which imports from the partner increase and imports from the 
ROW fall, but import-competing production increases, may still be categorised using the 
conventional trade creation-trade diversion terminology. The fall in imports from the 
ROW reflects trade diversion, as usual. On the other side, although import-competing 
production does not contract overall, it seems that there will still be trade creation via 
the production effect, since there is still a substitution of imports for domestic 
production (see Expression 15 in Section 6.2.4.3). The substitution effect is rather 
weak, however, and is outweighed by the tendency for import-competing production 
20 
21 
As noted earlier, if a country's increase in exports in a particular sector on formation of the FTA is 
simply determined on the basis of initial market share, it is difficult to understand the low percentage 
increases in exports to SADC in some sectors in Zimbabwe. In Evans (1996: 41,44), for example, 
Zimbabwe's initial exports of fabricated metal products to the rest of SADC are reportedly more than 
double those of SACU, yet the percentage increase in Zimbabwe's exports to the rest of SADC in this 
sector when the FTA is formed is less than half of that of SACU. 
Expansion in import-competing production in these sectors is fairly widespread in Zimbabwe, but 
almost entirely insignificant in SACU. The results for SACU probably reflect the low share of imports 
from SADC in total imports in these sectors, which translates into a small reduction in the composite 
import price, a comparatively small increase in composite imports, and hence an insignificant 
expansion in import-competing production in sectors where imports and domestic production are 
complementary. In Zimbabwe, by contrast, the share of imports from SADC in total imports is 
reported to be comparatively large in many of these sectors {due, presumably, to the importance of 
imports from South Africa}. 
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to increase in response to the higher demand for the composite good. 22 The elasticity 
assumptions of the RTMSA which produce this outcome will be considered further in 
Section 7.4 below. 
7.3 Tariff levels 
As the discussion in Chapter 6 shows, it is of critical importance that the appropriate 
tariff levels are used in the RTMSA in order to assess the implications of the formation 
of a FT A, particularly in view of the time period of at least eight years that will lapse 
between the ratification of the SADC Trade Protocol and the eventual elimination of 
import duties. 
The tariff levels used for the 1996 simulation were based primarily on the sectoral 
tariffs reported in IDC (1995b) for the early 1990s, adjusted (halved) in most cases to 
take account of the difference between the tariff levels recorded in the books and the 
actual tariffs paid, or "water in the tariff" (Evans, 1996: 7). The accuracy of some of 
this tariff data is questionable, however, even for SACU.23 As noted in Chapter 6, the 
tariffs used in the 1997 simulation of the effects of the FTA are based on the 
assumption that the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) undertaken by all SADC 
countries except Angola have reduced tariff levels to a rough equivalence with 1996 
SACU tariffs, except where tariffs are lower than those of SACU.24 While it is clearly 
important to use tariff levels which take account of the generalised liberalisation 
undertaken in most SADC countries since the years to which the IDC (1995b) data 
refers, any results obtained in the absence of reliable recent tariff data from specific 
country sources should be treated with caution. 
The tariff levels employed in the 1997 simulation apparently differ in another important 
respect from those used in Evans (1 996). As a more recent technical appendix to the 
22 
23 
24 
While both import-competing production and composite imports increase in these sectors, the ratio 
of domestic production to imports always falls in the RTMSA (see Section 6.2.2.1). 
Alternative sources of sectoral tariff data for SACU include Holden (1996: 42) and GATT (1993: 
181). 
In Evans (1997a), the effects of the SAPs themselves were simulated using the original tariff data 
from IDC (1995b). 
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model (Evans, 1997b) illustrates, an Armington function is used to aggregate imports 
from other SADC countries of a given commodity into a particular SADC home country. 
This allows the model to take account of any differences in tariff levels applied by the 
home country to imports from other SADC countries before the FT A is formed, and 
hence to recognise existing tariff concessions between SADC members in terms of the 
bilateral trade agreements outlined in Chapter 1 and CBI or COMESA tariff preferences. 
This is an important consideration, since, as the discussion in Chapter 1 shows, the 
tariff levels which are actually applied between countries already involved in preference 
schemes in the region may differ quite markedly from those which apply more generally. 
Although the 1997 simulation attempts to account for the generalised liberalisation 
undertaken as part of the SAPs, up to 1996, the tariffs which will apply more generally 
when intra-SADC import duties are finally eliminated at least eight years after the 
signing of the August 1996 Trade Protocol will differ considerably (particularly in the 
case of South Africa) from those which applied in 1996, given commitments made in 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. It is therefore the tariffs that are going to 
apply at the end of the Uruguay Round implementation period which are important. To 
the extent that these tariffs are lower than those used in the model, the effects of the 
FT A will be different. 25 
Grossman (1982: 271-272) notes that the question of whether generalised tariff 
reductions will erode the benefits of any particular preference scheme depends critically 
on the degree of substitutability between imports from partner and non-partner sources 
versus the degree of substitutability between imports and domestic production. 
Considered from the point of view of a particular SADC exporting country such as 
Zimbabwe, for example, if the substitutability between imports from Zimbabwe and 
imports from the ROW into other SADC countries is lower than the substitutability 
between imports and domestic production in these countries, then trade creation (the 
replacement of home production by imports from Zimbabwe) is likely to be a more 
important source of export expansion for Zimbabwe when a FT A is formed than trade 
25 Evans (1997a: 23-27) introduces the impact of the Uruguay Round into the RTMSA only by 
simulating the effect on SADC countries of a 6 per cent increase in agricultural prices, predicted by 
the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAD). On its own, this clearly does not adequately capture 
the general implications of the Uruguay Round for a SADC FTA. Indeed, projections of an overall 
increase in agricultural prices of this magnitude as a result of the Uruguay Round have themselves 
been called into question (see Bell, 1996: 88-91). 
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diversion (the replacement of imports from the ROW into these countries by imports 
from Zimbabwe). The relative magnitudes of the substitution elasticities, in this case, 
imply that the preference recipient (Zimbabwe) will face greater competition from home-
produced goods in other SADC countries than from ROW imports. Grossman (1982: 
277) argues that, with this pattern of import competition, concern on the part of 
preference recipients about the erosion of tariff preferences as a result of generalised 
liberalisation would be largely unwarranted. 
In the RTMSA, the elasticity of substitution between imports from SADC and imports 
from the ROW (aMi) and the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic 
production (aDi ) are assumed to be equal in consumer good sectors. However, in 
intermediate and capital good sectors, imports from the two sources are assumed to be 
more substitutable than imports and domestic production. 26 
It may thus be argued that, in terms of Grossman's (1982) analysis, the effects of a 
SADC FT A in intermediate and capital good sectors will be felt more through trade 
diversion than through trade creation, given the comparatively high value assumed in 
the RTMSA for aMi relative to a Di in these sectors. 27 
In consumer good sectors, on the other hand, the assumption of equal elasticities of 
substitution between imports from the two sources and between imports and domestic 
goods produces the result that the proportionate reduction in imports from the ROW 
equals the proportionate reduction in import-competing supply when the FT A is formed 
(see Section 6.2.4.4). Since the initial levels of import-competing production in these 
sectors tend to be much greater than imports from the ROW, the assumption of equal 
substitution elasticities will generally guarantee trade creation well in excess of trade 
diversion. 28 
26 
27 
28 
Recall that, in the first case, a oi = aMi = 2.5, while in the second case a oi is assumed to be 0.5, but 
aMi remains 2.5. 
The question of whether the relative magnitudes of the substitution elasticities assumed in the 
RTMSA are appropriate in the SADC context is considered further in Section 7.4 below. 
This characteristic of the RTMSA is also a feature of the prominent study by Baldwin and Murray 
(1977), which examines the implications of most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff reductions on 
developing country trade benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The Baldwin-
Murray model has frequently been criticised for underestimating trade diversion as a result of the 
assumption of equal substitutability between imports from preferred and non-preferred sources and 
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Following Grossman's (1982) analysis, thus, it may be argued that in consumer good 
sectors, in which regional export expansion is likely to take place through trade creation 
(given the assumptions of the RTMSA), the erosion of tariff preferences as a result of 
Uruguay Round tariff reductions need not be a cause for concern among regional 
exporters. On the other hand, in intermediate and capital good sectors, where export 
expansion is more likely to be seen through trade diversion in the light of the model's 
assumptions, MFN tariff reductions will stimulate import competition from the ROW for 
regional exporters in SADC markets. 29 
On a more general level, to the extent that intra-SADC tariffs are lower than the tariffs 
used in the RTMSA simulations to date, when a FTA is finally formed, the increase in 
intra-SADC imports will be reduced, whether this increase takes place through trade 
creation or trade diversion. The expansion of intra-SADC exports will thus be 
correspondingly lower, so that individual members' exports to SADC receive a smaller 
stimulus. Improved market access to the ROW, as a result of Uruguay Round tariff 
reductions elsewhere, may stimulate export expansion to overseas markets, as in the 
Evans (1996, 1997a) "growth" scenario. However, as noted in Chapter 6, this aspect 
is largely distinct from the effects of the formation of the FT A as such, and will depend 
on factors such as export demand in the ROWand the substitutability between exports 
from SADC countries and competing exports from other countries, which would also 
face lower trade barriers. 
The implications of Uruguay Round tariff reductions for a SADC integration scheme will 
also depend on whether a full-blown FTA, in which tariffs are completely eliminated, or 
a preferential trade area (PTA), in which they are simply reduced, ultimately emerges 
29 
between imports and domestic production in the preference-donor country (Pomfret, 1988: 138-139; 
Sawyer and Sprinkle, 1989: 62). 
This discussion also suggests that the pain of adjustment to a SADC FT A in consumer good sectors 
will be felt more acutely in home good industries in SADC member countries than in export industries 
in the ROW (Grossman, 1982: 272). As noted in Chapter 5, however, the costs of this adjustment 
may be eased if there is scope for intra-industry specialisation in these sectors. The question of 
whether it is preferable for export expansion within the bloc to take place through trade creation 
rather than trade diversion depends on some of the considerations raised in Chapters 4 and 5, and 
will be examined further in Section 7.6 below. 
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in the region. 3o In the case of a PTA, generalised liberalisation will raise the partner 
country's relative margin of preference for as long as the absolute margin of preference 
can be maintained (that is, until the tariff on imports from the partner falls to zero). The 
partner country's relative preference increases because the duty payable on imports 
from the partner within the PTA becomes a smaller proportion of the normal duty. 
Whether the increase in the partner country's relative preference in the region would be 
sufficient to counter the effect of increased competition from exporters outside SADC 
when external tariffs are lowered is an open question, and would require some 
assessment of relative levels of international competitiveness. 31 
Finally, while Evans (1996: 7) notes that the halving of the IDC (1995b) tariff estimates 
in the 1996 RTMSA simulation could be viewed either as a rough attempt to capture 
the water in the tariff phenomenon, or as a lowering of tariffs by only 50 per cent to 
reflect a PTA rather than a full-blown FT A, he does not consider the possibility of an 
asymmetrical preference agreement. Such asymmetry could take two forms: firstly, 
tariffs could be reduced by different proportions in different sectors, and secondly, some 
countries could make larger concessions to the rest of SADC than others. South Africa, 
for example, may be persuaded to allow better access to its markets than it obtains in 
return, either generally, or in particular sectors. The idea of an asymmetrical preferential 
arrangement among SADC countries has frequently been raised in the literature on 
southern African trade integration (see Chapter 3), and a simulation of the effects of 
various possible scenarios could be of considerable use to policy-makers. 
30 
31 
To illustrate this, suppose that the normal rate of duty on a particular product in the home country 
is 30 per cent. In the case of a FTA, with intra-SADC tariffs of zero, the SADC partner country's 
absolute margin of preference of 30 per cent will necessarily fall as the home country's external 
tariffs are lowered (although a relative preference of 100 per cent will remain until external tariffs fall 
to zero). Consider, on the other hand, the case of a PTA in which the normal rate of duty is initially 
30 per cent, but in which the SADC partner country enjoys an absolute margin of preference of 1 5 
per cent. Imports from the partner country are therefore subject to a duty of 1 5 per cent, and the 
partner has a relative preference of 50 per cent (see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1). If the normal duty 
payable on the product is reduced from 30 per cent to 20 per cent, then, given the partner's absolute 
margin of preference of 1 5 per cent in the PTA, the duty payable on imports from the partner will fall 
to 5 per cent, and the partner's relative margin of preference will increase from 50 per cent to 75 per 
cent. 
It is uncertain, for example, whether an increase in the relative preference of Mauritius or Zimbabwe 
in the textiles sector within SADC would enable them to compete with exporters from the Far East 
in the context of more generalised liberalisation. 
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7.4 The assumptions of the RTMSA 
Evans (1996: 3) notes that economic model users often have to assume "reasonable" 
values for important model parameters, such as elasticities, in the absence of suitable 
data which would otherwise allow their formal econometric estimation. Although the 
magnitudes of the elasticities assumed critically affect the results of the simulation, 
there is no real basis given for some of the elasticity assumptions of the RTMSA. The 
purpose of this section, thus, is to consider whether these assumptions are plausible in 
the light of similar empirical studies, and whether they bias the simulation results in any 
systematic way. 
As noted in Chapter 6, by allowing for imperfect substitutability between alternative 
sources of supply, and hence product differentiation by country of origin, the Armington 
formulation adopted by Evans (1996, 1997a) provides a realistic compromise between 
the two extreme assumptions of perfect substitutability and perfect complementarity 
between imports from different sources and between imports and domestically-produced 
goods (Dervis et al., 1982: 221). However, the degree of substitutability would be 
likely to vary between countries, and, perhaps more importantly, across sectors. Evans 
(1996, 1997a) appears to assume the same elasticity of substitution between imports 
from SADC and imports from the ROW (aMi) for all sectors in all SADC countries. 
Although different elasticities of substitution between imports and domestic production 
(aDi) are specified for intermediate and capital goods on the one hand (which are 
assumed to be more complementary) and consumer goods on the other (which are more 
substitutable), the elasticities are the same for all intermediate and capital goods in all 
countries, and for all consumer goods.32 
Corado and de Melo (1986) present a similar, but more general, structural ex ante model 
to analyse the effects of a country joining a customs union, and apply it to Portugal's 
accession to the European Community. Their econometric estimation of the elasticities 
of substitution in each sector allows for a wider range of values for aDi and aMi' and 
therefore a more varied pattern of change in the key economic variables than is possible 
32 The same applies to the price elasticity of composite demand edj • Further, no broad economic 
category classification has been given by Evans (1996, 1997a) to indicate which ISle sectors have 
been grouped into which category, although this may be inferred from the detailed sectoral results 
in the 1 996 study. 
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in the RTMSA. They recognise, as Evans (1996, 1997a) does, that joining a FTA or 
customs union involves both the elimination of home tariffs on imports from partner 
countries and the elimination of tariffs in partner countries facing home exports. 
However, their model relaxes the assumption that domestic goods are in infinitely elastic 
supply (which follows from the assumption of excess capacity in the RTMSA), so that 
adjustments in the domestic price (PSM;) when tariffs change are taken explicitly into 
account. 
The implications of the different assumptions in these two models, as well as those of 
other empirical studies, are considered in the rest of this section. 
7.4.1 Substitutability between imports and domestic production, and the elasticities 
of supply and demand 
It was noted in Chapter 6 that import-competing sectors may be divided into import 
substitutes or import complements depending on the substitutability between domestic 
and foreign goods (Go;) as well as on the sectoral demand elasticity of the composite 
good (Ed;). In the RTMSA, Go; is assumed to be greater than IEdd in consumer good 
sectors, so that import-competing production falls when a FT A is formed, and foreign 
and domestic goods may be seen as substitutes. In intermediate and capital good 
sectors, on the other hand, Go; is less than I Ed; I. Import-competing production therefore 
increases when a FTA is formed, and foreign and domestic goods are complementary. 
These effects do not, however, result in a change in the domestic price PSM;' because 
of the assumption of excess capacity. It may therefore be useful to consider the 
implications of allowing the domestic price to vary for the predicted changes in some 
of the key variables, for any given set of demand and substitution elasticities. 
The direction of change in the domestic price in import-competing sectors when a FT A 
or customs union is formed will depend on the relative magnitudes of Go; and Ed;. In 
Corado and de Melo (1986: 158) and Dervis et al. (1982: 240), for sectors classified 
as import substitutes (in which Go; > I Ed;!), a fall in the import price due to a tariff cut 
leads to a fall in the domestic price PSMi" For sectors classified as import complements 
(where Go; < I Ed; I)' a fall in the import price leads to an increase in the domestic price. 
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This may be explained via the effect of the tariff reduction on import-competing supply. 
As noted in Section 6.2.4.3, the fall in the import price as a result of the removal of 
tariffs will reduce import-competing production in sectors classified as import 
substitutes, because the substitution of imports for domestic production will outweigh 
the increase in domestic production in response to a higher demand for the composite 
good. If domestic supply is less than infinitely elastic, the contraction in import-
competing supply will lower the domestic price PSMi" Similarly, in sectors classified as 
import complements, the demand effect outweighs the substitution effect, so that 
import-competing production expands and the domestic price increases. 
The magnitude of the change in the domestic price depends on a number of factors, 
considered by Dervis et al. (1982: 239). Firstly, the higher the elasticity of supply, the 
smaller the change in the domestic price required to restore equilibrium. 33 Secondly, 
for sectors where the import share is low, the responsiveness of the domestic price to 
a change in the import price will be small. Thirdly, the size of the elasticity of demand 
for exports is also important in determining the responsiveness of domestic prices to 
changes in the tariff rate, especially when the share of exports in domestic production 
is large. The higher the export demand elasticity, ceteris paribus, the lower the 
domestic price change resulting from the removal of tariffs. 
This third aspect illustrates an interesting contrast between the RTMSA and the 
formulations of Dervis et al. (1982) and Cora do and de Melo (1986), and highlights the 
implications of the assumption of excess capacity for the treatment of exports in the 
RTMSA. As noted earlier, if imports and domestic production are substitutes, the fall 
in the import price following the removal of tariffs will reduce import-competing 
production, and, if supply is less than perfectly elastic, the domestic price PSMi will fall. 
The fall in the domestic price has a feedback effect on the demand for exports, which 
will increase as the export price (expressed in foreign currency units) falls (Dervis et al., 
1982: 234). The expansion in export demand leads to an inward shift of the supply 
curve of the domestic product for domestic use. The net effect of the removal of the 
tariff on the domestic price will be less than it would have been in the absence of a 
feedback effect via exports. The adjustment in the domestic price will be less, the 
33 In the RTMSA, thus, since the supply elasticity is infinite, no adjustment in the domestic price is 
required. 
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easier the substitution of domestic production from the domestic market to foreign 
markets (i.e. the higher the export demand elasticity). 34 
In the RTMSA, the assumption of perfectly elastic supply (due to excess capacity) thus 
implies that there is no feedback effect on the demand for the home country's exports 
when home country tariffs are eliminated, since there is no change in the domestic 
price. The basis of a home country's export expansion in the RTMSA thus appears to 
rest only on the elimination of tariffs in other SADC countries facing home country 
exports. As noted in Section 6.4, export expansion is determined by allocating the 
change in total intra-SADC exports (derived from, and equal to, the change in total intra-
SADC imports) between countries, according to initial market share. With excess 
capacity, export expansion may occur without affecting home production for the 
domestic market. 
In view of this, the important question is whether the excess capacity assumption is a 
reasonable one to apply to all sectors in all SADC countries. Evans (1997a: 4) notes 
that the assumption of infinite supply elasticities is a particularly restrictive feature of 
the model, and that for sectors operating close to full capacity, the supply response 
predicted by the RTMSA will be exaggerated. 35 It should be stressed, thus, that in 
consumer good sectors, for example, the contraction of domestic industry predicted by 
the RTMSA when a FT A is formed will be overstated if the relevant supply elasticities 
are, in fact, less than perfectly elastic. This would in turn tend to exaggerate the extent 
of trade creation predicted by the model. It would, however, also suggest that the pain 
of adjustment to the FT A in domestic industries could be less. 
The values assumed in the RTMSA for the elasticity of substitution between imports 
and domestic production (aD;) and the elasticity of composite demand (e.(\) may also be 
briefly considered in the light of other empirical studies. Corado and de Melo (1986: 
161-162), for example, obtain econometric estimates of aDi for 26 sectors in their study 
34 
35 
In the case of sectors in which imports and domestic production are complements, the removal of 
tariffs will raise the domestic price, since import-competing production increases, and export demand 
will fall. Once again, however, the net effect of the removal of the tariff on the domestic price will 
be less. 
The assumption of infinite supply elasticities is retained on the export side of the model. The validity 
of assuming perfectly elastic export supply from developing countries has been questioned by 
Grossman (1982: 275) and Pomfret (1988: 140). 
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of Portugal's accession to the European Community. They find, as expected, that aD; 
generally exceeds unity in consumer good sectors, but that it is low for most sectors 
with a relatively high import share, indicating complementarity between imports and 
domestic production in sectors such as iron and steel, machinery, and non-ferrous 
metals. This pattern for aD; broadly agrees with that in the RTMSA, although Corado 
and de Melo (1986) are able to apply sector-specific estimates to their model. 
The assumed magnitudes of aD; in the RTMSA can also be compared to those employed 
by Dervis et al. (1982: 257-287) in a "stylised" nineteen-sector model of a semi-
industrialised country (Turkey), used to explore the effects of changes in trade policy 
on resource allocation. The important feature of this study is that, as in the RTMSA, 
a lack of data precluded the econometric estimation of important model parameters, 
which therefore had to be defined by the model users. In view of this, Dervis et al. 
(1982: 258) argue that it is essential to investigate the sensitivity of the model's results 
to different assumptions about key parameter values. More particularly, their study 
examines the sensitivity of their model to systematic variations in some of the key 
elasticity parameters specified. 
Dervis et al. (1982: 263-264) choose a range of substitution elasticities for their 
sensitivity analysis such that a "high" aD; is three times the size of a "low" one. 
Differences in the range which aD; can adopt across sectors roughly reflect the extent 
of product differentiation in a given sector, due to differences in quality and the degree 
of product homogeneity.36 A comparison of the elasticities of substitution between 
imports and domestic production in the two studies reveals that, in general, for 
consumer goods, the RTMSA substitution elasticities of 2.5 just exceed the "high" 
values of 2.25 assumed by Dervis et al. (1982: 263). For intermediate and capital 
goods, the RTMSA values for aD; (0.5) fall in between the "low" and "high" elasticities 
in the other study. It thus appears that, in the case of aD;, the values specified for the 
RTMSA are of the same general order of magnitude as those in similar empirical studies. 
Further, while sector-specific estimates are not available, the RTMSA allows for the 
distinction between sectors which are import substitutes and those that are import 
complements. 
36 The highest elasticities of substitution are therefore seen in agriculture and petroleum products (which 
are assumed to be the most homogeneous) and traditional non-durable consumer goods (which are 
assumed to be more substitutable in use than other manufactures). 
213 
It would nonetheless be useful to conduct sensitivity tests on the RTMSA in order to 
explore the sensitivity of the model's results to variations in the assumed elasticities. 
This is particularly important when the relative magnitudes of G Dj and the elasticity of 
composite demand Edj are considered, since their relative size determines whether 
import-competing production is likely to contract or expand when tariffs are removed. 
Dervis et al. (1982: 272) note that output changes are very sensitive to the specified 
value of GDj in their study, since sectors switch from being import substitutes to import 
complements quite easily when substitution elasticities are lowered. Partial equilibrium 
estimates of Edj in Dervis et al. (1982: 263) yield demand elasticities well below those 
of the RTMSA, which vary not only between broad economic categories, but also within 
them. 37 
Dervis et al. (1982: 239) suggest that it will be difficult to predict when G Dj is likely to 
be less than I Edj I because, in general, the elasticity of substitution tends to be low for 
sectors such as intermediates, which at the same time tend to have a low elasticity of 
demand. Capital goods generally have low substitution elasticities, so the outcome 
depends on the elasticity of demand, which in turn depends on how responsive 
aggregate investment is to price changes. In the RTMSA, both GDj and I ~j I are 
assumed to be lower in intermediate and capital good sectors than in other sectors, but 
their relative magnitudes are such that GDj (0.5) is less than I Ed j I (0.8) in the former, 
while GDj (2.5) exceeds IEdd (1.8) in the latter. 38 
7.4.2 Substitutability between imports from partner and non-partner countries 
As noted in Section 6.2.4.4, the direction of change in imports from the ROW (MRj) 
when intra-SADC tariffs are removed has important implications for the trade diversion 
consequences of a FTA. Although some of the aggregate country results in the 1997 
37 
38 
The reason for this may be that the expression from which these elasticity estimates are derived takes 
account of intermediate, consumption and investment demand (Dervis et al., 1982: 265). In the 
RTMSA, the different components of domestic demand are not considered separately. 
It is interesting to note that partial equilibrium estimates of sectoral elasticities of supply by Dervis 
et al. (1982: 263), assumed to be infinite in the RTMSA, yield output supply elasticities for Turkey 
of below 0.81 in all but four manufacturing sectors: textiles (2.12), clothing (1.88), wood products 
(1.87) and metal products (1.59). Supply elasticities depend on factor shares and substitutability, 
and are greatest in labour-intensive sectors with high substitution elasticities between capital and 
labour (Dervis et al., 1982: 264-265). 
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RTMSA simulation show a slight increase in MRi, the analysis of Section 6.2.4.4 
illustrates that, given the magnitudes of the elasticities that have been assumed in the 
model, the formation of a FT A should result in a fall in MRi.39 This essentially follows 
from the assumption of a relatively high elasticity of substitution between imports from 
SADC and imports from the ROW (aMi) of 2.5 in all sectors. 
The likely pattern of trade creation and trade diversion in the different sectors, given the 
assumptions of the RTMSA, may be summarised as follows. In consumer good sectors, 
the removal of intra-SADC tariffs should result in an increase in imports from SADC 
(Msi ), a fall in import-competing production (SMi)' and a fall in imports from the ROW 
(MRi ) (see Section 6.2.4). Given the assumption of equal substitutability between 
imports from the two sources and imports and domestic production (aMi = aOi = 2.5), 
it follows that, for sectors in which the initial level of import-competing production 
exceeds imports from the ROW, trade creation will outweigh trade diversion. According 
to the data in Evans (1996: 37-44), initial SMi outweighs MRi in most consumer good 
sectors. 
In intermediate and capital good sectors, imports are complements to domestic 
production (aOi < I Ed;!), so that import-competing production increases when a FT A is 
formed. These sectors still exhibit trade creation, however, since there is still some 
substitution of imports for domestic production, although this effect is weak (aOi = 0.5). 
However, the substitution effect between MSi and MRi is as strong as before (aMi = 2.5), 
so that, in these sectors, trade diversion is likely to outweigh trade creation. 
In Corado and de Melo (1986), trade creation is accompanied by trade diversion in most 
sectors (as in the RTMSA), conforming to the traditional "expected" pattern of response 
(Truman, 1975: 6). However, Corado and de Melo (1986) obtain econometric estimates 
for the elasticity of substitution between imports from different sources (aMi), so that 
these elasticities vary across sectors, unlike in the RTMSA. More particularly, they find 
that, in some sectors, aMi is quite low.40 In these cases, imports from the partner and 
39 
40 
In the 1996 simulation, MRi falls in most sectors, or shows no change, but never increases (Evans, 
1996: 37-44). 
Lower values of aMi are found for chemical products, non-electrical machinery, paper and printing, 
other non-metallic mineral products, and other food products. 
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non-partner are complementary, and imports from both sources may increase when a 
FT A is formed. This results in a pattern of "double trade creation" (internal and 
external), rather than trade creation accompanied by trade diversion (Corado and de 
Melo, 1986: 160). However, as argued above, despite the aggregate country results 
of Evans (1997a: 11), the value of aMi assumed across sectors in the RTMSA (2.5) is 
too high to allow imports from the two sources to be classified as complements. A 
pattern of double trade creation should therefore not be possible in this model, given the 
magnitudes of the elasticities that have been assumed. 41 
7.4.3 The relative magnitudes of the elasticities of substitution 
The discussion in the previous sub-section raises the question of whether, in, the SADC 
context, one should expect greater substitutability between imports and domestic 
production, or between imports from partners and non-partners. In the RTMSA, as 
noted earlier, a Oi is assumed to equal aMi in consumer good sectors, whereas imports 
from the two sources are far more substitutable than imports and domestic production 
(aMi> a Di) in intermediate and capital good sectors. Corado and de Melo (1986: 162) 
suggest that it may be expected, in general, that the elasticity of substitution between 
imports from the partner and non-partner countries aMi would be greater than the 
elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic production a Di, however this 
question appears to be controversial. 
In his study of import competition from developed and developing countries in the US 
domestic market, Grossman (1982) finds that for sectors with a high import share, in 
which the share of imports from developing countries in total US imports is significant, 
imports from both developed countries and developing countries are relatively close 
substitutes for domestic US production, but quite imperfect substitutes for each other. 
This implies aMi less than a Di , in contrast to Corado and de Melo (1986) and the RTMSA. 
A detailed examination of the goods within each product group, by ranking them 
41 Double trade creation may occur when a FTA is formed if a country's external tariffs against the ROW 
are simultaneously lowered. While this is a plausible scenario, given tariff cuts being implemented 
in terms of Uruguay Round commitments, the RTMSA does not model the simultaneous reduction of 
external tariffs in the FT A simulations. Note that if a customs union rather than a FT A is formed, 
double trade creation may occur in countries or sectors in which external tariffs are lowered to meet 
the union's common external tariff wall. 
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according to quality or technological sophistication, suggests an explanation for 
Grossman's (1982) results. The goods imported by the US from developed countries 
are found to be largely distinct from those imported from developing countries, with the 
former being more "up-market" and the latter more "down-market". In each case, it 
was found that home firms produce both types of good. 42 This implies substitutability 
between each import source and domestic production, but non-substitutability between 
different sources of imports.43 
The findings of Grossman (1 982) do not support the assumption of equal substitutability 
between imports and domestic production and imports from different sources, made 
generally by Baldwin and Murray (1977), and for consumer good sectors by Evans 
(1996, 1997a). However, they do support the conclusion of Baldwin and Murray 
(1977), implicit in Evans (1996, 1997a) for consumer good sectors, that the effect of 
tariff preferences for developing countries will be seen more through trade creation 
(replacement of domestic industry) than trade diversion (replacement of imports from 
the ROW). 
Other studies, however, suggest that it is more likely for the elasticity of substitution 
between imports and domestic production (aDi ) to be smaller than that between 
competing imports (aMi) (Ahmad, 1978; Verdoorn and Schwartz, 1972). This pattern 
of substitution possibilities, also found to be most common by Corado and de Melo 
(1 986), and which is characteristic of intermediate and capital good sectors in the 
RTMSA, suggests that the effects of tariff preferences will be seen more through trade 
diversion than trade creation. 
42 
43 
An illustrative example is the leather industry. Leather from cattlehide may be heavy (for making shoe 
soles or machine belting) or light (for shoe uppers, clothing or other high-quality leather products). 
Calf or kip leather is also light. Imports from developed countries consist mostly of finer cattlehide 
leather, and calf and kip leather, whereas imports from developing countries are predominantly 
cattlehide leather. Domestic leather tanneries produce both types of leather. The two types of 
imported leather therefore tend to be complements rather than substitutes (e.g. shoe uppers and shoe 
soles), and domestic industry faces competition from both types of imports (Grossman, 1982: 278). 
Grossman (1982: 280) argues that these findings are consistent with the product cycle theories of 
Vernon (1966) and Hufbauer (1970), which suggest that imports from developing and developed 
countries will be poor substitutes for one another. The US domestic industry, on the other hand, 
produces the entire spectrum of products, perhaps continuing to compete with developing country 
producers with the aid of protection (even after product cycle considerations would suggest 
otherwise). 
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In the southern African context, the discussion in this sub-section highlights the 
difficulties of assuming the same magnitudes for these elasticities in all countries, given 
the highly unequal levels of development among SADC members. From South Africa's 
point of view, for example, it is probably unrealistic to expect a high degree of 
substitutability between imports from the ROWand imports from the rest of SADC. On 
the other hand, in the case of SADC countries whose imports from the region come 
largely from South Africa, it may be more plausible to assume a greater substitutability 
between imports from South Africa and the ROW than between imports and domestic 
production, at least in some sectors. A detailed analysis of the imports of SADC 
member countries from the region and the ROW, as well as an examination of the 
degree and type of differentiation within product categories along the lines of Grossman 
(1982), would be required before any conclusion could be drawn. 
7.5 Refining and extending the RTMSA 
It was noted in Section 7.1 that any assessment of the RTMSA is complicated by the 
fact that the model is in the process of being developed to take account of a variety of 
aspects which have not been included to date. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made 
in this final section to highlight some of the directions in which the model could usefully 
be extended in the light of the analysis in earlier chapters. 
As acknowledged by Evans (1996: 5)' the RTMSA is a partial equilibrium model, and 
therefore does not include income generation and investment. It does not incorporate 
capital and does not consider income distribution effects. While the analysis is 
comparative static, and is thus unable to take account of the potential dynamic effects 
of the formation of a SADC FTA, the discussion in Section 5.4 suggests that these 
effects are inadequately defined and not readily quantifiable. Further, the impact of the 
removal of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) has not been included for data reasons (Evans, 
1996: 6-7; Evans, 1997a: 3). Given the widespread perception that NTBs constitute 
a major constraint on intra-regional trade (ADB, 1993b: 24; Maasdorp and Whiteside, 
1993: 18-19), the implication of their elimination or reduction calls for some 
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consideration. 44 
The focus in this section, however, will be on issues relating to the analysis in Chapters 
4 and 5, particularly the trade creation-trade diversion consequences of a SADC FT A, 
and the question of the potential benefits of economies of scale and intra-industry 
specialisation. 
The discussion in the previous sections of this chapter, as well as in Section 6.2.4, 
suggests that the RTMSA could be used to estimate trade creation and trade diversion 
at the sector level in each country. As noted in Section 5.2, it is also important to 
calculate the benefits to each country of export expansion to its partners. Whether this 
represents trade creation or trade diversion from the partner's point of view is irrelevant 
to the exporting country's gain. This gain is derived from the opportunity of exporting 
on more favourable terms than would otherwise be possible, and is equivalent to the 
income loss that would have been incurred if the product had been sold domestically or 
to the ROW (Robson, 1987: 249). The method of calculation of export expansion in the 
RTMSA is questionable, however, and should be modified to account for the tariff 
benefits obtained by a particular country in each export market. 
Despite allowing for product differentiation by country of origin, the RTMSA is based 
on the assumption of constant returns to scale, and therefore disregards the implications 
of scale economies in production. Work is apparently under way at present to 
incorporate scale into the model. This would require some identification of sectors in 
which economies of scale are likely to be important, and, for these sectors, an 
estimation of the cost reduction effect identified in Section 5.2, taking account not only 
the effect of market enlargement, but also any predicted increase in demand as a result 
of the FT A itself. 45 
44 
45 
In Brown et al.'s (1992) empirical study of NAFTA, NTBs are incorporated by finding the ad valorem 
tariff rate that will maintain imports covered by NTBs in a particular product category at a pre-
determined level. The ad valorem tariff rate in this product category is then an average of the NTB 
tariff-equivalent rate and the nominal tariff rate, with the NTB tariff-equivalent weighted using the 
NTB coverage ratio (Brown et al., 1992: 16). 
Owen (1983), for example, has calculated the scale-related cost reductions resulting from intra-
European Community trade creation, although his approach has been criticised for failing to establish 
a causal link to trade liberalisation (Pomfret, 1988: 133). As noted in Section 5.2, Pearson and 
Ingram (1980) use individual firm data to estimate the cost reduction benefits from economies of 
scale in a customs union among developing countries in their study of the welfare effects of 
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In Brown et al.'s (1992: 15-16) empirical study of NAFTA, sectors are classified as 
perfectly competitive or monopolistically competitive depending on the degree of scale 
economies in production. 46 Products in both types of industry are characterised by 
some degree of product differentiation: in perfectly competitive sectors, products are 
differentiated by country of origin, as in the RTMSA, while in monopolistically 
competitive sectors they are differentiated by firm. This allows for consideration of the 
gains from intra-industry specialisation and trade, discussed in Section 5.3, including the 
benefits of increased variety for consumers and, in the case of monopolistically 
competitive sectors, the exploitation of economies of scale.47 
Since the RTMSA does not currently model imperfect competition, it is not possible at 
this stage to investigate the benefits of intra-industry specialisation resulting from the 
exploitation of scale economies per 5e. However, the RTMSA could, in principle, be 
used in its present form to consider the extent of intra-industry versus inter-industry 
specialisation on formation of a FT A, from which inferences could be drawn about 
possible gains from increased consumer variety and the likely costs of adjustment to the 
FTA. 
The detailed simulation results of Evans (1996: 37-44) report the percentage changes 
in imports from SADC and exports to SADC in each three-digit ISIC category for each 
country. If trade, output and employment data were available at a more disaggregated 
level (at least at the four-digit ISIC level) then, for a given SADC country, the presence 
of both increased exports to and imports from the rest of the region within a particular 
sector would suggest some degree of intra-industry expansion. Further, instead of 
treating a country's imports from SADC in a given sector as a single aggregate which 
is substitutable with imports from the ROW, each source of SADC supply could be 
considered separately (Evans, 1997b). This would facilitate the simulation of bilateral 
46 
47 
integration between Ghana and the Ivory Coast. 
All manufacturing sectors, as well as mining, are characterised by monopolistic competition, while 
agriculture is designated as perfectly competitive. 
The simulation results of Brown et al. (1992: 24-26) show the percentage change in industry output 
and the percentage change in the number of firms in each monopolistically competitive sector. The 
difference between these two yields the percentage change in firm output. It is found that firm 
output increases in all sectors in the US and Canada, and in most sectors in Mexico. This suggests 
widespread benefits from economies of scale in NAFTA (Brown et al., 1992: 28-29). 
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trade changes in each sector, as in Brown et al. (1992), so that the pattern of inter-
sectoral versus intra-sectoral specialisation between each pair of SADC countries could 
be investigated.48 More specifically, to determine the pattern of specialisation within 
the bloc fully, it seems that cognisance would have to be taken of substitutability 
between different SADC sources of supply, as well as the actual tariff benefits obtained 
in each SADC export market for a particular exporting country. 49 
In their analysis of NAFTA, Brown et al. (1992: 27) find that both the US and Canada 
increase imports from each other in most sectors, suggesting a marked expansion of 
intra-industry trade. On the other hand, although Mexican imports from its two partners 
increase in all categories, its exports are strongly concentrated in a small range of 
sectors, suggesting a far greater degree of inter-sectoral specialisation for Mexico when 
the FTA is formed. 50 The implication is that the benefits of liberalisation between 
Canada and the US arise mostly from increased product variety rather than inter-sectoral 
specialisation (Brown et al., 1992: 27). As the analysis of Section 5.3 suggests, the 
costs of adjustment to the FTA are therefore likely to be easier for these countries. 
What inferences can be drawn from this for SADC? It was suggested at the end of 
Chapter 5 that if both factor endowments and per capita income levels are more similar 
among southern African countries (or among a subset of southern African countries) 
than between these countries and their trading partners in the rest of the world, then 
regionalliberalisation could provide benefits from intra-industry specialisation which may 
not be readily attainable through multilateral liberalisation. 
To examine this further, the current extent of intra-industry trade between SADC 
members in relation to the levels of intra-industry trade between SADC countries and 
their external trading partners may be considered, particularly since the bulk of intra-
regional trade takes place in manufactures where intra-industry trade tends to be more 
prevalent. As noted in Chapter 2, the most complete sets of dis aggregated bilateral 
48 
49 
50 
In Brown et al. (1992), each of the NAFTA members is modelled individually. 
As noted earlier, the current treatment of exports in the RTMSA does not recognise this latter aspect 
(see Evans, 1996: 13). 
The US, for example, reduces its imports from Mexico in a wide range of industrial products. A fall 
in imports from a particular partner country cannot be captured in the RTMSA since, as noted above, 
imports from the bloc are considered as a single aggregate. 
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trade flows between SADC members are those involving SACU or Zimbabwe (lDC, 
1996; Zimtrade, 1996). Since South Africa and Zimbabwe have the most similar 
industrial structures in the region (see Section 2.5), it may be of particular interest to 
consider the prevailing levels of intra-industry trade between them. 
Using four-digit ISIC data, unadjusted Grubel-Lloyd (1975) indices of intra-industry trade 
have been calculated for SACU and Zimbabwe, and for SACU and the ROW. The 
results for selected sectors are shown in Table A-S. The discussion of these indices is 
somewhat tentative for the following reasons. Firstly, it is problematic to compare 
intra-industry trade ratios between SACU and Zimbabwe with those between SACU and 
the ROW, because of the significantly larger relative trade imbalance in manufactures 
between SACU and Zimbabwe, shown by the Grubel-Lloyd indices for manufacturing 
as a whole (Table A-S). Secondly, the problems of using an unadjusted index to 
measure intra-industry trade are well documented. The index should be preferably be 
adjusted to account for categorical aggregation and, it is sometimes argued, for overall 
trade imbalance. 51 Thirdly, the index itself does not reflect the significance of trade 
in a particular sector. For example, it is of little consequence that intra-industry trade 
in pottery between SACU and Zimbabwe is 95 per cent if the absolute trade flows in 
this sector are extremely small. 
Nevertheless, the results suggest that intra-industry trade between SACU and 
Zimbabwe exceeds intra-industry trade between SACU and the ROW in a number of 
sectors in which SACU-Zimbabwe bilateral trade is important (ef. Table A-S and Table 
2.13). There is significant intra-industry trade with Zimbabwe relative to the ROW in 
some foodstuffs and textiles sub-sectors. More interesting, perhaps, are the levels of 
intra-industry trade in sectors with significant bilateral trade flows such as iron and 
steel, non-ferrous metals, some metal products and machinery sub-sectors, as well as 
transport equipment. There is noticeably little intra-industry trade with Zimbabwe in 
chemical products, except for medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations. 
According to Greenaway (1 991: 1 66), intra-industry trade is more likely to be recorded 
in capital-intensive than labour-intensive product lines. In this regard, the factor 
51 A detailed analysis of issues relating to the measurement of intra-industry trade is beyond the scope 
of this study. For further discussion, see Simson (1987: 76-81), Parr (1994: 397-399) and 
Greenaway and Milner (1983). 
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intensity of a SADC country's trade with the rest of the region may be compared to the 
factor intensity of its trade with the ROW. Data on factor intensities at the required 
level of disaggregation were only obtainable for South Africa. Retaining the focus on 
SACU and Zimbabwe, and following the methodology outlined in Bell and Cattaneo 
(1997: 5-6), weighted average labour coefficients of SACU's manufactured trade with 
Zimbabwe and the ROW have been calculated, and are shown in Table 7.2.52 
Table 7.2: Weighted average labour coefficients of SACU's manufactured exports, 
imports and gross output, 1993 
SACU-ROW SACU-Zimbabwe 
Total export labour requirements' 220593.21 7876.05 
Total import labour requirements2 281981.63 3941.48 
Total value of exports (R million) 36270.35 1694.52 
Total value of imports (R million) 51142.07 486.47 
Weighted average labour coefficients3 
Exports 6.08 4.65 
Imports 5.51 8.10 
Gross output 5.42 5.42 
Labour coefficient ratios (%) 
Exports/lmports 110.00 57.37 
Exports/Gross output 111.93 85.78 
Imports/Gross output 101.75 149.52 
Source: Own computations from IDC (1995a, 1996). 
Notes: ' Total amount of labour required to produce exports. 
2 Total amount of labour required to produce imports domestically. 
3 Labour coefficients indicate the number of workers per million rands of exports, imports, and 
gross output, respectively. 
The results indicate that SACU's manufactured exports to the ROW are more labour-
intensive than its manufactured imports from the ROW.53 SACU's exports to 
Zimbabwe, on the other hand, are significantly less labour-intensive than SACU's 
imports from Zimbabwe. The contrast is reflected in the export/import labour 
52 
53 
Employment/gross output ratios in each three-digit ISIC sector are multiplied by the exports in that 
sector to obtain the amount of labour required to produce the sector's exports. Similarly, 
employment/gross output ratios are multiplied by imports in a sector to determine the labour required 
to produce the sector's imports domestically. The weighted average labour coefficient for exports 
is obtained by dividing the sum of individual sector export labour requirements by the total value of 
exports; the labour coefficient for imports is calculated in the same manner. 
This result differs from that obtained by Bell and Cattaneo (1997: 7) for South Africa's manufactured 
exports, which are found to be less labour-intensive than manufactured imports in 1993. The 
difference reflects the relative labour-intensity of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland's 
exports compared to South Africa's. 
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coefficient ratios of 110 per cent and 57 per cent for trade with the ROWand 
Zimbabwe respectively. Further, SACU's exports to Zimbabwe are notably less labour-
intensive than its exports to the ROW (in fact, they are even less labour-intensive than 
its imports from the ROW), while imports from Zimbabwe are strikingly more labour-
intensive than imports from the ROW. 54 
Given the importance of trade between SACU and Zimbabwe in total intra-SADC trade, 
these results suggest that SACU's (effectively South Africa's) comparative advantage 
in the region lies in more capital-intensive manufacturing sectors, while Zimbabwe's 
regional comparative advantage is concentrated in labour-intensive sectors. It is perhaps 
likely, therefore, that despite their relative similarity of industrial structure in the 
southern African context, the adjustment to free trade between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe would primarily take the form of inter-sectoral resource reallocation, as 
between Mexico and its partners in NAFT A. There could, however, be intra-industry 
specialisation of some significance in particular manufacturing sectors. 
Balassa's (1979: 258) suggestion, that there may be greater scope for intra-industry 
expansion in a regional union among countries which are at lower but more equal levels 
of development, may apply to a subset of SADC countries. Further research is 
necessary into the factor intensity of production and trade in the region, the extent and 
type of product differentiation, and the prospects for exploiting economies of scale in 
a regional market before any conclusions can be drawn. Greenaway (1991: 167) notes, 
however, that as industrialisation proceeds and per capita income increases, intra-
industry trade will become more important in the trade of developing countries. 
Integration in the SADC region could thus be aimed at stimulating intra-industry rather 
than inter-industry trade expansion. 
54 Ideally, for a fuller picture, the factor intensity of Zimbabwe's trade with South Africa/SACU should 
also be compared to the factor intensity of Zimbabwe's trade with the ROW. At present, however, 
direction of trade data for Zimbabwe by ISIC category, required to match the production and 
employment data, are not available. A conversion of the Zimtrade (1996) data from SITC to ISIC is 
in progress. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to provide a critical assessment of the RTMSA, the model 
underlying the only serious study to date which provides quantitative estimates at the 
sub-sectoral level of the impact of a SADC FT A on the individual members of SADC. 
The results of Evans (1997a) suggest that the formation of a SADC FTA will result 
primarily in trade creation, with little or no trade diversion. However, the discussion in 
this chapter illustrates that, in consumer good sectors, the excess capacity assumption 
and the assumption of equal elasticities of substitution between imports from SADC and 
the ROWand between imports and domestic production in the RTMSA tend to 
exaggerate the likely trade creation effects of a SADC FTA. Further, as Section 6.2.4.4 
shows, the absence of any reduction in imports from the ROW at the country level in 
the 1997 simulation, except in the case of Mauritius, and the marginal increase in ROW 
imports for some members appear to be anomalous results, given the magnitudes of the 
assumed elasticities in the RTMSA. In contrast to the 1996 simulation, the results of 
Evans (1997a: 11) reflect little or no trade diversion when a FTA is formed. Taken 
together, these factors appear to make the FTA look more favourable from the point of 
view of orthodox static customs union theory, which assesses the welfare implications 
of integration on the basis of the balance between trade creation and trade diversion, 
than would perhaps be expected. 
The inferences drawn by Evans (1996, 1997a) from the simulation results of the 
RTMSA are, firstly, that the formation of a SADC FTA will, on balance, be trade 
creating, and therefore beneficial to SADC member countries. Secondly, the gains from 
export expansion will be significant and widespread, while the costs of adjustment will 
be concentrated in only a few adversely affected sectors and in countries experiencing 
a marked reduction in government revenue. The analysis in this chapter suggests, 
however, that the incidence of adverse sectoral effects on formation of a FTA may be 
more widespread than Evans (1996) has argued. 
In terms of the Cooper-Massell analysis in Section 4.3.3, it may indeed be preferable for 
trade expansion within the bloc to take place through trade diversion rather than trade 
creation, if the latter is reflected by the contraction of domestic industry in some SADC 
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member states. According to the ADS (1993b: 29, 37), for example, it would be more 
desirable for South Africa's increased penetration of the regional market to take place 
via the replacement of imports from the ROW (that is, through trade diversion) than via 
the displacement of other regional exporters or of domestic production for the domestic 
market in these countries, to avoid serious negative consequences for existing regional 
industry. In this view, assessing the desirability of a SADC FTA simply in terms of the 
conventional criterion that trade creation should outweigh trade diversion would seem 
inadequate. 
On the other hand, the possible benefits of a SADC FT A may be understated in the 
RTMSA, to the extent that the model is currently unable to estimate the potential 
benefits from the exploitation of economies of scale and intra-industry specialisation in 
a regional market. A major obstacle to the use of the RTMSA in its present form to 
distinguish the role of factor endowments and product variety in determining the pattern 
of trade and specialisation which may follow the formation of a SADC FT A appears to 
be the treatment of a particular country's imports from SADC and exports to SADC in 
a given sector as a single aggregate. This aspect, together with the method of 
calculation of a country's export expansion in a given sector, seems to mask the likely 
pattern of specialisation between individual countries within the bloc. An extension of 
the model to allow the estimation of bilateral trade changes in each sector would clarify 
the possible inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral patterns of specialisation reSUlting from the 
removal of intra-SA DC tariffs. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
As shown in Chapter 2, the proposed formation of a SADC free trade area (FT A) 
provides an extreme example of an attempt at regional trade integration among partner 
countries differing greatly in per capita income, economic size and stage of 
development, which together comprise a relatively small trading bloc. The essential 
question with which this study has been concerned is whether, despite these 
inequalities, it is possible that a FTA among SADC members could be mutually beneficial 
to South Africa and its partners. 
Other features of SADC, noted in Chapter 2, which raise crucial questions about the 
feasibility of successful trade integration in southern Africa are that the industrial 
structures of member countries are by and large complementary to one another, and 
that the existing degree of trade integration, measured by the intra-regional trade ratio, 
is comparatively low. 
These issues are raised implicitly in the existing literature on regional integration in 
southern Africa. However, the survey of recent studies in Chapter 3 illustrates that 
there are wide differences of opinion on the economic desirability and feasibility of a 
southern African FT A. It is not clear in many of these studies how these diverse views 
and conclusions were derived, and whether they are consistent with the theory. The 
present study has attempted to address some of the key questions relating to the 
problem of economic integration among unequal partners, with reference to the 
theoretical literature and empirical studies of such experience elsewhere in the world, 
and hence in effect to assess the current state of the debate on trade integration in the 
SADC region. 
Orthodox customs union theory evaluates the merits of regional integration on the basis 
of the balance between trade creation, which is considered to be welfare-improving, and 
trade diversion, which is seen as welfare-reducing. In terms of this analysis, trade 
integration is likely to be beneficial the more competitive the partner countries are, in 
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the sense that the range of goods produced under protection is similar, and, for any 
specified overlap, the greater the differences in the unit costs of similar protected 
industries in different parts of the union. A greater degree of overlap implies that there 
is more scope for trade creation. 
Using this framework, Holden (1996: 61) concludes that the smaller members of SADC 
would lose from a southern African FTA and that South Africa would gain at their 
expense. However, as shown in Chapter 4, this conclusion follows from the 
assumption that the home country's supply of a single homogeneous good is initially 
entirely provided by imports and that, on formation of the FT A, the partner country is 
unable to displace imports from the ROW entirely. In this case, the FTA results only in 
trade diversion and, given the large trade surplus that South Africa has with the region, 
trade diversion to that country will predominate, resulting in a redistribution of income 
from the smaller SADC countries to South Africa. 
On the other hand, if the partner country is able to displace ROW imports completely, 
the discussion in Chapter 4 shows that trade creation gains via the consumption effect 
are possible, even if there is perfect complementarity of structure. Once domestic 
production is allowed for, implying at least some degree of competitiveness between 
partners, further gains from trade creation, via the production effect, will result if 
complete displacement occurs. 
The traditional trade creation-trade diversion analysis therefore does not enable one to 
say a priori that a FT A among the members of SADC could not be mutually beneficial 
to all the prospective partner countries, despite the existing degree of inequality 
between South Africa and the smaller countries, and the complementarity of their 
production structures. The outcome depends on whether home country imports from 
the ROW are completely displaced by the partner, which in turn depends on empirical 
questions such as the magnitudes of the demand and supply elasticities and the height 
of the initial tariffs. 
Holden's (1996) conclusions about the likely trade diversion consequences of a SADC 
FTA contrast most strikingly with those of Evans (1996, 1997a), who finds that a FTA 
in the region will result primarily in trade creation with little or no trade diversion. These 
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findings are based on a very different analytical approach involving the use of a static 
partial equilibrium simulation model, the Regional Trade Model for Southern Africa 
(RTMSA). The diverse conclusions in the two studies may be explained in part by a 
critical difference in their underlying approaches regarding the conditions necessary for 
a trade creation gain on integration. The assumption of perfect substitutability between 
goods from different sources of supply in the traditional framework implies that 
complete displacement of ROW imports by the partner is a necessary condition for a fall 
in price, and hence for a trade creation gain via the production or consumption effect. 
However, as shown in Chapter 7, once the restrictive assumption that goods from 
different sources of supply are perfect substitutes is relaxed, complete displacement of 
imports from the ROW is not a necessary condition for trade creation to occur. This is 
because the Armington (1969) formulation adopted by Evans (1996, 1997a), in which 
domestic and imported goods, and foreign goods from different sources, are imperfect 
substitutes, allows for two-way trade within a given sector and for goods from different 
sources of supply to have different prices. 
However, as argued in Chapter 7, the Evans (1996, 1997a) result that a SADC FTA will 
be primarily trade-creating may be questioned on several counts. Firstly, the assumption 
of excess capacity, which is questionably applied to all sectors in all SADC countries, 
together with the assumption of equal elasticities of substitution between different 
sources of supply in the case of consumer good sectors, appears to exaggerate the 
likely trade creation benefits of the FT A. Further, the pattern of double trade creation 
found by Evans (1997a) for some countries appears to be inconsistent with the 
structure of the model, given the magnitudes of the elasticities which have been 
assumed. In particular, it is unclear why imports from the ROW do not fall, given the 
elasticity of substitution between imports from SADC and imports from the ROW of 2.5, 
which is too high for imports from the two sources to be classified as complements. 
The discussion in Section 6.2.4.4 shows that the substitution of imports from SADC 
for imports from the ROW will outweigh any tendency for ROW imports to increase in 
response to an expansion in demand, in any sector, given the elasticity assumptions of 
the RTMSA. One would thus expect the simulation results to show some trade 
diversion on formation of a SADC FTA. 
These factors highlight the point raised by Page (1997: 8) that the problem with both 
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theoretical speculation and empirical analysis of the likely effects of trade integration is 
the wide range of possible assumptions about elasticities which may be made. 
The studies of Holden (1996) and Evans (1996, 1997a) appear to judge the desirability 
of a southern African FT A on the basis of the orthodox view that a trade-creating 
integration arrangement will be welfare-improving, while a trade-diverting one will be 
welfare-reducing. The limitations of assessing the merits of regional integration in the 
SADC region solely on the basis of the balance between trade creation and trade 
diversion do not emerge clearly in the southern African literature. While studies such 
as the ADS (1993b: 29, 37) suggest that it would be more desirable for export 
expansion within the region to take place via the replacement of imports from the ROW, 
rather than at the expense of domestic industry in the member states or existing 
regional exporters, this question is not addressed formally or systematically with 
reference to the theoretical literature on integration among developing countries. 
There is a theoretical basis for such a view, however, as the Cooper-Massell (1965b) 
analysis considered in Section 4.3.3 illustrates. Integration may be seen as a means of 
achieving the objectives of protection, such as industrialisation and the saving of scarce 
foreign exchange, at a lower cost than would be possible under non-preferential tariff 
policy. Further, such benefits may be more readily attainable when the economic 
structures of the prospective partner countries are complementary rather than 
competitive. In this framework, it may be argued that trade diversion will be preferable 
to trade creation for the preference-granting country, since it does not entail a sacrifice 
in domestic industrial production. 1 
The advantages of a protected regional market over non-preferential tariff policy, as a 
means of achieving industrialisation more efficiently, may be enhanced in the 
imperfectly competitive context where production is subject to increasing returns to 
scale. The question of potential benefits from economies of scale has not been 
incorporated systematically into the debate on trade integration in the SADC region. 
The comparative static analysis of Holden (1996: 55-56), for example, focuses only on 
The aspect of import substitution to save foreign exchange has been emphasised by Bhambri (1962), 
Mikesell (1963) and Linder (1967), while Andic et al. (1971) extend the Cooper-Massell 
industrialisation approach to incorporate Linder's (1967) analysis of the foreign exchange benefits of 
producing for a protected regional market. 
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the case where imports from the prospective partner country are produced subject to 
rising costs, and therefore does not consider internal economies of scale as a potential 
source of benefit from southern African trade integration. Although Holmes and Evans 
(1997: 54-64) make a preliminary investigation into the potential for scale economies 
in the SADC region, the Evans RTMSA does not yet model increasing returns. 
Studies such as Nordas (1996) and Holmes and Evans (1997: 62-64) suggest that scale 
may be important in some manufacturing sectors in the region. If this is so, then the 
essential question for the purposes of this study is whether the enlarged market in a 
regional union among countries of unequal size and levels of development will, in 
sectors where scale economies are important, mainly benefit producers in the larger 
countries. As the discussion in Section 5.2 suggests, it once again cannot be concluded 
a priori that this will be the case. Indeed, smaller countries may be the major 
beneficiaries of access to a larger market, because of the higher excess cost they incur 
of operating at below optimal scale. 
The limitation of Corden's (1972) extension of the orthodox trade creation-trade 
diversion framework to allow for economies of scale, considered in Section 5.2, is that 
by retaining the traditional focus on homogeneous goods it only allows for resource 
reallocation effects of the inter-industry kind on integration. While inter-sectoral 
resource reallocation may be the predominant outcome of a regional union among 
countries at unequal levels of development, it seems unnecessarily restrictive to adopt 
a framework that precludes the possibility of the simultaneous expansion of a country's 
exports and imports within a particular sector, which would allow for some degree of 
intra-sectoral specialisation on union. Indeed, a major feature of the growing literature 
on the effects of trade in an imperfectly competitive setting is the recognition of product 
differentiation. Further, while the current extent of intra-industry trade within a group 
of developing countries such as SADC may not be very significant, the evidence 
suggests that such trade will become increasingly important as industrialisation 
proceeds and per capita income increases. 
The question of the possible benefits of intra-industry specialisation and trade in the 
SADC region is poorly researched at present. Of the more formal theoretical and 
empirical analyses of southern African trade integration considered in Chapter 3, only 
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Evans (1996, 1997a) explicitly considers product differentiation and two-way trade 
within a given sector. However, as noted in Chapter 7, the RTMSA is based on the 
assumption of constant returns to scale, and therefore disregards the implications of 
scale economies in production. In its present form, thus, the model would be unable 
to investigate the benefits of intra-industry specialisation resulting from the exploitation 
of economies of scale per se. However, it could in principle be used to consider the 
extent of intra-industry versus inter-industry resource reallocation following the 
formation of a SADC FT A, from which inferences could be drawn about possible gains 
from increased consumer variety and the likely costs of adjustment to the FT A. The 
main obstacles to the use of the RTMSA, to distinguish fully between the role of factor 
endowments and product variety in determining the pattern of trade and specialisation 
which may follow the formation of a SADC FTA, appear to be the treatment of a 
particular country's imports from SADC and exports to SADC as a single aggregate, and 
the method of calculation of a country's export expansion to the rest of SADC when a 
FTA is formed. 
The discussion in Section 5.3 suggests that the gains from integration may be higher 
and the costs of adjustment less when the ensuing trade expansion is of the intra-
industry rather than the inter-industry type. Indeed, Behar (1991: 550) argues that, in 
the case of Brazil and Argentina, integration should specifically be aimed at stimulating 
intra-industry rather than inter-industry trade. A preliminary empirical analysis in Section 
7.5 suggests that there may be gains from intra-industry specialisation in some sectors 
in the SADC region, although the pattern of specialisation following the formation of a 
FT A may primarily involve an inter-sectoral reallocation of resources, even between the 
two countries with the most similar and developed industrial structures in the region, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
Mayer and Thomas (1997: 349) argue that the strictly quantitative methodology used 
in impact studies such as those of Evans (1996, 1997a) should be avoided in assessing 
the likely effects of a SADC FTA. Rather, key industries should be identified and 
qualitative assessments of their potential to survive and expand in a regional market 
should be undertaken. Page (1997: 23)' on the other hand, stresses that while a 
calculation of the potential gains and losses for industries, sectors of the population, and 
individual countries can only be uncertain, this type of analysis is nonetheless essential 
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to provide an indication of where difficulties may arise and intervention may be needed 
to limit adverse effects. 
The discussion in the present study suggests that, at a minimum, the framework for 
such an analysis should allow for product differentiation, and hence two-way trade 
within a sector, as well as the modelling of imperfect competition. Like the empirical 
analysis of Brown et al. (1992), it should be able to distinguish the relative degree of 
inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral resource reallocation at a bilateral level which is likely 
to follow the formation of a SADC FT A. From this, inferences could be drawn about 
the likely distributional effects of the FT A and the costs of adjustment in different 
sectors and countries. As the discussion in Chapter 7 illustrates, such an analysis 
should preferably attempt the econometric estimation of sectoral elasticities of 
substitution, demand and supply, although the data requirements for such an exercise 
would be enormous. 
Any consideration of the potential dynamic effects of a SADC FT A will be even more 
difficult. As noted in Section 5.4, the dynamic effects of integration refer to the ways 
in which integration may affect the growth rates of member countries. While it is 
generally argued that they are likely to be more important than the static resource 
reallocation effects of integration (Robson, 1987: 32-33), dynamic effects have been 
less extensively analysed and are not readily quantifiable. One effect which has been 
defined as dynamic, namely polarisation, has, however, been a prominent theme in the 
debate about the likely effects of trade integration in the SADC region. 
According to Robson (1987: 74-75), the supposed importance of polarisation effects 
forms an important part of the case that is often made for a regional industrial policy in 
an economic union among countries at unequal levels of development. In this regard, 
the SADC Trade Protocol has been criticised by Mayer and Thomas (1997: 346-349) 
for failing to provide for differential treatment for "least-developed" member countries, 
for failing to consider the question of investment adequately, for making insufficient 
provisions to foster equitable industrial development in the region, and for including no 
compensatory mechanisms. As noted by Page (1997: 18), however, the Protocol 
suggests an industrialisation strategy (Article 4) and makes explicit reference to infant 
industry protection (Article 21). Further, Article 3 allows for additional time to be 
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granted for the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade on application (SADC, 
1996: 4). 
The analysis of Holden (1996: 54-62), considered in Section 5.4, suggests that 
polarisation in the southern African region as a result of a regional FTA incorporating 
South Africa is not inevitable. Indeed, the analysis of Krugman (1991: 96-97) shows 
that the degree of integration is important if polarisation is to be avoided. A partial 
reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers which reduces transport costs to only an 
intermediate level may induce polarisation, since transport costs are low enough to 
make concentration of production to reap economies of scale worthwhile, yet still high 
enough to make market access outweigh production cost as a determinant of location. 
On the other hand, a complete removal of trade barriers may lower transport costs to 
the extent that production will take place in the lower-wage peripheral country, in which 
case polarisation may be avoided. This view has implications for any envisaged 
asymmetry of preference in the SADC region, which would itself have been intended 
to counter polarisation. 
If, as seems likely, it is perceived that a SADC FTA will result in the polarisation of 
development towards the more advanced countries in the region, then South Africa (and 
perhaps Zimbabwe) may face demands for compensation from the smaller countries in 
the region. As the discussion in Chapter 3 illustrates, it is implicitly assumed in a 
number of recent studies that South Africa will be able to, and indeed ought to, provide 
such compensation. The ADB (1993a) envisages a regional industrial policy and a 
system of asymmetrical tariff cuts, as well as capital flows from South Africa to the rest 
of the region. 2 While fiscal compensation is acknowledged by the ADB (1993a: 303) 
to be an unsuitable compensatory mechanism, Davies et al. (1993) go further to 
suggest resource transfers from South Africa to the rest of the region. 3 Cassim and 
2 Robson (1987: 205) notes that regional industrial policy involving agreed specialisation among 
members of a union, despite its merits, is fraught with problems. It is difficult in practice to reach 
agreement on the allocation of industry, particularly in groupings among countries at unequal levels 
of development. 
The view of the ADB (1993a) is supported in the general literature by Vaitsos (1978: 749), who 
argues that "fiscal compensation ... has proven in various cases to be one of the least appropriate and 
politically most unacceptable instruments". For further discussion of the relative merits of fiscal 
compensation and regional industrial policy, see Robson (1987: 201-208) and Foroutan (1993: 258-
260). As noted in Chapter 3, the ADB (1993a: 319-321) argues that intensified sectoral co-
ordination in power, water, transport and communications, for example, should proceed immediately 
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Zarenda (1995: 23)' on the other hand, give more careful consideration to South 
Africa's ability to transfer wealth to the rest of SADC, yet still benefit on balance, 
despite their view of the likely need for policies to promote equity and balance in a 
regional FT A. 
Page (1997: 19) argues that for regional groupings in which the gains from trade are 
likely to be uncertain, small, and unevenly distributed, it is the other objectives of the 
group which must hold it together. These objectives need to be defined by SADC, and 
may include regional security and greater negotiating power in a world of trading blocs; 
for South Africa, a commitment to the poorer countries of the region; and for the rest 
of SADC, a wish to have a voice in the activities of a major trading partner and regional 
power. It is therefore difficult to assess SADC without knowing whether it is "a 
temporary alliance of countries with common economic interests, a step to greater 
multilateralliberalisation, or a step to fuller SADC integration" (Page, 1997: 22). 
One of the stated objectives of the SADC Trade Protocol is "to enhance the economic 
development, diversification and industrialisation of the Region" (SADC, 1996: 3)' 
which suggests that, in accordance with the analysis of Section 4.3.3 and Chapter 5, 
it is the advantages of a larger protected regional market which are being sought by the 
members of SADC. However, as McCarthy (1994: 179) notes, there has been a shift 
away from economic integration as a means of achieving import-substituting 
industrialisation to a more outward-oriented focus, where integration schemes are 
intended to facilitate their participants' insertion into the global economy.4 This 
approach appears to be linked to the World Bank (1991) view, considered in Chapter 3, 
of regional integration as a means of promoting multilateralliberalisation, rather than for 
any specific developmental benefits which it may bring in itself. Indeed, McCarthy 
(1994: 179) argues that, with the current emphasis on outward-oriented trade 
strategies and a rapid continuation of the generalised trade liberalisation of the 1980s, 
the rationale for integration from a South African perspective would not be the creation 
of a protected regional market, but rather the creation of economic space that will 
4 
in the southern African region. The smaller countries would benefit from the sale of their resources 
to South Africa, which would offset the need for compensation. See also Mayer and Thomas (1997: 
350-351). 
MERCOSUR, for example, has been described as an instrument to facilitate "the competitive insertion 
of the member countries into the international economy" (Pena, 1992, cited in McCarthy, 1994: 184). 
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facilitate the country's integration into the world economy. 
The context of generalised liberalisation, whether a result of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes or Uruguay Round Commitments, will, as Mayer and Thomas (1997: 333) 
note, restrict the ability of the members of SADC to provide a meaningful regional 
preference. This will in turn reduce the effects, both beneficial and adverse, of a 
southern African FTA. Further, the proposed FTA between South Africa and the 
European Union, considered in Chapter 1, and the possibility of reciprocity of trade 
preferences in a re-negotiated Lome Convention, may constrain the ability of the smaller 
members of SADC to use trade integration to achieve industrial development and 
diversification. 
These factors highlight the point that, for any economic analysis of the costs and 
benefits of integration, it is not the answers based on present circumstances that are 
needed, but rather the expected answers when a SADC FT A comes into effect, at least 
eight years hence. As Page (1997: 11) notes, the structure of production and demand 
will alter as development proceeds, and will change rapidly for countries which are 
developing rapidly. The context of generalised liberalisation and the importance of 
future arrangements with the European Union will need to be carefully considered in any 
such assessment. 
Neither the theoretical analysis of trade integration among unequal partners, nor the 
present results of empirical studies on SADC, enable one to say, a priori, that the 
formation of a SADC free trade area could not be beneficial to South Africa and its 
smaller partners. Since the outcome is ultimately an empirical question, and all the 
information necessary to make an adequate assessment is not currently available, the 
SADC Trade Protocol has been signed without any definite knowledge of its likely 
effects. 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE SACU REVENUE-SHARING FORMULA 
All customs, excise and sales duties (but not general sales tax) as well as import 
surcharges collected in the five countries, are pooled at the South African Reserve Bank. 
A formula provides the basis for calculating the amount due to each of the BLNS 
countries. There are three stages in this calculation. First, the basic amount due to 
each country, let us say Swaziland, in any financial year is given by the equation: 
R = A+B+C (H) 
D+E+F+G (1 ) 
where 
R = the amount payable to Swaziland; 
A = c.Lf. value (including all duties)' at border of imports into Swaziland from all 
sources; 
B = value of excisable and sales duty goods produced and consumed in Swaziland; 
C = excise and sales duties paid on B; 
D = c.Lf. value at border of imports into the common customs area from the rest of 
the world; 
E = customs and sales duties paid on D; 
F = value of excisable and sales duty goods produced and consumed in the customs 
union; 
G = excise and sales duties paid on F; and 
H total revenue pool of customs, excise and sales duties. 
The formula thus seeks to divide the common revenue pool among the partners in 
proportion to their annual imports and their production and consumption of dutiable 
goods. But, a compensation factor was added, so that the formula may be rewritten 
as: 
Rc = A+B+C (H)(1.42) 
D+E+F+G (2) 
where 1.42 = compensation factor. 
Note that the numerator consists of three and the denominator of four items. Article 14 of the 
Agreement contained an apparent anomaly in that, whilst it specifically provided for customs and 
sales duties paid on imports (D) in the denominator, it did not do so in the numerator. The reason for 
this is that, at the time, BLS imports were almost totally from or through South Africa and hence the 
duties were included in the c.i.f. price and it was not considered necessary to include a separate item 
for them. However, the understanding was that the c.Lf. price in (A) would be interpreted to include 
all duties on imports from all sources. This interpretation was ratified at the first meeting of the 
Customs Union Commission in 1970 and again in 1975, and formed the basis of calculations. It was 
only explicitly written into the formula at the 1976 meeting of the Technical Liaison Committee. 
The compensated rate of revenue received by Swaziland is then: 
&---
A+B+C 
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In 1976 the formula was amended in order to provide BLS with a stabilised rate of 
revenue of about 20 per cent. This may be written as: 
Rs = & __ _ 
A+B+C 
subject to the constraints 
0.23 ~ &---
A+B+C 
(3) 
~ 0.17 
To clarify further: the amount due to Swaziland is calculated as per equation (2). Then, 
if the compensated rate of revenue 
Be =1= 0.20 
A+B+C 
one-half of the difference between the compensated rate and 20 per cent is either 
added to or subtracted from 20 per cent subject to the constraints that the stabilised 
rate may not be less than 17 per cent or greater than 23 per cent. 
Source: Summary of Maasdorp and Whiteside (1993: 52). 
Table A-1: Some comparative characteristics of southern African and other regional groupings, 1995 
------_. __ ... _-
-------
D GNP per capita (US$I GOP (US$ mnl Share of agriculture in GOP Share of manufacturing in GOP' Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range Min Max Range 
SAOC 80 3380 42:1 1 029 136035 132:1 5 58 12:1 3 34 11.3: 1 
SACU 770 3160 4:1 1 029 136035 132:1 5 14 3:1 4 34 8.5:1 
PTA/COMESA 80 6620 83:1 248 9095 37:1 3 58 19:1 3 34 11.3:1 
NAFTA 3320 26980 8:1 250038 6952020 28:1 
I : I 2: I 4,1 I 
17 20 1.2: 1 
MERCOSUR 1 690 8030 5:1 7743 668085 89:1 16 24 1.5:1 4:1 
Source: World Bank (1995a: 167; 1995b: 217-218, 241, 636-639; 1997a: 214-215, 236-237, 248; 1997b: 134-136, 150-152). 
Note: 1 1993 for NAFTA. 
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Table A-2a: Sector-specific average annual percentage real growth rates in the SADC countries 
D Agriculture Industry Manufacturing 1970-80 1980-90 1990-95 1970-80 1980-90 1990-95 1970-80· 1980-90b 
Angola -10.2 0.5 -1.8 -3.9 6.4 0.9 -12.0 -11.1 
Botswana 1 8.3 2.2 0.7 17.6 11.4 1.4 22.9 8.8 
Lesotho 0.2 2.6 -3.4 27.8 7.2 12.3 18.0 13.5 
Malawi 4.4 2.0 1.7 6.3 2.9 0.4 6.7 3.6 
Mauritius -3.3 2.9 -1.4 10.4 10.3 5.6 7.1 11.1 
Mozambique -1.8 1.6 2.4 -5.6 -9.8 -2.4 -5.8 -3.5 
Namibia 
- 1.8 6.8 - -1.1 2.9 2.5 5.3 
South Africa 3.2 3.0 -0.3 2.7 -1.1 -0.1 4.7 -0.1 
Swaziland2 2.1 1.4 -2.1 2.7 12.8 3.9 4.5 11.3 
Tanzania 0.7 4.9 4.1 2.6 3.4 8.4 3.7 1.1 
Zambia 1 2.1 3.6 -0.5 1.5 1.0 -1.2 2.4 4.0 
Zimbabwe 0.6 2.4 1.6 1.1 3.6 -3.6 2.8 2.9 
Source: World Bank (1995a: 164-165. 1995b: 636-637. 1997b: 130-132); ADB (1993b: 253). 
Notes: Industry comprises value-added in mining. manufacturing. construction. electricity. water and gas. 
1 GOP components at purchaser values. 
2 Own computations from World Bank (1995b: 636-637) for the periods 1973-80.1980-90 and 1990-93. 
• Malawi from World Bank (1982: 112); 1965-80 for Namibia from ADB (1993b: 253). 
b 1980-89 for Mozambique from ADB (1993b: 253). 
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Table A-2b: Sector-specific average annual percentage real growth rates: international comparisons 
I 
I Agriouhum Industry Manufacturing 
1980-90 1990-95 1970-80 1980-90 1990-958 1970-80 1980-90 1990-95 1970-80 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.7 1.9 1.5 3.8 0.6 0.2 4.3 1.7 0.0 
Brazil 4.2 2.8 0.7 9.4 2.0 1.7 9.0 1.6 1.7 
Argentina 2.5 0.9 0.5 1.9 -0.9 5.9 1.3 -0.5 -
Paraguay' 6.2 3.6 1.4 11.2 -0.3 1.9 7.9 2.1 1.2 
Uruguay' 0.8 0.0 4.5 4.1 -0.2 0.1 - 0.4 -1.6 
Mexico' 3.2 0.6 0.4 7.2 1.0 0.5 7.0 1.4 0.7 
Thailand' 4.4 4.0 3.1 9.7 9.9 10.8 10.5 9.5 11.6 
Malaysia' 5.0 3.8 2.6 8.7 7.2 11.0 11.7 8.9 13.2 
Indonesia' 4.1 3.4 2.9 9.6 6.9 10.1 14.0 12.6 11.2 
Turkey 3.4 1.3 0.9 6.6 7.8 4.2 6.1 7.9 4.7 
Low-income 2.0 3.6 3.1 6.3 7.7 11.6 7.3 8.5 12.7 
.. excl. China & India - 2.6 1.9 5.3 2.9 -0.7 - - -
Upper-middle-income 3.2 2.4 1.8 6.1 0.7 2.6 6.6 1.2 2.7 
Source: World Bank (1995a: 164-165; 1996: 208-209; 1997b: 130-132). 
Notes: 1 GOP components at purchaser values. 
• 1990-94 for low-income countries excluding China and India. 
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Table A-3: The manufacturing sector in southern Africa: some comparative indicators 
MVA MVA/GDP(%) 
(US$mn) 
1994" 1970b 1980 1995c 
Angola' 234 - 3.0 3.0 
Botswana 160 6.0 4.0 4.0 
Lesotho 122 4.0 7.0 18.0 
Malawi 215 13.1 12.0 18.0 
Mauritius 694 14.0 15.0 23.0 
Mozambique 44 - 9.0 4.0 
Namibia 234 - 5.0 9.0 
South Africa 25298 24.0 23.0 24.0 
Swaziland 289 - 17.6 34.0 
Tanzania 242 10.0 11.0 8.0 
Zambia 1 026 10.0 18.0 30.0 
Zimbabwe 1 477 21.0 25.0 30.0 
SADC excl. South Africa 4737 14.0 12.8 15.3 
Total SADC 30035 21.7 19.0 19.7 
International comparisons 
Sub-Saharan Africa 40925 13.0 12.0 15.0 
Brazil 108886 29.0 33.0 24.0 
Argentina 56500 32.0 29.0 20.0 
Paraguay 1 230 17.0 16.0 16.0 
Uruguay 2998 - 26.0 18.0 
Mexico 74233 22.0 22.0 19.0 
Thailand 40791 16.0 22.0 29.0 
Malaysia 22387 12.0 21.0 33.0 
Indonesia 41 186 10.0 13.0 24.0 
Turkey 24076 17.0 14.0 21.0 
Low-income 294045 19.0 21.0 27.0 
Upper-middle-income 345007 25.0 20.0 18.0 
Source: World Bank (1995a: 164-167, 1995b: 636-639, 1996: 210-211, 1997b: 130-136,150-152); 
ADB (1993b: 253); Jenkins et al. (1996: 45). 
Notes: ' These figures appear to exclude Angola's petro-chemicals industry. 
a 1989 for Mozambique; 1993 for Swaziland. 
b 1975 for Malawi, from World Bank (1978). 
c 1989 for Mozambique; 1993 for Swaziland and Zimbabwe; 1994 for SADC totals. 
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Table A-4: Total merchandise trade (US$mn) and trade/GOP ratios (%) of the SAOC 
countries, with international comparisons, 1995 
"", s Imports Export! Import! Trade! Man.exports! 
GOP GOP GOP Tot.exports 
Angola 3508 1748 94.3 47.0 141.2 -
Botswana 2130 1907 49.3 44.2 93.5 -
Lesotho' 143 821 16.1 92.7 108.8 -
Malawi' 325 491 25.0 37.7 62.7 6.0 
Mauritius 1537 1959 39.2 50.0 89.2 67.0 
Mozambique 169 784 11.5 53.4 64.9 20.0 
Namibia 1353 1196 44.6 39.4 84.0 -
South Africa2 27860 30555 20.5 22.5 42.9 74.0 
Swaziland3 626 838 60.3 80.7 141.0 -
Tanzania 639 1619 17.7 44.9 62.7 -
Zambia 781 1258 19.2 30.9 50.1 9.0 
Zimbabwe' 1885 2241 37.8 44.9 82.8 37.0 
SADC excl. SA 13096 14862 40.5 45.9 86.4 -
Total SADC 40956 45417 24.3 27.0 51.3 -
International comparisons 
SSA incl. SA 72847 77574 24.5 26.1 50.7 -
Brazil 46506 53783 6.8 7.8 14.6 60.0 
Argentina 20967 20122 7.5 7.2 14.6 32.0 
Paraguay' 817 2370 10.4 30.3 40.7 17.0 
Uruguay 2106 2867 11.8 16.1 27.9 43.0 
Mexico 79543 72500 31.8 29.0 60.8 75.0 
South Korea 125058 135119 27.5 29.7 57.1 93.0 
Thailand 56459 70776 33.8 42.4 76.2 73.0 
Malaysia 74037 77751 86.8 91.1 177.9 65.0 
Indonesia 45417 40918 22.9 20.7 43.6 53.0 
Turkey 21600 35710 13.1 21.7 34.8 72.0 
Portugal 22621 32339 22.1 31.6 53.7 78.0 
Low-income 245456 251806 18.2 18.6 36.8 -
excl. China & India 64769 86058 20.4 27.2 47.6 -
Upper-middle-income 372898 379450 18.8 19.1 38.0 -
Source: World Bank (1995b: 27, 75-79; 1996: 210-211, 216-217; 1997a: 236-237, 242-243). 
Notes: 1 1994 figures. 
2 Including net gold exports. 
3 1993 figures for exports and GOP, 1992 figure for imports. 
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Table A-5: Percentage shares of SACU's manufactured exports to each region/country 
Region/Country ~1988 1981 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Australia and New Zealand 0.94 1.04 1.07 0.89 1.03 1.36 1.54 2.38 
Caribbean 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.21 0.25 0.63 0.21 
Central America 0.06 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.06 
China 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.28 1.16 1.05 0.64 0.83 
East Asia excl. Japan 12.56 13.63 16.11 16.36 13.51 12.42 13.22 12.22 
Eastern Europe 0.11 0.09 0.26 0.41 0.73 0.56 0.65 0.74 
Japan 7.50 8.31 7.08 6.66 5.01 4.14 3.85 5.37 
MERCOSUR 1.11 1.02 0.85 1.34 1.28 1.57 1.91 1.90 
Middle East 4.88 5.69 5.76 4.84 4.76 4.12 2.94 2.93 
North Africa 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.44 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.21 
NAFTA 9.56 9.79 8.45 7.12 8.84 9.40 10.10 10.14 
Oceania excl. ANZ 0.01 0.37 0.27 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
S.America excl. MERCOSUR 1.40 1.42 1.50 1.25 1.03 0.82 0.71 0.65 
South Asia 0.54 0.62 0.72 0.72 0.66 0.67 1.70 1.70 
Sub-Sah. Africa excl. SADC 2.43 3.02 3.69 2.87 2.93 3.24 4.67 4.68 
Western Europe 49.35 43.38 41.11 42.32 44.95 46.72 43.67 40.56 
SADC 8.90 10.82 12.18 14.11 13.54 13.39 13.48 15.39 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total manuf. exports 7820 7805 8247 9404 11361 11645 11496 16307 
(US$mn) 
Source: Own computations from IDC (1996). 
Note: ANZ: Australia and New Zealand. 
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Table A-6: Percentage shares of SACU's manufactured imports from each regionl 
country 
I Region/Country II 1988 I 1989 I 1990 I 1991 I 1992 I 1993 I 1994 I 1995 I 
Australia and New Zealand 0.94 1.17 1.05 1.09 1.15 1.41 1.62 1.89 
Caribbean 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.08 
Central America 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 
China 0.69 0.69 0.89 1.13 1.48 1.90 1.81 2.04 
East Asia excl. Japan 9.41 9.43 9.76 11.52 11.14 11.58 11.03 10.66 
Eastern Europe 0.39 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.83 0.94 1.46 1.24 
Japan 15.55 13.84 11.74 12.54 12.94 14.50 11.08 11.40 
MERCOSUR 1.52 1.81 1.59 1.43 1.52 1.36 1.75 1.80 
Middle East 1.25 1.37 1.01 0.97 1.02 1.36 1.27 1.10 
North Africa 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
NAFTA 13.50 14.32 13.84 16.35 14.73 14.30 13.85 13.62 
Oceania excl. ANZ 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.Q1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
S.America excl. MERCOSUR 0.15 0.61 0.50 0.53 0.41 0.19 0.46 0.52 
South Asia 0.30 0.29 0.36 0.38 0.42 0.50 0.79 0.99 
Sub-Sah. Africa excl. SADC 0.16 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.67 0.68 0.54 
Western Europe 54.98 54.73 57.50 52.37 52.41 49.77 52.59 52.81 
SADC 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.81 1.56 1.30 1.43 1.22 
I Total II 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 100.0 I 
Total manuf. imports 14784 14459 14259 14776 15244 15694 19225 23968 
(US$mn) 
Source: Own computations from IDC (1996). 
Note: ANZ: Australia and New Zealand. 
Table A-7: Percentage share of SACU's manufactured imports from various regions/countries in 1995 (per ISIC sector) 
- - - -----
I I Sector ANZ CHI EAS EE JAP ME NAFTA SADC SAM SAS SSA WE Other To al % 
Food 7.30 2.69 20.86 0.71 0.05 0.97 12.61 4.68 22.41 2.05 1.82 23.19 0.66 100.00 
Beverages 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.38 6.23 2.43 0.46 0.12 0.04 86.25 3.70 100.00 
Tobacco products 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.15 81.79 1.45 0.00 0.01 0.00 15.51 0.38 100.00 
Textiles 0.85 6.50 38.86 0.62 1.85 2.67 5.97 5.38 0.49 7.62 0.19 28.81 0.18 100.00 
Clothing 0.41 23.90 20.16 0.35 0.44 2.02 5.10 9.79 0.10 17.70 0.07 19.80 0.14 100.00 
Leather products 9.68 10.19 18.29 0.17 0.24 0.08 2.88 6.28 6.04 24.37 0.09 21.52 0.16 100.00 
Footwear 0.18 35.90 35.04 0.11 0.04 0.12 4.17 6.63 1.10 3.07 0.16 13.27 0.20 100.00 
Wood 0.21 1.10 34.56 0.73 0.36 0.64 19.35 13.46 5.03 0.23 2.31 21.83 0.20 100.00 
Furniture 0.61 6.29 21.36 2.18 0.01 1.35 3.98 34.52 0.03 1.79 0.07 27.70 0.12 100.00 
Paper 0.34 0.17 2.19 14.04 1.03 1.16 22.29 0.89 4.94 0.29 0.02 52.61 0.02 100.00 
Printing/publishing 1.43 1.35 8.64 0.11 0.98 0.54 25.34 0.64 0.03 0.31 0.04 60.52 0.05 100.00 
Chemicals 4.11 1.31 6.07 0.94 3.67 1.54 15.53 0.27 2.72 0.67 0.17 62.64 0.36 100.00 
Rubber 0.59 0.53 15.12 0.36 21.49 0.59 10.35 1.70 1.26 1.01 0.03 46.94 0.03 100.00 
Plastic 1.08 3.03 15.02 0.37 6.69 2.89 14.62 0.35 0.27 1.25 0.02 54.28 0.14 100.00 
Pottery, etc 0.32 27.78 18.01 3.46 6.52 0.09 2.95 0.27 0.36 4.45 0.01 34.88 0.91 100.00 
Glass 0.23 3.19 17.54 5.06 2.52 2.57 9.03 0.96 1.45 2.31 0.16 54.95 0.03 100.00 
Other non-metallic 0.32 1.31 3.07 1.09 6.14 1.18 9.59 3.53 5.14 0.93 0.04 67.55 0.10 100.00 
Iron and steel 0.53 0.85 4.15 3.22 11.28 0.54 5.42 4.60 3.49 1.57 0.06 64.27 0.01 100.00 
Non-ferrous 14.69 1.87 3.12 2.95 0.77 0.83 5.53 4.63 0.98 0.36 2.04 62.23 0.03 100.00 
Metal products 0.83 4.17 17.01 0.60 4.96 1.67 10.61 2.49 1.58 1.56 0.03 54.24 0.25 100.00 
Machinery 0.82 1.10 11.51 1.21 7.51 0.91 16.71 0.19 0.79 0.22 0.04 58.92 0.07 100.00 
, Electrical machinery 1.03 1.85 14.70 1.15 7.37 1.18 12.58 0.35 0.51 0.27 0.03 58.92 0.06 100.00 
I Transport equipment 0.58 0.24 2.33 0.41 36.75 0.55 11.41 0.22 0.58 0.14 0.02 46.75 0.02 100.00 
, Scientific equipment etc 1.11 1.85 6.71 1.16 12.77 1.16 22.07 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.09 52.42 0.11 100.00 
Other manufactLJres 1.16 5.95 10.50 0.53 3.53 1.39 6.53 1.19 0.20 1.34 12.77 54.80 0.11 100.00 
Manufactured imports 1.89 2.04 10.66 1.24 11.40 1.10 13.62 1.22 2.32 0.99 0.54 52.81 0.17 100.00 
Source: Own computations from IDC (1996). 
Notes: ANZ: Australia and New Zealand; CHI: China; EAS: East Asia excluding Japan and China; EE: Eastern Europe; JAP: Japan; ME: Middle East; NAFTA: 
North American Free Trade Area; SAM: South America including MERCOSUR; SAS: South Asia; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa excluding SADC; WE: Western 
Europe. 
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Table A-8: Indices of intra-industry trade between SACU and Zimbabwe and SACU and 
the rest of the world for selected sectors, 1994 (percentage) 
r- I SACU-ROW I SACU-Zim I 
Meat processing 42.72 92.32 
Dairy products 83.21 26.27 
Fruit and vegetable canning 13.30 72.58 
Vegetable and animal oils and fats 30.33 10.96 
Grain mill products 51.97 72.41 
Confectionary 70.52 74.99 
Food products nec 59.52 57.55 
Prepared animal feed 59.93 68.87 
Soft drinks and carbonated waters 11.91 39.66 
Spinning and weaving of textiles 62.70 65.45 
Made-up textile goods 48.29 17.10 
Knitting mills 54.47 75.62 
Clothing 93.42 37.53 
Sawmills 78.46 27.68 
Wooden containers 87.61 71.42 
Wood and cork products nec 71.36 51.94 
Wooden furniture and fixtures 30.57 26.75 
Pulp, paper and paperboard 46.36 13.89 
Paper containers 11.43 57.20 
Industrial chemicals 88.22 4.50 
Fertilizers and pesticides 88.67 7.22 
Synthetic resins and plastic materials 37.06 2.90 
Paints, varnishes and lacquers 56.41 29.17 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations 10.58 46.54 
Other chemical products 26.36 10.02 
Miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal 51.90 85.90 
Tyres and tubes 60.93 32.88 
Other rubber products 18.23 26.23 
Other plastic products 36.89 13.42 
Other non-metallic mineral products 98.00 58.81 
Iron and steel basic industries 21.33 31.64 
Non-ferrous metal basic industries 39.66 42.45 
Cutlery, hand tools and general hardware 39.97 18.36 
Furniture and fixtures of metal 54.25 83.80 
Structural metal products 27.84 85.25 
Other fabricated metal products 72.25 88.56 
Engines and turbines 22.75 17.93 
Agricultural machinery 17.97 82.47 
Special industrial machinery 21.23 12.57 
Office and accounting machinery 8.35 18.83 
Other non-electrical machinery 29.48 7.76 
Electrical industrial machinery 16.36 10.47 
Radio, television and communication equipment 11.68 27.36 
Electrical appliances and housewares 15.67 29.97 
Other electrical apparatus 27.97 53.69 
Railroad equipment 48.18 37.73 
Motor vehicles 22.82 15.66 
Motorcycles 23.26 60.78 
Transport equipment nec 12.19 37.10 
Total manufacturing 74.41 49.25 
Source: Own computations from IDe (1996). 
Note: The unadjusted Grubel-Lloyd index is given by Bj ((Xi + Mi) - I X;-M;j )/(X; + Mi) x 100. 
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